Conflict Weekly

Conflict Weekly
Rising violence in the Lake Chad region I The New Wave of Violence in DR Congo
The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire I Iran’s Lebanon precondition for a ceasefire with the US

NIAS Global Politics Team
15 May 2026
Photo Source:

Conflict Weekly Note
Rising violence in the Lake Chad region:
Complex Geography, Multiple Insurgencies, and an Escalating Humanitarian Crisis

Akshath Kaimal

In the news
On 04 May, Boko Haram militants launched an attack on the Barka Toloram island garrison in Chad, killing 23 soldiers and wounding 26.

On 06 May, two Chadian generals were killed in another Boko Haram attack in the same region.

On 08 May, Chad declared a 20-day state of emergency in the Lake Chad province.

On 10 May, the Chadian military launched airstrikes on Boko Haram strongholds in the region as part of Operation Haskanite, reportedly killing over 40 civilians.

Issues at large
1. The complex geography and economy of the Lake Chad region 
The Lake Chad region has a complex geography. The lake has hundreds of small islands and dense marshland, making it nearly impossible for conventional heavy military vehicles to patrol effectively. Additionally, the lake sits at the intersection of four countries (Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon), making it easier for insurgents to evade authorities from any single country. The region's ethnic distribution is closely tied to its geography: the Buduma inhabit the islands and marshlands near Chad, the Kanuri occupy the mainland shores near Nigeria, and the Kotoko settle along the lower stretches of the Logone and Chari rivers near Cameroon. Numerous other ethnic groups are also dispersed across the wider basin. Boko Haram is primarily based in the southern islands of Lake Chad, while the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) dominates the northern islands. Resource control is also another factor that contributes to the violence. Both groups levy heavy taxes on local communities, particularly on fishermen and cattle herders, gaining significant control over the “island economy” in the region. They also control certain market towns, allowing goods to flow, while also taking a cut of the profits. The funds raised through taxation and trade disruptions, combined with the complex geography of Lake Chad, help contribute to the violence in the region.

2. The rise of Islamist militant violence in the Lake Chad region
The Boko Haram insurgency began in Nigeria but spread to the Lake Chad region in 2014 after the Nigerian military began pushing militants out of urban areas in the northeastern part of the country. The region eventually became a stronghold for the group, particularly due to its complex geography. The internal conflict within Boko Haram resulted in the group breaking into two - the original faction and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). While both are rivals and experienced significant infighting last year, the groups have targeted armed forces and military infrastructure around the Lake Chad region. Additionally, they created a stranglehold over the communities around the region, resulting in widespread human rights abuses and a worsening humanitarian situation. This has been exacerbated by indiscriminate attacks on civilian communities by both non-state armed groups and national armies. By July 2025, deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure had increased by 32 percent, resulting in 880 direct deaths, according to ACLED.

3. Multiplicity of actors and a largely inefficient state response
The main actors are Boko Haram, ISWAP, and the countries bordering Lake Chad. While violence in 2023 remained largely localized, 2024 marked a significant escalation, with recorded incidents rising 32 per cent to 2423. In addition to targeting military infrastructure, armed groups have tightened their grip on the population through systematic taxation, abduction, and even the killing of suspected military collaborators. Attacks became more widespread in 2025, resulting in nearly 4000 casualties by July. Violence around the border areas, especially, saw an 86 percent rise in violence, according to ACLED. The militaries of the four countries bordering Lake Chad have responded to the violence in varying ways. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established in 2025, was a regional military coalition intended to coordinate operations across the four countries. This initiative has failed to stop the violence in the region. Adding to its woes is the withdrawal of Niger in 2025, following a coup. The armies have also heavily relied on international support, particularly from the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the UK, and the US.

4. The escalating humanitarian crisis
The Lake Chad region is among the world's poorest and most conflict-affected regions. According to the UN humanitarian office, over 6.4 million people have been displaced since the conflict began. 2.3 million in Nigeria alone, while over 230,000 people have been displaced in the Lac Province of Chad. In 2025, 41.8 million people in West and Central Africa are at “crisis” levels of food insecurity, with a large part around the Lake Chad region. Health and education have been adversely impacted, leaving millions of children prone to acute malnutrition, violence, and child labour. Women are also disproportionately impacted, facing increased risk of exploitation, trafficking, and severe maternal health issues. Funding cuts have worsened the situation, with Chad only receiving 24 percent of the funding needed for refugee safety in 2025. 

In perspective
First, violence will continue amid a disorganised state response. In the Lake Chad region, violence and instability are likely to continue as attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP escalated in 2025, with the groups largely consolidating their strongholds around the region. Niger’s withdrawal leaves the MNJTF weakened, with each country now undertaking its own operations in several circumstances. As long as the military response from the four countries remains disorganised, the armed groups will continue to take advantage of the complex geography to mount attacks.

Second, the humanitarian situation will worsen, with women and children disproportionately affected. The escalation of violence in 2025 has stranded communities in the region with only sporadic help coming their way. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, with women facing widespread exploitation and trafficking, while children are subjected to forced recruitment and child marriage, especially with schools shut down. This significantly raises the risk of severe disease and health complications for both groups, exacerbated by the lack of functioning health facilities and a decline in aid funding.



Conflict Weekly Note
The New Wave of Violence in DR Congo:
Farmer-herder clashes, Armed groups, and Security vacuum

Anu Maria Joseph

In the News
On 8 May, several people were killed in an attack by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Ituri province. The attack followed another incident involving two other rebel groups, where at least 69 people were killed on 28 April. The attack was carried out by the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), which claimed to be protecting the Lendu community. The attack was in response to a previous attack by a lesser-known armed group, the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CRP), which fights for the Hema community. 

On 8 May, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) condemned the attacks. 

On the same day, a senior advisor at Amnesty International responded: “We do expect more from the security forces. In particular, with the confrontations with the ADF, we see entire areas that are emptied of troops that have been diverted to other front lines, leaving civilians completely vulnerable to ADF and other armed groups.”

Issues in the background
1. The DRC-M23 conflict, Security vacuum, and New violence
The eastern regions of DR Congo have been a conflict hotspot in Africa ever since the reemergence of M23 rebels in 2021. Last year, M23 took control of Goma and Bukavu, the regional capitals of North and South Kivu provinces, which was followed by full-scale violence. This is one of the conflicts US President Donald Trump claimed to have ended by mediating a peace deal in December 2025. However, the violence has continued; post-agreement developments are far from sufficient to end the conflict. While much security attention has been shifted to Goma, Bukavu, Masisi and border regions with Rwanda, fighting M23, violence between other armed groups (according to the UN, there are more than 120 armed groups active in the region) has increased, especially in Ituri. For state forces, fighting M23 is a priority over national security concerns and international attention. The state's limited security apparatus, in addition to the withdrawal of MONUSCO forces, has contributed to the security vacuum and increased violence involving farmer-herder communities and unpopular armed groups.

2. Prolonged Hema-Lendu farmer-herder clashes
The Hema are traditionally cattle-herding communities, while the Lendu are mainly agricultural communities. The clashes between the two communities over land, cattle, political power, and access to resources have been ongoing for decades. The clashes continue because state institutions are incapable of resolving colonial-era land disputes, providing security, enforcing justice, and regulating local governance. This has caused prolonged hatred, revenge killings, and retaliations.

3. The role of CODECO and CRP
The armed group, CODECO, is a Lendu group that claims to protect the community in Ituri province. They target the Hema villages and the Congolese state, which the group perceives as favouring Hema elites. Meanwhile, CRP is a lesser-known armed group in Ituri province that emerged in 1999 to oppose CODECO and support the Hema community. The group, formed by Thomas Lubanga, a former rebel leader, began reemerging in late 2025. Both groups control the mineral-rich areas of Ituri, the group's major source of finance. 

In perspective
The gold-rich Ituri province, where the new wave of violence has erupted, is part of the eastern DRC that has been a battleground for several armed groups, vying to take control of its minerals and illegal trade. National, regional, and international diplomatic and military efforts remain focused on the M23 insurgency and tensions involving Rwanda. This has given groups such as ADF, CODECO, and CRP greater operational space. 

The narrowly capacitated security forces have been fighting multiple armed groups in different regions. The failure to quell similar isolated clashes risks the likelihood of involvement of hundreds of other inactive armed groups. It would also intensify cross-border arms flows, displacement, illegal mineral smuggling, and the involvement of unstable neighbouring states, taking advantage of instability in eastern Congo. 

The ongoing US-led peace process appears to prioritize stability over long-lasting peace. The mediators focus on the peace process involving the primary armed groups. The new wave of attacks by lesser-known actors undermines the ongoing process, and peace cannot be established in such a restive region.



Conflict Weekly Note
The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:
Nominal Truce and Persisting Violations

Brighty Ann Sarah

 

In the news
On 11 May, Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun, in a meeting with the US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa, urged the United States to put pressure on Israel to cease fire and stop home demolitions in south Lebanon.

On 12 May, President Trump rejected the latest peace proposal from Iran, which had the end of Israeli hostilities in Lebanon as a core demand. On the same day, Israel's Channel 12 reported that the Israeli forces were "preparing to expand the ground operation in Lebanon, in light of Hezbollah's ongoing violations," ahead of the third round of US-mediated negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. The Israeli military said on Tuesday that its troops had carried out a days-long raid near the Litani River in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah chief Sheikh Naim Qassem stated that the group will not stop fighting and “will not return to how things were before March 2.” Qassem called for indirect negotiations, stressing that such talks fall under the authority of the Lebanese state, maintaining that Hezbollah’s weapons are an internal Lebanese issue and should not be included in negotiations with Israel.

Separately, Lebanon’s health ministry announced that "380 people, including 22 children and 39 women, have been killed in strikes on Lebanon since the ceasefire came into effect.”
 
Issues at large
1. The troubled road to a ceasefire
The renewed Israel-Hezbollah clashes, triggered by Hezbollah’s retaliatory strikes on Israel at the onset of the US-Israel war against Iran, shattered the fragile November 2024 ceasefire. Washington mediated two rounds of negotiations in April, a 10-day pause followed by a three-week extension. However, the fundamental points of contention have remained unchanged; Israel demands the complete disarmament of Hezbollah and the dismantling of its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah insists on an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory.
 
These irreconcilable positions have confined the two US-mediated talks in April to little more than temporary halts in fighting, without progress toward resolution. The second round also framed the ceasefire extension as an Israeli “act of goodwill" while explicitly granting Israel the right to preemptive self-defense even based on suspected threats. Further, Hezbollah was excluded from the negotiations. Lebanon has refused ministerial-level engagement with Israel without a comprehensive halt to hostilities, an end to the occupation, and a clear timeline for Israeli withdrawal. As a result, despite the declared ceasefire, the period has seen intensified hostilities and repeated mutual violations, rendering the truce largely nominal.

2. Israel, Hezbollah, and the challenges to the ceasefire
Despite the declared ceasefire, hostilities have been mutual, frequent, and asymmetric. Since the US-brokered ceasefire took effect, Lebanon has repeatedly accused Israel of ceasefire violations and entrenching its military in southern Lebanon. Israeli forces have maintained and expanded positions in southern Lebanon, a “forward defense line” or buffer zone roughly 5–10 kilometers deep; conducted frequent airstrikes and raids, including north of the Litani River; and issued ongoing evacuation orders for dozens of villages. The ceasefire’s ambiguous clauses have enabled Israeli preemptive strikes.

Hezbollah has outright rejected the US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, insisting that any discussion concerning its disarmament is a purely internal Lebanese matter that does not require Israeli involvement. Its exclusion from the talks, despite being the primary military actor, remains a significant obstacle. Without Hezbollah’s buy-in, any agreement reached between Washington, Beirut, and Tel Aviv lacks enforceability.

3. Beirut’s limitations and entrenched Hezbollah influence
Beirut’s limitations in curbing Hezbollah are rooted in deep structural, military, and political weaknesses. The Lebanese Armed Forces are outmatched by Hezbollah in manpower, weaponry, and combat experience and have historically avoided direct confrontation to prevent a civil war. Politically, Hezbollah remains a powerful actor with strong parliamentary representation, a vast social network, and deep roots within the Shia community. Hezbollah has also been successful in delivering social services and expanding its outreach beyond the capacities of the weakened state machinery. Any attempt by the state to disarm the group risks triggering sectarian violence and destabilizing Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance. These constraints have severely impeded Beirut’s repeated attempts to disarm Hezbollah.

In perspective
First, implementing a new ceasefire remains complicated due to a long history of fragile, repeatedly failed truces. Past efforts, including the two short-lived US-mediated rounds in April 2026, have produced only temporary halts rather than lasting resolutions due to core disputes over Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and security guarantees that remain unresolved.

Second, Israel is likely to maintain its military pressure through preemptive strikes and retain its buffer zone in southern Lebanon, refusing full withdrawal until it sees credible progress on Hezbollah’s disarmament.

Third, Hezbollah is anticipated to reject the US-mediated process, continue limited retaliatory attacks and drone operations, rebuild its capabilities quietly, and pressure the Lebanese government to harden its stance.



Conflict Weekly Note
Iran’s Lebanon precondition for a ceasefire with the US:
Four reasons why Tehran insists on including Hezbollah

Rohini Reenum

 

Between 11-15 May, the US and Iran exchanged proposals for peace. Iran’s proposal was rejected by the White House as a “demand for surrender”; US President Trump called the proposal “unacceptable." Among other reasons, the inclusion/exclusion of Lebanon (read Hezbollah) has emerged as a major sticking point between the two. Previously, during negotiations in March and April 2026, Iran maintained a strict, non-negotiable stance that Lebanon and Hezbollah must be explicitly included in any regional ceasefire agreement. Iran has consistently threatened to withdraw from the two-week truce if Israel continues its attacks on Lebanon.

Both Israel and the US have rejected Tehran’s demand. President Trump has asserted that the Israel-Hezbollah conflict is a “separate skirmish.” Finally, under Iranian pressure, on 17 April, a ten-day ceasefire was announced between Israel and Lebanon. Iran’s Foreign Ministry welcomed the development and framed it as a “Victory for the Axis of Resistance.” Israel has, however, continued attacks on Lebanon, particularly in South Beirut and southern Lebanon, both long considered Hezbollah strongholds.

The following are the four reasons why Tehran insists on including Hezbollah and a regional ceasefire.

1. Hezbollah is Iran’s most trusted, loyal, and capable ally
Since its formation in 1982, with Tehran’s assistance, Hezbollah has remained Iran’s most trusted, loyal, and capable regional ally. While deeply aligned ideologically, Hezbollah has also publicly acknowledged its allegiance to the Iranian Supreme Leader. Over the years, its members have been trained and armed with the help of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Quds force. Hezbollah is also touted to have trained and armed other Iran-aligned groups in the region, particularly Hamas and the Houthis.
Hezbollah has proven its loyalty time and again, first by joining the Syrian Civil War on the side of Bashar al-Assad, a long-term Iranian ally, and recently by retaliating against Israel for the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, having withheld attacks despite Israeli violations of the 2024 ceasefire.

Hezbollah is also the most capable of all Iran-aligned groups in the region: Before the 2023 conflict with Israel, it boasted several thousand troops, modern weaponry (drones and missiles allegedly provided by Iran, including the transfer of technology for domestic production); and the capacity to target Israel on its northern border. In essence, it was the linchpin of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” in the region, and if rearmed and reorganized by Iran (as reports suggest), it will continue to be the cornerstone of Iranian security architecture in the region.

2. Iran cannot afford to be viewed as abandoning its long-term ally
The 2026 war has raised serious question marks over Iran’s credible deterrence, especially its forward defense strategy, wherein it cultivated mostly Shiite armed non-state groups across the region to project its power regionally against adversaries like the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia and keep a direct conflict from reaching its borders. While this strategy did not deter the 2025 and 2026 US-Israeli attacks against Iran, these groups helped open multiple fronts that created unique pressure points. For instance, Hezbollah, with its capacity to directly target Tel Aviv, entered the war on Iran’s behalf and forced Israel to deal with another front on its northern border. The Houthis threatened to resume attacks in the Red Sea. With Hezbollah weakened and Hamas decimated, Iran cannot afford to alienate other partners in Iraq and Yemen. Moreover, several reports have indicated that Iran wants to buy time for Hezbollah to recuperate and is thus inflexible on Hezbollah’s inclusion.

3. The Shia factor
Iran has for long projected itself as the leader of the Shia world and harbours ambition to be the leader of the Muslim Ummah. These ambitions have been complicated by the fact that most of Iran’s neighbouring countries are majority Sunni countries, albeit with significant Shia populations. Over the years, Iran has used this demographic reality to curry support of the minority Shia populations across the region. Most of Iran’s proxies/partners/allies in the region are Shi’ite armed groups (excluding Hamas). Hezbollah in Lebanon is a case in point. Additionally, there are deep political and socio-cultural links between Iranian and Lebanese Shi’as. It is thus unsurprising that the ending of hostilities in Lebanon is a red line for Iran for it cannot legitimately claim to be the leader of the Shi’a world and abandon its historical promises.

4. Israel’s recent advances (and successes?) against Iran’s regional allies
Iran and Israel have fought a decades-long shadow war, with both viewing each other as an existential threat. Israel’s recent offensive in Gaza and Lebanon has not only weakened Iran’s allies but also created an opportunity for Israel to expand into these territories on the pretext of creating a buffer zone. This has, however, essentially translated into Israel expanding its borders into both Gaza and Lebanon. For Iran, any expansion of Israeli territory would be unacceptable. A ceasefire including Lebanon would naturally fix this conundrum for Iran.

To conclude:
The inclusion of Lebanon in the ceasefire will continue to be a red line for Tehran unless the separate negotiations held this week between Israel and Lebanon deliver something concrete, especially to Tehran’s liking.


Conflict Weekly Note
Continuing Militant Attacks in Pakistan:
Multiple targets, Civilian casualties, and Cross-border tensions with Afghanistan

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

In the news
On 5 May, the JUI-F district emir was shot dead by the ISKP in Charsadda. On 7 May, TTP used explosive cylinders to kill three children in South Waziristan. A civilian market was also hit with shells in Angoor Adda the same day, injuring ten people. Between 7 and 8 May, security operations were conducted in Hangu and Bajaur, killing six civilians and two children in incidents of crossfire and mortar fire. 

On 8 May, a quadcopter drone exploded over a residential area in Bannu. On 9 May, Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan attacked using a 1,500-kilogram VBIED at the Fateh Khel police checkpoint in Bannu, killing 15 of the 18 officers on duty. On 12 May, a rickshaw bomb attack in the Serai Naurang market in Lakki Marwat resulted in nine fatalities. JUI-F’s Attaur Rehman questioned in the Senate why the blood of the people in KP had “turned white.”

On 11 May, Pakistan summoned the Afghan Chargé d'Affaires over the Bannu attack. Another attack was reported near the Kohat-Attock border, where a retired railway employee stopped a suicide bomber who was heading toward a checkpoint and was killed as the bomb detonated. The Afghan Taliban dismissed Pakistan's allegations regarding the Bannu attack as baseless. On 13 May, Defense Minister Khawaja Asif declares in the National Assembly there would be “open war” if Afghanistan refused to formally put out its commitment to prevent harbouring militants in writing.

Issues at large
1. Continuing militant attacks in KP.
Attacks have taken place in Charsadda, Lakki Marwat, and the Kohat-Attock border, which are settled districts and interprovincial corridors, not the tribal areas where counterterrorism operations are concentrated. Security forces were not the only target. This week's attacks hit a religious and political leader in Charsadda, children in South Waziristan, a residential neighbourhood in Bannu, and a crowded market in Lakki Marwat. Five of the 41 dead were children.

2. Growing tactical sophistication of militant groups
A quadcopter struck a residential area in Bannu on 8 May. The Fateh Khel VBIED followed the next night in the same district. Drone use before a ground assault is a deliberate operational choice, not coincidence. The Fateh Khel device carried between 1,200 and 1,500 kilograms of high-grade explosives in a loader rickshaw. Getting that much material to a checkpoint requires supply chains, transport, and coordination that do not exist without external support. The checkpoint survived eighteen prior attacks. On the nineteenth, it was reduced to rubble. The Yarmook 60 link to Paktia is not incidental to that.

3. Bilateral talks and tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan
The talks that were held by Qatar and Türkiye in October 2025 collapsed within days. The Eid ceasefire that was brokered by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Türkiye in March of 2026 had failed in the truce period. China's mediation of the Urumqi talks in April failed to reduce the attacks. The incidents rose from 128 in Q4 of 2025 to 169 in Q1 of 2026. The pattern followed is the same: a truce is announced, both sides allege violations, and violence continues. Pakistan wants verifiable proof that the TTP has been neutralized. The Taliban denies giving the TTP sanctuary and refuses to recognize the Durand Line. Neither position has moved across any of these rounds. Until they do, the demarche and the denial will keep arriving together.

In perspective
First, military pressure is producing more splinter groups and more militants. Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan did not exist before Operation Ghazab Lil Haq. It emerged during the period of maximum military pressure and succeeded against a checkpoint that the previous attacks could not breach. Pakistan’s strategy is reorganizing the threat, not removing it.

Second, Pakistan's diplomatic response this week addressed only the TTP-linked Bannu attack. The Charsadda killing was ISKP. It received no demarche, no ISPR statement, no follow-up. TTP and ISKP are not the same organization. They do not share command structures, funding, or target logic. Treating them as one problem, addressable through the same pressure on Kabul, leaves ISKP's networks in settled KP untouched. Those networks are growing.

Finally, the India-proxy framing is narrowing Pakistan's diplomatic options. On 13 May, Prime Minister's adviser Rana Sanaullah told the Senate that 7,000 to 8,000 people were being trained in Afghanistan "with funding from India and Israel." ISPR uses the same framing. So does state media. Countries that might press the Taliban on TTP sanctuary are instead reading this conflict as a Pakistan-India confrontation and stepping back.


Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week (08-13 May):
Regional Roundups

Abhimanyu Solanki, Aishal Yousaf, Akshath K, Brighty Ann Sarah, Glynnis Winona B, Kirsten Wilfred Coelho, Manik Dhawan, Nithin V, Rakshitha B, Rebecca Ann Oommen, Siddhi Haylur, Sreemaya Nair, Vani Vaishnavi Jupudi, Vishal Manish M, Yesasvi Koganti

China, East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
China: China pushes for practical outcomes in next round of Taliban-Pakistan talks
On 13 May, according to Afghanistan International, China’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, said Pakistan and the Taliban have given a positive assessment of the China-mediated Urumqi process and are prepared to work together for peace, security, and development. Writing on X, Yue said he recently visited Afghanistan and met Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and other senior officials on 11 May. The Urumqi process refers to talks hosted by China between Pakistan and the Taliban aimed at reducing tensions along the border and over security. Previous negotiations held in Urumqi from 01 to 18 April ended without concrete results, similar to earlier rounds in Doha, Istanbul, and Riyadh. Pakistan has continued to press the Taliban to cut ties with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, while the Taliban have resisted the demand due to concerns over the consequences of hostility with the group and longstanding ethnic and ideological ties. Yue said the next round of talks in Urumqi should produce “practical” outcomes.

Myanmar: Arakan Army leader states that continued air raids prevent meaningful political negotiations
On 08 May, according to Mizzima, Twan Mrat Naing said meaningful political dialogue with Myanmar’s military authorities remains impossible while airstrikes against civilians continue. Reports indicate that the Arakan Army chief rejected recent junta invitations to talks, arguing that the military is attempting to negotiate while escalating attacks in resistance-controlled areas. Observers note that Twan Mrat Naing also stressed the importance of cooperation among revolutionary groups and expressed support for broader coordination with the National Unity Government. The development highlights deep mistrust between resistance forces and the military regime, raising concerns about prospects for peace talks amid ongoing violence and aerial bombardments.

Myanmar: Regional bloc shows signs of shifting approach toward Myanmar crisis
On 11 May, according to The Irrawaddy, ASEAN leaders expressed differing views over future engagement with Myanmar’s military authorities during the regional summit in the Philippines. Reports indicate that some member states supported renewed political dialogue with the junta, while others argued that ongoing violence and failure to implement ASEAN’s peace plan made deeper engagement premature. Observers note that discussions reflected frustration over limited progress since the 2021 military coup and highlighted divisions within the regional bloc over how to address Myanmar’s prolonged conflict. The development raises questions about whether ASEAN may gradually adjust its policy toward Myanmar while attempting to preserve regional unity and credibility.

Myanmar: Government representative to the UN calls for an end to military rule to address the country’s displacement crisis
On 12 May, according to Mizzima, Myanmar’s UN Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun urged the international community to recognise military rule as the main cause of Myanmar’s migration crisis. Reports indicate that over 3.6 million people have been internally displaced and 1.3 million have fled abroad since the 2021 coup because of violence and human rights abuses. Observers note that Kyaw Moe Tun called for stronger international support for refugees and asylum seekers while stressing that ending military rule and impunity is necessary for sustainable peace and the safe return of displaced populations. The development highlights growing concern over Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis.

Myanmar: Government criticises continued exclusion from ASEAN engagement
On 12 May, according to Agence France-Presse, Myanmar’s military-backed government criticised what it described as “discriminatory measures” by ASEAN after the bloc continued restricting its leaders from summit participation. Reports indicate that the junta claimed recent political developments had received support from several ASEAN states while accusing others of interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs. Observers note that divisions within ASEAN have widened as some members favour renewed engagement with Myanmar’s authorities, while others oppose restoring full participation because of continuing violence and human rights concerns. The development highlights growing tensions within the regional bloc over how to address Myanmar’s prolonged political crisis.

Myanmar: National Unity Government urges stronger ASEAN action against junta violence
On 13 May, according to Mizzima, Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) welcomed ASEAN’s concerns over the worsening conflict in Myanmar but called for concrete and time-bound measures to stop junta airstrikes and attacks on civilians. The NUG supported ASEAN’s continued commitment to the Five-Point Consensus and stressed that condemnation of violence must be backed by accountability mechanisms. Observers note that the NUG rejected the legitimacy of any junta-led electoral process conducted amid ongoing conflict and political repression. It also urged ASEAN to coordinate humanitarian assistance with the NUG and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations rather than relying solely on military-controlled channels. The statement further called for the unconditional release of political prisoners and broader engagement with democratic stakeholders to achieve an inclusive political settlement in Myanmar.

South Asia
Afghanistan: Deadly clashes continue in Badakhshan amid Taliban poppy eradication campaign
On 09 May, according to Afghanistan International, clashes between Taliban forces and residents in Argo district of Badakhshan over poppy eradication continued, with at least two people reported killed and several others wounded. Sources said one person was shot dead on Friday, 08 May, while another was killed by gunfire early on Saturday, 09 May, as protests against Taliban anti-poppy operations intensified. Local sources added that the Taliban restricted telecommunications networks in Badakhshan as violence escalated. The clashes reportedly began on 08 May after Taliban forces entered the area to destroy poppy fields and dispersed protesters using gunfire and violence. Earlier reports said the Taliban had deployed at least 1,500 forces to Kashm district for eradication efforts, while Taliban officials had recently urged residents in several districts to cooperate with anti-poppy operations. Similar confrontations linked to poppy eradication and the absence of alternative livelihoods have previously resulted in deadly clashes in the province.

Afghanistan: Shia commission backs Taliban security claims amid continued concerns over attacks and discrimination
On 08 May, according to Afghanistan International, the Afghan Shia Commission called for resolving disputes through dialogue, moderation and national unity during a meeting in Kabul, while expressing support for the Taliban’s “security achievements.” Sources said Taliban officials were dissatisfied after the commission raised concerns over insecurity in west Kabul and asked its leaders to acknowledge “nationwide security” in their statement. Mohammad Ali Akhlaqi said the commission aims to convey the concerns of the Shia community to the Taliban authorities and to pursue issues through engagement and cohesion. The meeting came amid continued insecurity in Shia-populated areas, including armed robberies in west Kabul and repeated ISIS-K attacks in Herat and Kabul, where bombings and shootings have killed and injured dozens of Shias in recent years. Shia representatives have continued to seek recognition of Jaafari jurisprudence, political participation and religious rights, while activists accused the commission of remaining silent on discrimination, forced displacement, unemployment and restrictions affecting Hazaras and Shia communities under Taliban rule.

Afghanistan and France: Afghan activists call for recognition of gender apartheid at Paris conference
On 08 May, according to Afghanistan International, Afghan activists at a conference in Paris urged France to recognise gender apartheid in Afghanistan and raise the issue at the United Nations Security Council for legal and diplomatic action against Taliban restrictions on women. The two-day conference, held at the French parliament, the French foreign ministry and Paris City Hall, focused on Afghanistan’s human rights crisis, women’s rights and possible political solutions. Discussions involving Richard Bennett, former Afghan officials and women’s rights activists emphasised recognising gender apartheid as a crime against humanity, accelerating humanitarian and educational visas for Afghan women and securing the release of women from Taliban prisons. Participants also discussed creating support networks for Afghan women refugees, financial support for Afghan and Afghan French organisations, and cooperation with the European Parliament to strengthen political pressure on the Taliban.

Afghanistan: Pakistani envoy calls on Taliban to take concrete steps against militant threats
On 11 May, according to Afghanistan International, Pakistan’s ambassador to Kabul, Ubaid-ur-Rehman Nizamani, urged the Taliban to take practical measures against terrorist threats originating from Afghanistan. Speaking at an event marking the first anniversary of the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan, Nizamani said Pakistan remained committed to brotherly relations with Afghanistan but warned the Taliban not to interpret Islamabad’s desire for peace as weakness. A statement issued by the Pakistani embassy in Kabul said he stressed the need for concrete action to curb threats emanating from Afghan territory. Earlier, Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir said in Rawalpindi that terrorism from Afghanistan continued and called on the Taliban to dismantle militant sanctuaries, while also accusing India of returning to its earlier policy of supporting militancy. Taliban officials have not responded to the remarks and have repeatedly said Afghan territory is not used against any country.

Afghanistan and EU: Brussels prepares talks with Taliban on Afghan migrant deportations
On 12 May, according to Afghanistan International, Agence France-Presse reported that the European Commission will soon invite Taliban officials to Brussels for technical talks on the deportation of Afghan migrants. The report said a letter would shortly be sent to Kabul to arrange the meeting, which is being coordinated with Sweden, while two European delegations are expected to visit Afghanistan beforehand. A European Commission spokesperson confirmed that preparations are underway, although no date has been announced. The discussions come as around 20 European Union member states seek ways to return Afghan migrants, particularly those convicted of crimes. The proposal has faced criticism from human rights and migrant advocacy groups, which warned that returning Afghans to a country facing humanitarian, economic and human rights crises could endanger lives. According to EU figures, around one million Afghans applied for asylum in Europe between 2013 and 2024, and Afghans remained the largest group of asylum seekers in Europe in 2025.

Afghanistan and EU: European Commission says Taliban migration talks do not imply formal recognition
On 13 May, according to Afghanistan International, the European Commission said planned talks in Brussels with Taliban representatives on the return of Afghan migrants do not amount to formal recognition of the Taliban government. A European Commission spokesperson stated that a letter had been sent to Kabul to arrange the meeting and clarified that the contacts were being conducted only at a technical level, without the involvement of senior Taliban leaders. Coordinated by Sweden, the discussions are part of wider European efforts to address deportation policies as nearly 20 EU member states push for stricter measures against Afghan migrants, particularly those viewed as security threats. The proposal has faced criticism within Europe, with European Parliament member Melissa Camara warning that such engagement risks legitimising the Taliban. The Commission said the talks focus on practical and diplomatic matters related to deportations. The issue comes amid Afghanistan’s worsening humanitarian crisis, with international organisations estimating that more than five million Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan since 2023. The report also noted that Belgium is prepared to issue special visas for Taliban delegates, while the European Commission has not disclosed which representatives were invited or whether travel costs would be covered.

Afghanistan: UN report records hundreds of civilian casualties in border violence during the first quarter of 2026
On 12 May, according to Afghanistan International, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan said 372 civilians were killed and 397 injured in border clashes between the Taliban and Pakistan between January and March 2026. UNAMA said it documented 95 incidents during the first three months of the year, attributing 94 per cent of them to Pakistan and one incident to the Taliban administration. The report stated that Pakistani air strikes accounted for 64 per cent of civilian casualties, while indirect fire along the border caused another 35 per cent. Among the casualties were 72 women, 48 girls, 95 boys and 554 men killed or injured. UNAMA identified the deadliest incident as the Pakistani air strike on the Omid drug rehabilitation centre in Kabul in March, where at least 269 people were killed and 122 injured, most of them male patients. Kabul recorded the highest number of civilian casualties, followed by Kunar and Paktika, while additional incidents were reported in Khost, Nangarhar, Paktia, Kandahar and Nuristan provinces. The mission urged both Pakistan and the Taliban administration to respect international humanitarian law and avoid using schools and hospitals for military purposes.

Bangladesh and Pakistan: The two countries sign an MoU to strengthen cooperation against narcotics trafficking
On 09 May, according to The Daily Star, Bangladesh and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to strengthen bilateral cooperation in combating drug trafficking, narcotics abuse, and related money-laundering activities. The agreement includes intelligence sharing, technical assistance, and coordinated anti-narcotics operations between the two countries. Officials stated that both sides will regularly exchange information on trafficking networks, smuggling routes, and concealment techniques to disrupt transnational narcotics operations.

Bangladesh: Prime Minister calls for stronger Organisation of Islamic Cooperation support on Rohingya crisis
On 12 May, according to Dhaka Tribune, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman urged member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to strengthen support for resolving the Rohingya crisis during a meeting with ambassadors and high commissioners of OIC countries stationed in Dhaka. He emphasised the need for sustained international cooperation to ensure the safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. OIC representatives also reaffirmed their commitment to supporting Bangladesh and enhancing cooperation in trade, healthcare, education, and investment.

Iran: "The armed forces are ready to confront any action by the American-Zionist (Israeli) enemies," comments Central headquarters
On 10 May, according to Reuters, Supreme Leader Mojitaba Khamenei met with the head of Iran's armed forces unified command. The armed forces recieved "new guiding measures to pursue military operations and firmly confront adversaries" from the armed forces."The armed forces are ready to confront ?any action by the American-Zionist (Israeli) enemies. In case of any ?error by the enemy, Iran's response will be swift, ?severe, and decisive," stated Ali Abdollahi commander of Khatam Al Anbiya's Central headquarters. There was also a brief about the readiness of the country's armed forces.

Maldives: Former President Yameen expresses readiness to work with Nasheed and Solih to restore press freedom
On 13 May, according to The Sun, former Maldivian president Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom stated that he was ready to work with former presidents Mohamed Nasheed and Ibrahim Mohamed Solih to restore press freedom after two journalists from Adhadhu were jailed on contempt of court charges. The crackdown on journalists, linked to a gag order over a documentary, which, drew criticism from local and international press freedom groups, including Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International Press Institute (IPI), Reporters Without Borders (RSF), and others. Premier opposition figures called for nationwide anti-government protests against President Mohamed Muizzu.

Nepal: Former finance minister and others charged in Pokhara airport tax waiver scam
On 08 May, according to The Kathmandu Post, Nepal’s Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) has filed a corruption case against 14 individuals, including former finance minister Gyanendra Bahadur Karki, over alleged illegal tax waivers linked to Pokhara International Airport. The CIAA claims that officials and representatives of China CAMC Engineering Co Ltd. colluded to grant unlawful tax and customs duty exemptions, despite the original contract requiring the contractor to bear those costs. Investigators say the arrangement caused a loss of NPR 3.62 billion to the state and gave the contractor “double benefits” through tax-inclusive payments without deposits to the treasury. The case also names former secretaries, Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) officials, and Chinese company representatives. This is the third corruption case related to the Chinese-funded airport project, which has faced allegations of inflated costs, procurement irregularities, and misuse of foreign loan funds since its inception.

Nepal: Government faces criticism over land policy contradictions
On 12 May, according to The Kathmandu Post,  landless squatters and informal settlers from across Nepal gathered at Maitighar Mandala in Kathmandu to protest forced eviction campaigns and demand proper rehabilitation. Around 100 representatives from 20 districts under the National Land Rights Forum Nepal (NLRF) accused the government of displacing poor communities without providing alternative housing. Protesters said the demolition drives, launched under Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s government, have already rendered thousands homeless in the Kathmandu Valley. Activists claim over 20,000 squatters from nearly 3,500 families have been displaced and shifted to holding centres. Demonstrators criticised the contradiction between the government’s reform agenda, which promised verification, rehabilitation, and housing support for landless settlers, and the ongoing bulldozer operations. Protests against evictions are continuing in several districts including Kaski, Mahottari, Banke, and Surkhet, while rights groups warned that forced displacement without alternatives violates the dignity and housing security of vulnerable communities.

Pakistan: Islamabad says militant sanctuaries in Afghanistan continue to block normalisation of ties
On 08 May, according to Afghanistan International, Tahir Andrabi said relations between Pakistan and the Taliban administration will not normalise unless support and shelter for militants opposed to Pakistan ends. Speaking at a weekly press briefing in Islamabad, he said Pakistan cannot tolerate attacks originating from Afghan territory and accused militants in Afghanistan of operating with support from local networks and the Taliban administration. Andrabi said the two countries share religious, ethnic and cultural ties and that people on both sides seek peace, but militant activity from Afghan soil continues to hinder relations. He added that Pakistan has asked the Taliban to provide written guarantees preventing such attacks, an issue that has remained unresolved in talks held in Qatar, Turkiye and Saudi Arabia. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains closed, disrupting trade and transit, while Pakistan has also halted visa issuance for Afghan citizens.

Pakistan: Australia sanctions Balochistan Liberation Army and its senior leaders
On 08 May, Dawn reported that Australia imposed sanctions on the banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and three of its senior leaders over their involvement in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The Australian government said the group was responsible for attacks targeting civilians, infrastructure, foreign nationals and Pakistani security forces. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said the sanctions were aimed at stopping support for terrorism. Australia said the sanctions would make it harder for the group to raise money, recruit members and continue its activities. Under Australian law, dealing with the assets of sanctioned individuals or organisations can lead to heavy fines and prison sentences. Pakistan has also been asking other countries and the United Nations to officially recognise the BLA as a terrorist organisation. This development highlights increasing international cooperation against militant groups and growing global support for counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan. 

Pakistan: Islamabad denies reports of targeted deportations from UAE
On 08 May, Dawn reported that Pakistan’s Interior Ministry denied reports claiming that Pakistanis were being specially targeted for deportation from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The ministry said there were no “country or sect specific” deportations and also called such reports false and misleading. The statement came after reports suggested that some Pakistani workers, including members of the Shia community, had been arrested, detained and deported from the UAE. Pakistan’s Interior Ministry said that any deportations were part of normal immigration procedures related to visa violations, overstaying or incomplete documents. The ministry also said Pakistanis who meet visa and work requirements continue to travel to the UAE without discrimination. These developments highlight concerns about misinformation, the rights of migrant workers and the importance of maintaining stable relations between Pakistan and the UAE, especially where a large Pakistani community lives and works

Pakistan: Islamabad seeks Singapore's help to bring back nationals from US-seized vessels
On 08 May, Dawn reported that Pakistan asked Singapore for support in bringing back 11 Pakistani and 20 Iranian seafarers who were on vessels seized by US authorities near Singaporean waters. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said Pakistan was working closely with Singapore, Iran and the United States to ensure the safety and early return of the affected people. Dar also spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and said Pakistan was ready to help Iranian nationals return safely if needed. The issue comes during rising tensions linked to the US-Iran conflict and increased US maritime security operations in the region. This development highlights the importance of diplomatic cooperation to ensure the safety and repatriation of seafarers affected by regional tensions and maritime security operations. 

Pakistan: Government raises fuel prices amid Strait of Hormuz crisis
On 08 May, Dawn reported that the federal government hiked the price of petrol by PKR 14.92 and that of high-speed diesel (HSD) by PKR 15 for the next week amid the fuel crisis triggered by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The new petrol price is PKR 414.78, and the new HSD price is PKR 414.58 per litre. This is the second consecutive increase since 30 April, when the government raised petrol prices by PKR 6.51 per litre and high-speed diesel (HSD) prices by PKR 19.39 per litre amid the ongoing fuel crisis caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Earlier this month, the government raised the petrol price by PKR 137 per litre, taking it to a record PKR 458.4. However, a few days later, the prime minister, in a televised address, announced a PKR 80 per litre reduction in the petroleum levy on petrol, bringing its price down to PKR 378 per litre. 

Pakistan: Islamabad reaffirm commitment to Qatar to regional peace as US-Iran impasse continues
On 10 May, Dawn reported that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif received a second call this week from Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, with both sides reaffirming their shared commitment to supporting constructive dialogue and lasting peace in the Middle East. Qatar's foreign ministry confirmed that Sheikh Mohammed expressed full support for Pakistan's mediation efforts and stressed the need for all parties to respond to these efforts to create conditions for a comprehensive peace agreement. PM Shehbaz conveyed appreciation for Qatar's continued backing and said he looked forward to the Qatari emir's visit to Pakistan "very soon." The call follows Sheikh Mohammed's meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in Washington, where Pakistan's mediation role was also discussed. Iran, meanwhile, has kept Washington waiting for its response to the latest US peace proposals, with the Pakistan-brokered ceasefire still holding but negotiations deadlocked since the first round of Islamabad talks in April. 

Pakistan: PM Shehbaz and Azerbaijan's Aliyev discuss Middle East peace efforts, reaffirm bilateral ties
On 12 May, Dawn reported that PM Shehbaz Sharif spoke with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, with the two leaders discussing regional developments and ongoing peace efforts in the Middle East. Aliyev expressed deep appreciation for Pakistan's initiatives in bringing about the US-Iran ceasefire, describing it as a reflection of international trust in Pakistan's leadership. The two sides reaffirmed bilateral ties and agreed to deepen cooperation in trade, investment, energy, and people-to-people contacts, with both leaders agreeing to meet in person later this year. PM Shehbaz conveyed regrets over being unable to attend the World Urban Forum in Baku next week and reiterated his invitation for Aliyev to visit Pakistan.

Pakistan: Pakistan issues formal protest to Afghanistan after Bannu attack
On 12 May, Dawn reported that Pakistan summoned the Afghan chargé d’affaires and issued a formal protest after a suicide attack in Bannu killed 15 police personnel. Pakistan’s Foreign Office said early investigations and technical evidence showed that the attack was planned by militants based in Afghanistan. The attack involved an explosives-filled vehicle followed by an armed assault on a police post in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan said it had repeatedly expressed concerns about militant groups using Afghan territory to carry out attacks inside Pakistan. The Foreign Office also warned that Pakistan had the right to respond against those responsible for the attack. In the past, Afghan Taliban authorities have rejected such accusations and said Pakistan’s security problems are internal matters. This incident comes during a situation where there are continuing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan over cross-border militancy and border security issues. 

Pakistan: Taliban rejects Pakistani claim that Bannu suicide attack was planned in Afghanistan
On 13 May, The News International reported that Afghanistan's Taliban government rejected Pakistan's allegation that last week's deadly suicide attack in Bannu was planned from Afghan territory, after Islamabad summoned Kabul's top diplomat over the attack that killed at least 15 people. Pakistani authorities said the attack on the Fateh Khel police checkpoint had been "masterminded by terrorists residing in Afghanistan", but Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid dismissed the accusation as "baseless" and called for resolving bilateral issues through "mutual understanding, respect and genuine cooperation". The exchange comes amid worsening tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban over cross-border militancy and repeated Pakistani allegations that militant groups, particularly the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), are operating from sanctuaries inside Afghanistan. Separately, Dawn reported that the Federal Investigation Agency arrested 34 undocumented Afghan nationals in Turbat during a raid along the CPEC route, accusing them of attempting to travel illegally towards Iran through Gwadar. Officials said the group included men, women and children, and that investigations were underway to identify human smuggling facilitators and networks involved in cross-border movement. The FIA said the arrests were part of broader efforts to crack down on illegal migration and trafficking activities in the region, and reflect Pakistan's tightening security and immigration measures amid growing concerns over militancy and undocumented movement along the Afghan border.

The Middle East
Israel: Netanyahu calls for reducing dependence on US military aid; Seeks to expand ties with Gulf states
On 11 May, Reuters reported that Prime Minister Netanyahu said Israel hopes to gradually end its dependence on US military aid within the next decade. It expects to expand ties with Gulf countries in the near future. In an interview with CBS News, Netanyahu stated that it was “absolutely” the right time to reset the financial aspect of US-Israel military relations. He stated that he wanted to begin reducing support immediately. Israel currently receives around USD 3.8 billion annually in US military assistance under a long-term agreement which runs until 2028. Netanyahu also acknowledged that Israel had underestimated Iran’s ability to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz during the ongoing conflict. He further commented that there is a possibility of political change in Iran and stated that the fall of the Iranian regime was possible but not guaranteed. Netanyahu believes that weakening Iran’s leadership could also weaken groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

The War in Gaza: Israel increases attacks on Gaza after the Iran ceasefire
On 13 May, Reuters reported that Israel increased its attacks on Gaza after the ceasefire in the Iran conflict. Israeli military officials said the operations were stepped up because of concerns that Hamas was rebuilding its military strength and reorganising its fighters. Gaza health authorities said at least 120 Palestinians, including women and children, were killed after the ceasefire began. Reports said Israeli strikes targeted Hamas-linked police and security sites in different parts of Gaza. Israel claimed Hamas was rearming despite ongoing ceasefire efforts. At the same time, talks aimed at maintaining peace in Gaza remained stalled with both Israel and Hamas accusing each other of breaking the ceasefire agreement. This situation shows continuing tensions in Gaza despite earlier ceasefire efforts and growing fears of renewed conflict in the region. 

The US-Iran War
DAY-69-70
The US-Iran War: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait restore base and airspace access to the US
On 07 May, The Wall Street Journal reported that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have lifted restrictions on the US military's access to their bases and airspace following high-level discussions between US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The decision comes after the US paused Project Freedom, an effort to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz. This operation relied heavily on support from the Gulf, but Saudi Arabia objected to providing any support, fearing escalation with Iran. Reuters reported that the US sanctioned Iraq's deputy oil minister Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly, along with militias, for allegedly supporting Iran. 

UAE oil tankers move through the Strait of Hormuz
On 07 May, Reuters reported that the UAE and buyers of crude oil have sailed oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz despite the ongoing tensions. According to sources, this was done to move the oil still available in the Middle East in large quantities, but it hasn’t moved due to the conflict. However, the current movement is reported to be only a fraction of what was exported before the conflict started, underscoring the risks traders and buyers are willing to take to move the oil in high demand. 

Lebanon: Israel strikes Beirut for the first time since the ceasefire; Targets Hezbollah commander
On 07 May, Reuters reported that the Israeli military targeted a Hezbollah commander in its strikes in Southern Beirut. This has been the first strike from Israel since a ceasefire was declared last month. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remarked that there is no immunity for Israel’s ‘enemies.’ Israel has stated that the commander belonged to the Iran-backed Radwan force. Hezbollah, which is reported to have control over the South of Beirut, is yet to issue a statement on this strike. 

DAY-71
The US proposal: As Washington awaits Tehran’s response, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi says, "Every time a diplomatic solution is on the table, the US opts for a reckless military adventure"
On 09 May, Reuters reported that the US is currently awaiting Iran's response to its latest proposals to end the conflict and begin peace talks. The US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 08 May that the US expected Iran to respond within hours. Iran has not responded so far. There were also clashes between US Navy vessels and Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz on 08 May. The US military stated that it struck two vessels linked to Iran, which were attempting to enter an Iranian port. It said that a US fighter jet forced them to turn back. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said: "Every time a diplomatic solution is on the table, the US opts for a reckless military adventure." The US also imposed sanctions on ten individuals and companies, including several based in China and Hong Kong, for aiding Iran's military by supplying weapons and materials used to build drones. The US Treasury Department said that it could sanction any foreign companies and financial institutions supporting Iran, including those connected to Chinese oil refineries.

Lebanon: Israeli attacks continue, killing 17 in southern Lebanon
On 08-09 May, Al Jazeera reported that the Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon killed at least 17 people despite a US-backed ceasefire. The strikes hit areas near the Lebanon-Israel border as the fighting between Israeli forces and Hezbollah continued. Lebanese officials and local reports said that the civilians were also among those who were killed and injured. Israel said the attacks targeted Hezbollah positions and military sites.

Strait of Hormuz: London and Paris deploy naval forces in anticipation of a defensive operation; The US Secretary of State Marco Rubio critiques the lack of support from Italy
On 09 May, the Independent reported that the United Kingdom is deploying its vessel HMS Dragon to the Middle East. This is in anticipation of a possible safeguarding mission in the Strait of Hormuz. It is also led by France, where the warship is to “pre-position” itself and prepare itself to contribute once the hostilities have ceased. On 08 May, Reuters reported that the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni. Following the meeting, Rubio noted that the US allies, including Italy, were hesitant to help Washington confront Iran and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Rubio was quoted on the same, stating, "I don't ‌understand why anybody would not be supportive." 

DAY-72
US-Iran War: Trump rejects Iran's peace proposal response as “TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE”; Netanyahu says the war would continue until Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities and regional proxies are addressed
On 10 May, Reuters reported that President Trump rejected Iran’s response to a US peace proposal, calling it “TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE,” in Truth Social. It dimmed hopes for a swift end to the 10-week conflict, which has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and driven up global energy prices. Iran’s proposal, sent to Washington through Pakistan, called for an end to fighting on all fronts, including in Lebanon, the lifting of US sanctions, an end to the US naval blockade, compensation for war damage, guarantees against further attacks, and the release of frozen Iranian assets. Iranian media stated Tehran also sought recognition of an Iranian role in managing security in the Strait of Hormuz if Washington made unspecified commitments. The US proposal had sought a halt to hostilities before talks on more contentious issues, including Iran’s nuclear programme. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the war would continue until Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities and regional proxies were addressed, while Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Tehran would not “bow down to the enemy.”

The Strait of Hormuz: South Korean, Qatari and Pakistan-linked vessels successfully transit despite regional tensions
On 10-11 May, Reuters reported that oil tankers and LNG vessels continued to travel through the Strait of Hormuz despite rising tensions in the Gulf region. Some oil tankers reportedly turned off their tracking systems while passing through the strait due to fears of attacks and security threats linked to ongoing Iran-related tensions. During this period, a South Korean cargo ship and another bulk carrier near Qatar were hit by unidentified objects in separate incidents. South Korea strongly criticised the attack on its vessel and said it would take steps to protect its ships operating in the region. Despite these incidents, Qatari LNG tankers carrying gas to Pakistan continued to move through the Strait, showing that commercial shipping in the area is still active. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s busiest routes for oil and gas transport, and governments and shipping companies are closely monitoring the situation

Iran: Supreme Leader Khamenei briefs military chief on new guidelines; Officials maintain there is no oil spill around the Kharg island
On 10 May, Reuters reported that the head of Iran’s armed forces met the Supreme Leader of Iran, Mojtaba Khameini. As per Fars news, the head of the armed forces received "new guiding measures to pursue military operations and firmly confront adversaries,” from Khameini. According to the same news agency, Ali Abdollahi, the commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, briefed Khamenei on the armed forces' preparedness. Abdollahi was reportedly quoted as saying, "The armed forces are ready to confront ?any action by the American-Zionist (Israeli) enemies. In case of any ?error by the enemy, Iran's response will be swift, ?severe, and decisive.” On 10 May, Reuters also reported on Iran’s denial of an oil leak near the Kharg island. Iran’s Oil Terminals Company denied reports of an oil leak near the Kharg ‌Island, and the company’s chief executive said that there have been inspections, but no evidence of leaks from storage tanks, pipelines, loading facilities or tankers operating near the island had been found. The official also maintained that Iranian teams conducted additional inspections and that “even the smallest trace” of a spill was not found.

Reuters reports on Iranian drone attacks across the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar 
On 10 May, Reuters reported that new drone-related incidents across the Gulf involving the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar reflect persisting tensions linked to the Iran conflict. The UAE’s Defence Ministry stated that its air defences dealt with two drones approaching from Iran. The incident occurred four weeks after reduced tensions following the US-announced ceasefire. Iran has denied involvement in the attacks on the UAE and warned that it would give a strong response if the UAE initiates further action against Tehran. Earlier tensions in the region caused the UAE to shift schools to remote learning, though classes were set to return to normal. Kuwait’s army stated that it detected and dealt with several hostile drones over its airspace early on 10 May, following earlier drone-related incidents that targeted border posts during the conflict. Simultaneously, Qatar's Defence Ministry said that a cargo vessel travelling from Abu Dhabi was hit by a drone near Mesaieed port, which led to a small fire that was later brought under control without any injuries. Meanwhile, the UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that another vessel near Doha had been struck by an unidentified projectile. These latest incidents show that security risks continue across the Gulf despite the ceasefire.

Israel: Tel Aviv established an undisclosed military base in Iraq linked to the Iran conflict, claims a Wall Street Journal report
On 09 May, The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel had set up a secret military outpost in Iraq’s western desert during its conflict with Iran. According to US officials and sources familiar with the matter, the base served as a logistical hub for the Israeli Air Force. It included special forces and rescue teams prepared for operations. The report stated that the facility was established shortly before the war began and operated with US awareness. The report also stated that a local shepherd informed the Iraqi authorities about unusual helicopter activity in the region, which led to its discovery. Iraqi troops later travelled towards the site to investigate, but Israeli forces reportedly launched airstrikes to stop them from advancing, which led to deaths and injuries. Iraq blamed the US for the attack, criticised it, and filed a complaint against it at the UN. The report claims that the outpost helped Israel carry out long-range operations against Iran more efficiently during the five-week war.

DAY – 73 
US-Iran War: President Trump rejects Iran's response; says ceasefire is “on life support” 
On 12 May, the BBC reported on President Trump rejecting Iran’s latest peace proposal, calling it “garbage” and stating that Tehran was making demands that were “unacceptable.” Speaking to reporters, Trump said the ceasefire process was “on life support” and warned that the United States would continue military and economic pressure if Iran failed to change its position. He also stated that Washington would not accept any agreement that allowed Iran to threaten shipping routes or maintain what he described as destabilising regional activities. According to media reports, Iran’s proposal included demands for an end to hostilities across the region, lifting of the US naval blockade, compensation for war damages, and guarantees against future attacks. President Trump dismissed the conditions and said the United States would “never reward aggression.” The remarks came as international mediation efforts have continued, but no breakthrough has been announced following the latest exchange between Washington and Tehran.

Iran: Tehran expands definition of Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing war, reports Reuters
On 12 May, Reuters reported that Iran has expanded its definition of the Strait of Hormuz to encompass a vast operational area, significantly wider than before the war commenced. A statement by Mohammad Akbarzadeh, deputy political director of the IRGC Navy, stated that, “The strait is no longer viewed as a narrow stretch around a handful of islands but instead has been greatly enlarged in scope and military significance. In the past, the Strait of Hormuz was defined as a limited area around islands such as Hormuz and Hengam, but today this view has changed.” As per Iranian news agencies Fars and Tasnim, the strait’s width which was previously reported to be around 20 to 30 miles, has now been increased to between 200 and 300 miles.

Iran: Tehran says it is ready for “any aggression”  
On 12 May, Al Jazeera reported on Iran warning that it was prepared for “any aggression” amid continuing tensions with the United States and uncertainty surrounding ceasefire negotiations. Iran's officials stated that the country’s armed forces remained on high alert and would respond decisively to any renewed attacks. The warning came a day after President Trump rejected Tehran’s latest peace proposal, calling it “garbage” and saying the ceasefire was “on life support.” Iran has insisted on conditions including the lifting of the US naval blockade, compensation for war damages, and guarantees against future attacks. Meanwhile, Washington has continued military and economic pressure, while also imposing new sanctions targeting Iranian oil shipments to China. 

US sanctions Chinese firms over Iranian oil shipments 
On 12 May, Reuters reported that the United States had imposed fresh sanctions targeting Chinese companies and vessels accused of facilitating Iranian oil exports to China. The sanctions, announced by the US Treasury Department, focused on entities involved in transporting and purchasing Iranian crude despite existing restrictions. Washington stated that the measures were intended to disrupt Tehran’s revenue networks amid the continuing US-Iran war and ongoing tensions over Iran’s regional activities and nuclear programme. According to US officials, the sanctioned firms were linked to shipments routed through intermediary networks designed to obscure the origin of Iranian oil. The measures also targeted several shipping operators and tankers accused of helping Iran evade sanctions through ship-to-ship transfers and concealed transactions. Beijing criticised unilateral sanctions and reiterated its opposition to measures not authorised by the United Nations. 

DAY-74
Degrading Iran’s nuclear programme outweighs Washington’s domestic economic concerns, asserts Trump
On 13 May, Reuters reported that US President Donald Trump stated on Tuesday that Americans’ financial struggles are not a factor in his decision-making as he seeks to negotiate an end to the war in Iran. As he departed from the White House for a trip to China, he claimed that preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is his top priority. These remarks have been highly scrutinized by those who argue that the administration should balance geopolitical objectives with the economic impact on Americans, especially ahead of the November midterm elections, as the rising cost of living remains a top concern for voters. Trump is under growing pressure from fellow Republicans, who fear that economic pain caused by the war could spark a backlash against the party and cost them the midterm elections, and potentially even control of the Senate. In remarks made before arriving in Beijing for a summit with President Xi Jinping, he also stated that he does not expect to need China’s help to end the war in Iran and ease Tehran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz. The Trump administration said on Tuesday that senior US and Chinese officials had agreed last month that no country should be able to charge tolls on traffic through the region, in an effort to project consensus on the issue ahead of the summit. China, a major buyer of Iranian oil and a close ally of Tehran, did not dispute that account. However, in his remarks, Trump downplayed China's role in resolving the conflict.

Iraq and Pakistan reach energy agreements with Iran 
On 12 May, Reuters reported that Iraq and Pakistan have reached deals with Iran to ship oil and liquefied natural gas from the Gulf. This is due to the sharp decline in Gulf exports, and reduced vessel traffic through the strait to around 5 per cent caused by the war. Iraq is seeking Iranian approval for additional tanker movements, as 95 per cent of its government revenue relies on oil. On the other hand, Pakistan has arranged for Qatari LNG cargoes to transit the strait to meet peak summer power demand. Although Iran has not been paid directly, Tehran is now requesting detailed documentation of each ship, underscoring its tightening operational control over the strategic shipping lane.

Saudi Arabia launched covert strikes on Iran before de-escalation, reports Reuters
On 12 May, Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia carried out covert airstrikes on Iran in late March. Reports suggest that this move was in retaliation for Iranian missile and drone attacks. The strikes reportedly marked the Saudi military's first known direct action on Iranian soil. It further indicates Riyadh’s growing readiness to respond independently rather than rely solely on the US’s protection. In addition, these assaults prompted heavy negotiations and warnings of further strikes, eventually leading to a tacit truce between the two antagonists.

Lebanon: Israeli attacks kill civilians, including two children
On 13 May, Reuters reported that the health ministry of Lebanon confirmed that twelve people were killed by a series of Israeli strikes on cars in Lebanon as the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel continued despite a US-mediated ceasefire announced last month. Israel’s attack on Wednesday included three drone strikes, around 20 kilometers south of Beirut. According to the health ministry, eight people perished, including two children, and a fourth strike killed one person near the southern city of Sidon. Three more people were killed in Israeli airstrikes on cars in three locations further south in the Tyre district. The Israeli military stated it was striking Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon and told residents to leave nine towns and villages where it intended to act against the group. 

Africa
Chad: Dozens of Nigerian fishermen feared dead after Chad targets Boko Haram with airstrikes
On 11 May, the BBC reported that dozens of Nigerian fishermen were feared dead following Chadian military air strikes targeting Boko Haram positions in the Lake Chad region. Abubakar Gamandi Usman, chairman of the Lake Chad Basin Fisheries Association of Nigeria, said more than 40 fishermen were believed to have died after panic broke out during the strikes, with some reportedly hit directly while others drowned attempting to flee in overloaded boats. Chad’s presidency said it had launched “intensive air strikes” on Boko Haram strongholds in retaliation for recent militant attacks that killed at least 24 Chadian soldiers and two generals near the lake. The region, shared by Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon, has long served as a base for Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighters, who local leaders say also control access to fishing grounds and collect taxes from fishermen. The incident has renewed concerns over civilian casualties during counterterrorism operations in the Lake Chad basin, where both Chadian and Nigerian military forces have previously faced accusations of causing unintended civilian deaths during operations against militant groups. 

DRC: At least 69 killed in militia attacks in eastern DR Congo’s Ituri province
On 10 May, Al Jazeera reported that at least 69 people were killed in a series of attacks in Ituri province in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where armed groups linked to longstanding ethnic and militia conflicts continue to target civilians. According to security and civil society sources, fighters from the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO), a coalition claiming to defend the Lendu community, carried out retaliatory attacks on several villages on April 28 following an earlier assault by the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CRP), a group aligned with the Hema community, on Congolese army positions near Pimbo. Local officials said bodies remained scattered near targeted villages such as Bassa because ongoing insecurity delayed recovery operations, while only 25 victims had reportedly been buried. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) condemned the attacks and said it had rescued nearly 200 civilians caught in fighting, while Amnesty International warned that overstretched Congolese security forces were leaving civilians increasingly vulnerable amid simultaneous threats from CODECO, the CRP, M23 rebels and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). 

DRC: 23 fighters withdraw from parts of eastern DRC amid ceasefire pressure
On 12 May, Africa News reported that fighters from the anti-government M23 had withdrawn from several areas in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the strategic town of Sange near the border with Burundi. Local officials, military sources and M23 representatives said the group had also retreated from nearby areas including Kabunambo, Mutarule and Bwegera, while pro-government militias known as “wazalendo” moved into some of the vacated zones. The withdrawal comes amid ongoing United States-backed efforts to preserve a fragile ceasefire between the Congolese government and the M23, as Washington seeks to stabilise the mineral-rich eastern region while advancing a broader peace framework linked to access to critical mineral resources. Although the M23 reportedly returned to positions held before its advance on Uvira, it continues to control Kamanyola, a key town near the borders of Rwanda and Burundi. Residents in Sange reportedly celebrated the withdrawal, reflecting local relief after months of violence in eastern Congo, where armed groups have fought over territory and mineral resources for more than three decades. 

Ghana: Immigrants flee as xenophobic attacks persist
On 12 May, Reuters reported that 300 citizens from Ghana will be evacuated amid the wave of xenophobic attacks, particularly on the migrant population from other sub-Saharan African countries. The Foreign Minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, via X stated that citizens had registered for assistance at the Ghana High Commission. While illegal immigration is a persistent issue, it condemns any and all xenophobic attacks. Kenya, Malawi, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe have issued warnings to their citizens, urging them to exercise caution and stay indoors. Around 130 citizens have requested evacuation amid this situation.  

Morocco: Body of missing US soldier recovered during search operation in Morocco
On 11 May, Africa News reported that Moroccan authorities recovered the body of one of two missing United States soldiers who disappeared during the African Lion 2026 military exercises near the Cap Draa training area in southern Morocco. According to the Moroccan army, the servicemen went missing near a cliff on the Atlantic coast last Saturday, prompting a large-scale multinational search operation involving US, Moroccan and allied forces across more than 8000 square kilometres of sea and coastline. A US military official told AFP that the soldiers were believed to have fallen into the sea in what appeared to be an accident rather than a terrorism-related incident. The recovered soldier’s body was transferred to a military hospital pending repatriation, while search efforts continued for the second missing serviceman using aircraft, cave divers and unmanned underwater vehicles. The African Lion 2026 exercises involve nearly 5000 troops from over 40 countries participating in joint security and defence training activities. (“Body recovered in search for two missing US soldiers in Morocco,” Africa News, 11 May 2026)

Nigeria: Boko Haram attack kills 18 loggers in northeast Nigeria
On 11 May, Africa News reported that Boko Haram fighters killed at least 18 loggers near the village of Abaram in Nigeria’s northeastern Borno State, according to local residents and anti-jihadist militia members. The attackers, travelling on motorcycles, reportedly rounded up the loggers in the bush outside Bama district and opened fire, with 11 bodies recovered initially and seven more discovered the following day after a search operation. Local sources said the victims had sustained gunshot wounds, while some were allegedly chased into the bush and killed as they attempted to flee. Boko Haram and its rival faction Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have increasingly targeted loggers, farmers, fishermen and herders in the region, accusing them of collaborating with security forces. The attack comes amid worsening humanitarian conditions in northeast Nigeria, where aid cuts have forced many displaced families to rely on logging and other risky activities to survive during the country’s prolonged insurgency. 

Europe and the Americas
Greenland: US military presence to expand
On 12 May, Reuters reported that Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said that increasing the US military presence in Greenland is part of ongoing talks with Washington. The discussions come at a time when Trump’s interest in gaining control of the island has brought the issue back into focus. Further, it creates tensions with Denmark and within NATO. Nielsen stated that the US believes Greenland does not do enough in terms of regional security and surveillance, making military expansion a key issue in negotiations. Reuters also reported that the US is considering establishing three new bases, possibly in southern locations such as Narsarsuaq and Kangerlussuaq. These were previously used by American forces. At the same time, Greenland stated that, though it is open to stronger military and economic cooperation, its sovereignty is non-negotiable. The talks are taking place within the framework of the 1951 US–Danish defence agreement, which provides the US considerable access to the territory.

Italy and the US: PM Meloni and the US Secretary of State Rubio discuss tensions over the Iran conflict
On 08 May, Reuters reported that Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni met US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Rome amid growing tensions between Italy and the United States over the conflict with Iran. Although Meloni is considered one of US President Donald Trump’s close allies in Europe, Italy has not fully supported the war and opposed the use of some Italian military bases for US operations. The discussions also covered the Middle East situation, the Ukraine war, trade tariffs and relations with the Vatican. Reports said tensions increased after Trump criticised Pope Leo XIV and threatened to reduce US military presence in Europe. Italy is also facing domestic pressure because of public opposition to the Iran war and concerns about its economic effects. The development highlights growing differences between Italy and the United States over the Iran conflict and the wider impact of the war on European politics and transatlantic relations. 

The UK: Keir Starmer rejects mounting calls to resign, after Labour’s severe losses in local elections
On 12 May, CNN reported that PM Keir Starmer rejected calls to resign after Labour’s severe losses in local elections. Speaking to his cabinet, he said the previous 48 hours had been “destabilising” and warned that political turmoil was driving up UK borrowing costs. While 80 Labour MPs urged his resignation, Starmer insisted that no formal leadership challenge had been launched and said he would continue governing. The crisis was deepened by the resignation of junior minister Jess Phillips and criticism from within the Labour Party concerning Starmer's inability to provide a compelling political vision. The potential successors include Angela Rayner and Wes Streeting, but none so far has the 81 MPs' nominations needed to prompt a ballot on his future.

The War in Ukraine: Moscow and Kyiv trade accusations of ceasefire violations
On 08 May, Reuters reported that Russia and Ukraine accused each other of violating a temporary ceasefire announced by Moscow during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations. Russian President Vladimir Putin had declared a short ceasefire from 8 to 10 May to mark the anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II. However, both sides reported drone attacks, missile strikes and fighting soon after the truce began. Ukraine rejected the limited ceasefire and called instead for a longer, broader agreement to end the fighting. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of continuing military attacks while publicly calling for peace. Russia also accused Ukraine of launching drone strikes and warned of strong retaliation if attacks disrupted Victory Day events in Moscow. This development highlights the deep mistrust between Russia and Ukraine and shows how difficult it remains to achieve even temporary ceasefires in the ongoing war. 

The War in Ukraine: Moscow and Kyiv agree to a US-moderated ceasefire
On 09 May, Reuters reported that Russia and Ukraine agreed to a ceasefire mediated by the US. As part of the deal, a prisoner exchange involving 1,000 prisoners from each side was agreed upon. The ceasefire was announced by US President Trump, who stated that he hoped the temporary truce could later be extended into a broader peace effort. Ukraine’s President Zelensky confirmed the agreement and said the prisoner swap was part of negotiations mediated by the US. Russia also confirmed its participation through Kremlin officials. The agreement comes amid continued accusations of ceasefire violations between Moscow and Kyiv. Russia had earlier announced a separate ceasefire linked to its Victory Day parade. Despite the temporary pause, the Kremlin stated on the day of the parade that a comprehensive peace agreement remained “a very long way off” due to unresolved territorial disputes.

The War in Ukraine: EU officials reject Putin’s proposal of former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as European negotiator
On 11 May, Reuters reported that the European Union rejected Russian President Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder should represent Europe in the political negotiations with Moscow.  Putin, speaking at the Victory Day celebrations on 09 May, claimed that the Russia-Ukraine war was “coming to an end,” and that he is willing to negotiate new security arrangements for Europe, naming Schroeder as  his preferred negotiating partner. Gerhard Schroder is a German Social Democrat politician who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005. He forged a notably close personal friendship with Putin in the early 2000s, publicly calling Putin a “flawless democrat” in 2004. After leaving office, he took high-profile roles with Russian energy projects and  has been described as a "high-level lobbyist" for Russian state-owned companies, according to an Al Jazeera report. This deep business and personal association has made him one of Putin’s closest Western allies, even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, drawing heavy criticism in Germany and the West.

The War in Ukraine: Russia launches drone attacks on Kyiv as the ceasefire ends
On 12 May, Reuters reported that Russia launched more than 200 drones against Ukraine overnight, hours after a US-mediated ceasefire expired. According to Ukraine’s air force, Russia fired 216 drones, of which 192 were intercepted or electronically neutralized. President Zelenskyy said that Moscow “chose to end the ‌partial silence” despite Kyiv’s proposal to extend the 9-11 May ceasefire. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha noted that the strikes majorly targeted civilian infrastructure, leaving about six people injured and one killed. Multiple residential buildings, transport infrastructure, and energy facilities were reportedly struck across Kyiv, Dnipro, Mykolaiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and Kherson, causing fires and power outages.
 


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