In the news
On 19 May, Russia began a three-day joint exercise of nuclear forces with Belarus. The Russian Defense Ministry stated the drills involved over 64000 troops, more than 200 missile launch platforms, 140 aircraft, 73 surface warships, and 13 submarines, eight of them carrying nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles.
On 20 May, according to media reports, Ukraine targeted a training camp for Russian drone pilots in Snizhne, in occupied Donetsk, killing 65 cadets and their instructor. Additionally, the Syzran oil refinery sustained damage 800 km inside Russian territory. The destruction of the FSB headquarters in occupied Kherson resulted in approximately 100 Russian casualties.
On 21 May, Russia and Belarus concluded the nuclear exercises. Trucks carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles moved over forest roads, atomic-powered submarines sailed from Arctic and Pacific ports, and crews scrambled into warplanes as the two countries completed the final stage of the drills.
On 24 May, Russia launched a large-scale combined aerial assault on Ukraine. The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed strikes using Oreshnik, Iskander, Kinzhal, and Zircon missiles against Ukrainian military command posts, air bases, and military-industrial complexes, framing the attack as a response to Ukrainian terrorist acts on Russian civilian targets. The Oreshnik struck Bila Tserkva, roughly 64 kms from Kyiv. Among the buildings hit in the capital were the National Art Museum, the Philharmonic Hall, the Cabinet of Ministers building, and the Foreign Ministry.
On 26 May, the Czech-led initiative to procure large-caliber artillery ammunition for Ukraine had lost half of its participating countries, dropping from 18 to 9 donor states. Czech President Petr Pavel, who had championed the project, acknowledged that it currently delivers up to half of all large-caliber ammunition to Ukrainian forces and warned it cannot be easily replaced.
Issues at large
1. The Oreshnik and Russia’s move from conventional arms to ballistic missiles
Moscow has adapted legacy platforms like the Topol and Yars ICBM families with modern guidance and propulsion to create new missile systems, including the Oreshnik. Since 2022, the state funding for strategic missile programmes has increased year on year, reflecting a decisive shift. The Oreshnik, a solid-fuel ballistic missile, is launched from mobile ground systems and capable of traveling 13000 km per hour. By deploying the Oreshnik in a conventional role, Russia maintains deliberate ambiguity about future payloads, whether the next launch carries a conventional or nuclear warhead.
2. The strategic importance of Belarus for Russia and the bilateral military drills
Prior to the war, Belarus served as a strategic buffer between Russia and Central Europe. Russia has since turned it into a launchpad for its war against Ukraine and a hardening bulwark against NATO. Wedged between Russia and NATO member states in the Baltic, Belarus lies along a historical invasion corridor linking Central Europe to the east. Russia's use of Belarusian territory reduces distances to strategic objectives, increases pressure on NATO reinforcement corridors, and cuts the warning time NATO might have of Russian military movements. President Lukashenko is a willing partner, as his political survival since 2020 has depended entirely on the Kremlin. The nuclear drills in May 2026 marked the latest step in Belarus’s importance, as Belarusian units practiced independent nuclear munitions deployment on home soil.
3. Ukraine and the Czech ammunition initiative
It emerged in early 2024 as a direct response to the suspension of US military aid and Europe's failure to meet its own promised shell delivery targets, leaving Ukraine critically short of artillery ammunition. At the time, Western manufacturers were producing 1.3 million shells a year while Russia was producing 4.5 million at a quarter of the cost. The Czech mechanism, informally called the Shell Bridge, bypassed that production gap by sourcing ammunition on global markets. It facilitated the delivery of over 3 million shells, including 1.5 million in 2024 and 1.8 million in 2025.
In perspective
First, Russia is shifting the terms of the war by deploying weapons that cannot be intercepted, embedding itself deeper into Belarus to multiply threat vectors. Ukraine has responded, as it destroyed a drone training facility, shut down a major oil refinery deep inside Russia, and hit an FSB headquarters, all in the same week it absorbed the heaviest aerial bombardment Kyiv had seen in the entire war. Czech support is important in this context.
