Israel-Lebanon Tensions I Crisis in Cuba I Ebola Outbreak in Africa

CWA # 2125

Conflict Weekly

Israel-Lebanon Tensions I Crisis in Cuba I Ebola Outbreak in Africa

Weekly Columns on Africa and the Middle East

Conflict Weekly #332-333, 29 May 2026

NIAS Global Politics Team
29 May 2026

Photo Source: Global Post, Guardian, Gulf News, First Post, Reuters

Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the Border Tensions:
Collapse of the Ceasefire, Ineffective Beirut, and Aggressive Tel Aviv

Deb Dutta

In the news
On 27 May, the Lebanese health ministry reported a staggering death toll of 3,213 and 9,737 people were wounded in the ongoing conflict with Israel.

On 26 May, according to Reuters, Israel conducted 120 air strikes that day alone. The strike affected the southern port of Tyre and the Beqaa Valley and killed 14 civilians in Burj al-Shamali. Reuters also reported that Israeli ground forces crossed the yellow line. Prime Minister Netanyahu, defending the escalation, said, “This escalation is a necessary strategic manoeuvre.”

On 25 May, according to the Guardian, Hezbollah launched a series of explosive drone attacks, targeting military barracks in northern Israel. The attack reportedly struck the Shomera military barracks and a post in Misgav Am. Hezbollah stated it is a direct response to Israel's violation of the ceasefire in April.

Issues at large
1. The Israeli push to create a buffer zone and an ineffective Beirut
On 15 May, the US brokered a 45-day temporary Israel-Lebanon ceasefire. Despite the ceasefire agreement, Israel continued massive aerial bombings across Tyre and deployed ground forces to advance beyond the new yellow lines. Israel intends to create a buffer zone on sovereign Lebanese soil. The Lebanese state has proven completely ineffective and inefficient at managing its territory or reining in non-state military choices. Due to Beirut's lack of enforcement capabilities or leverage, its national sovereignty has historically been viewed skeptically. External and non-state actors redraw the sovereign borders, leaving the Lebanese Armed Forces and the central government as bystanders. This power vacuum further complicates any potential implementation of a diplomatic resolution.

2. Growing humanitarian crisis and the Israeli efforts to undermine Hezbollah
Due to the bombardment of densely populated towns such as Tyre and the Beqaa Valley, the civil facilities are failing. With the escalation of attacks from the military outposts to cities, the displacement of people has greatly increased in recent weeks. Israel appears to disregard civilian casualties, primarily using military operations to dismantle the social care, education, and health services provided by Hezbollah.

3. The Lebanon and Hezbollah factors in the US-Iran negotiations
As the US and Iran engage in delicate negotiations, Tehran attempts to include Lebanon as a "red line." The US and Israel have repeatedly rejected this demand and continue to treat the Lebanon front as an isolated skirmish. For Israel, the current military intensification highlights its aim to rapidly accelerate its airstrikes and ground invasion to decimate Hezbollah’s infrastructure before any finalized US-Iran agreement can force a halt to the fighting. By decimating Hezbollah now, Israel aims to strip Iran of its most effective regional proxy, while Hezbollah escalates its own retaliatory attacks to ensure it survives this offensive and maintains its influence in any future regional settlement.

In perspective
First, the primary players have conflicting military objectives. The local diplomatic strategy has fallen apart as key players pursue opposing military objectives. Second, the structural weakness of the Beirut government hampers its ability to project authority or protect its national boundaries against foreign intrusion. With Israeli troops occupying land past the Yellow Line, rethinking the security map will likely be very difficult in the context of the coming diplomatic strategies. Finally, the military actions in this sector depend on the overall conflict between the US and Iran. No agreement can be effective in the region until the Hezbollah factor is addressed.

The Crisis in Cuba:
The US Sanctions, Energy Crisis, and Economic Instability

Glynnis Winona B

In the news
On 17 May, Axios, a digital news source based in the US, claimed that Cuba had bought more than 300 military drones from Russia and Iran, which could possibly be used to target US naval bases.

On 18 May, the US Treasury imposed new sanctions on 11 senior officials in Havana, including cabinet ministers, military generals, and Communist Party elites. In response to the drone claims, Cuba’s foreign minister, Bruno Rodriguez Parilla, stated that the claims are fabricated and that the US would use the allegations as an opportunity to justify more sanctions. Further, President Diaz-Canel warned that any US military aggression would lead to a bloodbath.

On 20 May, the US Justice Department announced criminal charges against the former Cuban leader Raúl Castro. Discussions regarding this case had already been ongoing. The US has accused them of murder for shooting down two unarmed civilian planes. In Havana's defense, they claim that the shootdown was a response to repeated violations in Cuba’s airspace. Trump declared that there would be "no escalation" after the charges were made public.

On 21 May, the US Supreme Court ruled 8–1 against four cruise companies and ordered them to pay a fine of USD 440 million. The court ruled that using a port in Havana is illegal because Fidel Castro's government took it over after the 1959 revolution.

On 22 May, Marco Rubio called Cuba a national security threat and stated that a peaceful agreement is unlikely. Protests erupted in Cuba in support of Raul Castro following his indictment by the US.

Issues at large
1. The energy collapse and human cost
Cuba’s energy crisis began in January 2026, following the US intervention in Venezuela. The capture of Maduro cut off the subsidized oil that Venezuela has been sending to Cuba. In 2025, Venezuela supplied around 26,500 bpd, which covers a quarter of Cuba’s total needs. After the intervention, the US introduced new actions to stop other countries from supplying oil to Cuba. Major suppliers of oil to Cuba backed out in fear of sanctions. This worsened the condition, and Cuba completely ran out of fuel and diesel. People now face power cuts up to 22 hours a day. These blackouts have affected basic needs such as food, commuting, and healthcare.

2. Increasing economic pressure due to sanctions
The US sanctions have contributed to the worsening economic condition of Cuba. Recently, the US expanded its pressure by targeting key sectors like energy, defence, mining, banking, and security. A major focus is GAESA, a military-run business group that controls a large part of Cuba’s economy. These sanctions have scared off foreign banks and shipping companies, as they risk losing access to the US financial system if they continue dealing with Cuba. As a result, many shipments to the island have stopped. This has increased food prices and made shortages even worse. At the same time, legal pressure is also growing. A recent US court ruling ordered cruise companies to pay a fine for using Cuban ports. Overall, the sanctions increase risks for any company doing business with Cuba.

3. The US indictment and the increased political pressure are significant developments
The charges against Raúl Castro were prepared earlier, but the US chose to announce them on Cuban Independence Day, as the timing appears to be significant. The indictment appears to be part of a broader strategy to pressure the Cuban government. It signals that the US is willing to take stronger steps, possibly even military action. Some US officials have openly suggested that the charges could justify removing Castro from power.

The prospect of hosting talks to ease tensions seems unattainable. President Miguel Díaz-Canel confirmed that Cuba is open to discussions aimed at finding solutions but also made it clear that Cuba’s political system is not open for negotiation. Cuban officials have stressed that leadership positions and internal governance are not up for discussion. At the same time, Díaz-Canel noted that negotiations require willingness from both sides. The US increases pressure through threats and sanctions, even though it keeps in touch.

In perspective
First, the indictment shows a clear shift in US strategy. Charging a former leader on Cuba’s Independence Day signals that Washington no longer sees Cuba as a partner for normal diplomacy. Instead, the pressure campaign has moved to the next phase. The increasing legal, economic, and military pressure will eventually lead to regime change. The key aspect to watch is how soon the US will attempt to achieve regime change.

Second, Cuba’s military is currently facing a challenging situation. The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces are the only institution strong enough to either defend the government or manage a transition. But their situation is weakening. The energy crisis has reduced their capacity to operate, and sanctions have affected their economic base.

Currently, the US is prioritizing Iran, which reduces the likelihood of immediate military action. It is in Cuba’s hands to negotiate or resist and protect its position. This choice is likely to shape what happens next more than any diplomatic talks easing the situation.

The Ebola and the DR Congo:
Multiple Outbreaks, Fragile Healthcare System, and Ineffective Global Responses

Akshath Kaimal

In the news
The outbreak
On 15 May, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) declared the 17th outbreak of Ebola, after eight samples tested positive for the Bundibugyo strain in Ituri province. The same day, Uganda’s Health Ministry confirmed one death from the disease in Kampala.

On 17 May, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), while a second case was confirmed in Uganda. The next day, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) also declared a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security.

On 21 May, the virus continued spreading within the DRC, with the M23-held South Kivu province confirming its first case a day after the rebels downplayed concerns related to its spread.

On 22 May, protesters attacked a hospital in Rwampara and set an isolation tent on fire when they were prevented from removing the bodies of their families for burial. Attacks on healthcare centers have escalated across Ituri province since then.

As of 27 May, there have been 1,077 suspected cases and 246 deaths from the disease in the DRC, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Another seven cases and one death have been recorded in Uganda.

International response
Since 15 May, countries around the world have implemented travel restrictions and put out advisories warning against travel to the DRC and Uganda. On 18 May, Rwanda shut its border with the DRC. On 19 May, the United States mobilised USD 23 million in emergency funding for disease surveillance, laboratory capacity and clinical case management.

On 22 May, the European Union and UNICEF officially launched a joint 100-tonne “Humanitarian Air Bridge”, delivering critical survival gear and protective equipment. On the same day, the upcoming India-Africa Forum Summit, which had been scheduled in New Delhi from 28-31 May, was indefinitely postponed. Also on 22 May, scientists at Oxford University said they were developing a vaccine that would be ready for clinical trials in two to three months. This came the same day the WHO raised the DRC’s public health risk from “high” to “very high”.

On 25 May, the WHO and Africa CDC launched a six-month, USD 319 million Ebola response strategy covering all 55 African Union member states.

Issues at large
1. The multiple Ebola outbreaks in the DRC
The DRC has been the epicentre of Ebola since 1976, with the current 2026 outbreak marking its 17th encounter. The historical toll is staggering: the 2018-2020 Kivu outbreak was the second-largest in history, resulting in 3,470 cases, 2,280 deaths, and a 65 per cent fatality rate. That crisis required the CDC Foundation to mobilise up to USD 20 million in philanthropic funding just for basic logistics. While the international community successfully deployed the Ervebo vaccine to over 300,000 people to end the Zaire strain epidemic, the current outbreak is caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain, for which no approved vaccine exists. Economically, these recurring crises are devastating, paralysing local trade and agriculture while forcing the DRC to divert scarce resources from long-term development into emergency containment, a strain heavily compounded by current border closures with Uganda and Rwanda.

2. The DRC’s fragile healthcare system and external reliance
The DRC remains one of the least developed countries in the world, heavily burdened by protracted conflicts, extreme poverty and an ongoing, multidimensional humanitarian crisis. Over 26 million people face food insecurity, 4.1 million children are suffering from acute malnutrition, and over 1.5 million have lost access to all healthcare facilities. The DRC’s ability to respond to these outbreaks is crippled by a chronically underfunded healthcare system. Out of a population of 113 million, nearly 15 million people require humanitarian assistance as of 2026. This system relies heavily on a highly concentrated foreign donor landscape consisting of the United States, the European Commission and Germany. However, because external aid props up public health, the infrastructure is deeply vulnerable to shifting foreign policy. A stark example was DRC’s 2025 deal with the US, which represented a 30 per cent cut in annual health assistance compared to 2024. This leaves the country structurally exposed, with particular concern mounting around the rapid viral spread in rebel-held eastern and northeastern provinces, where health services are scarce and localised conflict actively blocks emergency medical interventions.

3. Role of Geography and Climate Change in the Ebola spread
Geography plays a dual role in the DRC: dense forests complicate medical logistics, while high-mobility mining and trade corridors facilitate rapid transmission. Centred in Ituri Province, the 2026 outbreak easily breached geographic containment across the highly porous Ugandan border. This ecological vulnerability spans the broader Congo Basin, where the DRC, Central African Republic, and Republic of Congo share interconnected tropical rainforests that serve as massive reservoirs for zoonotic pathogens. Across Central Africa, aggressive deforestation and shifting rainfall patterns are rapidly dismantling the natural boundaries between human settlements and wildlife. As severe climate stress forces reservoir species, like fruit bats, to migrate across national borders in search of food, the risk of regional cross-border spillovers increases exponentially.

4. Weak early warning systems
Africa’s rich biodiversity and rapid urbanization accelerate zoonotic spillovers, making the continent highly prone to epidemics. However, responses remain reactive and neglect preventative preparedness and investment in early warning systems. Local and international systems wait for crises to explode rather than funding permanent infrastructure. Within the massive USD 1.4 billion UN appeal, for example, the health sector has only seen about USD 32.6 million in earmarked funding, leaving hospitals severely underequipped to stop a virus from circulating undetected. The WHO said that the outbreak might have started well before the first case was detected, exemplifying severe gaps in local and international early warning systems. Health infrastructure is also destroyed by protracted conflict, further burdening a strained system.

In perspective
First, an immediate end to the outbreak is unlikely. While the fatality rate of the Bundibugyo strain is far less than the Zaire strain, there is no vaccine or specific treatment to stem the current outbreak. With the WHO saying a vaccine could take up to nine months, the outbreak is likely to continue expanding. Fragile health systems in the DRC and neighbouring countries will struggle to curb the spread due to the lack of widespread testing and diagnostic facilities. But even if the outbreaks end soon, weak early warning systems will continue to keep the DRC exposed to outbreaks.

Second, the humanitarian situation is likely to worsen. Even if a vaccine is developed and the outbreak is stemmed, the aftereffects of this crisis will likely be felt for months or even years to come. The DRC is already struggling with an underfunded healthcare system, worsened by protracted conflicts and climate change. The latest outbreak will push more people into poverty, make the country more dependent on international donors and exacerbate political instability.

CW Column
Conflicts in the Middle East
The US-Iran War Week Thirteen: Escalating Hostilities, Tenuous Ceasefire and Tense Negotiations

Brighty Ann Sarah

In the news
On 20 May, Iran published new maps depicting extended control over the Strait of Hormuz region, insisting that the traffic in the region be controlled by Tehran’s newly formed Persian Gulf Strait Authority, in coordination with Oman and the UAE.

On 21 May, President Trump asserted that the US will recover Iran’s stock of enriched Uranium, stating that the US will “destroy it after we get it, but we're not going to let them have it.”

On 23 May, Trump wrote on social media that a memorandum of understanding on a peace deal with Iran is "largely negotiated.”

On 24 May, senior Iranian officials stated that Iran's nuclear issue was not part of the preliminary agreement, Tehran’s spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei reiterated the same.

On 25 May, the US Central Command launched attacks in southern Iran against targets including boats attempting to lay mines and â missile launch sites, in what it described as defensive actions.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry called the US strikes a "gross violation" of the ceasefire and a "show of bad faith," accusing Washington of undermining ongoing Doha negotiations, where an Iranian delegation including Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf were in talks with Qatar's prime minister on a potential deal with Washington.

On 27 May, Washington launched overnight strikes at an Iranian ground control station in Iran's Bandar Abbas, and shot down four Iranian drones in the Strait of Hormuz region. In retaliation, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards targeted a US airbase near Bandar Abbas,stating that the responsibility of the attack lay with the “aggressor.”

On the same day, Trump, in a cabinet meeting at the White House, accused Iran of attempting to stall political negotiations in view of Washington’s upcoming mid-term elections in November, in an attempt to achieve favourable terms. He asserted that he did not care about the midterms and that Washington is willing to ‘out-wait’ Tehran.

On 28 May, reports emerged that the US and Iran have reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding to extend their ceasefire for 60 days, and the draft is awaiting President Trump’s approval.

Issues at large
1. Renewed hostilities and the fragile ceasefire
The US strikes against Iran, and the retaliatory actions that followed, mark the most serious breach of the ceasefire agreement reached in early April. Although US forces have maintained that the strikes were carried out in self-defence, it has significantly undermined an already fragile truce. The timing of the attacks further intensifies the diplomatic fallout, as they occurred while the Iranian delegation was engaged in indirect talks in Doha aimed at securing a political resolution with Washington.

2. Persisting points of contention in negotiations
The latest diplomatic framework proposes a 60-day extension of the current ceasefire, along with the lifting of restrictions on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Under the draft deal, Iran would allow unrestricted commercial shipping through the strait, while the US would lift its naval blockade of Iranian ports and ease some sanctions on Iranian oil sales. However, the proposed agreement falls short of resolving several core points of contention that have repeatedly undermined previous diplomatic efforts. The most significant sticking point remains Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium and its broader nuclear program. Iran insists on its sovereign right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes, while Washington demands the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

The situation is further complicated by Israel’s ongoing war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran has demanded an end to hostilities on all fronts as a precondition for a comprehensive deal, yet Israel has intensified its military operations despite a ceasefire. Iran’s attempts to assert unilateral control over the Strait of Hormuz, countered by firm US opposition to any such authority, add another layer of complexity. Additionally, Washington remains reluctant to provide substantial sanctions relief or release frozen Iranian assets without securing a more comprehensive and favorable agreement. These unresolved issues continue to create deadlocks, casting serious doubt on whether the current draft can be accepted by both Tehran and Washington.

3. Trump’s gamble to “out-wait” Tehran with no end in sight
Despite acknowledging the political stakes of the prolonged Iran conflict in the upcoming midterm elections, President Trump has doubled down on his unyielding stance against Iran, declaring his willingness to outwait Tehran for as long as necessary until Washington’s demands are fully met. This position starkly contradicts his administration’s initial claims that the war would be swift and decisive, especially as the conflict has now dragged on for months with repeated stalemates. Trump has also proposed new conditions, such as requiring Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Arab states to join the Abraham Accords and normalising ties with Israel, a highly unrealistic demand in the current climate. This stance risks prolonging the conflict indefinitely and increasing the chances of further escalation with no clear end in sight.

In perspective
First, temporary respite without a lasting resolution. While the latest proposal, if approved by Washington and Tehran, marks a considerable achievement in halting active hostilities and restoring commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, it leaves many of the central underlying problems unaddressed. Without a comprehensive deal on core issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, Israel’s continued military operations and occupation in Lebanon, and the long-term control of the Strait of Hormuz, the risk of renewed tensions and escalations remain high.

Second, internal pressures in Washington and war liability. The Trump administration is under increasing pressure over the protracted Iran conflict, which was originally intended to be a swift military operation but has now stretched into its fourth month amid repeated stalemates. Despite the administration's bid to continue hostilities until all goals are achieved, mounting domestic war fatigue, public dissatisfaction, volatile oil prices and the looming 2026 midterm elections threaten Republican control of Congress. With Republicans currently holding narrow majorities in both chambers, a Democratic takeover could severely limit Trump’s goals for Iran, triggering oversight investigations, and weakening his position heading into the 2028 cycle.

CW Column
The War in Ukraine:
Ballistic missiles, Nuclear drills with Belarus, and the Czech ammunition initiative

Radhika Agarwal

In the news
On 19 May, Russia began a three-day joint exercise of nuclear forces with Belarus. The Russian Defense Ministry stated the drills involved over 64000 troops, more than 200 missile launch platforms, 140 aircraft, 73 surface warships, and 13 submarines, eight of them carrying nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles.

On 20 May, according to media reports, Ukraine targeted a training camp for Russian drone pilots in Snizhne, in occupied Donetsk, killing 65 cadets and their instructor. Additionally, the Syzran oil refinery sustained damage 800 km inside Russian territory. The destruction of the FSB headquarters in occupied Kherson resulted in approximately 100 Russian casualties.

On 21 May, Russia and Belarus concluded the nuclear exercises. Trucks carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles moved over forest roads, atomic-powered submarines sailed from Arctic and Pacific ports, and crews scrambled into warplanes as the two countries completed the final stage of the drills.

On 24 May, Russia launched a large-scale combined aerial assault on Ukraine. The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed strikes using Oreshnik, Iskander, Kinzhal, and Zircon missiles against Ukrainian military command posts, air bases, and military-industrial complexes, framing the attack as a response to Ukrainian terrorist acts on Russian civilian targets. The Oreshnik struck Bila Tserkva, roughly 64 kms from Kyiv. Among the buildings hit in the capital were the National Art Museum, the Philharmonic Hall, the Cabinet of Ministers building, and the Foreign Ministry.

On 26 May, the Czech-led initiative to procure large-caliber artillery ammunition for Ukraine had lost half of its participating countries, dropping from 18 to 9 donor states. Czech President Petr Pavel, who had championed the project, acknowledged that it currently delivers up to half of all large-caliber ammunition to Ukrainian forces and warned it cannot be easily replaced.

Issues at large
1. The Oreshnik and Russia’s move from conventional arms to ballistic missiles
Moscow has adapted legacy platforms like the Topol and Yars ICBM families with modern guidance and propulsion to create new missile systems, including the Oreshnik. Since 2022, the state funding for strategic missile programmes has increased year on year, reflecting a decisive shift. The Oreshnik, a solid-fuel ballistic missile, is launched from mobile ground systems and capable of traveling 13000 km per hour. By deploying the Oreshnik in a conventional role, Russia maintains deliberate ambiguity about future payloads, whether the next launch carries a conventional or nuclear warhead.

2. The strategic importance of Belarus for Russia and the bilateral military drills
Prior to the war, Belarus served as a strategic buffer between Russia and Central Europe. Russia has since turned it into a launchpad for its war against Ukraine and a hardening bulwark against NATO. Wedged between Russia and NATO member states in the Baltic, Belarus lies along a historical invasion corridor linking Central Europe to the east. Russia's use of Belarusian territory reduces distances to strategic objectives, increases pressure on NATO reinforcement corridors, and cuts the warning time NATO might have of Russian military movements. President Lukashenko is a willing partner, as his political survival since 2020 has depended entirely on the Kremlin. The nuclear drills in May 2026 marked the latest step in Belarus’s importance, as Belarusian units practiced independent nuclear munitions deployment on home soil.

3. Ukraine and the Czech ammunition initiative
It emerged in early 2024 as a direct response to the suspension of US military aid and Europe's failure to meet its own promised shell delivery targets, leaving Ukraine critically short of artillery ammunition. At the time, Western manufacturers were producing 1.3 million shells a year while Russia was producing 4.5 million at a quarter of the cost. The Czech mechanism, informally called the Shell Bridge, bypassed that production gap by sourcing ammunition on global markets. It facilitated the delivery of over 3 million shells, including 1.5 million in 2024 and 1.8 million in 2025.

In perspective
First, Russia is shifting the terms of the war by deploying weapons that cannot be intercepted, embedding itself deeper into Belarus to multiply threat vectors. Ukraine has responded, as it destroyed a drone training facility, shut down a major oil refinery deep inside Russia, and hit an FSB headquarters, all in the same week it absorbed the heaviest aerial bombardment Kyiv had seen in the entire war. Czech support is important in this context.

CW Column
Conflicts in Africa
The Ebola spread in DR Congo, The Faye-Sonko split in Senegal, and the Deepening US military involvement in Nigeria

Anu Maria Joseph

What happened this week?
1. DR Congo
On 27 May, the World Health Organization (WHO) Chief Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus described Ituri province in DR Congo as a centre of a “catastrophic collision of disease and conflict.”

On 18 May, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared an Ebola outbreak in DR Congo as a public health emergency of international concern. So far, there have been a total of 1000 suspected cases and 220 reported deaths; 51 cases have been confirmed in Congo's Ituri province. The WHO has also warned of a "much larger outbreak," with the risk of local and regional spread. Two cases were reported in Uganda. Rwanda and Uganda have closed their borders.

On 20 May, the WHO said it would take another nine months before a vaccine against Ebola is ready.

2. Senegal
On 23 May, Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye sacked Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko and dissolved the government following months of tensions between the two leaders. Later, on 26 May, the lawmakers voted Sonko as the Speaker of the parliament, a role that could challenge President Faye’s office.

3. Nigeria
On 20 May, Al Jazeera reported that the US military's Africa Command (AFRICOM) claimed to have killed 175 IS-linked fighters in a series of joint strikes in Nigeria's northeastern regions during recent days.

On 19 May, the Nigerian Defence Headquarters stated that a joint operation with AFICOM destroyed checkpoints, weapons caches, logistic hubs, military equipment, and financing networks of ISWAP. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu said that ISWAP's second-in-command, Abu Bilal al-Minuki, has been killed. Tinubu thanked US President Trump for his "leadership and unwavering support."

Meanwhile, on 18 May, according to the BBC, gunmen kidnapped more than 50 children from Borno state. No group has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping.

What are the issues?
1. DR Congo: Uncertain magnitude of Ebola endemic in conflict-hit eastern DRC
Ebola, a disease that spreads through bats, was first discovered in 1976 in DR Congo. It spreads via direct contact with bodily fluids. Since its discovery, the disease has been endemic in the country, with 16 previous outbreaks. The current outbreak is caused by the Bundibugyo variant of the virus. It was responsible for the 2012 outbreak that killed a third of those infected.

The majority of the cases have been confirmed in Ituri province in eastern DRC. Cases have also been identified in Goma, the rebel-controlled city in North Kivu. Initial symptoms of the virus are similar to those of malaria and typhoid, which are common in DR Congo, causing a delayed diagnosis of the spread. According to the MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, the outbreak is "larger than currently ascertained" and that its "true magnitude remains uncertain." Currently, there are no approved vaccines for the disease. However, the vaccines for the Zaire Ebola Virus and the AstraZeneca vaccine used for COVID-19 are being discussed in terms of preventing the spread.

Meanwhile, the violence in conflict-affected regions such as Ituri and Kivu has collapsed hospitals and public health facilities. The majority of the population lives in unsanitary conditions amidst frequent internal displacement. According to the UN, over 13 million people have been internally displaced in eastern DRC due to the conflict. A lack of information and access to health systems has increased the likelihood of a rapid spread.

There has been a swift national, regional and international response against the spread of Ebola. Rwanda has closed its borders to prevent the spread. The WHO has released USD four million to combat the outbreak. The M23 rebels have created an Ebola response team. However, neither the rebels nor the government has confirmed to work together. Caitlin Brady, the country director for the Danish Refugee Council, has been informed by the rebels that they are conducting contact tracing of the infected, implying that the capacity to respond has remained.

2. Senegal: The break of the Faye-Sonko tie-up over disagreement on the handling of the economic crisis
Tensions have been growing between President Faye and Prime Minister Sonko for months over the disagreement on the handling of the economic crisis. The IMF froze a USD 1.8 billion lending scheme following a misreported debt by the previous government. It pushed the debt level to 132 per cent of the country’s economic output. Faye criticised Sonko’s “excessive personalisation” within the party. Sonko accuses the resident of a “failure of leadership” for not supporting him.

During the 2024 presidential election, Faye contested in place of Sonko, the popular leader who was barred from running due to a defamation conviction, under the slogan “Diomaye is Sonko, Sonko is Diomaye.” The 2024 elections received much criticism when the previous government banned the major opposition party, Patriots of Senegal (PATSEF), from running. Faye, although a member of PATSEF, ran independently with the support of Sonko’s popularity. The tie-up between the two leaders unseated then-President Macky Sall. It was a democratic and extraordinary victory in Senegal’s political history, given that they were under arrest ten days before the election. However, the current unusual political situation has brought uncertainty.

3. Nigeria: Worsening security issues and deepening US military involvement
Since November 2025, there has been an increase in Boko Haram and Islamic State-linked attacks in Nigeria, with more than 15 attacks recorded in 2026. In February, an IS-linked group, Lakurawa, killed 162 people in the state of Kwara. In March, ISAWP and Boko Haram started launching attacks against military bases in Borno and Yobe states. On 11 March, 65 Nigerian soldiers were killed by ISWAP. While in 2025 the majority of the attacks were concentrated in the states of Borno, Zamfara and Kaduna, in 2026 they spread to Kwara, Niger and Katsina states.

Meanwhile, the US involvement in Nigeria's security affairs has increased recently. In November 2025, Nigeria came under US pressure when Trump accused the Nigerian government of failing to protect Christians from the IS-linked group's attacks in the northwest. The US-Nigeria military cooperation began with the US military strikes against IS-linked groups in Nigeria's Sokoto state in December 2025, in collaboration with the Nigerian government. In February, 100 US military troops arrived in Maiduguri to provide intelligence, military equipment and technical and operational coordination. However, the latest strikes imply US involvement in combat operations. While the Nigerian government welcomes US support, there is growing domestic concern about external influence on Nigeria's internal security decisions and US economic and geopolitical interests in the region.

What does it mean?
In DR Congo, the WHO declared a health emergency in a span of three days, highlighting swift action to avoid a regional and international spread. However, unlike the previous ones, the rapid increase in the number of cases in the current outbreak has raised the concern of a missed diagnosis and the uncertain magnitude of the spread. Besides, the outbreak is concentrated in the inaccessible region affected by a complex conflict, which is likely to complicate surveillance, tracing and healthcare. The collapsed state health system, misinformation and lack of trust among the conflict-hit population risk the virus spreading across eastern DRC and beyond the borders. Controlling the spread of the disease in conflict-hit regions requires coordination between rebels, the government and international actors to allow access for health care systems.

Senegal, a country that symbolizes democracy in West Africa, faces an unusual political situation. President Faye’s decision to dismiss Sonko has political risk. Sonko holds broad popular support. His removal may lead to a split with the PASTEF party. It also risks the return of protests, which the country witnessed during the Macky Sall regime. The new political struggle in Senegal, combined with the economic crisis, has pushed the country into an uncertain and complicated political trajectory.

In Nigeria, the latest US-Nigeria joint airstrikes and the death of the IS leader highlight a significant high-profile counterterrorism success against IS following the recent increase in attacks. However, it has also increased the likelihood of groups spreading to other states with limited security presence. ISWAP and Boko Haram operate through local alliances and infiltration. Even if the leaders are eliminated, structural drivers of the insurgency, including poverty, weak governance, corruption and ungoverned territory, remain intact. Besides, the expanding geographical spread of the ISWAP and Boko Haram attacks suggests the group’s improved operational coordination. The ISWAP’s attack on military bases implies the group’s increasing intelligence capacity and access to weapons. While debates on US economic and geopolitical interests in the region remain, a successful counterterrorism effort will depend on a long-term outcome.

The World This Week

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The Quad Foreign Ministersâ€™ Meeting 2026, and China's Shenzhou-23 Mission

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2127

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella

The Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting 2026:

Prioritizing Critical minerals, Supply chain resilience, and Maritime surveillance

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2126

Aparna A Nair

The Shenzhou-23 Mission:

Chinaâ€™s Space Missions, Technology, and Infrastructure

Conflict Weekly

May 2026 | CWA # 2125

NIAS Global Politics Team

Israel-Lebanon Tensions I Crisis in Cuba I Ebola Outbreak in Africa

Weekly Columns on Africa and the Middle East

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2124

Glynnis Winona B

The Crisis in Cuba:

The US Sanctions, Energy Crisis, and Economic Instability

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2123

Akshath Kaimal

The Ebola and the DR Congo:

Multiple Outbreaks, Fragile Healthcare System, and Ineffective Global Responses

CW Column

May 2026 | CWA # 2122

Radhika M Agarwal

The War in Ukraine:

Ballistic missiles, Nuclear drills with Belarus, and the Czech ammunition initiative

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2121

Deb Dutta

Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the Border Tensions:

Collapse of the Ceasefire, Ineffective Beirut, and Aggressive Tel Aviv

CW Column

May 2026 | CWA # 2120

Brighty Ann Sarah

Conflicts in the Middle East

The US-Iran War Week Thirteen: Escalating Hostilities, Tenuous Ceasefire and Tense Negotiations

CW Column

May 2026 | CWA # 2119

Anu Maria Joseph

Conflicts in Africa

The Ebola spread in DR Congo, The Faye-Sonko split in Senegal, and the Deepening US military involvement in Nigeria

The World This Week

May 2026 | CWA # 2118

Global Politics Team

The Putin-Xi Summit, PM Modi's UAE Visit, and the India-Nordic Summit

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2117

Lekshmi MK

The India-Nordic Summit and PM Modiâ€™s Oslo Visit

Arctic cooperation, Climate diplomacy, and Trade diversification

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2116

Yesasvi Koganti

India, the UAE, and PM Modiâ€™s visit:

Deepening Energy, AI, Defence, and Maritime Cooperation

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2115

Aparna A Nair

The Putin-Xi Summit

Trade, Technology, Security, and Pipeline

Global Politics Explainer

May 2026 | CWA # 2114

Glynnis Winona B

What makes the UAE a global player?

Explaining the Governance, Economy, People, and Strategic Influence of a Small Middle Eastern State

Global Politics Explainer

May 2026 | CWA # 2113

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Sri Lanka and the US-Iran WarÂ

Rising oil imports, Austerity measures and State capacity

Global Politics Explainer

May 2026 | CWA # 2112

Nithin V

Why does the Falkland Islands dispute keep recurring?

Why do the UK and Argentina still clash over a remote South Atlantic archipelago?

The World This Week

May 2026 | CWA # 2111

NIAS Global Politics Team

The Trump-Xi Summit

The Africa Forward Summit 2026 I North Korea's Constitutional Amendment 2026

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2110

Aishal Hab Yousuf

The Trump-Xi Summit:

Managing Strategic Competition through Trade, Technology, and Diplomacy

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2109

Aishal Hab Yousuf

North Korea's Constitutional Amendment 2026:

The End of Korean Reunification, the Declaration of New Borders, and the Control of Nuclear Command

TWTW Review

May 2026 | CWA # 2108

Ada Khan

The Africa Forward Summit 2026:

Five Takeaways of the Nairobi Declaration

Conflict Weekly

May 2026 | CWA # 2107

NIAS Global Politics Team

Rising violence in the Lake Chad region I The New Wave of Violence in DR Congo

The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire I Iranâ€™s Lebanon precondition for a ceasefire with the US

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2106

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Continuing Militant Attacks in Pakistan:

Multiple targets, Civilian casualties, and Cross-border tensionsÂ with Afghanistan

CW Explainer

May 2026 | CWA # 2105

Rohini Reenum

Iranâ€™s Lebanon precondition for a ceasefire with the US:Â

Four reasons why Tehran insists on including Hezbollah

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2104

Brighty Ann Sarah

The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:

Nominal Truce and Persisting ViolationsÂ

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2103

Akshath Kaimal

Rising violence in the Lake Chad region:Â

Complex Geography, Multiple Insurgencies, and an Escalating Humanitarian Crisis

CW Review

May 2026 | CWA # 2102

Glynnis Winona B

Weakening faith in institutions and Political polarization in Latin America and the Caribbean:

Six Takeaways from the UNDP Democracy and Development Report 2026

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2101

Anu Maria Joseph

The New Wave of Violence in DR Congo:

Farmer-herder clashes, Armed groups, and Security vacuum

The US-Iran War

May 2026 | CWA # 2100

Aishal Hab Yousuf

The Hormuz Strait and the Fertilizer Crisis in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

The US-Iran War

May 2026 | CWA # 2099

Kirsten Wilfred Coelho

Why is the UK reluctant to engage?

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2098

Sreemaya Nair

India, Russia and the imperative to strengthen the traditional relationship

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2097

Kirsten Wilfred Coelho

President Trump and the US-China Trade Tensions

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2095

Santhosh Guru PR

The Eurasian-Indo Pacific Congruence and its Critique

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2094

Rakshitha B

Transactional US foreign policy and it implications for India's Strategic Autonomy

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2093

Glynnis Winona B

The Russia-Ukraine War and the Rise of Parallel Strategic Systems: A Critique of Raghavan's Strategic Framework

Conflict Weekly

May 2026 | CWA # 2092

NIAS Global Politics Team

The US-Iran War, Week Ten

CW Column on Middle East: Escalating Israeli Aggression in Lebanon I UAE's Covert Manoeuvres

CW Column

May 2026 | CWA # 2091

Brighty Ann Sarah

Conflicts in the Middle East:

Escalating Israeli Aggression in Lebanon I UAE’s Covert Manoeuvres

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2090

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Ten:

Fraying Ceasefire, Renewed Negotiations and the Risk of a Stalemate

The World This Week

May 2026 | CWA # 2089

Global Politics Team

US troop withdrawal from Germany I UAE’s Exit from OPEC I Japan, Vietnam and PM Takaichi’s Visit

King Charles's US Visit

TWTW Takeaways

May 2026 | CWA # 2088

Nithin V

King Charles's US Visit:

Emphasis on strong bilateral relations, democratic values and security cooperation

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2087

Siddhi Halyur

Japan, Vietnam and PM Takaichi’s Visit

Exploring Strategic Sectors of Cooperation

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2086

Aishal Hab Yousuf

UAE’s Exit from OPEC:

Implications for the Middle East and the Energy Market

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2085

Glynnis Winona B

US troop withdrawal from Germany:

Growing US-Europe differences and Challenges for Berlin

Conflict Weekly

May 2026 | CWA # 2084

NIAS IPRI

The US-Iran War, Week Nine I Escalating Violence in Mali

Review: Five Takeaways of RSF's 2026 Report on Media Freedom

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2083

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Nine:

Deadlocked Negotiations, Competing Agendas and Domestic Pressure

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2082

Akshath Kaimal

Escalating Violence in Mali:

Between Ethnic Insurgencies, Jihadist Attacks, and Military Coups

CW Review

May 2026 | CWA # 2081

Jenin Raj S

Media freedom hits a 25-year low:

Five Takeaways from the RSF 2026 Index

The World This Week

April 2026 | CWA # 2080

Global Politics Team

Nepal’s New “National Commitment” I Japan’s New Defence Posture

Four Takeaways of the WFP's report on the fallouts of the Middle East crisis

TWTW Note

April 2026 | CWA # 2079

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Japan’s New Defence Posture:

From Post-War Pacifism to Strategic Recalibration and Autonomy

TWTW Note

April 2026 | CWA # 2078

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal’s New “National Commitment”

Managing Consensus and Moving ahead towards a New Nepal

TWTW Review

April 2026 | CWA # 2077

Nithin V

The Middle East Crisis and its Fallouts on Hunger and Global Food Supply Network

Four Takeaways of the WFP's report on the fallouts of the Middle East crisis, April 2026

April 2026 | CWA # 2050

IPRI Team

The US-Iran War, Week Five: Widening Conflict, Houthi Involvement, and Trump’s Renewed Threats

PR Commentary

March 2026 | CWA # 2043

Abhimanyu Solanki

Escalatory Airpower, Hybrid Retaliation, and Regional Security

Reassessing the Pakistan–Afghanistan Confrontation and Its Implications for India

March 2026 | CWA # 2042

R Preetha

Transnational organized crime, Emerging technologies, Global security environment and ‘Diverse threat vectors’

Five Takeaways of the US Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) Report for 2026

March 2026 | CWA # 2041

Aparna A Nair

China-Vietnam 3+3 Strategic Dialogue

Defence, Diplomacy and Public Security

March 2026 | CWA # 2040

Femy Francis

China's Interests and Strategies in the US-Iran War

Why Beijing’s support for Iran is rhetoric and muted

March 2026 | CWA # 2039

Femy Francis

Trump-Xi Meeting

Why did Trump reschedule it? What does that mean?

March 2026 | CWA # 2038

Anu Maria Joseph

Sudan-Chad tensions and the Boko Haram attack in Nigeria's Maiduguri

March 2026 | CWA # 2037

Padmashree Anandhan

Massive drone attacks, Growing energy leverage and Drifting peace efforts

March 2026 | CWA # 2036

Brighty Ann Sarah

Continuing Israel-Hezbollah Confrontation

Expanding Israeli Military Operations and the Reshaping of Southern Lebanon

March 2026 | CWA # 2035

Akshath Kaimal

Five Takeaways of Human Rights Watch Report 2026

March 2026 | CWA # 2024

Lekshmi MK

The UN and the Iran-US War

UNSC Resolution 2817 between “Clear and Unified Message” and “Manifest Injustice”

March 2026 | CWA # 2023

Femy Francis

China’s Two Sessions 2026

New Five-Year Plan, Ethnic Unity Law, and an Enhanced Defence Budget

March 2026 | CWA # 2022

Padmashree Anandhan

Continuing Strikes and Inconsistent Diplomatic Efforts

March 2026 | CWA # 2021

Anu Maria Joseph

Political instability in Madagascar and spreading violence in South Sudan

March 2026 | CWA # 2020

Brighty Ann Sarah

Continuing Israel-Hezbollah Confrontation

Attacks in South Lebanon, Beirut’s Conundrum, and Tel Aviv’s Greater Goals

March 2026 | CWA # 2019

Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria

Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment

March 2026 | CWA # 2018

Rohini Reenum

The US-Iran War, Week Two

Expanding Fronts, Shifting Goalposts, and Global Fallout

The World This Week

March 2026 | CWA # 2011

Tanvi Thara Harendra Jha

Canada’s PM Mark Carney’s India Visit

Resetting Economic, Strategic and Cultural Ties

Global Politics Early Bird

March 2026 | CWA # 2010

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Elections 2026

The Rise of the “New” and the Fall of the “Old”

March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026

Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape

The World This Week

March 2026 | CWA # 2008

Global Politics Team

Canadian PM's India Visit I Nepal Elections and its Political Reset

March 2026 | CWA # 2007

Global Politics Team

The World Today #272, 06 March 2026

The World Today

Early Bird

March 2026 | CWA # 2006

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Election 2026, Day One

Peaceful polling, with over 60 per cent turnout

March 2026 | CWA # 2005

Global Politics Team

The World Today #271, 05 March 2026

The World Today

March 2026 | CWA # 2004

Akshath Kaimal

The “Forgotten” South Sudan Conflict

Instability returns, with a fragile peace agreement, uptick in violence and limited international engagement

March 2026 | CWA # 2003

Yesasvi Koganti

PM Modi’s Visit to Israel

From bilateral ties to a special strategic partnership

March 2026 | CWA # 2002

Femy Francis

German Chancellor’s China Visit

Reducing trade deficit and recalibrating economic cooperation with Beijing

March 2026 | CWA # 2001

R Preetha

Trump’s State of the Union Address

Six major takeaways on the economy, border and internal security and Iran

March 2026 | CWA # 2000

Rohini Reenum

The US-Iran War, Week One

Rapid Escalation, Regional Spillover, Global Uncertainty

Conflict Weekly

March 2026 | CWA # 1999

IPRI Team

The US-Iran War, Week One | The Return of Violence to South Sudan

Weekly Column on Ukraine & Africa

February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan

Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover

February 2026 | CWA # 1997

Padmashree Anandhan

Four Years of War in Ukraine

Continuing Uncertainty

February 2026 | CWA # 1996

Akshath Kaimal

Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes

Another round of cross-border attacks

March 2026 | CWA # 1995

Global Politics Team

The World Today #269, 03 March 2026

The World Today

March 2026 | CWA # 1994

Global Politics Team

The World Today #268, 02 March 2026

The World Today

PR Commentary

March 2026 | CWA # 1993

D Suba Chandran

The US-Iran Conflict and Pakistan

Balancing Rhetoric, Regional Interests and Global Alignments

Conflict Weekly

February 2026 | CWA # 1992

IPRI Team

Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes I Fours Years of Ukraine War

Weekly Column on Africa

March 2026 | CWA # 1991

Global Politics Team

Trump’s State of the Union Address | German Chancellor’s China Visit | India’s PM’s Israel Visit

February 2026 | CWA # 1990

Global Politics Team

The World Today #266, 27 February 2026

The World Today

Conflict Weekly

February 2026 | CWA # 1989

IPRI Team

Abu Dhabi Talks on Ukraine I Militant Attacks in Balochistan

CW Columns on Middle East and Africa

February 2026 | CWA # 1988

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine Peace talks in Abu Dhabi

Negotiations without a ceasefire or resolution

February 2026 | CWA # 1987

Akshath Kaimal

Continuing militant attacks in Balochistan

Expanding violence, Security-first response and Missing political dialogue in Pakistan

PR Commentary

February 2026 | CWA # 1986

R Preetha

Pakistan’s Central Asia Boost

Pakistan’s Climate and Water Crisis

Five Questions on Challenges, Capacity and Policies

The World This Week

February 2026 | CWA # 1965

Global Politics Team

AI Impact Summit in New Delhi I Munich Security Conference 2026

Conflict Weekly

February 2026 | CWA # 1964

IPRI Team

US-Iran & Ukraine Negotiations in Geneva I US Military Deployment in Nigeria

CW Columns on Middle East and Africa

February 2026 | CWA # 1963

Global Politics Team

The World Today #255, 16 February 2026

Today in History

The World This Week

February 2026 | CWA # 1962

Global Politics Team

Japan: Sanae Takaichi’s historic win | Honk Kong: Jimmy Lai Sentenced

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas

Early Bird

February 2026 | CWA # 1961

Lekshmi MK

Sanae Takaichi’s historic win in Japan

What does it mean for domestic politics and regional stability?

Early Bird

February 2026 | CWA # 1960

Femy Francis

Jimmy Lai sentenced for 20 years in Hong Kong: Who, What, and Why

CEAP

February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti

UK and China

PM Keir Starmer’s visit and the Recalibration of Economic, Strategic, and Domestic ties

February 2026 | CWA # 1958

Akshath Kaimal

India-EU Free Trade Agreement: Five Major Takeaways

The focus on expanded cooperation in defence, technology and critical minerals

February 2026 | CWA # 1957

R Preetha

The India–US interim trade framework

Tariff recalibration and Energy and Supply Chain realignment

February 2026 | CWA # 1956

Lekshmi MK

End of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

Erosion of arms control, Return of nuclear anxieties, and the New focus on China

The World This Week

February 2026 | CWA # 1955

Global Politics Team

End of the New START I India–US interim Trade Framework I India-EU Free Trade Agreement I UK PM Keir Starmer’s China visit

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas

February 2026 | CWA # 1954

Nishchal Nath Pandey

Nepal Elections 2026: Political Parties, Gen Z Protests and Hope for a New Beginning

Conflict Weekly

February 2026 | CWA # 1953

IPRI Team

Abu Dhabi Talks on Ukraine I Militant Attacks in Balochistan

Weekly Columns: Conflicts in Africa and the Middle East

CW Column: Conflicts in the Middle East

January 2026 | CWA # 1952

Brighty Ann Sarah

US threats against Iran, and Phase Two operations in Gaza

CW Column: Conflicts in Africa

January 2026 | CWA # 1951

Anu Maria Joseph

Africa: Renewed violence in Ethiopia and a Jihadist attack in Niger

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1950

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine: The Trilateral Talks, and the Deadlock over Donetsk & Security Guarantees for Kyiv

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1949

R Preetha

The United States: ICE Crackdowns, Rising Resistance and the Political/Legal pushback

Conflict Weekly

January 2026 | CWA # 1948

ICE Crackdowns and Resistance in the US I Trilateral Talks on Ukraine

TWTW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1947

Brighty Ann Sarah

The Pentagon’s National Defence Strategy: Four major takeaways

TWTW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1946

R Preetha

The Davos Summit 2026

Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum

The World This Week

January 2026 | CWA # 1945

Global Politics Team

The Davos Forum 2026 Takeaways I The US Pentagon’s National Defence Strategy

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1944

Brighty Ann Sarah

Syria: The State victory over the Syrian Democratic Forces

Conflict Weekly Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1943

Anu Maria Joseph

Another major kidnapping in Nigeria and Election announcement in Guinea-Bissau

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1942

Lekshmi MK

Greenland: Trump’s escalation-deescalation approach and Europe’s defence

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1941

Brighty Ann Sarah

The War in Gaza: Trump’s Board of Peace and the Challenges to Phase Two

Conflict Weekly

January 2026 | CWA # 1940

IPRI Team

Trump’s “Board of Peace” in Gaza I Escalation/De-escalation in Greenland

TWTW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1939

Lekshmi MK

Greenland: Trump’s escalation-deescalation strategy and Europe’s defence

The World This Week

January 2026 | CWA # 1938

Continuing Tensions over Greenland

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1937

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Nigeria: Intensifying domestic responses, and questions over Trump’s intervention

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1936

Brighty Ann Sarah

Protests in Iran: Continuing Stalemate and Shifting US Position

Conflict Weekly

January 2026 | CWA # 1935

IPRI Team

Protests in Iran | Instability in Nigeria

The World This Week

January 2026 | CWA # 1934

Global Politics Team

The US, Greenland and Trump's Claims

Conflict Weekly

January 2026 | CWA # 1933

IPRI Team

Protests in Iran, the US Military Intervention in Venezuela and Conflicts in Africa

NIAS Conflict Weekly | The World This Week

January 2026 | CWA # 1932

Global Politics Team