What happened?
On 26 May, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar hosted the 11th Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and Japan’s Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi were in attendance. On the same day, the meeting produced a joint statement, a factsheet, and a statement on Indo-Pacific energy security.
New initiatives launched at the Quad summit include the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC), the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative Framework, a joint port infrastructure project in Fiji under the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership initiative, and the Quad Indo-Pacific Energy Security Initiative.
They also confirmed the growth of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness and an open radio access network, clarified their position on "economic coercion" and actions that unilaterally define the status quo, and expressed concern about the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China said, “We also do not support the formation of exclusive cliques or bloc confrontation. No cooperation should undermine mutual trust and cooperation among regional countries."
What is the background?
1. A brief note on Quad and the member countries
The Quad grouping emerged after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when an informal disaster relief and humanitarian assistance coalition was formed between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, which was later formalized in 2007 by Japan's then-Prime Minister. Today, it brings together some of the world’s largest economies, accounting for approximately a third of global GDP and a fourth of the world's population.
2. Increasing focus on critical minerals and supply chain resilience
The new Critical Minerals Initiative Framework launched by the Quad commits member countries to mobilizing up to USD 20 billion in combined government and private-sector support across mining, processing, and recycling. Critical minerals are essential inputs of the modern economy; they are indispensable for manufacturing semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, defence equipment, and renewable energy systems. The key issue lies not in the supply of these minerals but in their processing concentration; roughly 70-75 percent of global processing capacity is held by China. Furthermore, export restrictions enforced by China since 2023 on germanium, gallium, and graphite have demonstrated the challenge of this supply chain control for other manufacturing and growing economies.
3. Enhancing maritime surveillance for digital security
The new Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC) is an integrated surveillance initiative to enhance monitoring capabilities across the Indo-Pacific; this ties into the fragility and need for security of digital infrastructure. Approximately 95 percent of all intercontinental internet traffic travels through a network of undersea cables that can be disrupted by natural events, ship anchors, or deliberate interference. The Indo-Pacific harbours a high concentration of these cables, as well as submarine activity, making maritime domain awareness and surveillance a security necessity.
4. Increasing attention to the Pacific Islands
Pacific Island countries have become a focal point in geopolitical strategy. China has significantly expanded its investments, diplomatic presence, and security partnerships in the region, most notably in 2022, establishing the China-Solomon Islands security agreement. This development has alarmed the Quad countries. In 2023, the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership initiative was built specifically to provide infrastructure, port development, undersea cable connectivity, and development finance alternatives to Pacific Island countries. Now, the joint port infrastructure project in Fiji aims to advance port infrastructure and related activities in the country.
5. Securing critical maritime trade and energy corridors
The new Indo-Pacific Energy Security Initiative is a plan covering technology, emergency response, and a dedicated Quad Fuel Security Forum. Approximately 60 per cent of global maritime trade passes through the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the region links energy exports from the Gulf to manufacturing hubs in East and Southeast Asia, and these hubs to Europe and the Americas. Recent instability in critical container shipping and oil and gas corridors, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, has direct energy security and trade implications for the Quad economies.
6. China’s continued opposition to the Quad
China's opposition to the Quad has been consistent since the grouping's revival in 2017, often characterizing it as an exclusive group aimed at sowing discord between regional countries and China. The core objection is framed not as opposition to any specific Quad initiative but as a rejection of "group politics," arguing that it is inherently destabilizing and incompatible with the Asia-Pacific's role as a "pacesetter of cooperation.” The Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, reiterated this position of discontent after this year’s Quad meeting as well.
What does this mean?
First, the meeting signals continued investment in the Quad by its member countries. This is the third ministerial in eighteen months, demonstrating that the grouping has become a feature of how these four governments manage shared interests, despite foreign policy turbulence.
Second, the meeting is not exceptional in itself. Here, the agenda is important and shows a growing focus on making supply chains stronger, improving digital infrastructure, and managing technology as key security issues.
Third, the initiatives launched go beyond strengthening partnerships. These initiatives aim to challenge China's dominance in mineral processing, maritime surveillance, Pacific Island infrastructure, and technology standards. However, none of these pose a material challenge until they are fully operationalized.
