CWA # 2133
Conflict Weekly
Israel-Lebanon Tensions and a New Deal I The US-Iran War, Week Fourteen
Conflicts in Africa I The UK-Rwanda Asylum Deal
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NIAS Global Politics Team
5 June 2026
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Conflict Weekly Note
Israel-Lebanon Tensions:
New Deal amidst Israeli incursion and Hezbollah’s retaliation
Rohini Reenum
In the news
On 31 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his official instruction to the IDF to “deepen and expand” ground operations and control over previously Hezbollah-held areas.
On 1 June, US President Trump announced a verbal agreement between PM Netanyahu and backchannel representatives for Hezbollah, wherein the latter had agreed to halt its attacks against Israel if the latter ceased its offensive against Lebanon. On the same day, the UNSC convened an emergency session on Lebanon; top UN officials termed the situation “deeply alarming,” and cautioned over continuing attacks and Israel’s push further north. On the same day, Hezbollah announced that it had engaged and attacked Israeli ground troops and launched a retaliatory strike.
Between 1 June and 31 May, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio held urgent diplomatic calls with PM Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, proposing a phased framework where Hezbollah would halt attacks in exchange for Israel ending escalating strikes in Beirut.
On 3 June, the US, the Lebanese government and Israel issued a joint statement on Israel and Lebanon agreeing to a conditional ceasefire depending on “a complete cessation of Hezbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hezbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” The statement also emphasized that “the future of the relationship” between the two countries “must be decided by the two sovereign governments.” Additionally, the parties “rejected any attempt, by any state or non-state actor, to hold Lebanon’s future hostage.”
On 4 June, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem dismissed this deal, labeling it as “surrender and defeat.”
Issues at large
1. The expanding conflict geography
Previously, Israel had restricted itself to launching aerial attacks on Hezbollah strongholds in Southern Lebanon and South Beirut. Subsequently, Israel announced plans to occupy southern Lebanon up to the Litani River as a “defensive security zone.” This was followed by a ground offensive, which saw targeted attacks against civilian infrastructure, effectively cutting off Southern Lebanon from the mainland. The expansion further north continued with the capture of the castle and the crossing of the Litani River.
2. Diplomatic success followed by implementation failure
Since Israel’s offensive began, the US has mediated four direct talks and has managed to successfully conclude one 10-day pause and its subsequent extension. Despite this, Israeli attacks on Lebanon have continued, with Hezbollah intensifying its retaliation and increasingly taking an offensive posture. Even assurances from President Trump have failed to alter Netanyahu’s plans for Lebanon. The truce has thus been rendered ineffective. This diplomatic success should also be viewed against the backdrop of ongoing Iran-US negotiations wherein Tehran has insisted on the inclusion of Hezbollah as a prerequisite to any deal. A major roadblock to the implementation of the ceasefire has been the inability of the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah/deter its rearmament, which is a key Israeli demand.
3. The New Deal and its attempt to address implementation challenges
The latest deal has sought to mitigate some implementation challenges by mandating the expedited creation of “pilot zones.” The US has also reiterated its commitment to train the LAF, which can be viewed as sidelining Hezbollah diplomatically, scuttling its rearmament goals, and rendering it a non-factor in Israel-Lebanon relations permanently. This move is also aimed at reaffirming the Lebanese government’s territorial sovereignty and improving its state capacity.
4. The failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) and the entry of the US
The UN peacekeeping mission (UNFIL) was deployed in Lebanon in 1978 to “confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.” Subsequently, its mandate was expanded to include providing humanitarian aid, bringing the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River under the control of the LAF and UNFIL, among others. Despite its mandate being renewed annually for the past four decades, the mission has failed to achieve anything concrete. Unsurprisingly, in 2025, the UNSC decided to withdraw the UNFIL, setting a deadline of December 2026, effectively ending the UN’s presence in Lebanon.
In perspective
First, the last week was characterized by rapid escalation, breakthrough talks followed by ceasefire violations- a cycle that has repeated this past year. This has continued to fuel suspicion on both sides, creating a classic case of security dilemma. Second, the ongoing conflict has also created a conundrum for the Lebanese government, which lacks both the state capacity to disarm Hezbollah and respond to Israel effectively. Beirut has chosen the diplomatic route to reaffirm its sovereignty, deal with the Israeli aggression, and solve the Hezbollah problem. The success depends largely on continued US support and Israel’s commitment to its obligations, which is highly unlikely given its past actions. Third, Hezbollah is likely to remain a factor in Israel- Lebanon relations, at least for the immediate future, given Iran’s unwillingness to abandon it and Hezbollah’s long-standing domestic support.
Rohini Reenum is a doctoral student at NIAS. She is working on Governance in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction using the case study of the BBNJ Agreement.
Conflict Weekly Column
The US-Iran War, Week Fourteen:
Intensifying Domestic Pressure and the Lebanon Question
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 01 June, Iranian media outlet Tasnim reported that Tehran has suspended all indirect negotiations with the US in light of Israel’s violations in Lebanon.
Iranian officials stated that the political negotiations between Washington and Tehran are being delayed by Israel’s persisting violations in Lebanon, and accused the US of “constantly changing its views and putting forward “new or contradictory demands.” Iran’s spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei, added that Tehran is pursuing its core demand for the release of its frozen funds.
On 03 June, the Iranian Central Bank released a report warning of inflation at World War II levels, with the Iranian rial falling to 1.7 million per US dollar. Subsequently, on 04 June, Reuters reported that Iran’s exports of crude oil and condensate fell to their lowest level in at least six years in May, well below 300,000 barrels per day.
On 04 June, the US House of Representatives passed a War Powers Resolution aiming to halt further military action in Iran. The 215-208 vote was successful after four Republicans joined Democrats in a public show of disapproval of the war. President Trump rebuked the resolution as "unpatriotic" and ill-timed, as he was close to drawing a peace deal with Iran. Separately, Hezbollah rejected the US-mediated ceasefire proposal between Israel and Lebanon, as Israel continued its strikes on Lebanon and reasserted that it would not withdraw from southern Lebanon.
On 05 June, Iran reiterated its support for Hezbollah and asserted that any broader Iran-US negotiations were contingent on the end of hostilities in Lebanon and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Lebanese territory. "This war will end only when it ends in Lebanon as well," asserted Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi.
Issues at large
1. Intensifying Congressional pressure over the Iran war
The War Powers Resolution is a US federal law that limits the President’s ability to deploy forces into hostilities without congressional approval. Under the resolution, the President must notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces and cannot keep them deployed for more than 60 days without explicit congressional authorization or a formal declaration of war. The passage of the resolution, notably backed by four Republican senators despite several prior failed attempts, signals growing domestic disapproval and war fatigue. Rising gas prices and broader increases in household costs have already fuelled public discontent and weighed on President Trump’s approval ratings. The absence of a “swift and decisive” end to the conflict, as initially promised, has further deepened this dissatisfaction. This discontent also reflects unease over Israel’s continued military actions in Lebanon, complicating already strained US-Iran negotiations, particularly amid repeated US attempts to broker a ceasefire in Lebanon as a path toward a broader US-Iran peace deal.
2. The Lebanon factor in the US-Iran stalemate
The cessation of Israeli violations in Lebanon has consistently remained a core Iranian demand for any comprehensive negotiations with the US. Israel’s continued ceasefire violations, despite US intervention, remain a key obstacle to a US-Iran settlement, further complicated by recent escalations around Beirut and the entrenchment in southern Lebanon. Iran has also become more vocal in its support for Hezbollah’s counterstrikes and opposition to Israel’s intensified military activity in Lebanon, further deepening the US-Iran impasse.
3. Rising economic pressure in Iran and the push for sanctions relief
Shipping data indicates that Iran’s crude oil exports averaged about 209,000 bpd in May, a sharp decline from 1.34 million bpd in April and nearly 1.9 million bpd in March. Iran’s latest set of demands in negotiations with the US has centered on the release of frozen assets and the lifting of stringent sanctions. This comes amid rising inflation gripping Iran’s war economy. Tehran’s economic strain, already marked by severe inflation and currency devaluation earlier in the year, has been further exacerbated by the escalation of hostilities with Washington and Tel Aviv, while disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have dealt a significant blow to its oil-dependent economy. With Washington’s dual blockade of the strait, Iran’s oil shipments, and the income anticipated from tolls and control over the strait have dwindled, leaving the economy in a much worse state than when it started. Iran’s previously significant reliance on shadow-fleet oil exports has also come under pressure, increasing the need for sanctions relief and access to frozen funds.
In perspective
Despite intensifying domestic pressure to end the prolonged conflict, core disagreements remain unresolved, leaving both administrations in a standoff over who will concede first. While Washington has sought to address Iranian demands for a comprehensive cessation of hostilities by mediating Iran-Lebanon ceasefire negotiations, Israel’s continued operations and broader strategic ambitions, alongside Hezbollah’s retaliatory strikes, have undermined prospects for a swift resolution. The multi-front war and its protracted nature have severely eroded the Trump administration’s approval ratings, increasing pressure for a peace deal with Iran. Tehran simultaneously faces mounting economic strain from the blockade of the Strait and disruptions to its oil trade, further complicating its domestic landscape. With recent memories of severe civil unrest in early January, prompted by economic crisis and rising prices, Iran’s war-burdened economy is in dire need to stabilize on the domestic front.
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant with the Global Politics team at the Science, Technology and International Relations (STIR) Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.
Conflict Weekly Column
Conflicts in Africa This Week:
The Ebola fear in DR Congo and the Elections in Ethiopia amidst conflicts
Anu Maria Joseph
What happened this week?
1. DR Congo
As of 29 May, according to the WHO, 223 people died out of 906 suspected Ebola virus cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The disease has spread to neighbouring Uganda, with nine confirmed cases and one death. The previous week, the WHO declared the Ebola outbreak a public emergency of international concern.
On 31 May, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) deputy director Dr Alan Gonzales stated: "Never before has an Ebola outbreak recorded so many cases so soon after its declaration." He added: "Nobody knows the true scale and severity of this outbreak. New suspected cases are being reported daily."
On 29 May, a Kenyan court suspended the US plan to open an Ebola quarantine facility in Kenya to host American citizens exposed to the disease. However, Kenyan President William Ruto defended the plan, stating: "When President [Donald] Trump asked Kenya to support them by having a centre in Laikipia Airbase I gave the ok because it was an agreement with friends who have walked with Kenya for 30, 40 years." He added: "We are a responsible government. We know what we are doing."
Later, on 1 June, two people died in a protest against the planned US Ebola quarantine facility at the Laikipia military base. The US government said it plans to commit USD 13.5 million towards Kenya's Ebola preparation efforts. A US official stated that Kenya was selected because of its "proximity, airports in the region having limited capability, and to ensure Americans can be treated in a timely manner."
2. Ethiopia
On 1 June, Ethiopia conducted its seventh national election. 47 political parties contested the election, fielding 10,900 candidates for 547 seats in parliament. To form the government, the ruling party must secure 274 seats, a simple majority. Incumbent Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party are vying for another win. Voting has been suspended in Oromia, Amhara and Tigray regions, citing "unfavourable conditions" amid the conflict.
What are the issues?
1. DR Congo: The Ebola problem in conflict regions and Kenya’s debate on health burden sharing
DR Congo had faced 16 previous Ebola outbreaks. However, the current spread of the Bundibugyo variant has sparked fear for three reasons. First, the spread was diagnosed late. On 17 May, when WHO declared a public emergency in Congo, the death toll was above 80. The health agency also warned of the potential for a "larger outbreak." In a span of a week, the death toll crossed 200.
Secondly, the Bundibugyo variant does not have approved vaccines or drugs. Although unlike COVID-19, Ebola is not a respiratory virus that spreads effectively, it is easily transmitted and often deadly. 30 percent of people died in the previous outbreak of the current variant. The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) says it will take another 9 months to prepare the vaccine for clinical trials.
Third, the conflict in eastern Congo is complicating the containment. The conflict-hit Ituri province was identified as the epicenter of the disease outbreak. The disease has also spread to North and South Kivu provinces, both of which are challenged by rebel violence. The complex conflict has collapsed hospitals and health facilities, and the state has limited access to carry out surveillance, tracing, or health care measures. The disease has spread faster in conflict zones due to poor sanitation, greater mobility due to conflict-induced displacement, a weaker immune system among civilians, and a compromised health system.
The positive development is a swift international response. The EU has allocated EUR 15 million. The EU, WHO, Africa CDC, national authorities and other partners have scaled up surveillance, infection prevention and control, health services and community engagement to reduce the risk of regional and international spread.
Meanwhile, in Kenya, the US plan to establish an Ebola quarantine centre for its citizens, who have been exposed to the virus, has sparked widespread public anger among Kenyans. The protesters accuse the US of offloading health risks on Kenyan soil. The argument came after Trump announced it "cannot and will not allow" any Ebola cases to enter US soil. Kenya has not recorded any Ebola cases yet. The protesters fear that the centre will expose Kenya to the virus, a country with a weak health system.
2. Ethiopia: Elections overshadowed by conflicts
Abiy Ahmed's Prosperity Party came to power in 2018 with widespread popular support. In the 2018 and 2022 elections, he secured over 90 percent of the vote. Prosperity Party still dominates Ethiopian politics, while the opposition is weak and divided.
The election cannot be considered a democratic contest because it is overshadowed by multiple security issues. Elections are not being conducted in Tigray and parts of the Amhara and Oromia regions. The 2022 November Pretoria Agreement formally ended the Tigray War between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). However, the provisions within the agreement are yet to be implemented. In May 2026, TPLF restored its government in Tigray after the federal government extended the term of the interim government. The move has brought the region to the brink of a full return to war. In Amhara, the federal forces are fighting the Fano militia. In Oromia, the major security challenge is posed by the Oromia Liberation Army (OLA).
What does it mean?
1. DRC
DR Congo has previously managed to fight multiple Ebola outbreaks without a vaccine. It implies that the country has experience in surveillance, management, outbreak control, and coordination. However, the challenge is the lack of an operational environment due to conflict, displacement, state capacity, and collapsed health systems. International actors have stepped in and appear to have controlled a regional and international spread.
Meanwhile, in Kenya, the US plan to establish an Ebola quarantine centre has caused debates over risk, decision, consent, and burden sharing. For Kenya, the move raises questions of unequal distribution of risks. It has caused perceptions that Kenya is being considered as a place to manage the disease that originated in the DRC, as the US believes exposed individuals should not be brought to its territory. Additionally, although the quarantine facilities are designed to operate under biosafety protocols, Kenya’s limited public health capacity raises concerns about a high risk of disease spread.
2. Ethiopia
Ethiopia continues to face challenges from insurgency, militancy, and post-war uncertainty. These challenges limit political participation. In eight years, Abiy's party has managed to take control of state apparatus, federal institutions, security structures, and administrative structures. With none of the opposition parties having broad national support, Abiy's victory is certain. However, his victory also raises questions about political pluralism and inclusiveness. The continuation of Abiy’s regime is likely to leave the conflicts and security issues unresolved.
Anu Maria Joseph is currently a Non-Resident Fellow, Subhas Chandra Bose International Relations (SCB-IR) Chair, Chanakya University, Bengaluru.
Conflict Weekly Explainer
The UK-Rwanda Asylum Deal:
Why did the Permanent Court of Arbitration reject Rwanda’s claims? What was Rwanda’s complaint? Why did the UK cancel the deal?
Akshath Kaimal
On 01 June, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled in favour of the United Kingdom after Rwanda brought the country to court over the scrapped UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership Agreement. The deal was struck between the two countries in 2022 and signed in 2023 while a Conservative government was in power in the UK, but was later suspended by the current Labour government in 2024.
In response to the ruling, a UK government spokesperson said that the country had “robustly defended its position, and the tribunal has now ruled in favour of the UK on all grounds.”
A Rwandan government spokesperson said that the country "respects the tribunal's ruling and considers the matter closed", but highlighted the dissenting opinion from one of the judges as representative of how the case is open to “different legal interpretations”.
1. What did the ruling say?
In its final Award, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) rejected the Republic of Rwanda's claims against the United Kingdom. The tribunal ruled by majority to dismiss Rwanda's financial claim for the GBP 50 million Year 2 installment, and voted unanimously to reject the GBP 50 million claim for Year 3 under the 2024 Finance Agreement within the larger UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership Agreement. Additionally, the panel unanimously rejected Rwanda's assertions that the UK breached its obligations under Articles 18 and 19 of the Agreement, finding that the UK was not in breach for failing to resettle vulnerable refugees. Ultimately, the tribunal decided that both nations must split the arbitration costs equally and absorb their own respective legal expenses.
2. What was the UK-Rwanda asylum deal?
The UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership Agreement was a high-profile immigration policy first announced in April 2022 by then-Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson and signed by both countries in 2023. Under the five-year agreement, asylum seekers who arrived in the UK illegally - such as via small boats across the English Channel - would be relocated to Rwanda for processing. If their asylum claims were successful, they would be granted permanent residency in Rwanda, not the UK. In return for taking in the migrants, the UK government agreed to pay Rwanda an initial GBP 120 million through the Economic Transformation and Integration Fund (ETIF), plus an additional GBP 20,000 to GBP 30,000 per relocated individual to cover temporary accommodation and resettlement costs.
3. What led to the deal?
The Conservative government's primary goal was to curb illegal entry into the country. Small boat crossings across the English Channel into the UK increased from just 299 in 2018 to 45,774 in 2022. By resettling asylum seekers in the East African country as opposed to providing them a safe haven within the country, the UK aimed to drastically reduce the number of migrants attempting the dangerous Channel crossings. Officials also argued that the threat of deportation to Rwanda would undermine the business model of the human smuggling networks that facilitate the journeys. The policy is also part of a broader push to rein in immigration and asylum numbers, which had been increasing since the 2015 European migrant crisis.
4. Why did the Labour government suspend the deal?
When Keir Starmer became Prime Minister following Labour's general election victory in July 2024, he immediately declared the Rwanda plan "dead and buried" on his first day in office. The Labour government viewed the scheme as an “expensive gimmick". Before its cancellation, the UK had already spent roughly GBP 700 million on the policy, yet only four people - all of whom were volunteers - had actually been relocated to Kigali. Labour deemed this a waste of taxpayer money and pledged to redirect the funds toward delivering vital border security reforms and scaling up removals of those with no legal right to stay.
5. Why did Rwanda file a case against the UK?
After the UK walked away from the agreement, Rwanda filed an arbitration case against the UK at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in November 2025. Rwanda sued for over GBP 100 million, claiming the UK had breached the terms of the treaty. Specifically, they demanded two outstanding payments of GBP 50 million each, scheduled for the second and third years of the deal, plus compensation. Rwanda's Justice Minister, Emmanuel Ugirashebuja, argued his country had incurred "significant costs" preparing for the partnership, and complained that the UK didn't give Kigali the courtesy of advance notice, leaving Rwandan leaders to read about the cancellation in the media.
6. What next for the UK, Rwanda, and the migration issue?
With the arbitration settled, Rwanda is pivoting to other international partnerships, while the UK is shifting its focus to a domestic enforcement strategy. Having scrapped the deportation scheme, London is gambling heavily on its new Border Security Command to dismantle human smuggling networks. However, the underlying maritime crisis continues to swell. Despite the policy pivot, Channel crossings in small boats rose by 13 percent in 2025, reaching 41,472 arrivals - the second-highest annual total on record. As 2026 crossings continue at a relentless pace, the UK faces the reality that curbing irregular migration requires far more than just closing the book on Rwanda.
Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, and is part of the NIAS Pakistan Reader and Africa Studies teams.