The World This Week

The World This Week
Shangri-La Dialogue 2026: Major Statements and Takeaways
The Blue Origin Rocket Explosion

NIAS Global Politics Team
7 June 2026
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Shangri-La Dialogue 2026: Four Major Takeaways
Focus on Rules-based maritime order, AI & Cyber Security, and Preventive Diplomacy, but with no consensus

Aishal Hab Yousuf

During 29-31 May, 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, bringing together defence ministers, military leaders, and security experts from across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Discussions focused on regional security, maritime stability, military modernization, and the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Concerns over China's growing military capabilities, maritime security in the South China Sea, defence partnerships such as AUKUS, and the need for stronger regional cooperation featured prominently. Vietnam's President To Lam delivered the keynote address, while several countries used the forum for high-level bilateral defence engagements.

1. The emphasis on UNCLOS and the rules-based maritime order, especially in the Indo-Pacific
The Philippines's Defence Secretary, Gilbert Teodoro, emphasized China’s refusal to participate in the Annex VII proceedings under UNCLOS. He stated that China’s refusal does not absolve it from its legal obligation to comply with the tribunal’s ruling. In addition, he drew attention to China’s preferred course of action: bilateral negotiations. He quoted former Indian Secretary Vijay Gokhale’s recent book China Wars, while characterizing the said bilateral negotiations as a “talk and take strategy.” In this approach, diplomacy may create a façade of restraint while realities on the ground may be quite different. Vietnam’s President, Tô Lâm, also reaffirmed peaceful dispute settlement within the UNCLOS framework. However, he avoided any direct confrontation with Beijing. Australia’s Defence Minister, Richard Marles, also highlighted that the South China Sea continues to depict a trend of extensive militarisation and artificial island construction. 

All the speeches imply the longstanding limitation of international law, while the UNCLOS provides a coherent legal architecture, it is still not a strong deterrent, giving way to state impunity. 

2. Focus on AI and Cybersecurity in military applications, but with no broad consensus
The dialogue repeatedly mentioned emerging technologies. President Tô Lâm cautioned against AI and autonomous systems making decisions that amplify suspicion and increase the risk of miscalculation, especially in regions with multiple unresolved territorial flashpoints. Minister Marles mentioned satellite-based monitoring and AI-enabled vessel tracking for grey zone attribution. Australia’s 2026 National Defence strategy allocates significant importance to AI for maritime domain awareness. China’s Meng proposed the strongest measures, calling for a legally binding international instrument along the lines of the Chemical Weapons Convention to regulate AI in military applications. He also submitted a position paper on the same, but there was no consensus on a shared protocol, code of conduct, or verification mechanism. While the dialogue incentivized the underlying issue, it failed to produce a pragmatic solution. 

3. Repeated emphasis on Preventive Diplomacy, but no tangible action in place
President Tô Lâm delivered the most developed vision for preventive diplomacy, a topic touched upon by a few delegates. His proposal contained dedicated early-warning mechanisms, emergency communication channels, incident management protocols, quasi-formal exchange platforms, and wider confidence-building initiatives linking defence establishments, maritime law enforcement, businesses, and civil society. The primary aim is creating a “credible diplomatic off-ramps before parties become drawn into spirals of escalation.”

Minister Marles cited NATO’s Baltic Sentry operation and the Malacca Straits Patrols as scalable regional models. However, tensions lie in Hegseth’s posture of “strong, quiet, clear” doctrine, which implicitly discourages multilateral dialogue and, in turn, favours bilateral deterrence and hard power. Currently, the US is moving towards transactional burden-sharing, and China remained entirely absent from bilateral engagements throughout the conference. Thus, the multilateral preventive diplomacy infrastructure that delegates advocated for has no major power backing it to come to fruition.

4. High on principles without major mechanisms to reach them
Most speeches were rich in principle but lacking in a practical mechanism. Secretary Hegseth’s framing of the US strategy around “interest alignments” rather than shared values marks a significant shift from the US’s longstanding promotion of liberal internationalism. Akin to Hegseth’s words, other speeches, too, centered on self-reliance and strategic resilience rather than shared norms and collective security, which are considered more conventional for a rules-based liberal order. 

Vietnam’s President Tô Lâm offered a highly ambitious vision with early warning systems, emergency communication channels, and preventive diplomacy. However, without the support and facilitation of major powers, the words remain just a mirage. 

Proposals to reform multilateral institutions were made by China’s Meng Xiangqing, raising the valid point that the Global South is marginalized when it comes to global security governance; this assertion was largely uncontested by the Global North’s contingent that is increasingly reliant on realpolitik. The disruptions on the Strait of Hormuz had a direct impact on the Indo-Pacific, despite which, during the conference, no coordinated response was proposed. The Shangri La dialogue was firm in its rhetoric on a rules-based order while also accepting its current, gradual erosion in silence. 

Aishal Hab Yousuf is a postgraduate student at the Department of International Studies. Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is currently an intern at NIAS, Bengaluru.


Shangri-La Dialogue 2026:
Who said what

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella

During 29-31 May, the 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, bringing together defence ministers, military leaders, and security experts from across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Discussions focused on regional security, maritime stability, military modernization, and the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Concerns over China's growing military capabilities, maritime security in the South China Sea, defence partnerships such as AUKUS, and the need for stronger regional cooperation featured prominently. Vietnam's President To Lam delivered the keynote address, while several countries used the forum for high-level bilateral defence engagements.

Tô Lam, President, Viet Nam
On 29 May, President Tô Lam delivered the keynote address of the 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue, warning that the world is facing an interconnected crisis of international order, economic development, and strategic trust. He noted that economic competition, geopolitical competition, and emerging technologies are increasing the risk of conflict and instability. He called for stronger crisis-prevention mechanisms, ASEAN-centred regional cooperation, responsible governance of emerging technologies, human security and societal resilience, and preventive diplomacy as recommendations for creating a peaceful Indo-Pacific. Finally asserting that “peace, stability and development” are foundational principles for all peoples, and that they “carry meaning only when translated into concrete actions.”

Pete Hegseth, Secretary of War, United States
On 30 May, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, at the first plenary session on the United States’ Strategy for Peace in the Indo-Pacific, opened his speech with Operation Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury as a realistic approach to America’s national Defence, further discussing the 2026 US National Defence Strategy as America First but not “America alone.” He warned that China’s military buildup poses a challenge to the balance of power in the region, undermining regional security. He argued that the United States, in the case of the Indo-Pacific, aims to sustain equilibrium, preserve stability, and safeguard American interests in the region, highlighting the recent Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing. He asserted that burden sharing among allies in the Pacific was necessary, along with strengthening military capabilities and defence spending, and in this regard, appreciating nations like South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and India. Finally, he highlighted the ideas of “peace through strength,” saying that “Those who long for peace must prepare for war.”

Dr José Ramos-Horta, President, Timor-Leste
On 30 May, President José Ramos-Horta delivered a special address at the 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue, where he argued that the current international security architecture is “irrelevant,” that preserving the rules-based order requires restraint and dialogue, and that the current conflicts are a failure of global leadership. He highlighted ASEAN as a good example of bringing together nations with vast differences, building trust between nations, and delivering mutual benefits. He asserted the importance of preventive diplomacy, proposed exploring a “zone of peace” in the South China Sea, and argued the importance of rules being applied consistently. Lastly, he also discussed the dangers of climate change, food insecurity, and weak resilience as threats to security, calling for a “third path” focused on cooperation.

Gilberto Teodoro Jr, Secretary of National Defence, the Philippines
On 31 May, Secretary of National Defence Gilberto Teodoro Jr, at the sixth plenary session on Evolving Security Partnerships in a Fragmenting World, contended that “we are in a period of transition” caused by strained institutions and diverging priorities, and that the international order is changing. In his statement, he noted the tenth anniversary of the Arbitral Award of the South China Sea, affirming the importance of adhering to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), criticizing China’s rejection of the ruling, and warning against coercive behaviour, foreign interference, and economic manipulation. Furthermore, he presented a “vision of the Philippines” as the “Archipelagic Sentinel,” “Guardian of the Freedom of the Seas,” and “indispensable to Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific.” He highlighted the importance of international law, ASEAN-centrality, deterrence, and enhanced regional cooperation with partners such as Australia, Japan, and the United States. Lastly, he called on countries to protect human life, to protect migrant workers from Asian countries, and asserted that “in a fragmenting world, convergence is not merely an option.”

Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Australia
On 30 May, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, at the third plenary session on Asia’s Maritime Security Disorder, warned that maritime security is deteriorating because of attacks against subsea critical infrastructure, noting events in the Baltic Sea and Indo-Pacific, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the militarisation of the South China Sea, and shadow fleets operating in grey zones. He argued that the post-Cold War assumption that economic interdependence ensures security is no longer valid, calling for stronger maritime capabilities, regional cooperation, and protection of critical infrastructure. Additionally, he noted the importance of the “stabilisation of the Australia–China relationship.” On the international rules-based order, he noted its imperfections, however, arguing that “we are so much better off with it than without it.” Lastly, he closed his statement by illustrating Australia’s investment in ensuring security, cooperation, and peace in the region.

Chan Chun Sing, Minister for Defence and Coordinating Minister for Public Services, Singapore
On 31 May, Minister for Defence Chan Chun Sing, at the sixth plenary session on Evolving Security Partnerships in a Fragmenting World, presented Singapore’s perspective on the nature of conflict as extending beyond geography, military firepower, and “beyond the here right now.” This, he explained, was because of countries being hyper-connected across borders, citing the example of the supply chain disruptions caused by the conflict in the Middle East, a result of multidimensional systems of power like economic leverage, and because conflicts are about the setting of frameworks for tomorrow’s contests. He called for strengthening international rules and institutions, developing flexible issue-based partnerships, and building domestic cohesion as security measures against evolving conflict, presenting examples like the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and Singapore’s work with the Netherlands and South Korea to convene global discussions on military-AI governance. Lastly, stating that the goal for countries remains the same, “to build a better future for the next generation.”

Meng Xiangqing, Professor; Member, National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, National Defense University, People’s Liberation Army, China
On 30 May, Professor Meng Xiangqing, at the simultaneous special session one, on Managing Threats to Strategic Stability, warned that strategic stability is under threat due to nuclear risks, weakening arms-control mechanisms, the militarization of emerging technologies such as AI, and disorder in global governance resulting from disrupted multilateral mechanisms. He criticized AUKUS, conveyed concerns over Japan’s security posture, and noted the challenge to traditional rules of engagement and ethics of war, highlighting the importance of stronger multilateralism, inclusive co-governance, greater representation for developing countries, expansion of BRICS, SCO, and ASEAN, a renewed commitment to non-proliferation, and human control over warfare and weapons. 

Cui Tiankai, Former Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China
On 30 May, Former Vice Minister Cui Tiankai, at the simultaneous special session two, on Enhancing Littoral Security in Asia, noted the diversity of challenges in the context of littoral security. He argued that these challenges must be resolved through respect for sovereignty, peaceful negotiation, and inclusive partnerships rather than military alliances or bloc politics. He stressed that for a free and open Asia-Pacific, confrontational blocs and exclusive security arrangements divide the region and deprive other countries of the right to development. Additionally, he expressed concern about instability in the Strait of Hormuz, noting its impact on China. Finally, concluding by saying that “if anyone tries to have total and absolute freedom at the expense of others’ freedom, then there is no freedom for anyone.” 

Koizumi Shinjirō, Minister of Defence, Japan
On 31 May, Minister of Defence Koizumi Shinjirō, at the sixth plenary session on Managing Regional Tensions Amid Global Competition, highlighted that the Indo-Pacific is “ the world’s centre of growth,” which is currently facing challenges such as economic coercion, disinformation, and complex competition. He reaffirmed Japan’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific (noting the implications of an “unfree and closed” Strait of Hormuz), stressing that all nations must be free to choose their own future without coercion, while calling for stronger deterrence, defence cooperation, transparency, and dialogue. Against Japan being labeled “new militarism,” he asserted Japan’s lack of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers, respect for international law and the United Nations, “path as a peace-loving nation” valued by the international community, and its continued cooperation with Australia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the Quad, and ASEAN. 

Catherine Vautrin, Minister for the Armed Forces and Veterans, France
On 30 May, Minister for the Armed Forces and Veterans Catherine Vautrin, at the third plenary session on Asia’s Maritime Security Disorder, argued that maritime security is central to economic resilience and global stability, citing France’s presence in the Red Sea through Operation Aspides, the La Pérouse exercise, and the battle against piracy in the Indian Ocean through Operation Atalanta. She warned of the growing threats to maritime security from shadow fleets (discussing Russian shadow fleets), geopolitical tensions, targeting of critical underwater infrastructure, organized crime, drug trafficking, and climate change. Lastly, she asserted that France, as “a nation of the Indo-Pacific committed to its strategic autonomy,” is committed to free and open maritime areas and to ensuring the sovereignty of every state.

Rajesh Kumar Singh, Defence Secretary, Ministry of Defence, India
On 30 May, Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh, at the simultaneous special session three, on Building Defence Industrial Resilience, argued that in a time of geopolitical uncertainty, vulnerabilities caused by conflicts and strategic competition, defence preparedness is necessary. He highlighted how, for India, this has meant self-reliance and trusted interdependence, diversified manufacturing networks, and reforms in defence production, innovation, and exports – this, he argued, has transformed India into an emerging, dependable defence manufacturing and maintenance hub. Speaking on the Indo-Pacific, he asserted the importance of cooperative frameworks, secure sea lanes, stable supply chains, ASEAN-centrality, multilateral mechanisms, and inclusive and reliable partnerships. Lastly, stating that “resilient defence industries must support peace and stability and not deepen divisions.”

Apart from these statements, representatives from Greece, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, Poland, Germany, New Zealand, Lithuania, Qatar, South Korea, Norway, NATO, ASEAN, and SCO made statements as well.

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at NIAS.


TWTW Explainer

The Blue Origin Rocket Explosion:
Does this leave Jeff Bezos grounded, Elon Musk unchallenged, and NASA’s lunar timeline in jeopardy?

Acsah H

On 28 May, Blue Origin's heavy-lift “New Glenn” rocket exploded during a static fire test on its launchpad at the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida. The spacecraft was preparing for its fourth orbital mission, scheduled on 04 June, to support Amazon’s LEO broadband constellation mission plans. The enormous fireball was visible for more than a hundred miles. The company has not identified the root cause of the major disaster that destroyed a huge portion of Launch Complex 36, whose ruins can also be seen from the space.

What is Blue Origin?
In 2000, Blue Origin, the Jeff Bezos-owned American aerospace manufacturer and spaceflight services company, was founded. Its primary objectives are to reduce the cost of access to space, harness the vast resources of space, and inspire and mobilize future generations. Its founding philosophy, in its Latin motto Gradatim Ferociter ("Step by Step, Ferociously"), reflects Bezos' vision of moving heavy industry off Earth to preserve the planet, building reusable rockets to make space access economical enough for a permanent human presence beyond Earth. 

BO operates two major rocket families: New Shepard, a suborbital vehicle used for space tourism and scientific experiments that carries paying passengers to the edge of space; and New Glenn, a large orbital rocket that made its debut in January 2025 and is designed to compete directly with SpaceX’s Falcon 9. It also develops lunar landers under the Blue Moon programme.

On the explosion, BO responded that, "We experienced an anomaly during today's hotfire test. All personnel have been accounted for. We will provide updates as we learn more." This was shortly followed by Jeff Bezos, who said, "All personnel are accounted for and safe. It's too early to know the root cause but we're already working to find it. Very rough day, but we'll rebuild whatever needs rebuilding and get back to flying. It's worth it." On 31 May, CEO Dave Limp shared the largest update yet, confirming that critical propellant infrastructure remained intact and dismissing speculation about switching rocket configurations. He also pledged to fly again before year's end, which framed the explosion as a setback rather than a turning point.

What does the explosion mean for the launch infrastructure?
The explosion not only destroyed the New Glenn rocket but also severely damaged Launch Complex 36, which was the company’s only orbital launch facility. The Transporter-Erector and Lightning Protection Tower were destroyed beyond repair, while the launch tower sustained heavy charring. 

Critically, the propellant farm, fuel tanks, and water tower survived intact, the longest lead-time items, significantly compressing the recovery timeline. According to avaiable report, rather than rebuilding the Transporter-Erector, Blue Origin will adopt a vertical integration concept already in development, removing the pad entirely. Blue Origin targets a return to flight by the end of 2026, whereas NASA suggests a full recovery of the launchpad is only possible by 2028.

What does the explosion mean for Blue Origin’s commitments to NASA?
Blue Origin’s commitments and active contracts with NASA primarily focus on the lunar exploration initiative and commercial infrastructure. In 2018, Blue Origin made its entry into NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) programme; in April 2020, it joined the Human Landing System Competition. In 2021, the company lost to SpaceX in the HLS competition. In September 2022, NASA opened a second HLS Competition; Blue Origin in the following year was selected with a USD 3.4 billion for the HLS contract for Artemis V. 

NASA made its first CLPS task order for Blue Moon Mark 1 Cargo Lander to carry science payloads to the Moon's South Pole, which slipped from late 2025 to 2026 and now faces further delays following the explosion. In September 2025, NASA awarded a second CLPS task order, a USD 190 million contract, to deliver the revived VIPER water-hunting rover to the Moon's South Pole in late 2027. NASA restructured Artemis in February 2026, turning the crewed Moon landing into a direct competition between SpaceX and Blue Origin, with Blue Moon Mark 2's first crew-capable flight test targeted for as early as 2027.  Finally, just two days before the explosion, NASA awarded Blue Origin a 468 million USD contract to deliver crewed lunar terrain vehicles to the Moon, bringing its total NASA contract exposure to over 4 billion USD and making the May 28 explosion the most consequential technical failure in the company's history, when most of these missions depend entirely on New Glenn returning to flight. Blue Origin cannot get anything to the Moon without New Glenn, and New Glenn is grounded.

Blue Origin offered a lower price than competitors, extra lander capabilities, and a reusable architecture. Where SpaceX's Starship is enormous and requires orbital refueling before reaching the Moon, Blue Moon Mark 2 is simpler and self-contained for initial missions. NASA deliberately spread lunar contracts across both companies to avoid over-dependence on any single provider, a lesson drawn directly from the risks exposed by SpaceX's repeated Starship delay.

What are the implications?
The explosion did not occur in isolation; it was the third significant setback Blue Origin faced in 2026 alone. On 19 April, New Glenn's third mission launched from Cape Canaveral carrying AST SpaceMobile's BlueBird 7 satellite, while the first-stage booster landed successfully on a drone ship for the first time; the upper stage's second engine burn failed to produce sufficient thrust, placing the satellite in an orbit too low to be usable. AST SpaceMobile confirmed the satellite would be de-orbited and destroyed. Blue Origin had only just cleared that grounding when it proceeded to the static fire test that destroyed the rocket and its pad. 

The explosion's most immediate consequence falls on NASA's Artemis lunar programme. A prolonged launchpad repair would effectively hand SpaceX's Starship an uncontested position across every crewed and cargo lunar mission simultaneously. 

The explosion will likely have implications for NASA's Artemis programme timeline and the nation's efforts to return astronauts to the surface of the Moon. If Blue Moon Mark 2's first crew-capable flight test slips past 2027, SpaceX's Starship Human Landing System despite its own delays, becomes NASA's only viable crewed lander option for Artemis III and IV by default. When New Glenn exploded, it was not just a rocket that burned, it was months of that ambition, and the clearest evidence yet that Blue Origin remains structurally, technically, and operationally behind the competitor it has been trying to catch for a decade.

References
“Blue Origin Rocket Explosion the Largest Ever at Cape Canaveral: Commander," airandspaceforces, 02 June 2026.

“Blue Origin says New Glenn rocket will launch again 'before the end of the year' after explosion,” space.com, 03 June 2026, https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/blue-origin-says-new-glenn-rocket-will-launch-again-before-the-end-of-the-year-after-explosion?shem=rimspwouoe.

“Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket explodes during prelaunch testing at Cape Canaveral” SpaceflightNow, 29 May 2026
https://spaceflightnow.com/2026/05/29/blue-origins-new-glenn-rocket-explodes-during-prelaunch-testing-at-cape-canaveral/

“NASA head urges new launcher for Blue Origin’s moon landers to meet Artemis mission deadlines” SpaceflightNow, 04 June 2026
https://spaceflightnow.com/2026/06/04/nasa-head-urges-new-launcher-for-blue-origins-moon-landers-to-meet-artemis-mission-deadlines/?shem=rimspwouoe

Acsah H is a postgraduate student in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at the Manipal Institute of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, MAHE, Manipal, Udupi. She is currently a research intern at NIAS.


 


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The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
December 2025 | CWA # 1971

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan Budget 2025-26
Legislating stabilisation under IMF discipline and coalition constraints
December 2025 | CWA # 1970

Aparna A Nair

Pakistan & China
Ten Years of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
November 2025 | CWA # 1968

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan and the US
A New opening, or another cycle?
February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti

UK and China
PM Keir Starmers visit and the Recalibration of Economic, Strategic, and Domestic ties
January 2026 | CWA # 1946

R Preetha

The Davos Summit 2026
Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum
December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech and the Civil Rights Movement in the US
August 2025 | CWA # 1790

GP Team

The World This Week#323-324
The Trump-Putin meeting & the US-China tariff extension
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
Weaponization of access to the US economy
August 2025 | CWA # 1779

GP Team

The World This Week#322
US tariffs on India, Brazil and Canada & the EU-US trade deal
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, starting the First World War
July 2025 | CWA # 1770

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:
Why the focus on terrorism, refugees, and Uzbekistan as the third partner?
July 2025 | CWA # 1769

GP Team

The World This Week#321
Indian PM Modi's visit to the Maldives I Elections to the Upper House in Japan
July 2025 | CWA # 1762

Lekshmi MK

Ocean Darkening: 
What is the phenomenon? What are its effects? And who are more vulnerable?
July 2025 | CWA # 1749

R Preetha

Africa as the Hunger Epicenter
Of the 13 Global Hunger Hotspots, 8 are in Africa: Five reasons why
July 2025 | CWA # 1748

GP Team

The World This Week #318
PM Modi’s Visit to Trinidad and Tobago & Ghana, One big beautiful bill, and Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting
July 2025 | CWA # 1744

Chittrothu Vaihali

EU-Canada Summit 2025
What is security and defence partnership all about?
July 2025 | CWA # 1742

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly # 287-88
The 12 Day War and the Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal
July 2025 | CWA # 1738

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Thailand and Cambodia
What was the phone call between PM Shinawatra and President of Senate Hun Sen? What is the border dispute between the two? Why has this become an issue?
June 2025 | CWA # 1735

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025:
Trump making Europe great again
June 2025 | CWA # 1734

GP Team

The World This Week #317
NATO Summit 2025 and Russia-Mali bilateral agreements
June 2025 | CWA # 1733

Ananya Dinesh

China and the Pacific Islands 
What was the recent China-PIC joint statement about? What it says, and what it means?
June 2025 | CWA # 1728

M Kejia

G7 Summit 2025:
The Focus on the Middle East and Trade negotiations
June 2025 | CWA # 1726

GP Team

The World This Week #316
China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, and the G7 Summit in Canada
June 2025 | CWA # 1725

Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Santhiya M, Aparna A Nair & M Kejia

Operation Midnight Hammer: US bombs three nuclear sites in Iran
What were the three Iranian nuclear sites that were targeted? What are the B2 Bombers and Bunker Buster Bombs? What do these attacks mean? What Next?
June 2025 | CWA # 1724

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #286
The Spiralling Israel-Iran Crisis, and the Dangerous Hunger Hotspots
June 2025 | CWA # 1721

Rizwana Banu S and Santhiya M

Who are the Afrikaners?
Why is Trump interested in the Afrikaner question in South Africa?
June 2025 | CWA # 1720

Lekshmi MK

New WMO Report on Arctic Warming
What are the social, economic and environmental implications of Arctic warming
June 2025 | CWA # 1719

J Yamini  

China’s EV Surge
What contributes to the rise of BYD
June 2025 | CWA # 1717

J Yamini

Gender Violence in Pakistan:
What are the larger issues in the Noor Mukadam case?
June 2025 | CWA # 1715

Femy Francis

The US-China:
On Tariffs, Rare Earths and Visas
June 2025 | CWA # 1713

GP Team

The World This Week #315
The UN Ocean Conference in France and the US-China Meeting in London
June 2025 | CWA # 1709

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #284-285
Cambodia-Thailand Border Tensions, Protests in the US, and the Indigenous Māori question in New Zealand
June 2025 | CWA # 1705

GP Team

The World This Week #314
Elections in South Korea and Poland I China and the Pacific Island Countries I Bangladesh Election Announcement 2026
June 2025 | CWA # 1700

R Preetha

Ethiopia bans the TPLF
What does the TPLF ban mean for the Pretoria agreement? What next for Ethiopia?
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
Harvard vs Trump Administration
June 2025 | CWA # 1691

GP Team

The World This Week #313
China-ASEAN-GCC Summit I President Macron's visit to South East Asia I Trump Vs Harvard
May 2025 | CWA # 1690

GP Team

The World This Week #312
Elections in Romania, Portugal & Poland I UK-EU Summit
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
Continuing Russia’s Aerial Attacks, despite exchange of prisoners
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
The Humanitarian Crisis and Israel’s Renewed Offensive
May 2025 | CWA # 1685

Aparna A Nair

UK-EU Summit:
First step towards a reset
May 2025 | CWA # 1683

Aashish Ganeshan

Elections in Portugal:
The Rise of Chega Party and the Search for Political Stability
May 2025 | CWA # 1679

Aashish Ganeshan

US in the Middle Easr
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE
May 2025 | CWA # 1678

Gauri Gupta

China in Latin America
China-CELAC forum: Strengthening ties with Latin America and Caribbean
May 2025 | CWA # 1677

GP Team

The World This Week #310-311
China in Latin America and the Carribbean I Trump's Middle East Visit I Denmark as the new Arctic Chair
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
May 2025 | CWA # 1672

D Suba Chandran

India and Pakistan:
De-escalation and the “New Normal”
May 2025 | CWA # 1671

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

US, Ukraine and Russia:
Air attacks amidst a Minerals deal and Ceasefire Proposals
May 2025 | CWA # 1670

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Singapore Elections in 2025:
People’s Action Party (PAP) Wins, Again
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Tough Tariff Negotiations with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1666

Padmashree Anandhan

The US-Ukraine
The mineral deal with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
May 2025 | CWA # 1663

R Preetha

Canada Elections 2025:
What do the results convey? What next for Mark Carney?
March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon

The Maldives
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan

India
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej

Bangladesh
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Afghanistan