CWA # 2167
Conflict Weekly
Africa’s Conference on Slavery
The US-Iran MoU I Ukraine's Crimea Campaign
NIAS Conflict Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 338, 26 June 2026
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NIAS Global Politics Team
26 June 2026
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CW Column: Africa This Week
Africa’s Conference on Slavery and Reparatory Justice
Elections in Ethiopia and Abiy’s authoritarian shift
Anu Maria Joseph
What happened this week?
1. Conference on Slavery and Reparatory Justice
On 19 June, African and Caribbean countries held a “Next Steps” conference on slavery and reparatory justice in Ghana's capital, Accra. The conference was attended by heads of state, policymakers, academics, legal experts, and civil society groups.
Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama said: “History does not ask us to inherit guilt, but it asks us to inherit responsibility.”
The conference concluded with a 19-point framework calling for a “full, formal and unconditional apology” and reparation. The document stated: “The enduring consequences of slavery continue to manifest through structural inequalities, economic disparities, systemic racism, cultural erasure and development challenges.”
It adds: “The recommendations from Accra must now be matched with concrete institutional reforms, including stronger protections for diasporans who return to the continent, and a deliberate strategy to use Africa’s creative industries as a vehicle for reparation advocacy and narrative control.”
2. Ethiopia
On 21 June, Ethiopia’s National Elections Board (NENE) declared Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as the winner of the general election, securing 438 of the 501 seats. The Fano militia in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Oromia, both seeking autonomy, rejected the elections and the results.
What are the issues?
1. Africa: The enduring historical injustice and the global debate on justice
During the 15th- 19th centuries, over 12-15 million African men, women and children were captured and sold as slaves to Europe and the Americas. The historic cost continues to shape many African countries’ political and economic trajectories. The Accra Conference is the first major step towards creating mechanisms for justice for the enslaved and their descendants. It came after the UN adopted the resolution declaring the transatlantic slave trade as the “gravest crime against humanity” on 25 March. However, the resolution and the Accra conference are fueling international debates on reparation and apology.
The argument by the supporters of formal apology and reparation is that the economic and political structures that were deliberately imposed on many African countries have and continue to cause structural inequalities on the continent. They argue that while the process enriched the colonisers, it left African countries with immense gaps in wealth and development, accompanied by political crisis and conflicts.
The responses from the former colonisers have been different. In 2022, the Netherlands apologised for the Dutch role in slavery. In 2001, France recognised slavery as a crime against humanity. The UK government has never extended a formal apology for transatlantic slavery. Most recently, in 2024, the UK’s Prime Minister Kier Starmer, during the Commonwealth meeting, described the slave trade as “abhorrent.” The UK has long rejected a formal apology or reparations, saying that today’s institutions cannot be held responsible for past wrongs. The US has also maintained a similar stance that it will not recognise legal right for reparation “for historical wrongs which were not illegal under the international law” at the time they occurred.
The debate is also around the lack of consensus on the structure of reparations. Many opposing countries argue that reparations never reach the enslaved. The majority of the reparations that were paid during the decolonisation period reached the slave owners and never the enslaved.
2. Ethiopia: Abiy’s authoritarian shift and worsening conflicts
For Abiy, it was a comfortable election victory. However, for Ethiopia’s democracy, the victory points to two major challenges: Abiy’s authoritarian shift and worsening conflicts.
Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, ending the then-authoritarian government under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). With widespread popular support, his initial year in power was marked by the release of political prisoners, journalists and activists and the overturning of restrictive laws. He also ended the conflict with Eritrea, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.
However, all the achievements were reversed after the beginning of the Tigray conflict in 2020. The 2022 November Pretoria Agreement formally ended the Tigray War between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). But the provisions within the agreement are yet to be implemented; the slow implementation is pushing the conflict to the brink of another violent wave. Besides Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and Afar regions are under security risk, challenged by several ethnic militias seeking autonomy. The elections were not conducted in Tigray and parts of Oromia and Amhara, citing “unfavourable conditions.”
Journalists, opposition parties and dissents have been repressed violently, citing security concerns. According to the election board, over 50 opposition parties were running against Abiy’s Prosperity Party; however, none have national support. The opposition parties are fragmented across ethnic and regional lines.
What does it mean?
1. Conference on slavery and reparation justice
It took 80 years for the UN to pass a resolution recognising the slave trade as the gravest crime against humanity. The conference in Accra is a major output-oriented achievement following the resolution. Although the resolution is not legally binding, it was a major international milestone towards global recognition; the recognition of slavery not only as the gravest crime, but also that a genuine apology and justice are long overdue. While Africa and Caribbean countries take a regional effort to convert the resolution into action, the global debates imply that a genuine apology and sustainable justice is a long road.
2. Ethiopia
Abiy’s election victory was unchallenged. The Abiy government’s repressive policy, fragmented opposition, and conflicts have challenged the credibility of the election process. The election victory consolidated Abiy’s authoritarian shift; a drawback to Ethiopia’s position as a stable democracy in the Horn of Africa. Exclusion of Tigray, Amhara and Oromia from the election is likely to increase the tensions. It risks another wave of full-scale violence. Abiy Ahmed, who came to power by ending an authoritarian regime through liberal reforms, has ironically emerged as another authoritarian leader. This trend is not new to Africa. Sudan, Tunisia, and Senegal, and several African countries have or are going through a similar trajectory. The structural issues triggering this trend must be delved into separately.
The US-Iran MoU
Renewed strikes, Persistent disagreements, and a Fragile Agreement
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella
In the news
On 19 June, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel reserved the right to continue military operations against Hezbollah. Iran condemned the operations as a breach of the Iran-US MoU.
On 20 June, US Vice President JD Vance and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Switzerland for the first round of negotiations. Lebanon reported strikes by Israel, and in response Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, citing violations of the ceasefire.
On 21 June, the negotiations between the US and Iran, mediated by Pakistan and Qatar, began in Switzerland.
On 22 June, the negotiations between the US and Iran concluded, with an agreement on a 60-day roadmap for a final deal, a high-level committee to oversee the negotiations, a mechanism to end fighting in Lebanon, and a communications line to facilitate the safe passage of commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz. The US stated that Iran had “in principle” agreed to nuclear inspections, while Iran stated that discussions focused on sanctions relief, reconstruction assistance, and maritime security. On the same day, the US authorized the production, delivery, and sale of crude oil and petrochemical products of Iranian origin until 21 August.
On 23 June, Lebanon and Israel began a new round of talks in Washington. President Trump stated that Iran agreed to nuclear inspections. Additionally, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) launched an evacuation plan for ships and seafarers stranded in the Gulf.
On 24 June, the IAEA announced inspectors would return to Iran, while Tehran said this would only be resolved in the “final agreement.” The IMO evacuation plan came into effect. The US Senate voted in favour of the War Powers Resolution. A drone strike by Israel in southern Lebanon was reported.
On 25 June, the IAEA and Iran continued to dispute the timing of possible nuclear inspections. IMO announced that it suspended its emergency evacuation programme after a ship was reportedly struck by Iran’s drones.
On 26 June, the disagreement among the US, the IAEA, and Iran over the status of nuclear inspections persisted. Lebanon’s state media reported that Israeli forces dropped leaflets over a town in southern Lebanon, ordering residents to leave. Secretary Rubio and the Gulf Cooperation Council released a joint statement on the regional developments and the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran called “interventionist, irresponsible, and provocative.” Later that day, Secretary Rubio announced a 14-point “framework” between Israel and Lebanon, which Hezbollah said undermined Lebanon and served Israel’s interests. After the reported drone strike on a cargo ship on 25 June by Iran, the US military said it launched strikes on Iran. In response, the IRGC said its navy targeted locations in the Gulf where US forces were deployed and that the US strikes violated the UN Charter and the MoU between both sides.
Issues at large
1. Disagreements over nuclear inspections, the Strait of Hormuz, and Lebanon
Washington claims Iran "agreed in principle" to nuclear inspections, Tehran insists inspections are contingent on a final deal, and the IAEA states inspections will begin soon. This divergence has become a focal point of the post-MoU period, with the three sides disagreeing on the timing of the inspections. The MoU itself excluded IAEA inspections from its text, requiring a separate, supervised mechanism for Iran's enriched stockpile. Washington continues to assert commitments on nuclear inspections, but Iran has never explicitly affirmed them.
On the other hand, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz days after the MoU was signed, citing Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon, and struck a cargo ship in the Strait on 25 June, reiterating Tehran's position that de-escalation in the Gulf remains contingent on a ceasefire in Lebanon and control over the Strait of Hormuz. This, in the backdrop of Hezbollah rejecting the 26 June Rubio-brokered Israel-Lebanon framework as serving Israeli interests, puts a ceasefire in Lebanon into question, and makes the transit through Hormuz uncertain.
2. Sanctions relief implementation
Amid disputes over inspections, flare-ups in Lebanon, and contentions over Hormuz, Washington's authorization of Iranian crude and petrochemical sales stands out as the one MoU commitment clearly implemented. The scope of other sanctions relief measures, reconstruction financing, and the release of frozen assets remains unclear, with conflicting statements on the use of frozen assets adding further hurdles to the 60-day negotiation period.
3. Exchange of fire post the MoU and Switzerland talks
The MoU called for an immediate end to operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. Strikes continued nonetheless till 26 June when Lebanon and Israel reached an agreement. After which, a reported drone strike on a cargo ship by Iran was followed by the US striking missile storage facilities in Iran, and the IRGC responding with strikes on US positions in the Gulf: marking the first direct military exchange between the two sides since the MoU was signed. The exchange of fire underscores that, despite the Switzerland talks and the gains made there on establishing communication channels, the MoU has not proven capable of preventing renewed military escalation when disputes over its implementation arise.
In perspective
The MoU has functioned more as a pause in hostilities than a resolution of them. While sanctions relief measures implemented so far have held, the disputes over frozen assets, nuclear inspections, the Strait of Hormuz, and Lebanon have each resurfaced the same disagreements the MoU was meant to settle. Additionally, the direct exchange of fire between the US and Iran on 26 June, four days after the Switzerland talks concluded, suggests that perhaps the underlying drivers of the conflict remain largely unaddressed.
The War in Ukraine:
Ukraine's Crimea Campaign, The Belarus Standoff, and Russia's Aerial Bombardment
Radhika M Agarwal
In the news
On 18 June, a railway bridge in Russian-occupied Crimea was struck in a Ukrainian drone attack, sparking a fire. The bridge crosses the North Crimean Canal near the village of Rozdolne and sits on the Kerch-Dzhankoi railway line, a key supply route for Russian forces in the south.
On 19 June, President Zelensky issued a public ultimatum to Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, warning that Minsk had one week to remove communications relay equipment on its territory that Kyiv says was being used to guide Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian civilians. Zelensky identified systems in the Gomel and Brest regions bordering Ukraine. Russia condemned the ultimatum as interference in Belarus's internal affairs, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying Putin and Lukashenko would discuss the matter, and that Russia, as an ally of Belarus, would always stand by the country.
On 20 June, Russian forces launched a missile attack on Poltava, killing two people and injuring 14 others, including six children. Fifteen residential buildings sustained blast damage.
On 21 June, Ukrainian forces struck oil terminals, ferry infrastructure, and air defence systems on both sides of the Kerch Strait, setting at least three ferries ablaze and disabling four S-400 radar stations and two Pantsir systems guarding the Crimean Bridge. Russia's installed governor in Crimea immediately banned all civilian fuel sales on the peninsula. Ferry services across the Kerch crossing were suspended, with heavy truck drivers redirected to the overland route via Rostov-on-Don.
On 22–23 June, Ukraine's Special Operations Forces struck the North Crimean Canal railway bridge at Rozdolne again, collapsing one of the bridge spans, and hit fuel reservoirs at the Kerch Thermal Power Plant, a gas distribution station in Simferopol, and a major electrical substation in western Crimea.
On 24 June, Zelensky confirmed that the Belarusian relay equipment had ceased operating as of June 22, according to Ukrainian military and intelligence reports, though he said it was not yet clear whether the equipment had been physically dismantled. On the same day, Russia's fourth-largest oil refinery, the Lukoil-Nizhegorodorgsintez facility in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and the second-largest producer of gasoline in Russia, went offline after a Ukrainian drone strike.
On 25 June, Russia launched a fresh ballistic missile attack against Kyiv, injuring at least two people and causing a fire in the city's Darnytskyi district.
On 26 June, Russia's Defence Ministry reported that air defence systems shot down 660 Ukrainian UAVs overnight across Russian regions, the Sea of Azov, and the Black Sea, the largest single-night drone attack of the year according to estimates. Drones were intercepted over Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Tula, Ryazan, Moscow, Rostov, and Crimea, among other regions.
Issues at large
1. Russia's aerial campaign and competing narratives on targets
Russia's strike intensity reached approximately 2,200 attack drones, more than 1,800 guided aerial bombs, and 87 missiles, the highest weekly totals since the full-scale invasion began. Russia's Defence Ministry has consistently described its strikes as targeting Ukrainian military-industrial infrastructure, command posts, and air bases. Ukraine says the strikes overwhelmingly hit residential buildings, hospitals, energy infrastructure, and cultural sites. The two accounts are irreconcilable, and independent verification inside active strike zones remains difficult.
2. Ukraine's Crimea isolation campaign and Russia's logistical bind
Crimea has become the primary focus of Ukraine's "middle strike" campaign while using mid-range drones to hit Russian targets at operational depth behind the front, typically between 25 and 200 kilometres from the front lines, targeting energy and logistics infrastructure. The cumulative effect is significant: the Kerch Bridge has been restricted to light vehicles since January 2026, forcing heavy freight onto the ferry route; those ferry terminals were then struck; gas compression stations, power infrastructure, and the Tavriyska Thermal Power Plant were all hit in the following days. Russia has been forced into difficult trade-offs in response: Ukraine's long-range strike campaign forced Russia to redeploy air defence systems to protect Moscow and the Kerch Bridge, weakening coverage across other regions and occupied territories.
3. The Belarus relay station standoff
Zelensky identified four signal relay stations in Belarus's Gomel and Brest regions, which, according to Ukrainian analysis, were enabling Russian drone strikes on Zhytomyr, Rivne and Volyn regions, including attacks on energy infrastructure, railway facilities, and civilian areas. Moscow condemned the ultimatum as aggressive interference in a sovereign state's internal affairs, and Lavrov accused Kyiv of trying to drag Belarus into the conflict, noting that it was in fact Ukraine that launched the war. For Lukashenko, the episode illustrated a familiar bind difficult to satisfy Ukraine's demands without offending Moscow, but equally difficult to avoid escalating a situation that risks Belarus being drawn directly into the conflict. His silence throughout was telling. Beyond the relay stations, Zelensky linked Belarus's wider role to Russia's war economy, noting that Belarusian petrol exports to Russia rose thirteenfold from January to May 2026 compared to the same period in 2025, while diesel exports tripled.
In perspective
The week reflects two parallel and intensifying campaigns. Russia is pushing its aerial bombardment to record volumes, framing strikes as targeting military infrastructure while Ukrainian and international accounts document widespread civilian damage. Ukraine, meanwhile, is prosecuting a sustained effort to isolate Crimea logistically and strike deep into Russian energy infrastructure, a campaign that is visibly straining Russian logistics and forcing air defense redeployments. The Belarus episode sits between these two tracks: a rare instance of public ultimatum that tested, and for now held, the line between Belarusian facilitation and direct participation.