What happened this week?
1. Mali
On 4 May, Al Jazeera quoted the Malian army saying that armed men attacked five regions across the country, including Aguelhok, Anefis, Gao, Sevare, and Kenieroba. The regions included a northern town where the Malian Army and the Russian forces are based.
The al-Qaeda linked Jama’at Nusrat al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg separatist-dominated Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) have claimed responsibility for the series of attacks. They also claimed that it had taken control of at least seven regions held by government fighters.
The Malian Army said that the situation was “totally under control” and that “20 terrorists were killed in Sevare and six in Gao.”
On 6 July, the Tuareg fighters claimed that they shot down a Mi-24 helicopter of the Russian Africa Corps.
On 7 July, Al Jazeera confirmed that the Russian Navy supplied a shipment of weapons to the Malian government to fight the latest wave of rebel advance.
2. Sudan
This week, the UN News reported a series of drone strikes in El Obeid city, the capital of North Kordofan. The attacks came after the Rapid Support Force (RSF) tightened their siege over the city. According to Save the Children, more than 11,000 people, including 5,500 children, have fled the fighting over the past two weeks. Between 6 and 28 June, drone strikes killed 45 people in 15 attacks.
On 7 July, UN human rights chief Volker Turk stated: “The signs from el-Obeid are clear and unmistakable: Another human rights catastrophe is unfolding in Sudan.” Meanwhile, Amnesty International warned that el-Obeid could face a scale of violence similar to that of el-Fasher, where more than 6000 people were killed during the October 2025 RSF siege. The RSF has continuously denied accusations of carrying out attacks in el-Obeid.
What are the issues?
Mali: Islamist-separatist coordination and challenged Russian support
The latest wave of attacks was carried out by the Islamist al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and Tuareg separatist-linked FLA. In April, they carried out another series of coordinated attacks in Bamako and captured the city of Kidal. The attack killed Mali’s defence minister, Sadio Camara. JNIM, formed in 2017, is a coalition of al-Qaeda’s Sahara branch and armed groups of Ansar Dine, Katina Macina and al-Moura-bitoun. The group is led by Iyand Ag Ghali, the founder of Ansar Dine. The group’s objective is to expel Western influence from the country by taking control of territories. The FLA was formed in 2024 as a coalition of separatist forces and engages with the Tuareg rebels who have been fighting for self-determination and independence since 2012. The two groups, which are based on two ideologies, currently fight together against Malian forces and their allies, including Russian forces.
In 2013, under Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s presidency, the UN had brokered a peace deal between the government and the Tuareg forces. However, following the coup in 2020 and 2021, the military government cut ties with France and expelled French and UN peacekeepers for failing to quell the Islamist insurgent groups. Since 2021, the Malian government has been fighting the Islamist insurgency with the support of Russian mercenaries. The Russian Wagner forces withdrew in June 2025, but the mercenaries continued to operate under the banner of the Africa Corps. However, the Russian presence worsened security, and their ineffectiveness prompted the Tuareg rebels to reemerge.
Sudan: RSF’s siege in El-Obeid risks another catastrophe similar to El-Fasher
Ever since the RSF lost ground in the capital, Khartoum, in March 2025, the war has shifted to Darfur and Kordofan regions. It has divided the country, with the RSF in control of western Darfur and parts of Kordofan states and the SAF in control of Khartoum and eastern states. In October 2025, the RSF carried out a major wave of attacks in the el-Fasher region of North Darfur. After the fall of the last city in Darfur, the paramilitary began its attacks on the Kordofan states.
The city of El-Obeid, capital of North Kordofan, has been under the RSF siege for the past 18 months. The RSF has surrounded the city, while the SAF has reinforced its position inside. El-Obeid is strategically important for both sides. It links the capital, Khartoum, with Darfur and the country’s southern states. It is one of the major commercial centres and a logistical hub, important for military operations, supplies and humanitarian aid. For the SAF, the city is one of the important positions for supplying weapons to fight in the Kordofan and Darfur states. Control of the city will change the RSF’s military position and restrict the SAF’s foothold in the Kordofan region. It would also provide the RSF access to a major supply route to the capital and other parts of the country.
While the RSF siege in El-Obeid continues, the use of drones has destroyed civilian infrastructure, including fuel depots, electricity networks, and water facilities. According to Al Jazeera, the RSF siege has trapped about 500,000 people, including 105,000 displaced people.
What does it mean?
Mali
The April and July offensives imply that JNIM and FLA have expanded their attacks and regional control through coordinated attacks. The alliance, primarily pragmatic, has begun reshaping the regional security order as the state emerges as a common adversary. The attacks have stretched the Malian and Russian forces beyond their capacity. Russian forces have withdrawn from several towns, including Kidal, Tessalit and Tessit. The armed groups have taken control of these regions. Beyond the military gains, these developments also point to the limited reach of the Malian state in the northern regions and the increasing ability of armed groups to coordinate despite ideological divides when facing a shared strategic objective.
Sudan
The latest wave of violence in El-Obeid highlights that the RSF seeks complete control over the Darfur and Kordofan regions. For the SAF, the city is strategically important for access to western Sudan and for stopping the RSF from advancing again towards the capital. For international actors and aid agencies, a major concern is whether el-Obeid will become another el-Fasher. While Kordofan emerges as a major hotspot in the RSF-SAF three years of civil war, the violence and attacks on civilian infrastructure are likely to have paramount civilian implications and dire humanitarian consequences.
