CWA # 223
Strategic Forecast 2020
Syria: ISIS Decline, US Retreat and the Return of Russia in 2020
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Lakshmi V Menon
25 February 2020
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Photo Source: Agence France-Presse
CWA Brief, February 2020
Two phenomena are of great importance. First, the round-up of US activities – beginning from 2011 the sanctioning of Syria to 2019 withdrawal of forces from Syrian borders. Second, the simultaneous Russian Ascendancy in Syria – Putin’s interest to fill the American void
Background
The Syrian war is one of various multitudes and magnitudes. As the debate of whether or not the ISIS has been defeated continues, a recap of the war from its commencement in 2011 is necessary. Two phenomenon are of great importance. First, the round-up of US activities – beginning from the 2011 sanctioning of Syria to 2019 withdrawal of forces from Syrian borders; and second, the simultaneous Russian Ascendancy in Syria – Putin’s interest to fill the American void.
Following questions will be deliberated – Is Russia the new US in the region? Could the Russo- Israeli coordination commence a new chapter of regional instability in the conflict-prone region by testing the Russo-Iranian alliance? Is Trump’s decision to leave a good one at a bad time? Will
ISIS return?
The conflict which is now dominated by relentless geopolitical rivalries and bloodshed has a narrative that provides historical perspective highlighting trends which shaped the Syrian domestic landscape and explains the run-up to the crisis in 2011. No expanse of quantitative data can do justice to the complexity and depth of the Syrian crisis, however, deepening socioeconomic, governance and environmental challenges must not be dismissed. The eighteen years old war has not resolved these issues and conversely, they will continue to exacerbate until the war’s violence ebbs. In March 2011, the first protests in Syria were brutally put down by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government. A month later, on April 29, Washington stamped various sanctions on Syrian bureaucrats in an attempt to increase pressure on Assad. Soon, the sanctions extended to Assad. The first explicit demand from USA and its Western allies asking Assad to stand down came on August 18. Two months later, US and Syria recalled their ambassadors from Damascus and Washington respectively. (Al Jazeera, 2019)
In August 2013, Washington accuses Assad’s government of carrying out a brutal chemical attack which killed over 1,400 near Damascus. US President Barak Obama pulls back from retributive strikes on the Assad regime infrastructure in the last minute and on September 14, forms a deal
to dismantle Syrian chemical weapons with Assad’s chief patron – Moscow. (Al Jazeera, 2019) Islamic State was an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, that formed in Iraq in the aftermath of 2003 Us-led Iraq intervention. In 2011 it joined the rebellion against Assad. IS was a puritanical, extremist, Wahabist, Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization. In January, 2014, ISIS took control of Syria’s Raqqa and declared it their capital. In June, they seized control of Mosul and Tikrit. (Fox, 2019) In August, IS took over Zumar and Sinjar killing over 5000 Yazidi men and abducting around 7000 Yazidis women to be sold later as sex slaves. (BBC news, 2018) They used systematic rape as a weapon for the Yazidi genocide, as recognized by UN. At its peak, Islamic State controlled a vast territory across Syria and Iraq – roughly the size of Britain (34,000 sq miles) proclaimed the “caliphate” and governed over 8 million people. (BBC news, 2018) Over 40,000 have emigrated to the IS’s caliphate (BBC news, 2018), inspired by various recruiting videos that motivated various attacks world over.
On September 23, 2014, Washington along with its Arab allies expanded an ongoing campaign in Iraq by commencing air raids targeting ISIL in Syria. Washington initially deployed 2000 special forces and later in October 2015, backed the forming of a Syrian-Kurdish alliance of over 50,000 militias called the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF (overshadowed by Kurdish People’s Protection Units – YPG), and provided arms, intelligence and air support. (Al Jazeera, 2019) Fast forward to March 2019 and SDF overruns ISIL in Syria’s north eastern regions eliminating jihadists and their families from their last territory in the Baghouz village.
In September 2015, Russia launched its first major military strike outside the former Soviet region – in the Syrian city Aleppo. (Quinn, 2016) Although nominally intended to put down ISIL, the airstrikes helped endure Assad’s regime while also divvying and enflaming the global community. In October 2015, while Washington accused Russia of adding oil to the war-fire and called to cease Moscow’s attacks on Syrian opposition (Al Jazeera, 2019), Assad thanked Putin for military support to fight “terrorism”. (Quinn, 2016) On November 24, Turkey shot down a Russian warplane. Putin retaliated by calling Ankara “accomplices of terrorists”. Obama backed Turkey stating the latter’s right to defend its airspace and territory. (Quinn, 2016)
In January 2016, Russian airstrikes backed forces loyal to Assad regime to regain Latakia – a vital win. On February 13, Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev spoke of a “new cold war” addressing the European opposition to Russian engagement in the Syrian war. (Khatiri, Jerusalem Post) By 2018, Russian intervention benefited Assad significantly. Palmyra was recaptured in March 2016 (Neff, 2016), Aleppo in December 2016, Deir ez-Zor in November 2017 (Neff, 2016), Daraa and Quneitra in July 2018 after execution of Southern Syrian offensive (Ibrahim, 2018). According to the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov, by January 2017, Moscow had delivered over 71,000 strikes on terrorists’ infrastructures and carried over 19,160 combat missions. By end of 2017, Russian intervention eliminated over 60,318 terrorists. (Khatiri, Jerusalem Post, 2019) 2017 and 2018 witnessed Washington’s direct actions against Assad. US forces fired cruise missiles at Shayrat airbase killing 88 people in Idlib, the alleged launch site of chemical attack – the most noteworthy military decision of US President Donald Trump’s. (Al Jazeera, 2019) Russian ambassador to US, Anatoly Antonov, warned US against “another unprovoked and illegal aggression against Syria” based on the false allegation of a staged chemical attack. (Tom Balmforth, ) US along with UK and France launched retaliatory attacks following an alleged second chemical attack by Assad’s regime in Douma.
On 17 September 2018, during an Israeli-Syrian skirmish, a Syrian S-200 aurface-to-air missile struck down a Russian reconnaissance plane. (Darya Korsunskaya, 2018) Although Moscow blamed Israel for the accident, Putin seemed unoffended. Further Syrian army received more sophisticated and high-precision Russian missile and communication systems. (BBC News, 2018) For every fifth-generation Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptors deployed by US, Moscow arrayed newest fifth generation Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jets Syria. (Crawford, 2018)
Major Trends in 2019
The US withdrawal and end of Caliphate In late December 2018, Trump announced the recalling of 2000 US troops from Syria claiming the defeat of ISIS. (Fox, 2019) The withdrawal decision although troubled UK, Germany and France, secured praise from Turkey and Russia. Amidst calls for reconsideration of the decision, an ISIL suicide attack on January 16, 2019 that killed 15 including 4 US servicemen catalysed the withdrawal. (Yacoubin, 2019)
On March 23, SDF and US declared complete elimination of the so-called “caliphate” and 100 per cent territorial defeat of ISIS, while stating that they would continue actions against IS sleeper cells. In April ISIS released a new video message from Baghdadi. (Fox, 2019) On August 6, Pentagon issued report stating the resurgence of ISIS in Syria and blamed it on reduction of US forces. The following day, Washington and Ankara crafted a deal to jointly control the buffer zone between YPG controlled Syrian regions (considered a terrorist threat by Turkey).
Deepening Russian ties
Russian military units began patrolling in Manbij and Arima. (AMN, 2019) In March, Russian jets hit Hayat Tahrir al-Sham′s targets in the city of Idlib. On June 13, a Russian brokered ceasefire agreement was reached. (Russian News Agency, 2019)On July 10, owing to Russia-Turkey ties a restraint came over the government offensive in Idlib to restrain attempts to capture the northwest. (Tom Perry, 2019) On August 30, the campaign officially ended after a ceasefire was established by the rebels and Syrian Arab Army. (Musa, 2019) A major progress for Syrian Army in the Idlib de-escalation zone after liberation of Southern Idlib Governorate. Skirmishes, however, continued. Although activists cry possible violations of laws of war and the death of over 1700 civilians in Syria due to Russia’s engagement, Moscow has denied all reports. (Quinn, 2016)
Turkish intervention
On October 6, 2019, Washington announced that US forces would step aside giving way to a Turkish “long-planned operation”. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that attack on Kurdish fighters in Syria was definite. (Fox, 2019) Trump said that they do not endorse a Turkish operation and threatened to “obliterate” Turkey’s economy if Ankara does anything “off-limits” in Syria. Shortly after US-withdrawal and Turkey’s commencement of cross-border incursion in Kurdish-dominated regions, on October 13, Russian ground forces and Syrian army recaptured SDF-held north eastern Syrian regions. (Stocker, 2019) On October 22, Putin and Erdogan achieved the second buffer zone. (CNN, 2019)
Death of Baghdadi
October 26 was a monumental day. It marked the death of one of the most sought-after international terrorists – the fugitive Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, during a raid in Idlib by US Joint Special Operations Command’s (JSOC). (Fox, 2019) Soon the Syrian Constitutional Committee was formed. ISIS circulated an audio message confirming Baghdadi’s death and naming his successor - Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. (CNN, 2019) Following an ultimatum issued by Assad asking militants to surrender or leave the region, on November 2, Russian jets hit a militant concentration in Jisr al-Shughur. Russia pleased to fill US void – Russo-Iranian alliance vs Russo-Israeli dialogue The disengagement of USA from Syria fits into the larger picture of Washington’s disengagement from the Middle East. Meanwhile, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has deepened and strengthened Russia’s presence and stature in the region. Russia is already influential enough to veto any regional settlement they do not approve of.
To truly understand Russia in the Middle East, Russo-Iranian alliance and the unprecedented, previously dismissed, Russian-Israeli coordination must be understood. The survival of Assad’s regime has been on Moscow’s and Tehran’s agenda. In Syria, Putin wanted to prevent Russian combatant deaths to safeguard his domestic popularity. As Iran considers Syria as an integral part of its regional influence, they sent in paid Afghans and their proxy Lebanese militia – Hezbollah. However, with Assad’s victory and Trump’s exit from the Iran-nuke deal, JCPOA, Putin was willing to arm-twist Tehran as the realization that the only regional power capable of toppling Russian interests in the Middle East was Israel, struck.
With Obama backing off the chemical weapons “red line”, Netanyahu felt the need to align with the new power in the region, Moscow, for safeguarding national interests. Putin and Netanyahu have been on the same page in Syria. The ground-rules were set by the newly-weds in coordination and after much consideration. Ideologies and Putin’s philo-semitism have been brushed aside. Pure realist tendencies have cemented the alliance. Mutual realization of strengths, skills and supremacies in the region have led to the powers choosing cooperation over conflict. Through Israel, Iran and Syria, Moscow has embedded itself into the US void. As the void enlarges, so does Russia’s ascendancy in the region. Russia will remain in Syria and will not sacrifice the coveted Mediterranean warm-water ports. Realizing the necessity for deeper roots than an “anti-terrorist” campaign against ISIS and considering Tehran’s reservations post US- exit from JCPOA, Russia is fine-tuning with Israel in the new arrangement. A quietly confident and unoffended Putin’s response to Israel bombarding Iranian operated Russian S-300s and the rare, bland and ambiguous statements by Moscow signal to the fact that ground rules in Syria were set by Putin and Netanyahu. The game-plan is simple. Provided Netanyahu does not jeopardize Moscow’s crusade to protect Assad’s regime, Israel has complete liberty to manoeuvre and target pawns under Russian air-defence umbrella.
Netanyahu got Putin to do what Trump and Obama stalled – challenge Tehran’s forces in Syria. The Victory Day celebration by Vladimir Putin and Netanyahu while Israel annihilated Iranian targets in Syria raised some eyebrows. In this front, Iran is losing. (Trofimov, 2018) From 2018, the alliance has been a game-changer for multiple reasons. Firstly, Iran’s crippling economy is yet to recover from the blow of US-exit from the JCPOA. Having to exit Syria owing to Israel’s interests, while a huge blow to Tehran’s stature in the region, will also reduce supplies to Hezbollah. Secondly, Netanyahu wanting to prevent permanent Iranian presence in the Syrian territory; and Israel’s campaign to convince Moscow that allowing Syria to become a client state of Iran is detrimental to Moscow’s interests. Additionally, Moscow withdrew threat to deploy S-300 (Polina Nikolskaya, 2018) surface to air anti-aircraft missile in Syria; chose to leave the Syrian and Iranian forces unguarded from the Israeli attacks; refrained from condemning Israeli strikes that destroyed significant Iranian infrastructure in Syria; Israel’s Golan Heights decision; and West Bank annexation. Israel-Russia negotiations led to withdrawal of Hezbollah and Tehran-backed militias from certain Syrian regions (40km from the Israeli border as per SOHR). (Lemon, 2018) As Israel hopes for curtailing Iran’s movements in Syria, and Iran’s Islamic Republic’s popularity deteriorates, a PR campaign by Netanyahu is making Iranians pro-Israel and anti-Iranian regime. (Khatiri, The Jerusalem Post, 2019) Ever since the conception of Russo-Israeli alliance, Syria via Moscow wishes to restore the 1974 ceasefire line in Golan Heights while providing assurances to Israel. Nonetheless, Israel’s demand remains an entire Iranian withdrawal from Syria. A Russian-Iranian fracture has been floated but Tehran remains put and is moving with seasoned discretion. Meanwhile, Russo-Israeli dialogue is strengthening.
Forecasts for 2020
Evolving tactics and changing motives
The regional instability looming large is worrisome. Changing motives make insinuations wary and projections ambiguous. Diplomatic labours have paved the path to a novel Russian policy towards Israel and Iran in Syria. A scrutiny of Russian motives will throw more light on the current scenario and near future. Russian economy benefits from the flourishing investment and trade relations with Israel while the Russian elite respect Israel’s military-economic technological dexterity. Domestically, Putin still uses anti-Semitism and the pro-Jew diaspora sentiment (Russian emigration of 1980s to Israel) expediently. Israel’s respect to Russian reservations and bilateral visits which precede and succeed any provocative action have made the unprecedented alliance a mutually profitable one. Moscow’s motives in the region are more economic and strategic than ideological. Arms sale and an upper hand in regulation of global gas and oil business are priorities. Israel’s worry is not smuggling of gas. It is misusing assets to undermine the country or for espionage. Russia has not invested in Israeli economy, infrastructure or high-tech projects. In the event of a clash, Russia may side with Iran and Syria as Moscow’s interests are rooted in those countries and revolve around energy and arms deals. Putin however, realizes that wars waged on Israel end badly for the opponent and ensures Washington’s engagement. Nurturing a multifaceted positive Russo-Israeli dialogue, although sensitive to regional and global developments, becomes crucial for Putin’s Middle East policy as a stronger US presence in the region is undesired. For US, this is a sob story indicating its diminishing monopoly and crumbling regional hold.
Mutual Expectations
Nonetheless, Israel and Russia nurture unmet mutual expectations. Israel wants Moscow to drive Iranian military presence out of Syria while Russia expects Israel to payback for Moscow’s cooperation by functioning as a bridge between Moscow and Washington. Only symbolic responses have materialized. Both sides await substantial moves. Israel cannot create a major shift in the current US security-establishment’s unfriendly approach towards Moscow. Israel’s National Security Council sponsored a convening of US and Russian National Security Advisors in Jerusalem. The exceptional meeting received global attention but concluded devoid of a deal hence not delivering the Russian price for acceptance of Israeli manoeuvres in Syria.
Rewards expected by Moscow are not restricted to Middle East. Global returns such as easing sanctions and more Western restraint in former Soviet regions would be appreciated. Russian security apparatus’ frustration is heightening. The mounting distress of Moscow’s military with Israel is corroding Russia’s inclination to allow regional Israeli manoeuvres. Geopolitical developments like – Trump’s “America First Policy”; Donald Trump, the leader of the free world, running a mercenary army and sending 2800 troops to Saudi Arabia because “the Saudis are paying for it”; US desertion of the Kurds; and Russian troops filling the void – point to one aspect. If ISIS was defeated, yet it continues Islamic state saw global recruitment and impact as none before. ISIS had become not just Syria’s and Iraq’s problem but a global threat through its lone wolf attacks and recruitment strategies.
Islamic State once imposed its brutal rule over 8 million people, generating billions from oil, robbery, kidnaps and extortion by exploiting its territory to launch foreign attacks. In Iraq, though defeated in 2017, IS has evolved into an efficient covert network. Although the fall of Baghouz is momentous in the anti-IS campaign, the terrorist organization is far from defeated. Over 20,000 armed militants are still regionally active, waiting in sleeper cells for resurgence and rebuilding of the group. ISIS’s audio message by spokesperson Abu Hassan al-Muhajir, warning the caliphate has not ended shows that the battle is going to be a long one. (Fox, 2019) Although the caliphate has been territorially defeated, the jihadist group remains a well-disciplined and battle-hardened threat. Defiant IS-loyalist women form the new chapter of brutality and ruthlessness. Experts believe that if pressure on the terror organization is not sustained, Islamic State could resurge and gain limited territory in the Middle Euphrates River Valley in the coming year. (BBC, 2019) These warnings convinced Trump to not withdraw all 2000 troops from Syria. In February 2019, the White House said it would leave 400 peacekeepers in Syria. (Al Jazeera, 2019)
The Digital Caliphate Endures
ISIS was and remains a digital caliphate before a territorial caliphate. IS’ growth was through the effective and systematic utilization of cyber space. Territorial defeat is a mere dismemberment of ISIL. Lone wolf attacks verify that the caliphate established in the minds of supporters, has endured the war. Without neutralizing Islamic State online, victory cannot be achieved. Attacks orchestrated by ISIS sleeper cells will persist and escalate. ISIL is identifying and rebuilding support systems amongst sympathetic Sunni Arab communities. (Lynn E. Davis, 2017) The return of foreign fighters is imminent to prevent a resurgence. Countries like France and UK refuse to take back fighters in the name of national security.
Afghanistan - the next Caliphate?
ISIS has a fashion of replicating key leadership functions at provincial levels and systematically undergoing phases of transition, adaptation and consolidation. The peaking of IS claimed attacks in South Asia, mainly in Afghanistan indicates that a new stronghold has been created. ISIS did not end. They merely shifted states. In Afghanistan, IS’s modus operandi is already in place. Syria, a nation struggling with its own civil war witnessed many civilians extend support to ISIL in hope of freedom from human rights violations, unemployment, Assad regime’s fetters and other structural violence. Comparable social fabric in Afghanistan might mobilize backing for IS. The new threat and trauma of Soviet-era atrocities with privatization of the Afghan war may favor the terror group like in the case of Mujahideen and Taliban. Overlooking IS’ shift to South Asia, particularly Afghanistan, will prove difficult for the Americans. Perhaps Eric Prince will articulate a novel approach to eliminate the group from Afghanistan. Will history repeat itself in the graveyard of empires?
End of Assad regime?
With Islamic State out of the picture, Assad will come under fire from US, UK, European Union, and rebels. Regime change in Syria will once again become priority peaking diplomatic, military and economic pressures. With materialization of common interest – elimination of ISIL – old agendas and animosities will resume. Israel and Iran will certainly be factors in this fracas. Since 2011, Syrian war has killed over 370,000 people and displaced millions. (Dawn, 2019) More lives will be lost considering a feasible long-lasting deal is yet to be formed.
Nevertheless, Russia is far from achieving and enjoying the stature US enjoyed in the Middle East. Moscow is stuck in the Syrian muddle, surrounded by four powers – the Iranians who do not want them, Turks who are roughening up, disloyal Saudis and an eagerly ambitious Israel. The US void Moscow is trying to fill into may prove to be too vast considering respective capacities and capabilities. Unfortunately, in the hot spot called Middle East, abilities and aspirations are never the same.
Many claimed it was not positive as it was the host and hence a success would ensure Vietnam’s name in the history. However, this assumption could be wrong. Vietnam is an ally of the US in order to keep its neighbour China out of the bay with whom they do not share a cordial equation. In that scenario, the success of the summit would have been a serious concern for Vietnam, given that one of the demands of Kim was the withdrawal of US nuclear umbrella protection over the region. This is something Vietnam benefits from and hence would have been more important than the countries fame as a host of a successful summit. Thus, it seems that the failure of 2019 Trump and Kim summit have burnt bridges for the US and North Korea but have benefited Vietnam, the host of this summit.
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Lakshmi V Menon is a Research Consultant with the ISSSP at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru
This essay was published at the NIAS Quarterly on Contemporary World Affairs, Vol 2, Issue 1, January-March 2020
