CWA # 2316
The World This Quarter
Africa (Jul-Sep 2026)
Conflicts, Elections, Piracy, Security and Critical Minerals
The World This Week #376, Vol 8, No. 38, 25 October 2026
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R Vidya
25 October 2026
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Between July and September 2026, Africa’s political and security landscape was marked by renewed conflict, fragile peace agreements, contested elections, maritime insecurity, and intensified geopolitical competition. Crises in this part of the world, from Sudan and Ethiopia’s Tigray region to the Sahel and the Gulf of Aden, revealed the limitations of military solutions and security partnerships. Nevertheless, continued efforts to strengthen governance, the economy, and security were reflected in Algeria’s parliamentary elections, the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategy, and the minerals agreement signed between Nigeria and the United States (US). Together, these developments pinpointed the struggle of Africa’s institutions and resources to achieve enduring peace, legitimate authority and inclusive development.
1. Regional fallouts of the Sudan war
Sudan remained Africa’s most consequential conflict during the quarter. In July, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) mounted a major offensive and took control of a key supply route towards El-Obeid, while the European Union banned imports of Sudanese gold in an effort to restrict war financing. By August and September, fighting intensified in Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile, with external involvement and disrupted supply chains worsening the humanitarian crisis. The conflict also became increasingly regional. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that more than 400 people a day crossing from Sudan into eastern Chad in late September, a twenty-fold increase from previous months. Thus, Sudan’s civil war, marked by issues of displacement, arms trafficking, gold smuggling and the involvement of external actors, has resulted in a full-blown regional security crisis.
2. Algeria’s elections and democratic fatigue
Algeria’s parliamentary elections in July were marked by candidate bans and public disengagement. The ruling National Liberation Front secured the most seats, while turnout was historically low, indicating large-scale public withdrawal. The elections aimed to restore legitimacy to a governing system otherwise built on centralism and managed pluralism. The Algerian elections exposed the growing disconnect between the masses and the political system, reflecting a pattern of weak opposition and deteriorating trust in formal electoral institutions.
3. In the Gilf of Aden, the Somali piracy returns
August witnessed a sharp resurgence of Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden and, particularly, on the waters off Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region. The Cameroon-flagged vessel MV Lutuf was hijacked by armed men off Somalia’s coast on 17 August, and three days later, the Eritrean-flagged tanker MT Sibu 1 was also seized off Yemen. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) reported that the US-sanctioned MT Sibu 1 was the sixth vessel seized in the 2026 Somali piracy resurgence. This resurgence was striking because piracy had largely disappeared from the region for years. By late August, at least 15 attacks had been recorded off Somalia in 2026, the highest number since 2013. On 29 August, Somalia announced that the Somali forces, along with the Turkish naval forces, had freed the Lutuf after a ten-day pursuit, killing 14 pirates and destroying four pirate boats. The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) rescued MT Sibu in late September, after a 48-hour counter-piracy operation.
4. The Sahel insurgency highlights the limits of external partnerships
The Sahel region continued to face severe jihadist violence and weakening of state governance. In July, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched a major offensive against the Malian military government and Russian Africa Corps. This six-day battle for Anéfis, described as the longest sustained engagement in the region since 2012, was an attempt to control the northern supply lines between Gao and Kidal. An ambush near Anéfis targeted a joint convoy of the Malian army and Russian Africa Corps, killing at least 50 Malian soldiers, raising serious concerns about the limits of Moscow’s security partnership.
Niger also suffered major attacks in late September, including an ambush near the town of Abala-Filingué and a heavy assault at Birni-N’Konni that reportedly killed more than 30 soldiers. These events added to the growing frustration within the frontline army units after repeated losses to the insurgents. Moreover, it reinforced that external military partners cannot substitute for political legitimacy, welfare politics, local governance, intelligence capacity and development.
5. Tigray: Ethiopia’s peace deal under strain
Ethiopia’s Tigray region presented the most alarming late-quarter development with the return of large-scale fighting between Ethiopia’s federal army and the armed groups from the northern Tigray. In September, the Tigrayan forces launched a major offensive, reportedly seizing three airports and clashing with federal troops. This has raised fears that the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which ended the two-year war in 2022, would collapse. By the end of September, federal forces and allied militias claimed the recapture of Alamata, a town about 120 kilometres south of Mekelle. Moreover, seven Ethiopian armed groups have reportedly formed an anti-government alliance called Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
6. The African Union adopts a counter-terrorism strategy
To strengthen measures against terrorism and insurgency, the African Union (AU) adopted its Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism in Africa for 2026–2030 at the 1354th ministerial meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council held in July 2026. The AU also held the 49th Ordinary Session of its Executive Council in Addis Ababa on 29 July, linked to the 8th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting. These initiatives indicate that Africa’s security architecture is becoming more institutionalised, but their effectiveness will depend heavily on financing, member-state compliance, intelligence-sharing and cooperation among regional economic communities.
7. Nigeria–US Critical Minerals agreement
The framework agreement signed by Nigeria and the US on 23 September 2026 to deepen the latter’s investment in Nigeria’s mining sector reflects Washington’s push to strengthen ties with mineral-producing countries and diversify critical-mineral supply chains. The deal was signed by Nigeria’s Solid Minerals Minister Dele Alake and US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and is estimated to be worth about $700 billion. Nigeria hopes the partnership will attract investment into its largely underdeveloped mining industry and help diversify the economy away from oil. However, the framework is not to be considered a binding funding commitment by itself. Its real significance lies in its capacity to move beyond a mere resource-extraction model and generate quality jobs, skill development, and greater opportunities for the people of this West African country.
To conclude
For Africa, this quarter is marked by rising insecurity and governance deficits on one hand, and global economic competition on the other. The continent’s attempt to realise durable peace is weakening, but external partnerships and continental initiatives remain promising. Sudan, Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis and the Sahel insurgencies demonstrate how civil wars and extremist violence are fuelled by cross-border arms flows, refugee movements, illicit economies and external patrons. Thanks to the resurgence of Somali piracy, this quarter recaptures maritime insecurity into Africa’s conflict matrix. Algeria’s low-turnout election, meanwhile, exposes the gap between formal democratic procedures and public trust in political institutions.
The AU’s counter-terrorism strategy and Nigeria’s minerals framework with the US show that Africa is not merely a theatre of conflict. It is also seeking to build collective security mechanisms and position itself in the global contest over critical minerals and energy-transition supply chains. The quarter therefore suggests that Africa’s future will depend on whether African states can convert external partnerships and continental initiatives into legitimate sovereign capacity, local development and durable peace.
About the author
Dr R Vidya is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai.