Conflict Weekly 300th Issue

CWA # 1818
Conflict Weekly 300th Issue
The Conflict in Eastern Congo: Rebel Violence, State Failure and Failed Mediations
Africa
Conflict Weekly 300, 25 September 2025, Vol 6, No. 38

Anu Maria Joseph
25 September 2025

Photo Source: Reuters

The first quarter of 2025 saw a new wave of violence by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels and their capture of Goma and Bukavu, the regional capitals of North and South Kivu. Unlike the previous offensives, for the first time since formation, the group has taken control of two major regional capitals and mineral towns and networks surrounding them. 

The second quarter of 2025 saw a controversial US-led peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda, and a ceasefire between the DRC and M23 mediated by Qatar. Neither the ceasefire ended violence nor the peace deal achieve its objectives. The latest developments say M23 and DRC are mobilising troops to new frontlines and preparing for another wave of fighting.

Major issues
1. M23 violence, objective and cause. M23 or March 23 is one among the hundreds of armed groups in eastern DRC, led by ethnic Tutsis. It is a remnant of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the two Congo wars, fighting against the marginalisation of minority ethnic Tutsis in eastern DRC. The group has been fighting the Congo-backed Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group that fled to the DRC after committing the Rwandan genocide. In 2012, right after its formation, the group attempted to capture Goma; however, it was thwarted by the Congolese and UN forces. Currently, with the absolute control of Goma and Bukavu, the group has come closer to achieving its objectives of territorial control, access to mineral networks, regional and political influence and protection of Tutsi minorities. The renewed violence has killed over 2000 people and displaced over five million, according to the UN.

2. The Congolese state and its failure. Eastern DRC is home to over 200 ethnic groups. The region has been challenged with decades-long historical grievances, land disputes, ethnic tensions, a genocide, and rebellions. The Congolese state has been incapacitated of addressing these issues and has left governance in the region to ethnic chiefdoms. Besides, since independence, the Congolese regimes have survived on a patrimonial system, where state resources reached the elites and highest leadership of ethnic chiefdoms and never the grassroots. This ignorance was intentional to keep the peripheries divided, thereby avoiding a collective opposition. This systemic state failure has played a major role in the rise, expansion and growth of armed groups such as M23. 

3. The role of Rwanda. Beyond the Tutsi kinship with M23, Rwanda provides political and military support to the group. Rwanda uses M23 as a proxy to keep FDLR away from its boundaries. In 2024, the UN reported that Rwandan forces are in “de facto control of M23 operation,” have been training M23 recruits and supplying weapons. Most importantly, M23 is a major source for Rwanda to access the mineral towns and illegal mineral trade in eastern DRC. And, Rwanda has always sought a “denial” strategy whenever questioned about its support for the M23 rebels.

4. Previously failed mediations. Eastern DRC has a history of multiple failed peace efforts. One of the most important peace agreements was the Addis Ababa Agreement 2013. The agreement and the UN Congo mission contained the M23 campaigns until 2021. In 2024, MONUSCO was asked to leave by the Congolese state, citing its failure to contain armed groups. The later set of peace mediations was led by Angola and the East African Community (EAC). The Angola-led “Luanda Process” focused on a political settlement, and the EAC-led “Nairobi Process” focused on disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups. Both failed when DRC refused direct talks with M23 in December 2024 and a month after the group captured Goma and Bukavu. The record of failed peace mediations in eastern DRC is attributed to issues, including a lack of inclusivity, commitment, and compliance, conflicting demands, and the complex nature of the conflict 

5. A failed Qatari ceasefire and a US peace deal without peace. In June, the US successfully brought Rwanda and the DRC together to sign a peace agreement. The signatories agreed to respect territorial integrity and end hostilities. Rwanda agreed to withdraw its troops from eastern DRC, and both parties agreed to end their support to armed groups. The deal also called for demobilisation and integration of armed groups into the Congolese force. However, the deal was criticised globally for multiple reasons. While the deal served Trump’s global peace pursuits, by linking it to the US’ mineral interests, Trump’s intentions deviated from a genuine interest in conflict settlement. Secondly, the deal was signed between the two highest political heads of state, ignoring the underlying issues of the conflict. Thirdly, when the signatories asked about the mechanisms for maintaining the deal, Trump responded by leaving it open-ended. He said, “We’ll make sure you follow through”, or have to face “severe penalties.” In parallel to the US peace deal, Doha mediated a ceasefire agreement between the DRC and M23, with M23 agreeing to withdraw from the regions it seized and the Congo agreeing to release M23 prisoners. The ceasefire was supposed to set the stage for a peace process in a month. However, the ceasefire was violated immediately, with both sides failing to comply with the commitments.  

What does it mean? 
First, M23 violence. 2025 saw M23’s largest offensive since its formation. Having strategic and military advantage in North and South Kivu and closer to achieving its objectives, the M23 rebels have less incentive to commit to any peace mediations. A weak and failed domestic and international response is likely to increase the group’s confidence to expand its fighting beyond eastern DRC. The capital, Kinshasa, is increasingly under threat of the Group’s advance. 

Second, failed state response. Once again, the Congolese state failed to guarantee security in eastern DRC. The state has allied with several armed groups, such as FDLR, to contain M23’s advances; however, failed. The systemic state failure in addressing the socio-economic grievances in the region, while prioritising the survival of the regime, will likely continue to trigger further violence in the region.

Third, another failed peace effort. The US and Qatari-led initiatives have failed, adding to the list of failed peace mediations in eastern DRC. Trump’s deal prioritised the US’s geopolitical interests over conflict settlement. It has also set forth a new global trend of mediators involving their national interest rather than acting in the best interest of resolving the conflict. With the failed domestic and international responses, the conflict will likely continue and escalate with multiple waves of violence and a dire humanitarian crisis beyond eastern Congo. 

About the author
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS.

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