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Conflict Weekly
25 Years of UNSC 1325 Resolution, Election Protests in Tanzania, and Trump's Peace Plan in Gaza
Conflict Weekly #306, 6 November 2025, Vol 6, No. 45

  IPRI Team
6 November 2025

Conflict Weekly #306, 6 November 2025, Vol 6, No. 45
An initiative by NIAS-IPRI

D Suba Chandran, Anu Maria Joseph, Brighty Ann Sarah and Preetha R

Conflict Weekly Special Commentary
Women, Peace and Security: 
25 Years of UNSC 1325, its achievements and limitations
D Suba Chandran

On 31 October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted a landmark resolution on the role of women in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and prevention. It called for an increased role for women in the decision-making process, both in conflict resolution and prevention, and for the protection of women and their rights during and after conflicts. 

Twenty-five years after its adoption, what have been the achievements of the UNSC 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda it spearheaded? What lessons have been learned and what can be done further?

UNSC 1325 Resolution: Background and Context
UNSC Resolution 1325 came into being amid an increased international push during the 1990s to focus on non-military security issues, with a special emphasis on women and security. Multiple conflicts in the Balkans and in Africa, including the great genocide in Rwanda during the 1990s, pushed civil society to take up the issue and build a global coalition. Also, during that decade, there was increased civil society activism at the regional and international levels, covering a wide range of issues - from nuclear disarmament to the landmine ban. Thanks to the above global push, and an unacceptable level of violence against women in the above-mentioned conflict regions, the gender agenda got a fillip. 

Besides the global movement, there were also regional initiatives focusing on women's rights and demanding their participation in the decision-making processes. In some regions, for example, in South Asia, even before the 1325 resolution, there were domestic initiatives across the region, from Nepal to Sri Lanka in the 1990s, led by civil society organizations and individuals. 

One of the highlights of the above global and regional initiatives was the Beijing Declaration in 1995, which called for the empowerment of women and their participation in decision-making to achieve equality, development, and peace.  The 12 areas of the Plan of Action that the governments and civil society actors agreed to in Beijing subsequently became the backbone of the WPS agenda.

Shaping of the WPS Agenda
UNSC Resolution 1325, adopted in October 2000, led to a series of subsequent resolutions over the next two decades, creating a "WPS Agenda." The 1325 resolution emphasized women's representation in decision-making relating to conflict management, resolution and prevention at national, regional and international levels; subsequent resolutions expanded the agenda. The resolution also invited the Secretary-General to undertake studies on the "impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peacebuilding and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution," and to report to the UNSC and the UN member states. There were "open debates" to take stock of WPS performance and discuss course corrections. 

A vital pivot of the 1325 resolution and the subsequent WPS agenda has been that women are not just victims but can be agents of change when engaged in decision-making processes. 

The biggest achievement of UNSC Resolution 1325, as mentioned above, was the WPS agenda, which it helped shape and expand since 2000 and which also built on previous efforts, for example, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. 

Another significant achievement has been the National Action Plan; member countries were expected to implement the UNSC 1325 through the National Action Plans. More than 100 countries have formulated National Action Plans. Even some regional organizations have also adopted the WPS agenda.

Finally, engaging women in conflict management and resolution programmes. The UN Secretary-General, in his action taken reports, has indicated that in countries across the world and in conflicts across regions, there have been efforts to include women in negotiations. 

25 years later: Limitations, Challenges and the Road Ahead for the WPS Agenda
While the 1325 kick-started a process and introduced an agenda on women, peace and security, there was a belief that it would lead to a transformation. Early October 2025, the UN Secretary General, in his remarks to the Open Debate on the WPS agenda, was candid when he admitted that "women remain absent from negotiating tables…women peacebuilders are underfunded, under threat, and under-recognized" and "sexual violence persists with impunity." Twenty-five years later, why is this the case? What have been the challenges? 

First, the changing global environment on peace and security. 1325 was born at the end of the 1990s, when the Cold War had ended and civil society played a larger role in global issues. The WPS agenda expected that women would have a larger role in peacebuilding, leading to a reworking of the idea of security. Since post-9/11 up to the two wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the opposite has started happening. Instead of peace defining the security discourse, the security narrative has returned as the dominant one, thereby returning to the pre-1991 period. This return of the security and militarisation narrative has undermined the peace dividend of the 1990s. 

Second, a collateral of the above – the return of the dominant security discourse – is the declining space for civil society activism at the national, regional and global levels. The rise of rightwing politics and shrinking space for democracy and civil society activities are blocking the march of the WPS agenda. Worse, there is a conservative pushback; a section is against reproductive rights and the LGBTQ debate, and is countering the WPS agenda. This could be seen in the slowdown in new resolutions to the WPS agenda and the discussions during the last six years. Of the ten big resolutions as a part of the WPS agenda, the last one was passed in 2019.

Third, the numbers. Though women's participation in conflict management and resolution processes has increased, the number remains marginal. Though numerous reports relating to conflict highlight the increasing number of women being affected, their engagement remains limited. Their participation (or the lack of it) in big-ticket items – for example, in two big conflicts of recent years – Ukraine and Gaza, should underline the real limitation. According to data, their involvement in the mediation hovers around 10 per cent or less. There is a huge gap between what the resolutions aim to achieve and what the practice is.

Fourth, the national action plans. While more than 100 countries have adopted national action plans, their implementation remains a far cry. For most developing countries, the issue is general and not specific to the WPS agenda – it is about implementing the legislation. The state institutions remain weak. While the global process – in terms of legislations and resolutions, irrespective of the recent push back - has continued, at the national level, effective implementation of the spirit of the above resolutions is yet to take place. As a result, there have been national action plans, but legislation alone cannot transform unless it is effectively implemented.

Fifth, the required gender budget at the national, regional and global levels. Multiple reports and statements, including the UN Secretary-General's latest in October, underline that the WPS agenda is underfunded. Without providing adequate funding support, but politically agreeing to the WPS agenda amounts to gender-washing. 

Sixth, the social institutions. The real problem is here; unless there is a transformation in the patriarchal structure at the ground level, no national action plan can succeed. The anti-gender and the conservative pushback emanates from the age-old structures and challenges that the social institutions have posed to the gender agenda. Without societal-level changes, the global WPS agenda may remain strong in the paper in terms of legislation and resolutions, but weak in its achievements. 

For the 1325 to succeed, the WPS agenda must return to what it aimed to be– transformative, not a trickle-down process. Twenty-five years later, there have been achievements, but there are also challenges and limitations. While the first two decades saw progress, the first half of this decade witnessed a slowdown, and worse, a pushback. There is a need for a course correction to get the WPS agenda back on a fast track. Otherwise, there will be a backsliding of the WPS agenda. Given the conservative pushback and the return to the security paradigm, the WPS agenda is more relevant today than ever before.

Tanzania: Election Protests and Violent Crackdown
Anu Maria Joseph
 
In the news
On 5 November, the AU said that the elections in Tanzania failed to comply with democratic standards. The AU’s election monitoring team highlighted ballot stuffing, internet shutdown, social media restrictions, use of excessive military force and politically motivated abductions. The mission concluded that the election “did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections.”

On 1 November, the Election Commission Chief, Jacobs Mwambegele, declared Saima Suluhu Hassan as “the winner of the presidential elections.” Hassan stated that the election was “free and democratic,” and accused the protesters of being “unpatriotic.” She stated: “We thank the security forces for ensuring that the violence did not stop voting.”

The election week (20 October-1 November) was marked by violent protests. The protests were against undemocratic elections and the violent suppression of dissent. The government responded with force. On 31 October, AFP news quoted a spokesperson from the opposition Chadema party that "around 700" people have been killed during the clashes with security forces.

Issues at large
First, Tanzania's political history. Tanzania (previously Tanganyika) gained independence from Britain in 1961, with Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) forming the government under pan-Africanist Julius Nyerere. The ruling CCM has stayed in power for the past 64 years. The CCM, the party that led Tanzania's independence struggle, has lost its popularity since 2015. The regime survives by quashing political opponents, human rights defenders and journalists and repression of all kinds of dissents. Hassan, Tanzania’s first female President, came to power in 2021 following the death of her predecessor, John Magufuli. She was applauded for the initial easing of political repression and censorship. Later, her government adopted a similar approach of her predecessors, with more authoritarian tendencies.

Second, Tanzania's record of violent political repression and election fraud. Election violence and political repression are not new to Tanzania. During the 2020 election, similar events of banning of opposition candidates, protests and violent suppression were reported. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) described CCM as the "last of the hegemonic liberation parties" clinging on to power by blocking opposition "through administrative, legal and extra-legal means." In June, a UN panel of human rights reported more than 200 cases of politically motivated enforced disappearances since 2019. This year, the largest opposition party, Chadema's candidate, Tundu Lissu, was blocked from contesting after being imprisoned on treason charges for calling for electoral reforms. Luhaga Mpina of the Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT-Wazalendo) was disqualified from running by the election commission. The other 16 presidential candidates lacked adequate political support to make an impact.

Third, the role of institutions. The CCM has extensive control over the election commission, although it's called the “Independent” National Election Commission (INEC). Its commissioners are appointed by the President and lack operational independence. The AU election observers have highlighted the lack of transparency in INEC’s election process, citing the ban on two major opposition candidates. Another factor is the historical politicisation of the security apparatus. Since independence, Tanzania’s police functioned as a regime protection force. Despite being democratised in 1992, the police remain under the direct control of the President. Many senior police officers are members of CCM. Opposition rallies are frequently disrupted and quelled under the pretext of public order. The security mandate of police forces is often misused for political agendas, especially during the elections.

Fourth, domestic and regional responses. The violent protests were a major response against the undemocratic elections. It was mobilised by the opposition parties. Civilians, frustrated with CCM's 64-year domination, unemployment, inequality and poverty, joined the protests. The government responded using force. It also took measures to downplay the scale of election violence by blaming foreign nationals for inflaming it, especially Kenyans. Internet services are shut down, and social media remains restricted. Meanwhile, regional institutions such as the AU observer mission and the SADC have been vocal about the democratic deficits and human rights concerns, implying mounting international pressure on the CCM.

In perspective
Tanzania has long been regarded as one of the relatively peaceful and politically stable countries in Africa. This reputation was largely associated with CCM’s ability to maintain influence over the state and security apparatus, and the structural emergence of new leaders every five years. The party has been able to maintain peace and stability, regardless of longstanding political oppression. This has been the major reason for considerable support to CCM, especially from the rural population. However, the recent election protests and subsequent violence indicate that CCM’s 64 years of control and erosion of checks and balances risk more intense and frequent protests and civic mobilisations. Although strong regional responses and pressure indicate a positive development, the extent of leverage they exercise to push CCM for a democratic transition is doubtful.

The War in Gaza and the 20-point peace plan: 
An audit of phase one and the pivot to phase two
Brighty Ann Sarah and Preetha R
 
In the news
On 6 November, the US shared the draft resolution on the implementation of President Trump's peace plan for Gaza with Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE, along with the 10 Security Council members.

On 5 November, Turkey's MIT intelligence agency chief met Hamas' negotiating team head Khalil Al-Hayya and discussed the path to be followed in implementing the next phases of the Gaza ceasefire plan, Turkish security sources said.

On the same day, Israel received the remains of another hostage from Gaza, stated the prime minister's office. 

On 2 November, Reuters reported that foreign ministers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia are set to join the meeting in Istanbul on ceasefire developments and the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

On 31 October, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that foreign ministers of certain Muslim countries will convene in Istanbul on 3 November to discuss the next steps on the Gaza ceasefire. "The topics being discussed currently are how to proceed to the second stage, the stability force," he added.

Issues at large
First, an audit of phase one. Under the ceasefire, Hamas agreed to release all living hostages in exchange for nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and detainees. The agreement also required Hamas to transfer the remains of 28 deceased hostages in return for 360 Palestinian militants killed during the conflict. Since the US-backed ceasefire took effect, Hamas has released 20 living hostages and returned the remains of 18 others. Israel has accused Hamas of delaying the remaining transfers, while Hamas maintains that locating and recovering all remains requires time. The disagreement over the recovery and handover of bodies remains a key challenge in implementing the broader 20-point peace plan. 

On the humanitarian front, nearly a month into the ceasefire, aid flows remain far below commitments, with the World Food Programme reporting that only half the required food deliveries have entered. Gaza’s local administration says that only about 145 trucks actually reach their destinations due to Israeli restrictions, as opposed to 600 trucks of the average daily supply stated in the ceasefire. Israel maintains it is meeting its ceasefire obligations, while accusing Hamas of diverting supplies, a claim the group denies. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), food access has modestly improved since the deal, with half of families now eating two meals a day. Civilians living in tents in southern Gaza say that tents have completely worn out and fear they will not last the winter, as per reports from Reuters. With winter approaching, inadequate shelter, flooding risks, and disease from uncollected waste add to the humanitarian challenges in Gaza. 

Second, the pivot to phase two. According to the reports suggest that the draft resolution circulated by the US proposes a two-year international force in Gaza, extendable beyond 2027. The draft resolution will be the basis for negotiations over the coming days between UN Security Council members. The draft grants the US and partner states broad authority to govern and secure Gaza through the international stabilization force (ISF), authorized to use "all necessary measures.” This operating alongside a Gaza “Board of Peace” chaired by President Trump, would secure Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt, protect civilians and aid corridors, train a new Palestinian police force, and oversee Gaza’s demilitarization, including dismantling Hamas’ military infrastructure if it resists disarmament. The force would also support transitional governance as Israel withdraws and the Palestinian Authority prepares for longer-term control. Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE are reportedly "showing clear regional support.” That said, the resolution's adoption relies on nine favourable votes without vetoes from permanent members like Russia or China.

Third, regional efforts to advance the peace process. The Istanbul ministerial meeting reflects efforts to transition the US-brokered truce into a sustainable framework. According to sources from Turkey’s foreign ministry, Minister Hakan Fidan was expected to emphasize "coordinated action by Muslim countries for the ceasefire to evolve into a lasting peace," and point to Israel for "making excuses" to undermine the deal and for insufficient humanitarian aid flows. It hints that these countries, which earlier joined President Trump on the UNGA sidelines to back the 20-point plan, are now focusing on the second phase that looks at establishing a stability force to oversee Gaza's security and administration by Palestinians. This regional alignment gains further momentum with the US sharing its draft UNSC resolution. In parallel, Turkey's engagement, as seen in the recent meeting between its intelligence chief and Hamas negotiator Khalil Al-Hayya, highlights Ankara's mediator role, in spite of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent hints at opposition to any Turkish security presence in Gaza. These efforts come as the ceasefire, effective since 10 October, faces tests from sporadic violence, with Palestinian authorities reporting 236 deaths from Israeli strikes since then.  

In perspective
First, phase one reflects a basket of mixed outcomes. The partial completion of hostage exchanges, coupled with disputes over the recovery of remains, shows limited trust and operational constraints of the ceasefire. Hamas' time pleas clash with Israel's delay accusations, risking phase-two derailment. On the humanitarian front, while marginal improvements in food access show some stabilization, the continued shortfall in aid delivery, shelter crisis and upcoming winter challenges expose the current lapses.

Second, partial success and the way forward. The pursuit of the second phase of the ceasefire, despite several violations from both Israel and Hamas during the first phase, reflects a commitment towards the peace process. Unlike the previous peace negotiations that broke down under violations, the current plan overlooks the breaches as the Trump administration is keen on the establishment of the Board of Peace and asserting regional control. The active participation of Arab and Islamic leaders, led by Turkey, to sustain the momentum of the efforts further highlights the region’s collective desire to move beyond the conflict and strive for lasting peace.

Third, the deployment of the ISF as an enforcement authority to oversee Gaza’s demilitarization, including the “permanent decommissioning” of armed groups like Hamas, risks disrupting the fragile peace and provoking renewed aggression. Additionally, the proposed Board of Peace emerges as an external administrative body without a tangible local administrative framework, leaves the broader question of Palestinian statehood uncertain. 

CW Column: The War in Ukraine This Week
The War in Ukraine Days 1341-1347
Ukraine sends special forces to counter Russian offensive in Pokrovsk
This week’s edition covers the War in Ukraine Days 1341-1347, up to 4 November
Padmashree Anandhan
 
WAR ON THE GROUND
On 4 November, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited troops in the Pokrovsk area of Donetsk oblast. He spent some time with soldiers in the Dobropillya sector, which is roughly 20 kilometres from Pokrovsk. Russian forces have pushed deeper into Pokrovsk and nearby regions, with neither side claiming full control, as shown in maps from the Ukrainian project DeepState. They described the situation as critical, highlighting that in some districts, Russian forces are shoring up their positions.

On 4 November, Ukrainian long-range drones hit an industrial site in Sterlitamak, which is about 1,300 km deep in Russia. Local officials reported an explosion at the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant, resulting in some damage to the water treatment facility, but the exact cause of the blast is still unclear. Ukraine's military general staff stated that the plant suffered "considerable damage." In another incident, Ukraine's forces targeted a Lukoil oil refinery in Kstovo, located in the Nizhny Novgorod region, east of Moscow.

On 2 November, Ukrinform reported on Ukraine’s response to tackle a significant Russian offensive involving thousands of troops; it had dispatched special forces to Pokrovsk, which is often referred to as “the gateway to Donetsk.” This city is vital for Ukrainian supply routes and has been under Moscow’s radar for more than a year as Russia aims for complete control over the Donetsk region. While Ukraine has requested Tomahawk missiles for long-range attacks against Russia, it continues to successfully carry out strikes using its own drones and missiles. These efforts have targeted Russian military and strategic sites, including oil depots and refineries.

On 2 November, Ukrinform reported that Russian drone and missile strikes in Ukraine resulted in the deaths of at least six individuals, including two boys aged 11 and 14, leaving tens of thousands without electricity, as reported by officials. These attacks particularly targeted the Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa regions, according to Ukraine's prosecutor general. The strikes caused power outages across the eastern Donetsk region and affected nearly 58,000 households in southern Zaporizhzhia.

On 1 November, a Russian strike set a shop ablaze in Ukraine’s southeastern Dnipropetrovsk region, killing two and injuring several others, according to acting governor Vladislav Haivanenko. This attack occurred in the Samarivskyi district near Dnipro, destroying the shop and damaging seven nearby homes. Public broadcaster Suspilne reported seven injuries.

On 1 November, Ukraine’s top general, Oleksandr Syrskyi, asserted that Ukrainian forces continue to defend Pokrovsk, despite Russia claiming it has nearly encircled the city after over a year of fierce fighting. Syrskyi noted that a coordinated operation is in place to push back and eliminate Russian troops, with reports of slight improvements in some areas from Ukraine’s military. Kyiv has also upped the number of assault troops in the region, though the situation remains tense and rapidly evolving. If Russia takes Pokrovsk, often dubbed “the gateway to Donetsk,” it would represent its most significant territorial gain in Ukraine since it seized Avdiivka in early 2024.

THE MOSCOW VIEW
Claims by Russia
On 4 November, Vladimir Putin put his signature on a new law that expands the role of Russian military reservists in the ongoing conflict. Now, they’re tasked with protecting oil refineries from Ukrainian drone attacks. The law also allows for military conscription at any time of the year, moving away from the old system that only permitted it during certain periods in the fall and spring. While conscripts cannot be deployed directly to combat, they do become part of Russia's reserves once their service ends, which means they could be called back for the war.

On 1 November, Russia’s defence ministry reported that its forces had thwarted an attempt by Ukraine to send special forces into Pokrovsk via helicopter, resulting in the deaths of all 11 soldiers aboard. At the same time, two sources from the Ukrainian military stated that Kyiv had successfully deployed some special forces units in certain areas of the city, despite Moscow's claim that they had surrounded Ukrainian positions there.

THE WEST VIEW
Responses from Europe and the US 
On 4 November, Germany revealed it’s boosting military aid to Ukraine by an extra EUR three billion by 2026, which pushes the total to about EUR 11.5 billion. The finance ministry explained that this new funding will go towards different kinds of support, like artillery, drones, armoured vehicles, and replacing two Patriot missile defence systems.

On 2 November, US President Donald Trump mentioned that he is not seriously thinking about sending long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. When reporters on Air Force One asked about it, he said: "No, not really," but he also noted that he could reconsider. There have been recent reports suggesting that the Pentagon told the White House that US stockpiles of Tomahawks are enough to possibly supply Ukraine.

CW Column: Conflicts in Africa This Week
Protests in Tanzania, the US military threat to Nigeria, and Sudan
Anu Maria Joseph

1. Election violence in Tanzania
On 3 November, Samia Suluhu Hassan was sworn in as Tanzania's President for a second consecutive term. Political repression, ban on political parties, internet shut down and social media restrictions led to violent protests across the country. 

This issue is discussed in the Conflict Weekly note above. See: “Tanzania: Election Protests and Violent Crackdown.”

2. Nigeria: Trump’s military threat against Christian genocide
On 3 November, US President Donald Trump said that he would send military to tackle Islamist militant groups in Nigeria, citing violence against Christians. He also accused the Nigerian government of not taking adequate action to protect Christians. Referring to a report by Open Doors, Trump says 3,100 Christians have been killed between October 2023 and 2024. Trump stated: "They're killing record numbers of Christians in Nigeria. They're killing the Christians and killing them in very large numbers. We're not going to allow that to happen." US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth added: "The Department of War is preparing for action. Either the Nigerian Government protects Christians, or we will kill the Islamic Terrorists who are committing these horrible atrocities."

On the same day, the Nigerian government rejected the claims. Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Francisca Omayuli, stated: "It is not true that Christians are being specifically targeted in Nigeria and that militants belonging to Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISAWAP) "attack both churches and mosques."

The issue explained
The issue stems from the geographic spread of multiple security issues in the country: Islamist militancy in the northeast, farmer-herder clashes in the Middle Belt and bandits in the northwest. 

Islamist militants, predominantly Boko Haram and ISWAP, have been active since 2009. "Bandits" carry out mass kidnappings demanding ransoms. Their motivations are not ideologically driven rather for money and resources. The farmer-herder clashes are complicated. The herder community belongs to ethnic Fulanis, who predominantly belong to the Muslim religion. Fulani Muslim herders attack farmers belonging to both Christian and Muslim Communities. More than a religion-driven conflict, it has more to do with land, cattle and grazing rights. Meanwhile, many research groups and agencies collectively describe Muslim Fulani herders and Islamist insurgents as "jihadists." Another factor is the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a secessionist armed group fighting for a Christian breakaway state in the south-east. They have reportedly played a major role in spreading the narrative of "Christian genocide."

The demographic divide between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria is almost even. And, religious violence had reportedly started in the country before independence. In terms of figures and numbers, according to ACLED, under 21,000 civilians have been killed across Nigeria since 2020. The report suggests that both Muslims and Christians are targeted. ACLED data says there were 385 incidents between 2020 and 2025 where Christians were targeted, killing 317 people. This indicates that targeted attacks on Christians account for only a small portion. 

What does this mean?
Although explicit religious violence and targeted attacks on both Muslims and Christians are occurring in Nigeria, the majority of the incidents are related to terrorism, banditry and land ownership clashes. Trump's allegations seem to be exaggerated and fit well with his idealised Christian-Right-wing narratives. However, Trump's military threat against Nigeria appears concerning. First, the inter-state military operation in Nigeria raises questions on the US's derogatory posture towards a sovereign democratic country, with which the US has limited cooperation. Regardless, Nigeria has shown openness to the US assistance as long as its sovereignty is respected. Most importantly, the authority under which Trump plan a potential intervention? For the US to intervene in another sovereign democratic country, it needs either: consent from the respective country, a UN mandate, or domestic legislation to intervene. Finally, it also raises doubts about another humanitarian intervention in the name of religious freedom.

3. Sudan after the fall of el-Fasher
The previous week saw the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) capturing el Fasher, the last remaining city under the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Darfur. The paramilitary has continued its atrocities and summary killings. According to the UN refugee agency, more than 60,000 people have fled the city within a week. The incidents in el-Fasher echo the Darfur genocide in 2004. While the situation in el-Fashe is status quo, on 4 November, 40 people were killed by the RSF in the city of el-Obied in North Kordofan state. el-Obeid directly connects to Khartoum. The new development has raised fears that the RSF would likely push its offensives further into the capital.

Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week:
Regional Roundups
Rohini Reenuam, Anu Maria Joseph, Femy Francis, Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Lekshmi MK, Aparna A Nair, M Kejia, and Rizwana Banu

China, East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
China and Russia: Beijing and Moscow pledge a joint response to unilateral sanctions 
On 4 November, China and Russia reaffirmed their partnership, pledging coordinated action against unilateral sanctions during Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin's visit to China. In a joint communiqué released by China's Foreign Ministry following Mishustin's meetings with Premier Li Qiang and President Xi Jinping, both sides condemned "unilateral coercive measures" imposed outside UN Security Council resolutions as "illegal" and unacceptable. The statement reflected their intent to develop mutual assistance and economic cooperation while countering external economic pressures. President Xi stated that China-Russia relations had advanced "steadily despite a turbulent external environment," describing the protection, consolidation, and enhancement of their partnership as a "strategic choice." He identified energy, agriculture, aerospace, digital economy, and green industries as key areas for future collaboration. Mishustin emphasised the importance of both countries establishing favourable conditions for attracting mutual investment and supporting joint projects. The visit comes in the backdrop of increased Western sanctions on Moscow over the war in Ukraine and US efforts to restrict states and firms engaging with Russia.

China: A UK university threatened over research on human rights violations in Xinjiang
On 3 November, the BBC reported on China's National Security Service demanding the shutdown of research into human rights abuses by China. Sheffield Hallam University staff in China were threatened. China was seeking to halt research by Laura Murphy, who is a professor of human rights and contemporary slavery at Sheffield Hallam. She alleges Uyghur Muslims in the north-western region of Xinjiang were subject to forced labour. China’s Embassy in London said: "The Helena Kennedy Centre at Sheffield Hallam University has released multiple fake reports on Xinjiang that are seriously flawed."

China: US might open a direct military hotline, says US Secretary of War
On 1 November, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that the US and China plan to establish military-to-military communications channels, aimed at de-escalating the conflict. Hegseth posted on social media that he had a positive meeting with China’s Minister of National Defence, Admiral Dong Jun. Hegseth posted: “Admiral Dong and I also agreed that we should set up military-to-military channels to deconflict and de-escalate any problems that arise. We have more meetings on that coming soon. God bless both China and the USA!” Meanwhile, while attending the ASEAN meeting, he stated that China is sweeping maritime claims in the South China Sea, and that they seek peace and not conflict, and that they must ensure that China does not dominate anyone in the region.

China: Joint initiative with UK police to crack down on cryptocurrency fraud
On 31 October, SCMP reported that Chinese police worked with the UK law authorities to crack down on a cryptocurrency fraud and money laundering case. This is aimed at helping 128,000 Chinese investors to recoup their funds currently caught in fraudulent wealth schemes between 2014 and 2017. A government task force in Tianjin called for victims to submit and confirm their information on an online platform and urged them to wait patiently for the return of funds. The British government proposed the establishment of a compensation scheme for the Chinese victims, while it also sought to keep most of the seized bitcoins.

China: First batch of Hangor class submarines to be operational in Pakistan by 2026, reports Global Times
On 2 November, Global Times reported that the first batch of Hangor-class submarines under a China-Pakistan cooperation project will be operational and in service in Pakistan Navay by 2026. Pakistan’s Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Naveed Ashraf said: “Hangor-class submarine program is progressing smoothly, and the successful launch of the second and third submarines in China earlier this year is a major milestone for naval collaboration between China and Pakistan.” Pakistan signed a contract with China to procure eight Hangor-class conventional submarines in 2015, with the first four to be constructed by China and the rest to be assembled by Pakistan.

China: To lift chip export ban for a few European firms, reports BBC
On 31 October, the BBC reported that China will loosen its chip export ban. This comes after Dutch authorities took charge of the Chinese firm Nexperia citing national security threat. In retaliation, China said that it will not re-export the chips completed in Chinese factories in Europe, which could lead to the temporary shutdown of Volvo and Volkswagen factories. Around 70 per cent of Nexperia chips made in Europe are sent to China to be completed and re-exported to other countries. China’s Ministry of Commerce said: “We will comprehensively consider the actual situation of enterprises and grant exemptions to exports that meet the criteria.” The ministry added that the improper intervention by the Dutch government led to the chaos in the global supply chain.

Taiwan: New opposition leader calls for cross-strait peace with China
On 1 November, Taiwan’s new opposition leader Cheng Li-wun of the Kuomintang party, warns against the rising military and political opposition with China. Cheng calls for a new era of peace and said: “This is the worst of times. The Taiwan Strait faces grave military danger, and the world is watching closely. Taiwan’s security faces the constant threat of war.” The KMT’s new deputy chairman, Hsiao Hsu-tsen, visited China this week and met Song Tao, head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Cheng stated that their party under her leadership will open a new era of cross-Strait peace and lead Taiwan forward.

South Korea: The US Defense Secretary Hegseth names South Korea "a model ally"
On 1 November, the US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that deterring North Korea will be the core objective of the South-Washington alliance. Speaking alongside his South Korean counterpart, Hegseth stated that "there's no doubt that flexibility for regional contingency is something we would take a look at," referring to the 28,500 US troops stationed in Seoul. The US officials have also hinted at the plan to advance the US troops in the Korean peninsula to address broader threats, such as defending Taiwan and monitoring China's military expansion, reported Reuters. Hegseth stated that Trump supported South Korea's plans to build nuclear-powered submarines to ensure US allies have "the best capabilities," and that "because Korea has been a model ally, he's open to opportunities like that." He added that both sides were finalising a joint communiqué that would cover discussions on defence costs and related issues, noting that talks included encouraging South Korea to increase its military investments. He added that the allies had also agreed for South Korea to take on the maintenance and repair of US naval vessels, enabling them to remain in the region and ensure operational readiness.

South Korea: Pete Hegseth visits Seoul for the annual Security Consultative Meeting; discussions to hinge on Seoul-Washington alliance and combined defence capabilities against Pyongyang
On 3 November, the US Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth, visited the Panmunjom truce village on the Demilitarised Zone border with North Korea, accompanied by South Korea's Defence Minister, Ahn Gyu-back. During the annual meeting on strategic and operational directions for the combined forces, both officials shared the view that the regional security environment was "complex and unstable." He is set to attend the annual Security Consultative Meeting on 4 November, the highest-level forum where South Korea's defence strategies against North Korea's nuclear capabilities are discussed. Defence Minister Ahn stated that the border visit "has symbolic and declarative significance itself, demonstrating the strength of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the combined defence posture." South Korea's Defence Ministry stated that the meeting will discuss plans to respond to the "changing security environment and threats," by developing a new alliance between Seoul and Washington, and evaluating the combined defence readiness against North Korea. Seoul also stated that its pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines was not aimed at escalating an arms race, but a need to counter North Korea's submarine programme. "It is not to generate more of an arms race... but the result of persuading China and the US that North Korea has announced (its own) nuclear submarines and we need to prepare correspondingly," presidential chief of staff Kang Hoon-sik stated.

The Philippines: Pentagon announces joint task force to strengthen operations in South China Sea and beyond
On 31 October, the US and Philippines launched Task Force-Philippines to bolster military readiness and interoperability, the Pentagon announced. Unveiled after US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth's fourth meeting with Philippine counterpart Gilberto Teodoro at an ASEAN defence forum in Kuala Lumpur, the task force aims to strengthen operational cooperation and joint planning in contested waters. Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell stated: "This will increase operational cooperation, improve combined planning, and enhance interoperability, particularly in the South China Sea." Backed by their mutual defence treaty, the allies pledged to "re-establish deterrence" against China's aggressive postures, including clashes with Manila and strains near Taiwan. They also finalised a two-year modernisation roadmap to fast-track defence priorities, signalling a deeper US commitment to Indo-Pacific stability amid Beijing's encroachments.

ASEAN Defence Summit: The US is "eager to share" defence capabilities with allies and partners to counter Beijing's aggressions in the South China Sea, says Pete Hegseth
On 1 November, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth, at the ASEAN defence summit in Malaysia, proposed to ASEAN defence ministers the building of shared maritime domain awareness and announced US support in countering China's aggression in the South China Sea. He stated: "We need to develop our joint capabilities to respond, and this includes being able to monitor maritime conduct and develop the tools that allow us to respond quickly." Hegseth also emphasized that "no one can innovate and scale like the United States of America, and we're eager to share those capabilities with allies and partners." His remarks follow a joint drill by the armed forces of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the US in the South China Sea. China's military spokesperson stated that the patrol "seriously undermined peace and stability."

APEC Summit: Joint declaration emphasizing resilience and mutual benefits; Seoul seeks Beijing's support in denuclearization talks with Pyongyang
On 1 November, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, hosted by South Korea, concluded with the adoption of a joint declaration emphasizing the need for resilience and mutual trade benefits. President Xi announced that China will host the 2026 APEC summit and proposed the establishment of a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. South Korea's President Lee Jae-myung also sought China's support in resuming denuclearization talks with North Korea. President Xi responded that he was willing to broaden cooperation and jointly tackle the challenges they face. "I am very positive about the situation in which conditions for engagement with North Korea are being formed," Lee said, referring to recent high-level exchanges between China and North Korea. However, Pyongyang dismissed Lee's remarks, stating that any effort to disrupt its nuclear program is a "pipe dream". Trump had also offered to meet Kim Jong Un during his visit to South Korea, but Pyongyang made no public response. The US had announced new trade deals with several countries, including China and South Korea, ahead of the meeting, but President Trump departed before the summit could commence. The Trump-Xi Jinping summit also produced a deal that includes lower US tariffs on Chinese goods in return for Beijing's action against illegal fentanyl trade, the resumption of US soybean purchases, and continued rare earth exports.

South Asia
India: Washington and New Delhi sign a 10-year defence framework agreement
On 31 October, India's Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth signed a 10-year Defence Framework Agreement between the two countries at the ASEAN Defence Summit in Malaysia. Rajnath Singh described it as a "signal" of our growing strategic convergence, stating that it would "usher in a new era in our already strong defence partnership." Pete Hegseth described the framework as "a cornerstone for regional stability and deterrence," emphasising enhanced coordination, information sharing, and technological cooperation. The pact provides long-term policy direction across the full spectrum of defence collaboration and reinforces the commitment to a "free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific." The agreement comes in the backdrop of efforts to repair strained relations after Washington imposed 50 per cent tariffs on Indian goods over New Delhi's Russian oil imports, which had led India to pause US defence purchases. The meeting between Singh and Hegseth marked the first since the tariffs, reflecting a mutual intent to revitalise defence engagement.

Pakistan-Afghanistan: Turkey hosts delegations from Pakistan and Afghanistan for the third round of talks
On 6 November, Turkey hosted the delegations from Islamabad and Kabul in Istanbul for the third round of talks between the two countries. Both Turkey and Qatar mediated between Pakistan and Afghanistan after a series of air strikes and military clashes between the two countries that resulted in substantial casualties. Qatar intervened between the two and brokered a ceasefire in the middle of October. However, the ceasefire was unstable, leading to another round of talks in Istanbul during the last week of October. After a tough discussion and an initial failure, Turkey and Qatar succeeded in getting a joint statement calling for the continuation of the ceasefire between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the establishment of a verification mechanism to monitor the border developments. The joint statement also called for the next round of talks on 6 November. Over the past week, the ceasefire has been maintained along the border. Pakistan wants the Taliban to give up its support to the TTP, while the latter wants Islamabad not to pursue any unilateral action on the border or inside Afghanistan.

The Middle East and Africa
Iran: "Cooperation with Iran is not possible as long as the US continues to support the accursed Zionist regime, maintains military bases, and interferes in the region," says Khamenei
On 3 November, Iran's Supreme Leader stated that cooperation with the United States is unlikely, pointing to Washington's continued support for Israel, its military presence, and interference in the Middle East. His remarks follow as President Trump's administration seeks to heighten pressure on Tehran, reported Reuters. "The Americans sometimes say they would like to cooperate with Iran. Cooperation with Iran is not possible as long as the US continues to support the accursed Zionist regime, maintains military bases, and interferes in the region," stated Khamenei as per state media. In October, Trump stated that "the hand of friendship and cooperation [with Iran] is open," reflecting readiness for dialogue once Tehran is willing. The two countries had previously held five rounds of nuclear talks. However, the efforts were undermined following the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, during which the US struck key Iranian nuclear sites.

Lebanon: Israel continues attacks despite ceasefire
On 5 November, Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health confirmed that one person died and another was injured in an Israeli airstrike in Southern Lebanon. Similarly, on 3 November, two people were killed and seven wounded in an Israeli strike on the town of Doueir in Southern Lebanon. Another was killed in a strike on Aita al-Shaab, a border town in the Bint Jbeil district. Earlier on 2 November, Al Jazeera reported that at least four people were killed in southern Lebanon in an Israeli airstrike. On 1 November, a similar airstrike had wounded three in the same region. This attack came in the aftermath of a statement made by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun on 31 November, where he had accused Israel of intensifying attacks following his offer to negotiate "a more lasting end to the cross-border attacks." Despite an agreed-upon ceasefire in November 2024, Al Jazeera has reported a near-daily violation by Israel. Israel has argued that it is targeting Hezbollah members who are gathering intelligence and their infrastructure.

Syria: Washington set to establish military presence in Damascus to oversee potential Israel-Syria agreement, reports Reuters
On 6 November, Reuters reported that the US is preparing to establish a military presence at an airbase in Damascus to "monitor a potential Israel-Syria agreement." The base is located at the gateway to southern Syrian regions, expected to form part of a demilitarized zone under a non-aggression pact between Israel and Syria, a deal being mediated by the Trump administration. The new US deal is parallel to two other recent military deployments in the region tasked with monitoring ceasefire agreements, one in Lebanon, overseeing the 2024 truce between Hezbollah and Israel, and another in Israel, monitoring the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. President Trump is set to meet Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa at the White House on 10 November, the first such visit by a Syrian head of state. The Pentagon and the Syrian foreign ministry have not commented on the plan. A US official stated that Washington was "constantly evaluating our necessary posture in Syria to effectively combat ISIS (Islamic State) and (we) do not comment on locations or possible locations of (where) forces operate.” Two Syrian military sources said technical discussions had centred on utilizing the base for logistics, surveillance, refuelling, and humanitarian operations, while emphasizing that Syria would retain full sovereignty over the site.

Syria: Israel resumes ground incursions 
On 5 November, Al Jazeera reported that Israel had resumed ground incursions into Syria with the setting up of a checkpoint in the southern province of Quneitra. It quoted reports by local media which revealed that two Israeli tanks and four military vehicles had entered the town of Jabata al-Khashab and set up a military post. This is not the first Israeli incursion that started after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Israel has repeatedly violated Syria's sovereignty with "air strikes, ground infiltration operations, reconnaissance overflights, the establishment of checkpoints, and the arrests and disappearances of Syrians." In response, Syria has condemned the breach of its sovereignty, accused Israel of not adhering to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement that followed the 1973 war, but has not yet responded militarily. In September, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa revealed that Israel had launched more than 1,000 air strikes and conducted more than 400 ground incursions in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. He had termed the situation "very dangerous."

West Bank: 2,350 attacks by Israeli forces and settlers, says CRRC report
On 5 November, Al Jazeera quoted a report by the Palestinian Authority’s Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (CRRC), which claimed that Israeli forces carried out 1,584 attacks in the West Bank, with most attacks concentrated in the governorates of Ramallah (542), Nablus (412), and Hebron (401). Additionally, Israeli settlers carried out a total of 766 attacks concentrated in the Ramallah governorate (195), Nablus (179), and Hebron (126). The report, which is titled "Occupation Violations and Colonial Expansion Measures," also claimed that the settlers were expanding settlements considered illegal under international law and termed it an “organised strategy that aims to displace the land’s indigenous people and enforce a fully racist colonial regime."

Sudan: 60,000 residents flee El Fasher, reports the UN
On 1 November, the UN reported that more than 60,000 people had fled El-Fasher. This happened after the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized the city following a long siege. The UN says those escaping report widespread violence, including killings, sexual assault, and severe hunger. Many people are trying to reach Tawila, which is about 80km away. But they face intimidation and abuse from armed groups along the road. Humanitarian workers say children arriving are severely malnourished. Meanwhile, about 150,000 people remain trapped in the city with limited access to food and safety. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have denied claims of ethnically driven attacks. However, footage has emerged showing summary executions, and one fighter has been arrested. Sudan's civil war, which began in April 2023 between the army and the RSF, has caused mass displacement and deepened famine across the country.

Sudan: RSF drone strikes killed 40 in North Kordofan
On 5 November, a drone strike allegedly carried out by Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) killed at least 40 people attending a funeral in al-Luweib village near el-Obeid, North Kordofan. The attack came amid intensified fighting and mass displacement following RSF advances in Bara and el-Fasher. The UN and ICC have warned of possible war crimes, citing reports of summary executions, sexual violence, and famine in besieged areas. Despite international calls for a ceasefire, peace talks remain stalled. 

Sudan: The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) confirm famine conditions in Al-Fashir and Kadugli
On 3 November, the UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) confirmed famine conditions in Al-Fashir and Kadugli. Al-Fashir, recently seized by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) after an 18-month siege, and Kadugli, under blockade by the SPLM-N armed group allied to the RSF, have faced extreme hunger, displacement, and violence. Residents of al-Fashir reported severe shortages, resorting to eating animal feed and hides, while drone attacks targeted community kitchens, according to Reuters. The IPC's findings, criticised by Sudan's army-backed government, highlight a deepening humanitarian crisis amid global aid cuts and bureaucratic restrictions limiting UN and other relief operations. On the same day, prosecutors of the International Criminal Court said that they have begun collecting evidence of alleged mass killings and sexual violence following al-Fashir's capture.

Nigeria: US threatens military action to protect Christians
On 2 November, media across the world have been referring to statements from the US President Trump and Defense Secretary Hegseth threatening the Nigerian government to protect the Christians in the country. They also warned that if the government failed, the US would take direct action and attack the Islamic terrorists. Trump was quoted to have instructed the US Department of War to prepare for action and said: "If the Nigerian Government continues to allow the killing of Christians, the USA will immediately stop all aid and assistance to Nigeria, and may very well go into that now disgraced country, 'guns-a-blazing,' to completely wipe out the Islamic Terrorists who are committing these horrible atrocities." Nigeria has been facing serious challenges in parts of the country with violent clashes between the herders and farmers, and atrocities committed by Islamist militant groups such as the Boko Haram. Nigeria has a population of over 200 million; Christians are estimated to constitute approximately 45 per cent of the total population. According to reports, Christian communities are targeted in the farmer-herder violence and also by Islamist militant groups. In 2020, the US designated Nigeria as part of the "Countries of Particular Concern" for religious freedom; recently, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom had requested that Nigeria be placed under the same category. Nigeria has rejected Trump's accusation; however, it has welcomed the US support to fight the Islamist militants.

Europe and the Americas
Serbia: Anti-government protests; police detain 37 for violating public order
On 3 November, Reuters reported that 37 Serbian citizens were arrested for anti-government protests for "violating public order and peace and causing incidents during an unannounced public gathering." On 2 November, a hunger strike was launched by a victim's mother, and it gathered protesters, instigating clashes with the supporters of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. On 1 November 2024, the roof of a renovated railway station collapsed, killing 16 citizens. This led to countrywide protests against the government for poor management and corruption, and demanded snap elections. Last week, an independent commission of professors, judges, and technical experts investigating the disaster reported to the European Parliament that it had found high-level state graft, which led to poor construction standards and the hiring of unqualified subcontractors. Government officials denied such accusations. Recently, President Vučić and Parliament Speaker Ana Brnabic said the collapse could have been an act of terrorism. Prosecutors have indicted several senior state officials on charges of endangering public safety, but the court has yet to confirm the indictment, preventing a trial from going ahead.

Peru and Mexico: Lima severs diplomatic ties over Betssy Chavez asylum
On 4 November, Peru's Foreign Minister Hugo de Zela announced the severing of diplomatic ties with Mexico after it granted asylum to former Prime Minister Betssy Chavez. Chavez served under President Pedro Castillo and faces criminal charges over her alleged involvement in Castillo's failed attempt to dissolve Congress in late 2022. Ousted and detained, Castillo remains under arrest, while Chavez, imprisoned since June 2023, was released by a judge in September during her ongoing trial. Her driver testified that she requested to be taken to the Mexican embassy. Chavez denies any prior knowledge of Castillo's plan. Prosecutors are seeking a 25-year prison sentence. "In response to this unfriendly act, and taking into account the repeated occasions in which the current and former presidents of that country have interfered in the internal affairs of Peru, the Peruvian government has decided today to break diplomatic relations with Mexico," de Zela said. Mexico's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

Climate Change: Ahead of the Brazil COP Summit, EU countries reach a deal that would weaken Europe's commitment
On 5 November, according to initial reports by Reuters and Financial Times, the EU countries reached a last-minute compromise. Although they have agreed to a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 90 per cent by 2040, the compromise reached by the EU allows them to meet the target through the purchase of five per cent international carbon credits. This would effectively mean that, by using international carbon credits, Europe would reduce its emissions by 85 per cent, instead of the agreed-upon 90 per cent. According to initial media reports, the deal also provides for an additional five per cent in the future. The deal also refers to reducing emissions by 66.25 to 72.5 per cent by 2035. While environmentalists are unhappy with the above, political leaders would prefer a weak deal to none before they arrive in Brazil for the COP summit. This would mean a weakened position for the EU in the COP negotiations and is likely to force strong commitments from other countries.

About the authors
Anu Maria Joseph and Femy Francis are Project Associates at NIAS. Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha are postgraduate students at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. Lekshmi MK is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. Rizwana Banu, and Aparna A Nair are undergraduate students at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. M Kejia is an undergraduate student at the Department of Po

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