CW Note

CW Note
Tanzania: Election Protests and Violent Crackdown

Anu Maria Joseph
8 November 2025
Photo Source: Reuters

In the news
On 5 November, the AU said that the elections in Tanzania failed to comply with democratic standards. The AU’s election monitoring team highlighted ballot stuffing, internet shutdown, social media restrictions, use of excessive military force and politically motivated abductions. The mission concluded that the election “did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections.”

On 1 November, the Election Commission Chief, Jacobs Mwambegele, declared Saima Suluhu Hassan as “the winner of the presidential elections.” Hassan stated that the election was “free and democratic,” and accused the protesters of being “unpatriotic.” She stated: “We thank the security forces for ensuring that the violence did not stop voting.”

The election week (20 October-1 November) was marked by violent protests. The protests were against undemocratic elections and the violent suppression of dissent. The government responded with force. On 31 October, AFP news quoted a spokesperson from the opposition Chadema party that "around 700" people have been killed during the clashes with security forces.

Issues at large
First, Tanzania's political history. Tanzania (previously Tanganyika) gained independence from Britain in 1961, with Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) forming the government under pan-Africanist Julius Nyerere. The ruling CCM has stayed in power for the past 64 years. The CCM, the party that led Tanzania's independence struggle, has lost its popularity since 2015. The regime survives by quashing political opponents, human rights defenders and journalists and repression of all kinds of dissents. Hassan, Tanzania’s first female President, came to power in 2021 following the death of her predecessor, John Magufuli. She was applauded for the initial easing of political repression and censorship. Later, her government adopted a similar approach of her predecessors, with more authoritarian tendencies.

Second, Tanzania's record of violent political repression and election fraud. Election violence and political repression are not new to Tanzania. During the 2020 election, similar events of banning of opposition candidates, protests and violent suppression were reported. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) described CCM as the "last of the hegemonic liberation parties" clinging on to power by blocking opposition "through administrative, legal and extra-legal means." In June, a UN panel of human rights reported more than 200 cases of politically motivated enforced disappearances since 2019. This year, the largest opposition party, Chadema's candidate, Tundu Lissu, was blocked from contesting after being imprisoned on treason charges for calling for electoral reforms. Luhaga Mpina of the Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT-Wazalendo) was disqualified from running by the election commission. The other 16 presidential candidates lacked adequate political support to make an impact.

Third, the role of institutions. The CCM has extensive control over the election commission, although it's called the “Independent” National Election Commission (INEC). Its commissioners are appointed by the President and lack operational independence. The AU election observers have highlighted the lack of transparency in INEC’s election process, citing the ban on two major opposition candidates. Another factor is the historical politicisation of the security apparatus. Since independence, Tanzania’s police functioned as a regime protection force. Despite being democratised in 1992, the police remain under the direct control of the President. Many senior police officers are members of CCM. Opposition rallies are frequently disrupted and quelled under the pretext of public order. The security mandate of police forces is often misused for political agendas, especially during the elections.

Fourth, domestic and regional responses. The violent protests were a major response against the undemocratic elections. It was mobilised by the opposition parties. Civilians, frustrated with CCM's 64-year domination, unemployment, inequality and poverty, joined the protests. The government responded using force. It also took measures to downplay the scale of election violence by blaming foreign nationals for inflaming it, especially Kenyans. Internet services are shut down, and social media remains restricted. Meanwhile, regional institutions such as the AU observer mission and the SADC have been vocal about the democratic deficits and human rights concerns, implying mounting international pressure on the CCM.

In perspective
Tanzania has long been regarded as one of the relatively peaceful and politically stable countries in Africa. This reputation was largely associated with CCM’s ability to maintain influence over the state and security apparatus, and the structural emergence of new leaders every five years. The party has been able to maintain peace and stability, regardless of longstanding political oppression. This has been the major reason for considerable support to CCM, especially from the rural population. However, the recent election protests and subsequent violence indicate that CCM’s 64 years of control and erosion of checks and balances risk more intense and frequent protests and civic mobilisations. Although strong regional responses and pressure indicate a positive development, the extent of leverage they exercise to push CCM for a democratic transition is doubtful.


About the author
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS.


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