CW Column: The Conflicts in The Middle East

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CWA # 1859
CW Column: The Conflicts in The Middle East
Israel’s escalating attack on Hezbollah and Syria’s deepening sectarian violence

  Brighty Ann Sarah
28 November 2025

What happened this week?
1. Lebanon
On 21 November, Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun expressed intent to engage in peace negotiations with Israel following Israel’s intensified attacks on alleged Hezbollah outfits in south Lebanon. He stated that “The Lebanese state is ready to negotiate – under UN, US or joint international sponsorship – any agreement that would establish a framework for a permanent end to transborder aggressions.” 

On 23 November, Hezbollah's chief of staff, Ali Tabtabai and four other members were killed in an Israeli strike on a southern suburb of Beirut. Hezbollah MP Ali Ammar accused Israel of again violating the ceasefire. “Every attack on Lebanon is a crossing of a red line, and this aggression is inherent in the entity that targets Lebanon’s dignity, sovereignty and the security of its citizens,” he said. 

On 25 November, the UN human rights office stated that at least 127 Lebanese civilians have been killed by Israeli strikes since the November 2024 ceasefire was implemented, and called for an investigation into the violations. 

On 28 November, Naim Qassem, Hezbollah head, stated that it retained the right to respond to Israel’s killing of Tabtabai, and that it would “set the timing” for any retaliation. On the same day,  Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee said the Lebanese army's efforts to seize Hezbollah weapons in south Lebanon were "inadequate," emphasising that "Hezbollah continues to manipulate them and work covertly to maintain its arsenal.”

2. Syria
On 23 November, a Sunni Bedouin couple was found murdered in the southern Homs town of Zaydal, with the woman's body partially burned and sectarian graffiti at the scene implicating Alawites. In response to the deaths, armed Bedouins targeted Alawite neighbourhoods with severe violence, firing indiscriminately, vandalising shops, and setting fire to homes and vehicles.

On 24 November, Ghazal Ghazal, the head of Syria’s Supreme Alawite Islamic Council, called on the community to “protest peacefully” against the government, condemning the administration as “exclusionary," calling for unified protests across Alawite-populated areas. 

On 25 November, in one of the largest protests since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad, who hails from the community, the Alawites took to the streets of Latakia, the heartland of the Alawite community, demanding an end to the “ethnic cleansing” of Alawites, an effective federal governance, minority rights, and the release of detained former Alawite military personnel. Severe clashes broke out between the protesters and security forces; reports also suggested the involvement of Sunni militias in the crackdown. 

What are the issues?
1. Lebanon: Escalating ceasefire violations and the threat of retaliation 
The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement was brokered by France and the US on 27 November 2024, aiming to end the severe hostilities that emerged from Hezbollah’s October 2023 airstrike on Israel. The ceasefire calls for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory to points behind an imaginary ‘Blue Line,’ in the south of the country, while Hezbollah withdraws behind the Litani river in the north. It also calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah. It further called for the deployment of only the Lebanese Armed Forces, supported by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in the zone south of the Litani, with no armed presence or military infrastructure permitted there except for the LAF and UN peacekeepers. However, Israeli troops continue to occupy five locations within the territory, while Hezbollah claims that the disarmament only applies to areas beyond the Litani River, rejecting further disarmament without the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces. UNIFIL has recorded that over the year since the ceasefire was established, Israel has committed more than 7,500 air violations and nearly 2,500 ground violations north of the Blue Line, reflecting “total disregard of the ceasefire agreement.” This demonstrates the near-collapse of the agreement and highlights how sustained Israeli attacks to coerce Hezbollah’s disarmament have instead reinforced the group’s determination to counter Israeli aggression.

Despite the state's attempts to respond assertively to Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israel’s non-compliance and persistent ceasefire violations have fuelled the feud. The killing of Hezbollah’s top military commander raises the risk of a significant retaliatory strike, potentially pushing the region toward renewed conflict and instability.  Amidst the state’s phased attempts to disarm and dismantle Hezbollah, the increasing pressure from the US and Israel undermines the efforts and strains the relationship between the state and Hezbollah, given that the group functions not only as a militant organisation, but also as a prominent political party with parliamentary representation.

2. Syria: The persisting sectarian clashes and the government’s inability to curb the violence
Historically, the Sunni Alawite community had long been marginalised in the Sunni-majority in Syria, until Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite, seized power in 1970. Hafez, and later his son Bashar, derived their major support from the community and weaponised the sect, making them central to the security and administrative apparatus. For over five decades, the Assad regime’s dictatorial rule hinged on the Alawite support, portraying the community as complicit in the regime’s atrocities, particularly in the violence against the Sunni population. When Bashar al-Assad fell in December 2024 and a Sunni-led government under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a former affiliate of al-Qaeda that is now under the Sunni Islamist political banner, took power, long-suppressed grievances exploded into revenge and retaliation against the Alawites, who most Sunnis view as inseparable from the former regime’s crimes. The escalating crisis is a response to the Assad regime's rule of terror, which perpetuates a cycle of violence among the communities. 

The al-Sharaa government, since taking power in December 2024, has pledged inclusivity and minority protections but has fundamentally failed to dismantle the deep-rooted sectarian divides inherited from the Assad era, allowing cycles of revenge to persist. The incumbent government has failed to provide justice for the violence against the Alawites, including a massacre in March 2025. Reports of these atrocities remain unpublished or dismissed as "revenge-based" rather than sectarian, shielding HTS-aligned militias and hardline Sunni elements from prosecution, and this impunity is a major fuel to the ongoing violence. There is also a lack of minority representation in the Sunni-dominated administration that perpetuates the majoritarian bias and lack of safeguards for the minorities, including the Alawites, Druze, and Kurds.

What does it mean?
First, Israel maintains that Hezbollah has been attempting to regroup and argues that the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm the group are ineffective, thus remaining persistent in its attacks to ensure that the militant group remains militarily weakened. Israel’s pursuit of top military leadership indicates an effort to undermine its core command, and while such attacks could trigger retaliation, a full-scale fight may not work in Hezbollah’s favour right now, given how much its capabilities have been worn down over the past year.

Second, the intensifying violence against the minorities poses a severe threat to the country’s internal stability. The Bashaar regime's inability to prevent escalation, enforce accountability, and address root sectarian grievances risks a downward spiral, intensified by the regime turning a blind eye to the violence of the Sunni militias. The protesters' demands for federalism also threaten the regime’s centralised control and could lead to a more severe crackdown against the minorities. 

About the author
Brighty Ann Sarah is a postgraduate student at Stella Maris College, Chennai.

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