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CWA # 1867
CW Note
One Year of Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire: Continuing Violations and Evolving Endgames

  Rohini Reenum
6 December 2025

27 November 2025 marked one year of the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement. Although the violent conflict was between Hezbollah and Israel, the ceasefire was finalised between Israel and the Republic of Lebanon. Since the ceasefire came into effect, routine violations by Israel with varying intensity have been reported widely. Conversely, Israel has accused Hezbollah of violating the terms of the agreement and the Lebanese government of not fulfilling the agreed mandate. The Lebanese government has accused Israel of violating Lebanon’s sovereignty and called for meaningful peace negotiations. In effect, the ceasefire has been limited to a textual agreement with no meaningful engagement toward lasting peace or an end to violence.

Ceasefire: A brief background
The 2024 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel began in October 2023 following Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel. Hezbollah concurrently began cross-border attacks into Israel in solidarity with Hamas following Israel’s offensive in Gaza. Israel retaliated with force, with near-daily attacks into Lebanon, targeting what it called Hezbollah infrastructure, its members and first-rung leadership. After nearly a year of fighting, Israel invaded Southern Lebanon on 1 October 2024. Following this, France and the US brokered a ceasefire in November 2024. This ceasefire was agreed amidst a weakened Hezbollah following the targeted assassination of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, his successor Hashem Safieddine and a pager attack to dismantle its communications. According to Hezbollah, around 500 of its fighters had been killed by September 2024.

Additionally, this conflict led to mass displacements both in Lebanon (886,000) and Israel (60,000) and left hundreds of people dead, predominantly on the Lebanese side. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, by November 2024, 3,768 people had been killed in Lebanon and 15,699 injured. 45 Israeli civilians and 73 soldiers were killed by the time of the ceasefire. A World Bank report stated the economic cost of the War in Lebanon alone was USD 2.8 billion.

The ceasefire agreement - “Announcement of a Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on Enhanced Security Arrangements and Toward the Implementation of UNSCR 1701,” explicitly mentions that both Israel and Lebanon are looking for a “a sustainable end to the current escalation of hostilities across the Blue Line and are each prepared to take steps to promote conditions for a permanent and comprehensive solution.” The agreement recognises the “importance of the UNSCR 1701 to achieving lasting peace and security and commit to taking steps towards its full implementation, without violation.” It also calls for the implementation of other pre-existing UN resolutions on the matter.

The agreement called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, mandated the Lebanese government to prevent any attacks on Israel by armed groups from its territory and banned Israel from carrying out any attacks in Lebanon. The agreement also prevented the “re-establishment and rearmament of non-state armed groups in Lebanon.” The agreement further mandated that only the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Lebanese security forces and installations are allowed in the Southern Litani Area. Both Hezbollah and Israeli forces were to withdraw from this area within 60 days of the ceasefire. Hezbollah was to dismantle any of its remaining military infrastructure in this area. Additionally, both parties agreed to indirect negotiations under the aegis of the UN with the US as a facilitator.

Four Major Issues
First, the ceasefire violations. Both sides have accused each other of ceasefire violations. The UNIFIL has recorded more than 10,000 air and ground violations by Israel. Israel argued that Hezbollah is regrouping and rearming in violation of the ceasefire and that its attacks are in self-defence. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has refused to disarm until Israel ends its attacks. This has created a tit-for-tat situation that has jeopardized the fragile agreement. The agreement states that none of the stated commitments “preclude either Israel or Lebanon from exercising their inherent right of self-defence, consistent with international law.” This clause gives both parties de facto justification to violate the ceasefire under the pretext of self-defence. Israel has also refused to withdraw its security forces, arguing that Lebanese forces were being deployed slowly, which allowed Hezbollah to regroup and that the group was violating the agreement by smuggling weapons.

Second, Israel’s rationale and endgame. Despite its weakening, for Israel, Hezbollah and its regrouping remain a threat on its northern border. Since its formation, mainly as a response to the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah’s presence has kept the northern border of Israel restive. Israel has been unable to achieve a decisive victory until now. Israel views this moment as opportune to dismantle the group, even if it means violating the ceasefire. Additionally, Hezbollah’s loss of active support by its traditional partners, such as Syria and Iran, has lent urgency to Israeli actions. With Hamas decimated in Gaza and Hezbollah weakened, Israel wants to eliminate the threat posed by the axis of resistance once and for all.

Third, Lebanon’s Hezbollah conundrum. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is a political party with political representation and popular support, especially in the south and among Shia populations. Since the Lebanese Civil War, it has been the face of resistance against Israel. The Lebanese government has, despite efforts, not been able to disarm Hezbollah. The incumbent Lebanese president, Joseph Aoun, came to power promising a “state monopoly on arms,” which in effect meant disarming Hezbollah. The government fears a domestic backlash and resurgence of sectarian violence if it were to take concrete action. Given Israel’s past interventions in Lebanon and the state’s incapacity to act against its aggressive neighbour, the Lebanese government views Hezbollah as a deterrent.

Fourth, Hezbollah’s endgame. The ceasefire has provided Hezbollah time and space to re-group and re-strategise, which is likely another reason it did not retaliate. Further, opposition to Israel is Hezbollah’s raison d'état for existence. A permanent peace would significantly hamper the group’s domestic popularity. If reports about rearmament are to be believed, Hezbollah’s recuperation is indicative of its desire for survival rather than achieving lasting peace for the Lebanese people.

Will the ceasefire hold?
While the agreement provided a detailed framework for achieving not just cessation of hostilities but also lasting peace, it circumvented the Israel-Hezbollah issue by making Hezbollah  Lebanon’s problem. This is despite the fact that, since Hezbollah’s formation, the Lebanese-Israeli conflict has been an Israel-Hezbollah one. A permanent ceasefire will last only if Hezbollah is contained or brought on board. One pathway could be to make Hezbollah a party to the ongoing negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, even at the risk of negotiating with non-state armed groups, in the larger interest of achieving peace.

About the author
Rohini Reenum is a PhD Scholar at NIAS.

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