Thailand-Cambodia Border Dispute, Escalation of M23 offensive in DR Congo, the War in Ukraine and Conflicts in Africa

CWA # 1875

Conflict Weekly

Thailand-Cambodia Border Dispute, Escalation of M23 offensive in DR Congo, the War in Ukraine and Conflicts in Africa

Conflict Weekly #311 & 312, 18 December 2025, Vol. 6, No. 50 & 51

IPRI Team
18 December 2025

Photo Source: AFP

Akshath Kaimal, Anu Maria Joseph and Lekshmi M K

Thailand-Cambodia: Border disputes, blame game and a fragile ceasefire
Akshath K

In the news
On 7 December, Thailand and Cambodia traded blame for a brief armed encounter along the border near Sisaket province. The Thai army said that it retaliated after Cambodian fire injured two of its soldiers.

On 12 December, fighting between the countries entered its fifth day as Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said that he was scheduled to speak to US President Donald Trump.

On 13 December, President Trump announced a ceasefire, writing: “They have agreed to CEASE all shooting effective this evening, and go back to the original Peace Accord made with me, and them, with the help of the Great Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim.” Thailand rejected the claim, but Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet said his country “supported the ceasefire initiative of Malaysia, with Washington's participation.”

On 14 December, Thailand protested with the United Nations human rights agency, accusing Cambodia of launching indiscriminate attacks, including on non-military targets, resulting in the first civilian death from the conflict.

On 16 December, Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said of Trump’s ceasefire proposal that he “should ask Cambodia to stop firing at Thailand first, because Thailand has never fired first."

Issues at large
First, a brief background to the conflict. Thailand and Cambodia have been embroiled in a border conflict since the latter was under French colonial rule. The primary site of tensions is the Preah Vihear temple in the Dangrek Mountain range, which acts as a natural border between the two countries. Two Franco-Siamese treaties in 1904 and 1907 demarcated the border between the two countries, with the Preah Vihear temple falling inside Cambodia - a proposal Thailand (then Siam) claims it never accepted. Cambodia took the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1959, which ruled in its favour in 1962. Tensions reignited in 2008 when Cambodia nominated the temple as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, which led to skirmishes along the border. In July 2025, hostilities began again, killing at least 48 people. US President Donald Trump and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) helped broker a ceasefire between the two countries, but it did not hold as they began fighting again on 7 December.

Second, a fragile ceasefire. Although a US-brokered ceasefire was reached between Thailand and Cambodia in July 2025, the core issue of the conflict was not addressed. Although the ICJ had ruled in 1962 and 2011 that the Preah Vihear temple belonged to Cambodia, several other regions near the border remain disputed. Hence, a deal aimed at only halting hostilities meant any ceasefire between the two countries would be fragile. Additionally, Thailand had initially rebuffed President Trump’s efforts to mediate, but folded once Trump threatened to increase tariffs on the country. This indicates that the US used its leverage to force a ceasefire, rendering it vulnerable. The ceasefire also did not address the issue of landmines, as Cambodia is one of the most heavily mined countries. The landmine issue reignited hostilities after an explosion injured a Thai soldier in November.

Third, Trump’s intervention. President Trump has portrayed himself as a “global peacemaker,” touting his role in mediating a truce in several conflicts, including between Thailand and Cambodia. He even claimed through a Truth Social post that a “roadside bomb” had killed and wounded Thai soldiers by accident, which the Thai PM firmly denied. He also announced a second ceasefire following the outbreak of hostilities in December, which both countries disagreed on. Trump recently said that he would be able to stop hostilities “pretty quickly,” suggesting that the core issues of the conflict relating to border issues and landmines would not be addressed again.

Fourth, ineffective ASEAN. While the US played a major role in securing a ceasefire when hostilities broke out in July, the truce was made in collaboration with ASEAN. The bloc agreed to monitor the ceasefire along the Thai-Cambodian border, but details of this effort were sparse. With hostilities breaking out again in December, it is clear that ASEAN’s efforts to monitor the ceasefire were ineffective. Additionally, the July ceasefire agreement not only ignored the long-standing border issue between the countries but also failed to address the landmine issue and transnational cybercrime, which has been exploding in Southeast Asia, with Cambodia at its epicentre.

In perspective
The unresolved issues on the border with the landmine problem and a lack of commitment from the conflict parties to the ceasefire, added with larger-scale cybercrime operations, imply that the conflict between the two countries is unlikely to cease any time soon. Meanwhile, Trump has been keen on being the primary peacemaker and even used the threat of tariffs to get both countries to stop fighting in July. But with both countries nearing a trade deal with the US, he could have less leverage this time around. Besides, ASEAN’s inability to address the core issues of the conflict, while also being unable to prevent hostilities from breaking out, shows its ineffectiveness. In sum, the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand is likely to continue unless there is a breakthrough.

DR Congo: M23 offensive in Uvira and a fragile peace deal
Anu Maria Joseph

In the news
On 16 December, the leader of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) coalition, which includes M23, Corneille Nangaa, announced that its fighters will withdraw from Uvira town in South Kivu "as per United States mediation request." The rebels seized the town on 11 December.

On 11 December, Al Jazeera reported that more than 400 civilians had been killed in the latest wave of M23 violence in South Kivu. The new wave of violence comes after US President Trump finalised the peace agreement on 4 December, which was originally agreed upon by the warring parties in June.

On 9 December, the President of DR Congo, Felix Tshisekedi, accused Rwanda of violating the US-brokered peace deal. He stated: “Despite our good faith and the recently ratified agreement, it is clear that Rwanda is already violating its commitments." He claimed that the Rwandan army carried out and supported attacks on "the very day after the signing" of the peace deal.

Issues at large
First, the escalating M23 coalition's offensive. Since capturing Goma and Bukavu, the regional capitals of North and South Kivu, in January 2025, M23's control in eastern DRC has been expanding and strengthening despite multiple peace efforts. In June, a ceasefire was agreed between M23 and DR Congo under the mediation of Qatar. However, in July, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that the rebels summarily executed 140 civilians in July. Besides Goma and Bukavu, the rebels' control has now spread to neighbouring towns in South and North Kivu, including Butembo, Walikale, and, most recently, Uvira. The group has also quadrupled its troops to an estimated number of 22,000 in October. Neither the DRC-Rwanda peace deal nor the M23-DRC ceasefire has quelled M23's expansion.

Second, a controversial peace deal. In June, Trump successfully mediated a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda, with an impression of peace on the ground. In reality, peace is far from being achieved. The Trump deal is being criticised for many aspects. First, the deal lacked inclusivity. M23, the major actor in the conflict, was not a signatory to the deal. Second, the deal depicted a transactional character when Trump involved the US's mineral interests in the bargaining and deviated from a genuine interest in resolving the conflict. Third, the deal talks about an end to hostilities, disarmament and disengagement of the rebel groups, and a regional economic integration. However, the deal does not discuss resolving the decades-long root causes behind the complex conflict in eastern DRC. At the end, the DRC turned out to be a US geopolitical manoeuvre that served Trump's global peace pursuits. Most importantly, six months into the signing, the deal could not materialise any of its provisions on the ground.

Third, a lack of compliance from warring parties. All parties involved in the conflict are committed to the US-led peace agreement and the Doha-led ceasefire. However, there was no compliance with the commitment. Rwandan forces have not withdrawn from eastern Congo. Not only has M23 not withdrawn from the regions it had captured, but it has also continued its violence. DRC authorities have not released any of the M23 prisoners.

In perspective
M23's withdrawal from Uvira town is the only positive development in the eastern DRC conflict following the January escalation. However, the withdrawal is unlikely to signal M23 agreeing to end violence or give up the strategic towns it has captured. For M23, along with geographic and political control, presence in these mineral towns is a major funding source.

The US peace deal projected a successful initiation of the peace process. However, the challenges are multiple. The gap between commitment and compliance is too wide. The deal failed to address root causes and lacked inclusivity and effective implementation. The outcomes imply that the deal has failed to transform into meaningful progress towards peace, turning into a peace deal without peace.

CW Column: The War in Ukraine This Week
Ongoing diplomatic push, security deadlock, and strategic manoeuvres
Lekshmi MK

What happened?
On 17 December, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy described the US-backed peace proposal as “not perfect but workable.”

On 16 December, the EU voiced support for US-Ukraine negotiations, stressing Europe must play a central role in any settlement. Simultaneously, the EU adopted new sanctions targeting Russian oil, while the US signalled stricter enforcement of the Russian oil price cap.

On 15 December, ceasefire discussions progressed with Ukraine, the US, and European leaders. President Zelensky held extended meetings with US envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and senior NATO officials. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine would not withdraw from areas it controls unless Russia did the same.

On 14 December, Ukraine withdrew its long-standing NATO ambition to secure Western security guarantees. President Zelensky sought legally binding guarantees from the US, European partners, and allies such as Canada and Japan, including “Article 5”-style protections.

On 12 December, a revised 20-point framework was presented to Washington by Kyiv. Key sticking points remained Russian territorial demands, with the US offering a “free economic zone” in Ukraine-controlled Donbas as a possible compromise. Discussions also included potential Russian withdrawals in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk, and freezing frontlines in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

What are the issues?
1. Security guarantees versus territorial integrity
In the ongoing peace efforts, Ukraine has shown flexibility by softening its long-standing demand to join NATO to secure immediate security guarantees. Instead, Kyiv is willing to consider alternative security arrangements backed by the US and European countries, provided they are strong and reliable. This reflects Ukraine’s priority of preventing future Russian attacks rather than pursuing alliance membership. However, this adjustment does not mean Ukraine is ready to give up its territorial integrity. While Ukraine may delay or reframe its NATO ambitions, it continues to insist that its sovereignty and control over its territory must be respected. Russia, meanwhile, expects Ukraine’s neutrality to be permanent and linked to territorial concessions, especially in occupied regions.

2. Territorial disputes over Donbas and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility
Russia insists that any peace deal must recognise its control over most of Donbas, while Ukraine refuses to accept territorial concessions, arguing that such terms would undermine its sovereignty. This gap has made it difficult to finalise ceasefire terms. Similarly, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has become a sensitive issue in the talks. Russia’s continued occupation of the plant raises concerns about nuclear safety and energy control, while Ukraine demands its return or international supervision. The unresolved status of the facility has increased mistrust and slowed negotiations.

3. A persistent trust deficit, with pressure tactics used as bargaining tools
Although talks are being revived, both sides continue to rely on pressure to strengthen their bargaining positions. Russia has used military escalation, territorial ultimatums, and attacks on infrastructure to press Ukraine into accepting its demands. Ukraine, in turn, has relied on continued resistance on the battlefield and diplomatic backing from Western partners to avoid making forced concessions. This mutual distrust has weakened the peace talks, as neither side believes the other will honour commitments made during negotiations. Past experiences, including broken ceasefires and unfulfilled agreements, have reinforced these fears. As a result, negotiations are treated not as steps toward compromise, but as tools to gain advantage.

4. US-led mediation and the constrained role of European leaders in the peace process
While this US leadership has been essential in keeping negotiations alive, European countries mainly provide advisory input, with limited influence over the structure and terms of the plan. European perspectives on key issues such as security guarantees, enforcement mechanisms, and long-term reconstruction are not fully reflected in the peace proposals. Moreover, the dominance of the US in the negotiation process is complicating efforts to reach a consensus.

What does it mean?
First, deadlock over security and territory. Ukraine seeks strong, credible security guarantees from Western allies to prevent future aggression. Meanwhile, it firmly insists on retaining control over its territory, including the Donbas region. However, Russia ties any potential agreement to Ukraine accepting neutrality and territorial concessions, especially in occupied areas. This clash makes compromise extremely difficult and explains why ceasefires and peace proposals repeatedly stall. The deadlock also underscores the limits of current diplomacy. It means that even if broader elements of a peace plan, such as reconstruction or ceasefire monitoring, are agreed upon, the core issues of sovereignty and security remain unresolved.

Second, an imbalance in negotiation influence. European priorities on security, enforcement mechanisms, and long-term reconstruction may not be fully incorporated into the plan, potentially affecting its regional legitimacy and sustainability. It also highlights a concentration of power with the US, which may influence both the pace and content of negotiations. This imbalance underscores the challenges of creating a balanced, durable, and accepted settlement.

CW Column: Conflicts in Africa This Week
RSF advances in Kordofan and Khartoum and a coup attempt in Benin
Anu Maria Joseph

What happened this week?
1. Sudan
On 18 December, Al Jazeera reported that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked a key power plant in Khartoum.

On 17 December, Al Jazeera reported that at least 104 civilians had been killed in an RSF-SAF drone fight in Sudan's Kordofan region.

On 13 December, six Bangladeshi UN peacekeepers were killed in an RSF attack in Kaduhli, South Kordofan, in a drone attack. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned the attack and noted that the attack on peacekeepers "may constitute war crimes under international law."

2. Benin
On 7 December, Benin's President Patrice Talon stated that the country's armed forces thwarted a coup attempt. Talon stated: "This treachery will not go unpunished."
The statement came after a section of soldiers claimed on television that they removed Talon from power.

The coup was led by Lt. Col. Pascal Tigri, who cited “continuing deterioration of the security situation in northern Benin" and "the ignorance and neglect of the situation of our brothers in arms who have fallen at the front” due to worsening jihadist violence as the reasons.

The ECOWAS and the AU condemned the coup attempt. The AU chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Yousouf, stated: “The African Union stands ready, in coordination with regional and international partners, to accompany the Government and People of Benin toward the full restoration of constitutional normalcy and the strengthening of democratic institutions.”

On 8 December, Nigeria deployed fighter jets and ground troops in Benin to help foil the coup attempt. the same day, ECOWAS also deployed a standby force to Benin.

What are the issues?
1. Sudan: Escalation of war and another failed peace attempt
Attacks on the capital Khartoum point to a new escalation in Sudan's civil war, which started in April 2023. It comes after the RSF successfully captured the city of el-Fasher in North Darfur, the last standing city in the Darfur region under the SAF, in October. The fall of el Fasher not only consolidated the RSF's parallel government in Sudan's west but also paved advances into Khartoum. Since mid-November, the RSF has been carrying out offensives in the cities in South Kordofan and expanding its control towards the eastern states.

In November, the civil war in Sudan also saw a resumption of peace efforts after almost a year of multiple failed attempts. The US, along with Egypt and the UAE, called for a comprehensive ceasefire. The RSF had agreed to a humanitarian ceasefire, but the violence continued. The SAF responded to the US ceasefire proposal that, as long as the UAE is involved in the mediation, the deal would be "biased" and unacceptable. The UAE is being accused by the SAF of supporting the RSF with weapons.

2. Benin: Increasing political tensions and Africa's expanding coup belt
Talon's administration has been internationally credited for reviving the economy. The World Bank estimated 7.5 per cent economic growth. However, political tensions have been increasing around election issues and attacks by armed groups from neighbouring Nigeria and Burkina Faso. The main opposition party under former President Boni Yayi has been barred from running for the upcoming elections. According to the report by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project in the US, Benin's regime has turned into an electoral autocracy since 2019. Meanwhile, the coup plotters cited jihadist attacks spreading into the country from Nigeria and Burkina Faso. According to the ACLED data, al-Qaida-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has begun advancing in the northern parts of the country.

Unlike several other West African countries, Benin has no record of recent coups since 1975. However, this year the country witnessed three coup attempts. Since 2020, West Africa has seen seven successful coups, becoming the global epicentre of coups; most recently in Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS has been criticised for its ineffectiveness in thwarting previous coups in the region. Coup governments responded to a military intervention threat by the group following the coup in Niger in 2023 by forming the Sahel (military) Alliance with all military governments.

What does it mean?
In Sudan, the latest escalation has ended the hopes of a successful ceasefire. The RSF's successful expansion also implies that the fighting is likely to once again concentrate in the capital, Khartoum. Although recent RSF advancements point to a weakened SAF, considering continued weapon supply to both factions, RSF's complete victory over the SAF is unlikely. It implies that the civil war will prolong with more violence and humanitarian costs.

In Benin, the coup attempt was not unexpected. Politically unstable countries in West Africa have been prone to coups following the takeover in Guinea-Bissau. The coup in Guinea-Bissau projected a trend of powerful militaries adopting similar tactics and methods from neighbouring coup governments. A timely intervention by the ECOWAS and Nigeria has thwarted the coup attempt in Benin. Regional readiness in responding to coup attempts implies a positive development in West Africa after multiple failed efforts to reverse coups.

Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week:
Regional Roundups
Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Lekshmi MK, Aparna A Nair, M Kejia, and Rizwana Banu

China, East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
Taiwan: The US approves USD 11.1 billion arms sale, including HIMARS rocket systems, howitzers, Javelin anti-tank missiles
On 18 December, the US approved USD 11.1 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, second under US President Trump. The arms sale includes HIMARS rocket systems, howitzers, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and Altius loitering munition drones. The Taiwan defence ministry said, "The United States continues to assist Taiwan in maintaining sufficient self?defence capabilities and in rapidly building strong deterrent power and leveraging asymmetric warfare advantages, which form the foundation for maintaining regional peace and stability." Stating that the sale will help Taiwan modernise its armed forces and maintain a "credible defense capability," Pentagon added that arms sales serve US national, economic and security interests. Thanking US for the sale, Taiwan presidential office spokesperson said, "Our country will continue to promote defence reforms, strengthen whole?of?society defence resilience, demonstrate our determination to defend ourselves, and safeguard peace through strength." Demanding end to such deals that "severely undermines peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait," China's Ministry spokesperson said, "By aiding 'Taiwan independence' with weapons, the US side will only bring fire upon itself; using Taiwan to contain China is absolutely doomed to fail."

Thailand and Cambodia border dispute: Fighting continues in at least nine locations along the frontier; Thailand stops fuel shipments transiting a border checkpoint with Laos over concerns of diversion to Cambodian troops
On 15 December, Thailand’s military stated that it had halted fuel shipments transiting a border checkpoint with Laos due to concerns that supplies were being diverted to Cambodian forces. The Thai defence ministry spokesperson said fuel movements through the Chong Mek crossing were restricted after intelligence indicated diversion to Cambodian troops. This development comes as Thailand and Cambodia continue clashes along their disputed border. Fighting has been reported at multiple points across the 817-kilometre frontier, with no signs of de-escalation despite mediation efforts, including calls by President Trump. A meeting of Southeast Asian foreign ministers scheduled for 16 December was postponed to 22 December at Thailand’s request, the Malaysian foreign ministry stated. The violence, spanning inland areas near Laos and coastal provinces, is unprecedented in recent history, given the scale and intensity, said Reuters. National authorities report that more than half a million people have been displaced and at least 38 killed over eight days. A Thai defence ministry spokesperson added that fighting continues at at least nine points along the border, with heavy exchanges of fire reported across four frontier provinces, including coastal areas.

The Middle East and Africa
The War in Gaza: UNICEF warns that “horrendous” weather conditions would worsen the humanitarian crisis in the enclave
On 18 December, UNICEF spokesman Jonathan Crickx stated that intensifying rains have compounded the dire living conditions of the displaced Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. He stated that the overnight rains had been “horrendous,” with up to 15cm (6in) of water on the ground, and that “With temperatures about 7C, 8C (45-46F) at night, we are extremely concerned about children getting sick or even worse, dying from hypothermia.” Gaza’s health ministry has reported the death of an infant from hypothermia, and at least 11 other people have died in building collapses under heavy rains. The UN estimated that nearly 55,000 families have so far been affected by the rains, and over 40 designated emergency shelters have been severely flooded. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warned that the severe weather conditions were “deeply concerning,” and stressed the need for “increased and sustained humanitarian assistance to respond to urgent and long-term needs, including food, shelter, and equipment for the repair of critical infrastructure.” “We are working relentlessly to bring in that aid and to distribute it, but the scale of the needs is so immense that we still have thousands of people and children who are really suffering every night,” Crickx warned. Israel’s agencies denied the accusations of deliberate aid restrictions as “inconsistent with facts on the ground, and the ongoing co-ordination taking place daily.”

Israel and Lebanon: Ceasefire talks with Tel Aviv focus on ending Israeli hostilities on Lebanese territory; Beirut welcomes countries willing to deploy forces after UNIFIL's 2026 exit
On 05 December, Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun clarified that ceasefire talks with Israel are primarily focused on stopping Israeli hostilities on Lebanese territory, after Netanyahu's office statement that Israel is seeking economic cooperation. On 03 December, Israel and Lebanon sent civilian envoys to the military committee that monitors their ceasefire, in an effort to broaden the scope of their negotiations.
"These negotiations are mainly aimed at stopping the hostile actions carried out by Israel on Lebanese territory, securing the return of the captives, scheduling the withdrawal from the occupied areas, and resolving the disputed points along the Blue Line," Aoun said in a statement. He also informed a visiting UN Security Council delegation that Lebanon is open to any country prepared to deploy forces in the south to back the army once the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the long-standing peacekeeping mission, departs at the end of 2026, noting that several states have already shown interest.

Rwanda and DRC: Violence continues a day after US President Trump hosting the two countries' Presidents
On 05 December, fresh clashes erupted in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, a day after US President Trump hosted Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwanda's President Paul Kagame to operationalise a Washington-brokered peace deal signed in June. Despite Trump expressing that "we're settling a war that's been going on for decades", violence intensified across South Kivu and North Kivu. The AFC/M23 rebels, who are not party to the agreement, accused government-backed forces of launching "widespread attacks." Congo's army alleged "blind" bombardment by Rwanda's Defence Force. Analysts noted that although US diplomacy briefly paused escalation, neither Congo nor Rwanda fulfilled key commitments. An AFC/M23 official said that they had recaptured Luberika and downed a Congolese drone. He added that "the war continues on the ground and has no connection with the signing of the agreement."

Europe and the Americas
The War in Ukraine: Zelensky urges the EU to release frozen Russian assets to fund Kyiv as Brussels holds talks
On 18 December, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky urged European Union leaders to approve the use of frozen Russian assets during the meeting in Brussels. This was to support Ukraine’s military and economic needs. Around EUR 210 billion of Russian funds remain immobilised in the EU, mostly held by Belgium-based Euroclear. President Zelensky warned that without fresh financial support, Ukraine could face severe funding shortfalls within months. The European Commission has proposed loaning about EUR 90 billion from the frozen assets over the next two years, but divisions persist within the bloc. Belgium and a few other member states remain cautious, citing legal and financial risks, while some EU officials expressed guarded optimism about reaching a compromise. Meanwhile, Russia has warned against using its assets and has initiated legal action to reclaim the funds.

The War in Ukraine: Kyiv ceasefire talks continue in Berlin as the US says "progress was made"
On 15 December, talks aimed at securing a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia continued with the United States saying that “progress was made” in discussions with Ukrainian and European leaders. Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky held extended meetings with US envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, joined by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and senior NATO officials, on a compromise to advance peace efforts. The discussions focused on a Ukrainian 20-point peace proposal, including security guarantees, reconstruction plans and the future of the Donbas region. President Zelensky reiterated that while he was open to freezing the conflict along current front lines, Ukraine would not withdraw from areas it still controls unless Russian forces did the same.

The War in Ukraine: President Zelensky says the peace proposal is “not perfect but workable”; Belarus's President warns Ukraine war risks becoming a wider global conflict if Trump is unable to broker a compromise
On 17 December, media reported that Belarus's President Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, said the conflict is moving toward a diplomatic phase, claiming that Russia is open to negotiations but will insist on its core demands. President Lukashenko warned that prolonging the war would only deepen instability in Europe and argued that compromise would be unavoidable for all sides. Meanwhile, on 16 December, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Kyiv could present a set of peace proposals to Russia within days, following consultations with the United States and European partners. President Zelensky described the proposals as “workable,” though not perfect, and said they focus primarily on credible security guarantees to prevent future Russian aggression. While Ukraine has shown flexibility, including discussing alternatives to NATO membership, President Zelensky stressed that territorial integrity and sovereignty remain non-negotiable. The proposals are expected to form the basis of potential talks, though Moscow has not responded.

The War in Ukraine: President Putin warns "Donbas must be yours or ours" as Kyiv readies for the next round of talks
On 05 December, Russia's president Putin declared that Moscow intends to seize the entirety of Donbas, Ukraine's eastern industrial region, "by force of arms" unless Ukrainian troops withdraw. He made this statement ahead of a state visit to India, repeating a long-standing demand. Meanwhile, Ukraine confirmed that senior negotiators are preparing for new talks in the coming days amid mounting pressure from Russia. The renewed Russian ultimatum risks derailing any fragile progress. European countries and Western partners have expressed deep concern, noting that such demands heighten distrust and could undermine efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

Europe: EU President Ursula von der Leyen says, "Europe must be responsible for its own security"
On 17 December, addressing the European Parliament, European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Europe must be responsible for its own security. She said, "This is no longer an option. It is a must," and "Europe cannot afford to let others define its worldview." Additionally, she stated that the US rightly pointed out that Europe's share of global GDP is declining, and that the US is also on "the same path."

The US, Europe and NATO: Washington wants Europe to assume conventional defence responsibilities by 2027, reports Reuters
On 05 December, Reuters reported that the United States has asked European NATO members to assume the majority of the alliance's conventional defence responsibilities by 2027, a timeline Pentagon officials outlined to European diplomats in Washington. Quoting multiple sources, according to the Reuters report, the above reflected Washington's view that Europe has not advanced sufficiently in strengthening defence capabilities since Russia's expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022. US officials also indicated that failure to meet the 2027 target could lead to Washington's withdrawal from certain NATO defence coordination mechanisms. European officials, however, viewed the deadline as unrealistic. According to the news report, apart from political will and higher spending, Europe faces serious production bottlenecks, lengthy delivery timelines for key US-made systems, and structural limitations in replacing critical American defense capabilities. The US contribution includes "unique intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance" assets that "cannot simply be purchased" and have been central to Ukraine's defence, noted Reuters. There is also uncertainty over whether the 2027 benchmark reflects the Trump administration's formal position or the views of specific Pentagon officials. While European states have agreed to take greater responsibility for their own security and support higher defence spending, officials and analysts noted that even the EU's 2030 goal is highly ambitious. US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau stated: "Successive US Administrations have been saying this… but our Administration means what it says."

Venezuela: China calls the United States’ order to blockade sanctioned tankers entering and leaving Venezuela as "unilateral bullying"
On 18 December, Reuters reported that China opposed what it called “unilateral bullying” after the United States ordered a blockade of sanctioned oil tankers entering and leaving Venezuela, a move that has sharply escalated tensions around the oil-rich South American country. Early this week, President Trump ordered a full blockade of all sanctioned tankers attempting to depart from or arrive in Venezuelan waters, alongside a significant deployment of US troops and warships in the region. China, Venezuela’s largest crude buyer, imports roughly four per cent of its oil from the country. On 17 December, during a phone call with Venezuela’s Foreign Minister, his Chinese counterpart reiterated Beijing’s opposition to “unilateral bullying” and expressed support for countries defending their sovereignty and national dignity. However, China’s Foreign Minister did not specify how China might assist Venezuela. Despite previously describing the relationship with Caracas as an “ironclad friendship,” Beijing has remained cautious, reflecting its parallel effort to stabilise relations with Washington. Further, Venezuela has requested an urgent UN Security Council meeting on what it calls “ongoing U.S. aggression,” a move China has said it supports.

The US and Venezuela: Caracas decries Washington’s blockade of oil tankers in and out of the country
On 17 December, Venezuela condemned the US move to impose a “total and complete" blockade of the entry and exit of all sanctioned oil tankers to the country as “warmongering threats.” Following the US seizure of an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela last week, Trump accused the Maduro government of having designated foreign terrorist organisations (FTO), that use “stolen oil” to “finance themselves, Drug Terrorism, Human Trafficking, Murder, and Kidnapping.” The seized vessel, named the Skipper, was accused of involvement in "illicit oil shipping" and would be taken to a US port. Venezuela's government decried the move, with President Maduro accusing that the US "kidnapped the crew" and "stole" the ship. The US has also recently conducted deadly strikes on alleged Venezuelan drug-smuggling boats, and has significantly built up its naval presence nearby. Trump wrote that Venezuela was "completely surrounded by the largest Armada ever assembled in the History of South America,” adding that it would "only get bigger" and "be like nothing they have ever seen before.”

About the authors
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associates at NIAS. Akshath Kaimal is a Research INtern at NIAS. Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha are postgraduate students at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. Lekshmi MK is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. Rizwana Banu, and Aparna A Nair are undergraduate students at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. M Kejia is an undergraduate student at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Pondicherry University, Pondicherry.

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Brighty Ann Sarah

Conflicts in the Middle East

The US-Iran War Week Thirteen: Escalating Hostilities, Tenuous Ceasefire and Tense Negotiations

CW Column

May 2026 | CWA # 2119

Anu Maria Joseph

Conflicts in Africa

The Ebola spread in DR Congo, The Faye-Sonko split in Senegal, and the Deepening US military involvement in Nigeria

The World This Week

May 2026 | CWA # 2118

Global Politics Team

The Putin-Xi Summit, PM Modi's UAE Visit, and the India-Nordic Summit

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2117

Lekshmi MK

The India-Nordic Summit and PM Modiâ€™s Oslo Visit

Arctic cooperation, Climate diplomacy, and Trade diversification

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2116

Yesasvi Koganti

India, the UAE, and PM Modiâ€™s visit:

Deepening Energy, AI, Defence, and Maritime Cooperation

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2115

Aparna A Nair

The Putin-Xi Summit

Trade, Technology, Security, and Pipeline

Global Politics Explainer

May 2026 | CWA # 2114

Glynnis Winona B

What makes the UAE a global player?

Explaining the Governance, Economy, People, and Strategic Influence of a Small Middle Eastern State

Global Politics Explainer

May 2026 | CWA # 2113

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Sri Lanka and the US-Iran WarÂ

Rising oil imports, Austerity measures and State capacity

Global Politics Explainer

May 2026 | CWA # 2112

Nithin V

Why does the Falkland Islands dispute keep recurring?

Why do the UK and Argentina still clash over a remote South Atlantic archipelago?

The World This Week

May 2026 | CWA # 2111

NIAS Global Politics Team

The Trump-Xi Summit

The Africa Forward Summit 2026 I North Korea's Constitutional Amendment 2026

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2110

Aishal Hab Yousuf

The Trump-Xi Summit:

Managing Strategic Competition through Trade, Technology, and Diplomacy

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2109

Aishal Hab Yousuf

North Korea's Constitutional Amendment 2026:

The End of Korean Reunification, the Declaration of New Borders, and the Control of Nuclear Command

TWTW Review

May 2026 | CWA # 2108

Ada Khan

The Africa Forward Summit 2026:

Five Takeaways of the Nairobi Declaration

Conflict Weekly

May 2026 | CWA # 2107

NIAS Global Politics Team

Rising violence in the Lake Chad region I The New Wave of Violence in DR Congo

The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire I Iranâ€™s Lebanon precondition for a ceasefire with the US

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2106

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Continuing Militant Attacks in Pakistan:

Multiple targets, Civilian casualties, and Cross-border tensionsÂ with Afghanistan

CW Explainer

May 2026 | CWA # 2105

Rohini Reenum

Iranâ€™s Lebanon precondition for a ceasefire with the US:Â

Four reasons why Tehran insists on including Hezbollah

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2104

Brighty Ann Sarah

The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:

Nominal Truce and Persisting ViolationsÂ

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2103

Akshath Kaimal

Rising violence in the Lake Chad region:Â

Complex Geography, Multiple Insurgencies, and an Escalating Humanitarian Crisis

CW Review

May 2026 | CWA # 2102

Glynnis Winona B

Weakening faith in institutions and Political polarization in Latin America and the Caribbean:

Six Takeaways from the UNDP Democracy and Development Report 2026

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2101

Anu Maria Joseph

The New Wave of Violence in DR Congo:

Farmer-herder clashes, Armed groups, and Security vacuum

The US-Iran War

May 2026 | CWA # 2100

Aishal Hab Yousuf

The Hormuz Strait and the Fertilizer Crisis in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

The US-Iran War

May 2026 | CWA # 2099

Kirsten Wilfred Coelho

Why is the UK reluctant to engage?

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2098

Sreemaya Nair

India, Russia and the imperative to strengthen the traditional relationship

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2097

Kirsten Wilfred Coelho

President Trump and the US-China Trade Tensions

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2095

Santhosh Guru PR

The Eurasian-Indo Pacific Congruence and its Critique

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2094

Rakshitha B

Transactional US foreign policy and it implications for India's Strategic Autonomy

Remembering Amb PS Raghavan and his legacy

May 2026 | CWA # 2093

Glynnis Winona B

The Russia-Ukraine War and the Rise of Parallel Strategic Systems: A Critique of Raghavan's Strategic Framework

Conflict Weekly

May 2026 | CWA # 2092

NIAS Global Politics Team

The US-Iran War, Week Ten

CW Column on Middle East: Escalating Israeli Aggression in Lebanon I UAE's Covert Manoeuvres

CW Column

May 2026 | CWA # 2091

Brighty Ann Sarah

Conflicts in the Middle East:

Escalating Israeli Aggression in Lebanon I UAE’s Covert Manoeuvres

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2090

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Ten:

Fraying Ceasefire, Renewed Negotiations and the Risk of a Stalemate

The World This Week

May 2026 | CWA # 2089

Global Politics Team

US troop withdrawal from Germany I UAE’s Exit from OPEC I Japan, Vietnam and PM Takaichi’s Visit

King Charles's US Visit

TWTW Takeaways

May 2026 | CWA # 2088

Nithin V

King Charles's US Visit:

Emphasis on strong bilateral relations, democratic values and security cooperation

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2087

Siddhi Halyur

Japan, Vietnam and PM Takaichi’s Visit

Exploring Strategic Sectors of Cooperation

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2086

Aishal Hab Yousuf

UAE’s Exit from OPEC:

Implications for the Middle East and the Energy Market

TWTW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2085

Glynnis Winona B

US troop withdrawal from Germany:

Growing US-Europe differences and Challenges for Berlin

Conflict Weekly

May 2026 | CWA # 2084

NIAS IPRI

The US-Iran War, Week Nine I Escalating Violence in Mali

Review: Five Takeaways of RSF's 2026 Report on Media Freedom

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2083

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Nine:

Deadlocked Negotiations, Competing Agendas and Domestic Pressure

CW Note

May 2026 | CWA # 2082

Akshath Kaimal

Escalating Violence in Mali:

Between Ethnic Insurgencies, Jihadist Attacks, and Military Coups

CW Review

May 2026 | CWA # 2081

Jenin Raj S

Media freedom hits a 25-year low:

Five Takeaways from the RSF 2026 Index

The World This Week

April 2026 | CWA # 2080

Global Politics Team

Nepal’s New “National Commitment” I Japan’s New Defence Posture

Four Takeaways of the WFP's report on the fallouts of the Middle East crisis

TWTW Note

April 2026 | CWA # 2079

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Japan’s New Defence Posture:

From Post-War Pacifism to Strategic Recalibration and Autonomy

TWTW Note

April 2026 | CWA # 2078

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal’s New “National Commitment”

Managing Consensus and Moving ahead towards a New Nepal

TWTW Review

April 2026 | CWA # 2077

Nithin V

The Middle East Crisis and its Fallouts on Hunger and Global Food Supply Network

Four Takeaways of the WFP's report on the fallouts of the Middle East crisis, April 2026

April 2026 | CWA # 2050

IPRI Team

The US-Iran War, Week Five: Widening Conflict, Houthi Involvement, and Trump’s Renewed Threats

PR Commentary

March 2026 | CWA # 2043

Abhimanyu Solanki

Escalatory Airpower, Hybrid Retaliation, and Regional Security

Reassessing the Pakistan–Afghanistan Confrontation and Its Implications for India

March 2026 | CWA # 2042

R Preetha

Transnational organized crime, Emerging technologies, Global security environment and ‘Diverse threat vectors’

Five Takeaways of the US Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) Report for 2026

March 2026 | CWA # 2041

Aparna A Nair

China-Vietnam 3+3 Strategic Dialogue

Defence, Diplomacy and Public Security

March 2026 | CWA # 2040

Femy Francis

China's Interests and Strategies in the US-Iran War

Why Beijing’s support for Iran is rhetoric and muted

March 2026 | CWA # 2039

Femy Francis

Trump-Xi Meeting

Why did Trump reschedule it? What does that mean?

March 2026 | CWA # 2038

Anu Maria Joseph

Sudan-Chad tensions and the Boko Haram attack in Nigeria's Maiduguri

March 2026 | CWA # 2037

Padmashree Anandhan

Massive drone attacks, Growing energy leverage and Drifting peace efforts

March 2026 | CWA # 2036

Brighty Ann Sarah

Continuing Israel-Hezbollah Confrontation

Expanding Israeli Military Operations and the Reshaping of Southern Lebanon

March 2026 | CWA # 2035

Akshath Kaimal

Five Takeaways of Human Rights Watch Report 2026

March 2026 | CWA # 2024

Lekshmi MK

The UN and the Iran-US War

UNSC Resolution 2817 between “Clear and Unified Message” and “Manifest Injustice”

March 2026 | CWA # 2023

Femy Francis

China’s Two Sessions 2026

New Five-Year Plan, Ethnic Unity Law, and an Enhanced Defence Budget

March 2026 | CWA # 2022

Padmashree Anandhan

Continuing Strikes and Inconsistent Diplomatic Efforts

March 2026 | CWA # 2021

Anu Maria Joseph

Political instability in Madagascar and spreading violence in South Sudan

March 2026 | CWA # 2020

Brighty Ann Sarah

Continuing Israel-Hezbollah Confrontation

Attacks in South Lebanon, Beirut’s Conundrum, and Tel Aviv’s Greater Goals

March 2026 | CWA # 2019

Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria

Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment

March 2026 | CWA # 2018

Rohini Reenum

The US-Iran War, Week Two

Expanding Fronts, Shifting Goalposts, and Global Fallout

The World This Week

March 2026 | CWA # 2011

Tanvi Thara Harendra Jha

Canada’s PM Mark Carney’s India Visit

Resetting Economic, Strategic and Cultural Ties

Global Politics Early Bird

March 2026 | CWA # 2010

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Elections 2026

The Rise of the “New” and the Fall of the “Old”

March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026

Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape

The World This Week

March 2026 | CWA # 2008

Global Politics Team

Canadian PM's India Visit I Nepal Elections and its Political Reset

March 2026 | CWA # 2007

Global Politics Team

The World Today #272, 06 March 2026

The World Today

Early Bird

March 2026 | CWA # 2006

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Election 2026, Day One

Peaceful polling, with over 60 per cent turnout

March 2026 | CWA # 2005

Global Politics Team

The World Today #271, 05 March 2026

The World Today

March 2026 | CWA # 2004

Akshath Kaimal

The “Forgotten” South Sudan Conflict

Instability returns, with a fragile peace agreement, uptick in violence and limited international engagement

March 2026 | CWA # 2003

Yesasvi Koganti

PM Modi’s Visit to Israel

From bilateral ties to a special strategic partnership

March 2026 | CWA # 2002

Femy Francis

German Chancellor’s China Visit

Reducing trade deficit and recalibrating economic cooperation with Beijing

March 2026 | CWA # 2001

R Preetha

Trump’s State of the Union Address

Six major takeaways on the economy, border and internal security and Iran

March 2026 | CWA # 2000

Rohini Reenum

The US-Iran War, Week One

Rapid Escalation, Regional Spillover, Global Uncertainty

Conflict Weekly

March 2026 | CWA # 1999

IPRI Team

The US-Iran War, Week One | The Return of Violence to South Sudan

Weekly Column on Ukraine & Africa

February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan

Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover

February 2026 | CWA # 1997

Padmashree Anandhan

Four Years of War in Ukraine

Continuing Uncertainty

February 2026 | CWA # 1996

Akshath Kaimal

Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes

Another round of cross-border attacks

March 2026 | CWA # 1995

Global Politics Team

The World Today #269, 03 March 2026

The World Today

March 2026 | CWA # 1994

Global Politics Team

The World Today #268, 02 March 2026

The World Today

PR Commentary

March 2026 | CWA # 1993

D Suba Chandran

The US-Iran Conflict and Pakistan

Balancing Rhetoric, Regional Interests and Global Alignments

Conflict Weekly

February 2026 | CWA # 1992

IPRI Team

Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes I Fours Years of Ukraine War

Weekly Column on Africa

March 2026 | CWA # 1991

Global Politics Team

Trump’s State of the Union Address | German Chancellor’s China Visit | India’s PM’s Israel Visit

February 2026 | CWA # 1990

Global Politics Team

The World Today #266, 27 February 2026

The World Today

Conflict Weekly

February 2026 | CWA # 1989

IPRI Team

Abu Dhabi Talks on Ukraine I Militant Attacks in Balochistan

CW Columns on Middle East and Africa

February 2026 | CWA # 1988

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine Peace talks in Abu Dhabi

Negotiations without a ceasefire or resolution

February 2026 | CWA # 1987

Akshath Kaimal

Continuing militant attacks in Balochistan

Expanding violence, Security-first response and Missing political dialogue in Pakistan

PR Commentary

February 2026 | CWA # 1986

R Preetha

Pakistan’s Central Asia Boost

Pakistan’s Climate and Water Crisis

Five Questions on Challenges, Capacity and Policies

The World This Week

February 2026 | CWA # 1965

Global Politics Team

AI Impact Summit in New Delhi I Munich Security Conference 2026

Conflict Weekly

February 2026 | CWA # 1964

IPRI Team

US-Iran & Ukraine Negotiations in Geneva I US Military Deployment in Nigeria

CW Columns on Middle East and Africa

February 2026 | CWA # 1963

Global Politics Team

The World Today #255, 16 February 2026

Today in History

The World This Week

February 2026 | CWA # 1962

Global Politics Team

Japan: Sanae Takaichi’s historic win | Honk Kong: Jimmy Lai Sentenced

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas

Early Bird

February 2026 | CWA # 1961

Lekshmi MK

Sanae Takaichi’s historic win in Japan

What does it mean for domestic politics and regional stability?

Early Bird

February 2026 | CWA # 1960

Femy Francis

Jimmy Lai sentenced for 20 years in Hong Kong: Who, What, and Why

CEAP

February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti

UK and China

PM Keir Starmer’s visit and the Recalibration of Economic, Strategic, and Domestic ties

February 2026 | CWA # 1958

Akshath Kaimal

India-EU Free Trade Agreement: Five Major Takeaways

The focus on expanded cooperation in defence, technology and critical minerals

February 2026 | CWA # 1957

R Preetha

The India–US interim trade framework

Tariff recalibration and Energy and Supply Chain realignment

February 2026 | CWA # 1956

Lekshmi MK

End of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

Erosion of arms control, Return of nuclear anxieties, and the New focus on China

The World This Week

February 2026 | CWA # 1955

Global Politics Team

End of the New START I India–US interim Trade Framework I India-EU Free Trade Agreement I UK PM Keir Starmer’s China visit

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas

February 2026 | CWA # 1954

Nishchal Nath Pandey

Nepal Elections 2026: Political Parties, Gen Z Protests and Hope for a New Beginning

Conflict Weekly

February 2026 | CWA # 1953

IPRI Team

Abu Dhabi Talks on Ukraine I Militant Attacks in Balochistan

Weekly Columns: Conflicts in Africa and the Middle East

CW Column: Conflicts in the Middle East

January 2026 | CWA # 1952

Brighty Ann Sarah

US threats against Iran, and Phase Two operations in Gaza

CW Column: Conflicts in Africa

January 2026 | CWA # 1951

Anu Maria Joseph

Africa: Renewed violence in Ethiopia and a Jihadist attack in Niger

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1950

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine: The Trilateral Talks, and the Deadlock over Donetsk & Security Guarantees for Kyiv

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1949

R Preetha

The United States: ICE Crackdowns, Rising Resistance and the Political/Legal pushback

Conflict Weekly

January 2026 | CWA # 1948

ICE Crackdowns and Resistance in the US I Trilateral Talks on Ukraine

TWTW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1947

Brighty Ann Sarah

The Pentagon’s National Defence Strategy: Four major takeaways

TWTW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1946

R Preetha

The Davos Summit 2026

Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum

The World This Week

January 2026 | CWA # 1945

Global Politics Team

The Davos Forum 2026 Takeaways I The US Pentagon’s National Defence Strategy

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1944

Brighty Ann Sarah

Syria: The State victory over the Syrian Democratic Forces

Conflict Weekly Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1943

Anu Maria Joseph

Another major kidnapping in Nigeria and Election announcement in Guinea-Bissau

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1942

Lekshmi MK

Greenland: Trump’s escalation-deescalation approach and Europe’s defence

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1941

Brighty Ann Sarah

The War in Gaza: Trump’s Board of Peace and the Challenges to Phase Two

Conflict Weekly

January 2026 | CWA # 1940

IPRI Team

Trump’s “Board of Peace” in Gaza I Escalation/De-escalation in Greenland

TWTW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1939

Lekshmi MK

Greenland: Trump’s escalation-deescalation strategy and Europe’s defence

The World This Week

January 2026 | CWA # 1938

Continuing Tensions over Greenland

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1937

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Nigeria: Intensifying domestic responses, and questions over Trump’s intervention

CW Note

January 2026 | CWA # 1936

Brighty Ann Sarah

Protests in Iran: Continuing Stalemate and Shifting US Position

Conflict Weekly

January 2026 | CWA # 1935

IPRI Team

Protests in Iran | Instability in Nigeria

The World This Week

January 2026 | CWA # 1934

Global Politics Team

The US, Greenland and Trump's Claims

Conflict Weekly

January 2026 | CWA # 1933

IPRI Team

Protests in Iran, the US Military Intervention in Venezuela and Conflicts in Africa

NIAS Conflict Weekly | The World This Week

January 2026 | CWA # 1932

Global Politics Team