Afghanistan and India: Afghan Foreign Minister’s visit and the Reset of bilateral relations

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CWA # 1913

State of Global Politics 2025

Afghanistan and India: Afghan Foreign Minister’s visit and the Reset of bilateral relations

The World This Week #338, Vol 7, No 52, 31 December 2025

Rohini Reenum
31 December 2025

What happened?
On 9 October, Afghanistan’s Acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi arrived on an official visit to India. His visit is scheduled to last until 16 October. He has met India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM), Dr. S. Jaishankar, and is likely to meet the National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Doval.

On 10 October, EAM Jaishankar met Muttaqi and both leaders held discussions on “issues of mutual interest, as well as important regional developments.” On the same day, at a joint press meeting, EAM Jaishankar announced the upgradation of India’s “technical mission in Kabul to a full-fledged embassy.” He also emphasized that India was “fully committed to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Afghanistan.” In response, Muttaqi assured that Kabul “has always sought good relations with India” and recognizes “India's security concerns.”

The joint India-Afghanistan statement reaffirms the “long-standing friendship” between the two countries, and covers the following areas: deepening engagement in “development cooperation projects, particularly in the sectors of healthcare, public infrastructure, and capacity-building,” including scholarships to Afghan students; reconstruction of “ residential buildings in the earthquake-affected areas”; strengthening “cooperation in sports, especially cricket, to advance cultural interactions”; invitation to Indian companies to “invest in the mining sector.” Both sides also commend the commencement of the India-Afghanistan Air Freight Corridor.

What is the background?
First, the troubled India-Taliban relations. While historically India and Afghanistan share “deep-rooted cultural and historical ties,” New Delhi’s relationship with the Taliban has been a troubled one. During the mid and late 1990s, when the Taliban was founded in Pakistan and later captured Kabul, India did not recognize it. Taliban’s close relationship with Pakistan was an important factor in how New Delhi looked at the former. Later, during the American presence in the 2000s and 2010s, India’s support to the elected governments – Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani played a role in how the Taliban looked at New Delhi.

Second, recent changes in New Delhi-Taliban engagement. During recent years, there has been a gradual shift, after the American exit. After the Taliban took over in 2021, India continued providing humanitarian assistance but closed down its consulates. In June 2022, it sent a “technical team” to Kabul to monitor closely and coordinate humanitarian assistance efforts. A major shift happened in November 2024, when India accepted a Taliban nominee as the ‘Acting Consul General’ in Mumbai. In the same month, an Indian delegation headed by a joint secretary visited Kabul and met with acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid and other ministers. In January 2025, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met with Muttaqi during a visit to the United Arab Emirates and assured India’s readiness to provide “humanitarian aid and development needs.” Taliban’s sustained outreach also played a dynamic role in this renewed engagement, especially its strong condemnation of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam indicated a serious overture towards New Delhi.

Third, Taliban’s search for new partners. Taliban’s deteriorating relationship with its ally Pakistan has also pushed it to look for newer regional and extra-regional partners, including China, Russia, and Central Asian countries, who have responded favorably. China has seized this opportunity and significantly increased its presence in Afghanistan. India has observed these shifts with caution and patience and recalibrated its reengagement strategy, culminating in the current visit.

Fourth, India’s investments in Afghanistan during the last two decades, and New Delhi’s interest to secure them. According to a response to a parliamentary question, India has invested “more than USD 3 billion” until 2022. It has been a significant development partner with “more than five hundred projects spread across each of the 34 provinces of the country in critical areas of power, water supply, road connectivity, healthcare, education, agriculture, and capacity building.” India wants to not only secure these investments but also capitalize on them and further expand economic cooperation. India also views Afghanistan as a transit corridor to West Asia. Further, it is seeking returns on investments in the Chabahar port via trade with Afghanistan.

What does it mean?
First, India’s recent overture to the Taliban indicates that it is deeply cognizant of its stakes/interests- political, economic, and strategic- in Afghanistan and is willing to secure it. The invitation to explore the mining sector and the commencement of the air freight corridor also indicate Afghan reciprocity. The Afghan-Pakistan fracture has also provided New Delhi with a unique geopolitical ally to rebalance Pakistan. Additionally, India can cultivate Afghanistan as a regional ally, given its troubled relationship with other neighbors. It is also in India’s interest that Afghanistan does not once again fall under foreign spheres of influence or become a breeding ground for anti-India terror outfits. India seems keen on preventing both.

Second, the Taliban is likely to keep its India option open, not only as a geopolitical counterweight to Pakistan, but as a recourse against dependence on any one partner. Given India’s credibility as a provider of unconditional humanitarian aid and promise of development assistance, amidst devastating economic impact, of continuing international sanctions on Afghanistan, the Taliban will seek to further cultivate its relationship with India.

Third, India is likely to continue this cautious but pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, given its historical complicity in terror attacks and continued support for terror outfits (anti-India or not), fundamentalist ideology, and mistreatment of Afghan women. Otherwise, India risks domestic and international backlash. India is likely to continue to walk the diplomatic tightrope with the Taliban, short of full recognition. What is, however, certain is that this visit will set the tone for India-Afghan relations for the foreseeable future.

About the author
Rohini Reenum is a PhD scholar at NIAS, Bengaluru.

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