The US and Syria: Strategic Recalibration and Security Pivot

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CWA # 1915

State of Global Politics 2025

The US and Syria: Strategic Recalibration and Security Pivot

The World This Week #338, Vol 7, No 52, 31 December 2025

Brighty Ann Sarah
31 December 2025

What happened?

On 10 November, Syria’s Prime Minister Ahmed al-Sharaa met with President Donald Trump, becoming the first Syrian leader to visit the White House, and marking a turning point in the Syria-US relations. The meeting culminated in Syria joining as the 90th member of the US-led international coalition to combat the Islamic State.

On 11 November, while in Saudi Arabia, President Trump also announced a 180-day suspension of comprehensive sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, extending a prior waiver. Measures to reopen the Syrian embassy in Washington were also initiated.

During the meeting, the US urged Syria to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel, deport foreign terrorists from the country, aid Washington in preventing the resurgence of ISIS, and assume responsibility for ISIS detention centres in Northeast Syria. President Al-Sharaa affirmed his commitment to the 1974 disengagement with Israel and invited American companies to invest in Syrian oil and gas.

On 28 November, 13 people were killed in an Israeli attack in the Syrian city of Beit Jin. The US condemned the move, stating that “It is very important that Israel maintain a strong and true dialogue with Syria, and that nothing takes place that will interfere with Syria’s evolution into a prosperous state.” He also added that “The new President of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is working diligently to make sure good things happen, and that both Syria and Israel will have a long and prosperous relationship together.”

On 13 December, the Islamic State ambushed the city of Palmyra in which two US soldiers and a US civilian interpreter were killed, prompting a strong US response. A joint US-Syrian patrol was ambushed by a member of Syria’s own security forces near Palmyra, in central Syria formerly controlled by the ISIL (ISIS).

On 19 December, US launched ‘Operation Hawkeye Strike,’ in collaboration with Syria’s state security forces, against ISIS. US forces conducted major airstrikes and ground operations against over 50 IS targets in northern and central Syria.

On 29 December, PM Netanyahu visited Trump at his residence in Florida, during which Trump stated that he was "sure Israel would get along with President Ahmed al-Sharaa."

What is the background?
First, the key drivers of Syria-US relations: Counter-terrorism, US backing to non-state actors, and the sanctions regime. The Syria-US relations have historically been fraught and marked by the threat of terrorism, leading to Syria's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism by the US in 1979 due to its support for terrorist organisations, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah and Palestinian militants. The US has long perceived Syria as a potential enabler of transnational jihadist networks that posed serious security concerns to Washington and its allies, particularly Israel. The longstanding presence of Iran and Russia, where Iran wielded the country as a stronghold for its proxy groups exacerbated the US security concerns in Syria. The post-9/11 period witnessed limited cooperation between Syria and the US as Damascus offered intelligence cooperation to the US on al-Qaeda operatives and Islamist networks, driven by the Assad regime’s own fear of jihadist groups that threatened regime stability. However, the 2011 Syrian Civil War amplified the threat of terrorism with the rise of extremist groups including ISIS and the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the current ruling party of Damascus which had been a Syrian offshoot of al-Qaeda.

The Syrian civil war prompted direct US intervention, which was pursued through the US backing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition that emerged as Washington's primary ground partner in combating the Islamic State (ISIS) during the war. Following the rise of ISIS in 2014, the US launched Operation Inherent Resolve and provided arms, training, and air support to the SDF, enabling the recapture of ISIS strongholds like Syria’s Raqqa in 2017 and Kobani, which accelerated the defeat of group by 2019 and facilitated the US military presence in north-eastern Syria. The US engagement with the SDF fuelled suspicions under Bashar al-Assad, who denounced the US-SDF partnership as an “illegal occupation,” heightening tensions and prompting Syrian forces, backed by Russia and Iran, to clash with SDF while avoiding direct confrontation with the US.

The US also employed sanctions and embargoes to exert economic and diplomatic pressure against Syria’s support to terror networks, leading to export controls, financial and aid restrictions and ban on arms sales. The 2004 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, imposed trade embargoes and asset freezes in response to Syria’s alleged interference in Iraq and Lebanon, further isolating Syria economically and limiting foreign investment. The 2011 civil war and the largescale human rights abuses under the Assad regime that marked the conflict culminated in the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. The sanctions sought accountability through economic pressure and severely exacerbated Syria's already fragile economic crisis, leading to the devaluation of the Syrian pound, hyperinflation, and widespread poverty and hindering reconstruction efforts.

Second, drivers of the post-Assad realignment. The fall of the Assad regime in 2024 significantly altered the political landscape and the US interests and involvement in Syria. The US significantly reduced its military presence throughout 2025, drawing down from nearly 2,000 troops at the end of 2024 to fewer than 1,000, with forces consolidated primarily in northeastern regions. The US military bases in Syria also saw a stark drop from eight to one. The primary motivator has been the progressive weakening of the Islamic State in the region after its fall in 2019. This has allowed for a more focused presence to sustain counterterrorism efforts through intelligence sharing, and partnerships with the SDF. Additionally, the withdrawal of Russian and Iranian influence in the country, prompted by the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad, Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, and the weakening of Tehran's proxy groups including Hezbollah has created a favourable power vacuum for the US. The transitional government under Ahmed al-Sharaa actively distanced itself from Iran, expelling remaining proxies and signalling a break from Assad-era alliances to enable Western and Arab engagement.

Third, the persisting Israel-Syria to territorial tensions. The conflicts largely concern southern Syria, particularly the Israeli occupation of the UN-monitored buffer zone established by the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and expanded areas beyond it. This includes parts of Mount Hermon and villages in Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda provinces. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Israel unilaterally declared the 1974 agreement void, invaded and occupied the buffer zone, and conducted over 600 airstrikes and ground incursions throughout 2025 claiming efforts to prevent weapons from reaching “extremists,” and establish a deeper demilitarized zone south of Damascus. The al-Sharaa government condemned these actions as violations of sovereignty and aggression, while insisting on full Israeli withdrawal to pre-December 2024 lines as a precondition for any negotiations. Further, Syria and Lebanon remain Israel’s only neighbours who are not signatories to the Abraham Accords, brokered by the US in 2020 in an effort to normalise the relations between Israel and the regional powers.

What does it mean for 2026?
Firstly, for Syria this diplomatic recalibration can lead to economic relief, security guarantees and political legitimacy. The engagement creates a critical opportunity to consolidate authority and undertake post-war reconstruction after decades of isolation and conflict. The easing of the crippling sanctions could provide much-needed economic relief and catalyse international investment, particularly from the US, including in the trade and investment in the oil and natural resources in the northern territories. Engagement with Washington also confers political legitimacy on the new government, facilitating broader international acceptance and helping to move beyond its past identity as a former al-Qaeda offshoot. Moreover, closer ties with Washington may provide security assurances and strengthen cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts, thereby helping to contain jihadist threats that could undermine the stability of the emerging political order.

For the US, the recalibration is likely to emphasise limited military involvement while facilitating a Syria-Israel rapprochement. With a reduced on-ground military presence, Washington is likely to encourage Syria to assume primary responsibility for dismantling terrorist and extremist groups operating within its territory. The US policy would also focus on maintaining regional stability and ensuring the durability of a cooperative regime in Damascus. Additionally, the United States is likely to intensify efforts toward normalising Israel-Syria relations, including encouraging Syrian to be party in the Abraham Accords, in line with broader US strategic interests and Israel’s security objectives in the region.

About the author
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Postgraduate student from Stella Maris College, Chennai.

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