German Elections: Explaining the rise of extremism in East Germany

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CWA # 1917

State of Global Politics 2025

German Elections: Explaining the rise of extremism in East Germany

The World This Week #338, Vol 7, No 52, 31 December 2025

Brighty Ann Sarah
31 December 2025

On 23 February, the election results in Germany were released, with the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (CSU), emerging victorious, amassing 28.6 per cent. Amidst a struggling economy, rising of anti-immigration among the public, and administrative disarray, the collapse of the ‘traffic-light coalition’, led by Germany’s former Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Social Democratic Party (SPD)was imminent.

However, the true element of concern was the sharp rise in the vote share garnered by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), largely labeled as an extremist organization, currently under investigation by various authorities, including the German domestic intelligence agency, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). AfD emerged second in the race with a striking 20.8 per cent vote.

To say that AfD is the first and only evidence of the rise of right-wing extremism and political polarization in the country would be considered inaccurate since neither had quite gone away. With its formation in 2013, AfD is the most recent, yet the strongest manifestation of the ever-present extremism and ethnonationalism in Germany, the stark victory of the AfD at the polls is not merely a matter of the party’s growing prevalence, it is the reflection of a larger problem that has shaped German society, particularly the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).

While the evils have always simmered beneath the surface, East Germany has historically been a stronghold of such extremist movements. The reasons for the flourishing of radical right-wing movements and ideologies in the eastern provinces are multifaceted, and shaped by historical, economic, developmental, and psychological factors.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunification of both territories was hastened. After nearly four decades of political isolation, and economic and development constraints under the Soviet Union. The reunification was meant to be the rise of East Germany into socio-economic growth in comparison with the Western counterpart. Although measures were adopted towards this goal, the degree of its success is questionable. Policies including the Trust Agency (Treuhandanstalt) and Solidarity Surcharge (Solidaritätszuschlag) fundamentally destabilized the East German economy.

With the clear economic disparity between the two regions, it reflected in the slow economic growth, rising unemployment rates, and wealth disparity between the populations has been the major cause for the rise of right-wing populism and anti-establishment inclinations in the region. East Germany also experiences a persistent problem of internal migration due to income and employment inequity, which leaves the region’s population aging and shrinking.

Over the years, a fraction of the East German population has felt that the reunification was merely the assimilation of East Germany into the more affluent West, rather than true integration as equals. East Germans harbor a feeling of being ‘left behind’ and treated as ‘second-class citizens’, and the escalating ‘brain drain’ from the region in pursuit of better economic opportunities in the West, only adds to their concerns. Berlin remains the cultural hub of the region, while the other states are among the poorest in the country.

Germany’s far-right ethno-nationalist spirit which had been subdued by the Second World War was also on the steady rise, spurred on by the open-door policy under Angela Merkel during the European refugee crisis. East Germany remains unrelenting in its hostilities towards immigrants, the roots of which lay in its communist past. While West Germany grew more heterogeneous with the influx of immigrants in the 1970s and 80s, East Germany had remained largely ethnically homogenous, with a history of violent attacks against immigrants dating back as early as the 1920s. AfD fed on this fear of cultural erosion, and loss of opportunities to immigrants amidst the already struggling economy.

Additionally, the growing support towards right-wing extremism is an act of protest by the East German population who feel alienated from the ‘elitist’ mainstream politics. The 2017 German election brought forth the consensus that two-thirds of all AfD voters choose the party more as an act of protest, rather than in acceptance of their objectives. The growing radical movements have successfully capitalized on this mounting frustration and helplessness.

In hindsight, the East Germans show leniency towards extremism, and the West German’s affiliation to centrist political beliefs is pivoted in their historical experiences. The well-founded economic and industrial base also keeps the Western provinces less radical. The East German bitterness toward government policies and reduced benefits, an unchecked history of extreme nationalism, and alienation continue to enable the right-wing expansion in the East.

About the author
Brighty Ann Sarah is a student at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai.

What happened?
On 18 November, President Trump hosted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in Washington, marking the Crown Prince’s first visit to the capital in more than seven years. President Trump announced Saudi Arabia's designation as a “major non-NATO ally.” He also approved the future sale of up to 48 F-35 stealth fighter jets to Riyadh, and a purchase of 300 US-made tanks. MBS pledged to increase Saudi investment in the US from previously announced USD 600 billion to nearly USD 1 trillion.

According to a White House fact sheet, the US and Saudi Arabia signed a “Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation.” Both sides also agreed on a Critical Minerals Framework, and an AI Memorandum of Understanding. President Trump and the Crown Prince also signed the “U.S.-Saudi Strategic Defense Agreement (SDA).” This will secure “new burden-sharing funds from the Saudi Arabia to defray U.S. costs, and affirming that the Kingdom views the United States as its primary strategic partner.”

On 19 November, the two sides formalized several pacts during the US-Saudi Investment Forum attended by key business leaders. Saudi Aramco (the Saudi Arabian Oil Company) signed 17 deals worth over USD 30 billion. President Trump said USD 270 billion in deals are being signed at the Forum.

What is the background?
First, a note on recent US-Saudi Arabia relations and tensions. In recent times, the US-Saudi relations oscillated between convergence and strain. Under President Trump, the relationship was well prioritized, he chose Riyadh for his first foreign trips in both terms (2017 and 2025), securing major arms and investment deals. In 2018, relations were challenged over the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, killed by Saudi agents in Istanbul. This along with Saudi conduct in Yemen, led to US criticism over human rights. Former President Joe Biden guaranteed to make Saudi Arabia a "pariah” over these issues, however, energy and security needs led to his 2022 Jeddah visit and gradual re-engagement. Trump’s return further reset the partnership, with a USD 600 billion Saudi investment pledge in May. This week’s visit by MBS, his first since 2018, adds to this arc, with Trump’s statements such as the Crown Prince "knew nothing about” the Khashoggi murder, aiming to rehabilitate MBS in the backdrop of mutual strategic and economic interests.

Second, the economic, political and technological collaboration. During the meeting, Saudi Arabia was designated “a major non-NATO ally.” This means expedited access to US military hardware and cooperation, with fewer licensing requirements for advanced American weapons systems. Further, under Vision 2030, Riyadh seeks to diversify away from oil, attract high-tech investment, and position itself as a logistics, AI and green-transition hub. For the US, Saudi capital and critical minerals cooperation support supply-chain resilience and its broader competition with China.

Third, the Abraham Accords, Gaza, US interests, and Saudi Arabia’s leverage. President Trump has repeatedly shown his interest for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. During the meeting, Trump and MBS hinted at potential movement on this front, although no specifications or timelines were defined. The Kingdom has consistently linked normalisation with Israel to the Arab Peace Initiative framework. In recent years, Riyadh has increasingly used its role in Gaza and Iran to project regional leadership, while Washington has sought to anchor Saudi Arabia more firmly within a US-led regional security and diplomatic architecture.

What does it mean?
First, a strategic reset in US–Saudi relations. Security, investment, technology and diplomacy are bundled into a transactional framework: advanced defence systems, AI agreements and civil nuclear cooperation in return for substantial Saudi capital, critical minerals partnerships and alignment on regional issues such as Iran and Gaza. This meeting shows that Washington seeks Riyadh backing for energy stability, supply-chain resilience and leverage over China and regional issues. For Saudi Arabia, close ties with the US is important for its security and Vision 2030 objectives, even as it cultivates relations with other major powers.

Second, a shift in the Middle East military balance. The decision to sell stealth F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, marking the first such US sale to the kingdom, shows a significant policy shift. This shift also echoed in Trump’s statement: “They’ve been a great ally. Israel has been a great ally, and we’re looking at that exactly right now. But as far as I’m concerned, I think they are both at a level where they should get top of the line.”

About the author
R Preetha is a Postgraduate student from Stella Maris College, Chennai.

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