Conflict Weekly

CWA # 1933
Conflict Weekly
Protests in Iran, the US Military Intervention in Venezuela and Conflicts in Africa

Conflict Weekly #314, 9 January 2026, Vol 7, No. 1

IPRI Team
9 January 2026
Photo Source: AP

Conflict Weekly #314, 9 January 2026, Vol 7, No. 1
An initiative by NIAS-IPRI
 

Brighty Ann Sarah, Tanvi Thara Harendra Jha and Anu Maria Joseph

Protests in Iran: Economic Crisis, Intensifying Unrest and the Regime's Response
Brighty Ann Sarah

In the news
On 9 January, Iran witnessed the violent anti-government protests since their beginning in late December. The crowds chanted “death to the dictator” and torched government buildings. Authorities cut off electricity, internet and communication services to curb the protests. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei accused protesters of acting on behalf of US President Trump, and warned that “mercenaries for foreigners” will not be tolerated. He alleged that the protesters are “ruining their own streets to make the president of another country happy.” 

On the same day, opposition factions, led by Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the late ruler Shah, addressed the protestors in a social media post that “the eyes of the world are upon you,” urging them to “take to the streets.” 

At least 45 protesters, including eight children, have been killed since demonstrations began, with over 2,000 people detained, the Norway-based Iran Human Rights NGO (IHRNGO) reported. The protests have spread to over 27 of the 31 provinces. 

On 2 January, President Donald Trump voiced support for the protestors in Tehran and warned that if the administration “violently kills peaceful protesters,” the US “will come to their rescue,” and that “we are locked and loaded and ready to go.” On 3 and 4 January, Khamenei vowed that Tehran “will not yield to the enemy,” in response to Trump’s warning. 

On 30 December, President Masoud Pezeshkian urged the interior minister to listen to “legitimate demands” of protesters. The government spokesperson, Fatemeh Mohajerani, stated: “We officially recognise the protests,” and that a dialogue mechanism ?with the protestors would be set up and include talks with protest leaders. “We hear their voices and we know that this originates from natural pressure arising from the pressure on people’s livelihoods,” she wrote. 

Issues at large
First, the economic collapse compounded by external sanctions. Iran’s economic crisis is acute and accelerating. It has emerged as the primary driver of the current wave of protests. The sharp depreciation of the Iranian rial to 1.42 million against the US dollar, a 56 per cent loss in six months, has fuelled inflation, with food prices rising by 72 per cent. This strain has been further aggravated by the government’s decision to raise subsidised gasoline prices to curb fuel demand, intensifying public unrest. Rooted in chronic misgovernance, corruption, the financing of regional proxies, and structural inefficiencies, Iran’s economic fragility has been further compounded by intensified sanctions in 2025. The June 2025 US-Israel confrontation and subsequent sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear programme have sharply reduced oil exports, restricted access to global banking and frozen assets, and choked foreign investment and currency inflows. Together, these external pressures and domestic mismanagement have significantly heightened the risk of economic collapse and widespread unrest.

Second, the shift from economic grievances to a crisis of regime legitimacy. What began as protests driven by acute economic hardship is rapidly transforming into a broader anti-regime movement. It is being shaped by public frustration over the regime’s failure to address domestic issues, including poverty, energy shortages, water crisis, and authoritarian governance, while the regime prioritises support for foreign proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthis. Protest slogans like “Death to the dictatorship” and “Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran” reflect widespread resentment toward the regime’s priorities. Calls for monarchical restoration have gained visibility, amplified by exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s appeals for coordinated nationwide protests. He has urged the security forces to side with the public against what he terms Khamenei’s oppressive regime. Fragmented opposition groups are leveraging the moment to advance the pro-monarchy agenda, echoed in chants such as “This is the final battle, Pahlavi will return” and “Mullahs must leave Iran.”

Third, youth resistance to the regime. The current protests in Iran are the largest in scale since the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests over the custodial death of Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman who was detained by morality police for allegedly not wearing her hijab appropriately. While the 2022 protests were largely women-led and centred on demands for personal freedoms and resistance to the archaic values imposed by the regime, the current wave of protests has witnessed a significant influx of young men and university students at the forefront. This shift underscores the regime’s failure to consolidate support among Iran’s youth, who are increasingly alienated and deeply frustrated by the country’s deteriorating socio-political and economic conditions, and the suppression of personal freedom. 

Fourth, inflammatory rhetoric and escalation. Trump’s repeated warnings that the US is "locked and loaded" and ready to "come to their rescue" if Iran attacks peaceful protesters create the impression of external backing. It has put the regime in a precarious position where suppression risks further US threats or escalation, particularly in light of the US intervention in Venezuela. Further, the Khamenei regime has exploited such statements to delegitimise the movement by portraying protesters as US-backed “mercenaries,” while simultaneously using this narrative to justify repression and state violence.

In perspective
First, although the economic crisis is likely to worsen as protests intensify, the government’s response may remain relatively measured. Compared to previous waves of unrest, the regime has been willing to acknowledge the grievances raised by the current protests quickly and has called for a dialogue-based resolution. Although cases of violent state repression persist, largely in an attempt to regain control, they appear to be isolated instances rather than a coordinated, large-scale, systematic suppression.

Second, despite the escalating intensity of the protests, the prospects for regime change remain slim. External intervention in a weakened and highly fragmented Iran is unlikely. Inflammatory statements from Trump appear to be an attempt at accelerating internal pressure through rhetoric rather than any genuine intent to intervene. Moreover, opposition to the current regime remains deeply fragmented, and the protest lacks coherent political leadership. Although Reza Pahlavi’s name has emerged as a potential alternative, he lacks the political consolidation to trigger a regime change. Notably, even the US has refrained from endorsing Pahlavi’s offer to “lead a transition” should the current system collapse.

The US-Venezuela: Military intervention and sovereignty concerns
Tanvi Thara Harendra Jha

In the news
On 3 January, the BBC reported that the US conducted “Operation Absolute Resolve” and captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. The 150-minute operation involved strikes against military targets across Caracas and the surrounding regions. The couple was flown to New York to face the charges of narcoterrorism, weapons possession, and drug trafficking. 

On 4 January, six Latin American countries, including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Spain, rejected “the unilateral military interventions in Venezuela” in contravention of “the United Nations Charter’s ban on the use of force and the right to territorial sovereignty.” The same day, UN Secretary-General António Guterres described “the United States action” as “a dangerous precedent,” noting “all countries have a duty to abide by international law.” 

On 5 January, CBS reported that they had pleaded not guilty in federal court in Manhattan. Maduro stated in court that he is the legitimate President and called his capture a “kidnapping” while maintaining his innocence on all charges. The same day, Delcy Rodríguez, the former vice president, was sworn in as interim president. Rodríguez condemned the capture and pledged to work for the “peace, spiritual, economic, and social stability” of its people. 

On 6 January, Trump announced that Venezuela would transfer 30 to 50 million barrels of oil to the US, with revenue to be controlled by the US to ensure benefits for both citizens of the US and Venezuela.

Issues at large
First, the contested legality of the operation. The Trump administration claimed that the military intervention was a form of law enforcement targeting an indicted fugitive. However, this framing is highly contested internationally. The operation involved the use of military force on Venezuelan territory without the UNSC authorisation or clear evidence of self-defence, both of which are mentioned under the UN Charter Article 2(4). Senior UN officials cited by The New York Times have noted that arresting a foreign head of state by force on his own soil, without the consent of the host nation, appears to be inconsistent with international law norms. Several states, including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Spain, rejected the operation as a violation of their territorial sovereignty. Antonio Guterres also cautioned that such actions risk undermining the UN Charter. The contestation lies in whether the operation can be treated as extraterritorial law enforcement, as claimed by the US, or as an unlawful military intervention that weakens established norms governing the use of force.

Second, the fragility of the interim government. The interim government led by Delcy Rodriguez faces serious questions of legitimacy and durability. While the US signalled support for the interim authority, it lacks a broad domestic consensus and international recognition. Rodriguez rejected the operation by the US as an “abduction” and called Maduro the “legitimate President.” This shows the internal division within the administration. At the same time, Trump issued public warnings towards Rodriguez, which have reinforced perceptions of external influence shaping the interim leadership’s behavior. This dependency on foreign backing, in addition to difficulty in managing internal dissent, further complicates and challenges stability and the government’s ability to consolidate authority. 

Third, US control over Venezuelan oil and its geopolitical implications. The reported US plans to place Venezuelan oil sales and revenues under external oversight reflect an effort to use the country’s primary economic asset as a lever to shape its political outcomes. By controlling these oil revenues, the US seeks to prevent their use by the previous regime, finance economic stabilization under the interim authority, and influence the country’s future reconstruction. However, this approach has a broader geopolitical implication. The Venezuelan oil sector is central to the long-standing oil-to-debt arrangement with China under which the crude exports were used to service Chinese loans. The US control over oil flows will affect China’s strategic and financial interests in Venezuela. This will risk Venezuela becoming an arena of US-China rivalry. 

In perspective
The US intervention in Venezuela reflects a broader shift in how power is exercised in international politics, especially in the interpretation of sovereignty and the use of force. By presenting a military operation as a law enforcement action, the US has challenged long-standing legal norms under the UN Charter. The strong reactions from Latin American countries and the UN indicate disagreement with the US approach, as it risks normalizing unilateral military interventions, which are justified through domestic claims rather than a multilateral consensus.

At the same time, the crisis has moved beyond a domestic political struggle and into a geopolitical competition. The interim government lacks broader legitimacy and reinforces dependence on external actors, while US control over oil revenues ties Venezuela’s economic future to strategic calculations that involve China. Together, these dynamics suggest that Venezuela’s instability is being shaped by external actors as much as the internal actors and divisions. 

CW Column: Conflicts in Africa This Week
Israeli visit to Somaliland and another bandit attack in Nigeria
Anu Maria Joseph

What happened this week?
1. Somalia-Israel
On 6 January, Israel's Foreign Minister Gideon Saar visited Somaliland. The move came days after Israel recognised the independence of Somaliland, which is a breakaway region of Somalia. Saar said that Israel is undeterred by the criticism about the recognition, and that its government will "soon" open embassies and appoint ambassadors. He stated: “We hear the attacks, the criticism, the condemnations. Nobody will determine for Israel who we recognize and who we maintain diplomatic relations with.”
Somalia's Foreign Minister condemned the visit as an "unauthorised intrusion" and “unacceptable interference in the internal affairs” of Somalia. The ministry called Israel's engagement with Somalia's breakaway region "illegal, null and void."

2. Nigeria
On 4 January, gunmen, also known as bandits, raided a village in the Niger state and killed at least 30 people and abducted several others. They came in motorcycles and opened fire on the villagers.

What are the issues?
1. Somalia: Israel's objective, Somalia's objection and international condemnation
By recognising Somaliland, Israel has found a new ally in the Horn of Africa region. Somaliland's port of Berbera is situated along the Red Sea and lies near the Gulf of Aden, one of the busiest maritime routes in the world. For Israel, the port would provide not only access to the Red Sea but also a ground to carry out a direct attack on the Yemeni Houthis. Additionally, there is an increasing concern that Somaliland may take in Palestinians forced out of Gaza.

For Somalia, the recognition and visit are an attack on its sovereignty. Somaliland declared self-independence in 1991 following the overthrow of military dictator Siad Barre, who killed thousands in a secessionist struggle in the region. Although Somaliland has a separate political system, government institutions, a police force and its own currency, the region is not internationally recognised, and Somalia consider it an integral part of its territory.

Israel's move has been widely criticised internationally, including by the AU, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Libya, the UK and the EU. Regardless, the UNSC emergency meeting on the matter on 30 December witnessed a division. For the AU and many African countries, the major concern is that the move could encourage separatists everywhere to establish external relations and demand recognition of the territories they claim. The US neither condemned nor supported but defended the recognition by citing Israel's "right to conduct diplomatic relations as any other sovereign state."

2. Nigeria: Security issues in the Niger state, failed local response and a week after the US airstrikes
The state of Niger, located in the northwestern region of the country, has been experiencing an increase in security issues in recent months. In November, there was a major bandit attack in Niger where 300 school children and teachers were kidnapped from a Catholic school. The major issue behind the increasing attacks has been the local government's incapacity and the security forces’ preparedness to respond promptly. The latest attack also comes despite the US airstrikes on IS targets in Sokoto state in December, in collaboration with the Nigerian government. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu had claimed that the armed men who carried out the latest attack in Niger state were suspected to have been flown from Sokoto and Zamfara, amidst the US airstrike.

What does it mean?
1. Somalia
Israel, with the US defending, seems not to be swayed by international criticism against it for recognising Somaliland. This implies that Israel is moving faster towards achieving its objectives by formalising ties with Somaliland. With the new ally in the Horn of Africa and access to the Red Sea, particularly the Gulf of Eden, Israel seems to be preparing to attack Iran and its proxy Houthis, active in the region. However, for Somaliland, Israel's recognition alone is not enough to gain international recognition. Rather, it will increase tensions in the region. Ethiopia has been recently trying to access the Red Sea via Somaliland, which Somalia strongly condemned as a violation of its territorial sovereignty.

2. Nigeria
The US military intervention in Nigeria, although it involves several sovereignty concerns, was a major development towards counterterrorism in Nigeria. However, the IS-focused attack in Sokoto state has prompted the armed insurgents/bandits to flee to other vulnerable neighbouring states, including Niger, Zamfara, Kebbi and Kaduna. This implies that an overnight airstrike in the country is unlikely to address the multifold security issues. A long-term security will depend on local response, presence of state forces and technical and military capacity to respond on time.
 

Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week:
Regional Roundups
Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Lekshmi MK, Aparna A Nair, M Kejia, and Rizwana Banu

China, East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
China and Japan: Beijing imposes export ban on Japanese military purpose items; Tokyo calls the move "absolutely unacceptable and deeply regrettable"
On 7 January, the Chinese Commerce Ministry announced an export ban on Japanese dual-use items, which can be used for military purposes. It includes goods, software, or technologies that can be employed in both civilian and military applications. Stating protest and withdrawal of the ban, Japan called the move "absolutely unacceptable and deeply regrettable." This development is in the background of Japan's Prime Minister's statement on Taiwan, which had sparked tensions between Japan and China.

Myanmar: Conflict escalates as junta pushes toward second phase of elections
On 7 January, Mizzima reported that Myanmar’s military junta plans to hold the second phase of its general election on 11 January 2026 in 100 townships, despite widespread fighting that makes voting unfeasible in many areas. Active clashes, airstrikes and resistance offensives are ongoing in key election-designated townships, including Hpapun (Karen State), Bilin (Mon State), Budalin (Sagaing) and several areas of Magway Region. In Hpapun, most of the township remains under KNLA control, with recent airstrikes hitting civilian shelters and schools. In Bilin, intensified military patrols and shelling have killed civilians and displaced villagers. Resistance forces have also attacked junta camps and administrative offices in Magway and Sagaing, leaving towns like Budalin surrounded and contested. Analysts and resistance groups say the junta can only conduct voting in areas under firm military control, making a nationwide election impossible and reinforcing claims that the process lacks credibility.

South Asia
Nepal: Prime Minister urges party-affiliated ministers to resign
On 7 January, as reported by The Kathmandu Post, the Prime Minister has once again asked some cabinet ministers affiliated with political parties to leave the government in response to an initiative by a citizen-built government following the Gen Z movement. Over three ministers are yet to decide on quitting. PM Karki has stated that “we are entering a new phase. In this situation, some colleagues have clearly shown their desire to enter politics and contest elections. Therefore, it would be better for them to detach themselves from the government.”

Pakistan: ISPR says Afghanistan is involved in major terror incidents in 2025
On 7 January, Dawn reported that the Pakistan Army claimed that in 2025, Afghanistan was involved in major "high-impact" terror incidents in Pakistan. During a press conference, the Inter-Service Public Relations Director General maintained that Pakistan's fight against terrorism has been ongoing for more than two decades, and 2025 remains a landmark and consequential year in the fight against terrorism. He further highlighted that in 2025 world acknowledged Pakistan's stance, particularly that Afghanistan has become a "base for terrorist operations." "The hubs of Fitna al-Khawarij and Fitna-e-Hindustan are in Afghanistan," he said, alleging that all major terrorist organisations targeting Pakistan were based and being supported in Kabul. 

Pakistan: Protests in Balochistan over kidnappings
On 6 January, Dawn reported a protest organised by All Parties Kech in collaboration with traders, the Doctors association, accompanied by various leaders, workers and civilians, rallied in Turbat town against weakening law and order and the recent rise in kidnappings for ransom incidents in Kech districts. The protesters also demanded the recovery of recently abducted youths. They also demanded that state institutions enhance security in the province, whilst showing resistance to any forces that would lead to instability in the province. The Kech Bar Association displayed solidarity by boycotting the court proceedings. The kidnappings are severely disrupting the daily lives and business activities and affecting the entire Markran region.

The Middle East and Africa
Protests in Iran: Rights group reports 25 dead and 1000 arrested
On 6 January, an Iran-based rights group reported that the protest over high inflation and low value of currency claimed 25 lives and 1000 arrests. The group also reported that the protest has now expanded to 27 provinces, with slogans calling for economic reforms and criticising governance and the delivery of justice. In response to the rising unrest, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian called for dialogue and assured reforms to stabilise the economy. Furthermore, the government has announced subsidy reforms, which will take effect on 10 January.

Iran: Tehran “will not yield to the enemy,” Khamenei responds to Trump’s threats to aid protestors
On 3 January, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed that Tehran “will not yield to the enemy,” in response to Trump’s warning that Washington will “come to the rescue” of protesters in Iran if security forces fired on them, and that “we are locked and loaded and ready to go.” In a letter addressed to the UN, Iran’s ambassador Amir-Saeid Iravani called for the Security Council to condemn Trump's statements, stating that “Iran will exercise its rights decisively and proportionately. The United States of America bears full responsibility for any consequences arising from these unlawful threats and any ensuing escalation.” Iran’s top official, Ali Larijani, warned that US  interference in domestic Iranian issues would lead to regional destabilisation. Nearly ten people have reportedly been killed in the protests against the collapsing rial and the economic crisis. Authorities, while having agreed that the cause of the protestors is justified, are seeking to resolve the issues through dialogue. “The bazaaris were right. They are right to say they cannot do business in these conditions,” said Khamenei, adding that “We will speak with the protesters but talking to rioters is useless. Rioters should be put in their place.”

Yemen: Government regains control of Mukalla from southern separatist forces
On 3 January, Yemen’s government declared that it had regained control over the key eastern port of Mukalla, the capital of Hadramout province, from UAE-backed southern separatists who seized it last month. The rapid advancements from the government have reversed many of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) gains last month and cast doubt on the viability of its intention to hold a referendum on independence within two years, reports Reuters. STC forces blocked roads leading to Aden from the northern provinces and called on the international community to intervene against what it described as a “Saudi-backed military escalation.”  In a statement, it added that northern Islamist factions, referring to the Islah party that is part of the government, had targeted civilians and vital infrastructure. The UAE, the main STC supporter, urged restraint and stated that it was “deeply concerned” about the escalation in Yemen.

The Gambia: Migrant boat capsizes off Gambia, leaving at least seven dead
On 2 January, a maritime tragedy occurred off the coast of The Gambia, leaving at least seven people dead and several others missing from a migrant vessel carrying about 200 people en route to Europe. The vessel capsized around midnight close to the village of Jinack in the North Bank Region and was later found grounded on a sandbank. To date, ninety-six passengers have been rescued, with ongoing search-and-rescue operations led by the Gambian Navy, in cooperation with local fishing vessels. Of those rescued, ten are in critical condition and receiving urgent medical treatment. The identities of the victims are yet to be verified, although it is suspected that a number of the dead are non-Gambians. Preliminary estimates suggest it was a large wooden canoe, which has often been used by migrants despite being far from ideal for the over 1,500-kilometre crossing across the Atlantic to Spain's Canary Islands. This route has increasingly been favoured in recent years, though it remains very dangerous, with several thousand reported fatalities of migrants worldwide.

Europe and the Americas
The War in Ukraine: Ukraine and the US to revisit territorial questions and Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant control in peace talks
On 7 January, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said US and Ukrainian negotiators would once again discuss the issues of territory and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the most contentious issues in talks aimed at ending the war. Kyiv has firmly rejected Russian demands to cede the eastern Donetsk region or relinquish Europe’s largest nuclear facility, which was seized by Moscow back in 2022. While US official Steve Witkoff have indicated that possible land compromises were discussed, President Zelenskiy has insisted that any territorial concessions must be approved through a national referendum. According to Reuters, the recent opinion polls indicated that while many Ukrainians are open to freezing current front lines, a large majority oppose formally giving up territory. President Zelenskiy said the US has floated a proposal for trilateral management of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, including an American chief manager, while Kyiv has countered with a joint Ukrainian-American arrangement that would allow Washington to determine the use of half of the facility’s power output.

The War in Ukraine: Macron hosts Kyiv allies in Paris to seal security pacts
On 6 January, French President Emmanuel Macron convened Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and delegates from over 30 "Coalition of the Willing" nations in Paris to secure robust security guarantees for Kyiv. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, NATO chief Mark Rutte, and US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are taking part in this event. The summit targets a multinational force to safeguard Ukraine post-ceasefire, alongside economic and military aid, plus a US "backstop" against Russian violations. Zelensky, following the Trump talks, revealed a "90 per cent agreed" peace framework, with disputes over the territorial cessions in Donbas. Russia refused interim truces, ramping up energy strikes, while Washington pledges 15-year protections, though timelines lag. Talks undermined by US Venezuela raid, and Greenland grab threats, frustrating European leaders.

Denmark: Discussions in the US over acquiring Greenland spurs European allies to prepare a response 
On 7 January, the media reported that senior advisers to US President Donald Trump have been discussing options for acquiring Greenland. Some officials portrayed the idea as linked to long-term US national and military security interests. President Trump has revived a proposal first raised during his earlier presidency that the United States should gain control of the Danish territory. The renewed debate has prompted reactions in Europe. France said it was working with other European allies on a plan. France's officials emphasised that any move would need to respect territorial integrity and international law and that responses would be coordinated among NATO partners. The discussions underscored shared concern among European governments about sovereignty, defence cooperation, and Arctic security. Greenland has repeatedly expressed that it does not want to become part of the United States, and most Greenlanders oppose such a change. European allies reaffirmed support for Greenland’s autonomy and stressed collective defence through NATO rather than unilateral territorial shifts.

Greenland: President Trump renews threat to take control, and claims Denmark has failed to protect it; Europe issues joint statement saying “Greenland belongs to its people” 
On 6 January, the media reported that US President Donald Trump renewed his threat to take control of Greenland, stating that the Arctic island is vital to US national and military security. President Trump, who first floated the idea during his earlier presidency, has again refused to rule out the use of force. He argued that Denmark has failed to protect the strategically important territory. He blamed the insufficient military presence in the Arctic and growing security risks from increased Russian and Chinese activity in the region as reasons. The renewed threat comes amid US assertiveness following a recent US military operation in Venezuela that resulted in the seizure of President Maduro. US officials have cited Greenland’s location in the Arctic and its critical mineral resources as central to American security interests, particularly in the context of NATO and Arctic defence.

European leaders responded with France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and Denmark issuing a joint statement affirming that “Greenland belongs to its people” and that decisions regarding its future rest solely with Denmark and Greenland. They stressed that Arctic security must be ensured collectively through NATO and in line with international law. Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned that threats between NATO members would undermine the alliance. Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen welcomed European support and called for a “respectful dialogue” with the United States, emphasising territorial integrity. Denmark has pledged DKK 42 billion to strengthen its Arctic defence presence amid growing tensions.

Venezuela: US seizes Russian-flagged tanker as President Trump pushes to control oil flows
On 07 January, the United States seized a Russian-flagged tanker linked to Venezuela. US officials said the Coast Guard and military boarded the tanker, Marinera, after it refused to be boarded last month and switched flags.  The seizure coincided with US efforts to finalise a deal to import up to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan crude, which could potentially divert shipments away from China. Beijing, being the main buyer of crude from Venezuela, denounced the move as “bullying,” while oil prices fell on expectations of increased supply. Trump has argued that revenues from Venezuelan oil, refined and sold under US oversight, would benefit both countries. Although negotiations with state oil firm PDVSA are reported to be progressing, Venezuela’s government has not released an official announcement.

Venezuela: Maduro pleads not guilty at the US court and declares that he was "kidnapped" 
On 6 January, the deposed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro pleaded not guilty in a Manhattan federal court on Monday to charges of narco-terrorism and cocaine trafficking, following a US military raid. Maduro declared that he had been "kidnapped" and remained the legitimate leader of the oil-rich country. In Caracas, the power vacuum has been filled by Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, who was sworn in as interim president. While Rodríguez officially demands Maduro's release, the Trump administration has indicated a preference for working with her over the traditional opposition to maintain stability. This stance has sidelined opposition leader María Corina Machado, who praised the US intervention and vowed to return from exile to lead a transition toward free elections. The seizure has sparked a diplomatic crisis at the United Nations, with China and Russia condemning the move as "state terrorism." Domestically, President Trump asserted the US is now "in charge" of Venezuela and expressed his plans to rebuild the country’s crippled oil infrastructure. However, with Maduro’s loyalists still patrolling the streets and the US declaring a total oil embargo, the country faces a volatile period.

About the authors
Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha are postgraduate students at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. Lekshmi MK is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. Rizwana Banu, and Aparna A Nair are undergraduate students at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. M Kejia is an undergraduate student at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Pondicherry University, Pondicherry. 


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Tariffs, Ukraine, Iran and Operationalization of Trump’s World Order
March 2026 | CWA # 2039

Femy Francis

Trump-Xi Meeting
Why did Trump reschedule it? What does that mean?
March 2026 | CWA # 2035

Akshath Kaimal

Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict
Broken ceasefire, Expanding military strikes and Worsening humanitarian situation
Global Politics Early Bird
March 2026 | CWA # 2033

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal after elections:
Five major challenges for the new government
March 2026 | CWA # 2024

Lekshmi MK

The UN and the Iran-US War
UNSC Resolution 2817 between “Clear and Unified Message” and “Manifest Injustice”
March 2026 | CWA # 2023

Femy Francis

China’s Two Sessions 2026
New Five-Year Plan, Ethnic Unity Law, and an Enhanced Defence Budget
March 2026 | CWA # 2019

Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria
Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment
March 2026 | CWA # 2012

Padmashree Anandhan

The War in Ukraine
Long-range strikes, Defence adaptation and the EU’s energy dependence
Global Politics Early Bird
March 2026 | CWA # 2010

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Elections 2026
The Rise of the “New” and the Fall of the “Old”
March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026
Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape
February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan
Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover
PR Commentary
February 2026 | CWA # 1985

Abhimanyu Solanki

Basant in Pakistan
The return of Basant, and what it signifies
February 2026 | CWA # 1977

Anu Maria Joseph

Violence in Nigeria
US military deployment amidst worsening insurgency
February 2026 | CWA # 1976

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine
The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
Pakistan in 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1971

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan Budget 2025-26
Legislating stabilisation under IMF discipline and coalition constraints
Pakistan in 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1970

Aparna A Nair

Pakistan & China
Ten Years of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
PR Explainer
November 2025 | CWA # 1968

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan and the US
A New opening, or another cycle?
February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti

UK and China
PM Keir Starmer’s visit and the Recalibration of Economic, Strategic, and Domestic ties
TWTW Note
January 2026 | CWA # 1946

R Preetha

The Davos Summit 2026
Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum
State of Global Politics 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
State of Global Politics 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
This Week in History
August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech and the Civil Rights Movement in the US
The World This Week
August 2025 | CWA # 1790

GP Team

The World This Week#323-324
The Trump-Putin meeting & the US-China tariff extension
TWTW note
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
Weaponization of access to the US economy
The World This Week
August 2025 | CWA # 1779

GP Team

The World This Week#322
US tariffs on India, Brazil and Canada & the EU-US trade deal
This Week in History
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, starting the First World War
Global Politics Explainer
July 2025 | CWA # 1770

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:
Why the focus on terrorism, refugees, and Uzbekistan as the third partner?
The World This Week
July 2025 | CWA # 1769

GP Team

The World This Week#321
Indian PM Modi's visit to the Maldives I Elections to the Upper House in Japan
Global Politics Explainer
July 2025 | CWA # 1762

Lekshmi MK

Ocean Darkening: 
What is the phenomenon? What are its effects? And who are more vulnerable?
Global Politics Explainer
July 2025 | CWA # 1749

R Preetha

Africa as the Hunger Epicenter
Of the 13 Global Hunger Hotspots, 8 are in Africa: Five reasons why
The World This Week
July 2025 | CWA # 1748

GP Team

The World This Week #318
PM Modi’s Visit to Trinidad and Tobago & Ghana, One big beautiful bill, and Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting
Global Politics Explainer
July 2025 | CWA # 1744

Chittrothu Vaihali

EU-Canada Summit 2025
What is security and defence partnership all about?
Conflict Weekly
July 2025 | CWA # 1742

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly # 287-88
The 12 Day War and the Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal
Global Politics Explainer
July 2025 | CWA # 1738

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Thailand and Cambodia
What was the phone call between PM Shinawatra and President of Senate Hun Sen? What is the border dispute between the two? Why has this become an issue?
TWTW Note
June 2025 | CWA # 1735

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025:
Trump making Europe great again
The World This Week
June 2025 | CWA # 1734

GP Team

The World This Week #317
NATO Summit 2025 and Russia-Mali bilateral agreements
Global Politics Explainer
June 2025 | CWA # 1733

Ananya Dinesh

China and the Pacific Islands 
What was the recent China-PIC joint statement about? What it says, and what it means?
TWTW Note
June 2025 | CWA # 1728

M Kejia

G7 Summit 2025:
The Focus on the Middle East and Trade negotiations
TWTW Note
June 2025 | CWA # 1727

Aparna A Nair

Second China-Central Asia Summit:
China’s continuing search for regional partners, and the emphasis on the BRI
The World This Week
June 2025 | CWA # 1726

GP Team

The World This Week #316
China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, and the G7 Summit in Canada
Global Politics Explainer
June 2025 | CWA # 1725

Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Santhiya M, Aparna A Nair & M Kejia

Operation Midnight Hammer: US bombs three nuclear sites in Iran
What were the three Iranian nuclear sites that were targeted? What are the B2 Bombers and Bunker Buster Bombs? What do these attacks mean? What Next?
Conflict Weekly
June 2025 | CWA # 1724

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #286
The Spiralling Israel-Iran Crisis, and the Dangerous Hunger Hotspots
Global Politics Explainer
June 2025 | CWA # 1721

Rizwana Banu S and Santhiya M

Who are the Afrikaners?
Why is Trump interested in the Afrikaner question in South Africa?
Global Politics Explainer
June 2025 | CWA # 1720

Lekshmi MK

New WMO Report on Arctic Warming
What are the social, economic and environmental implications of Arctic warming
Global Politics Explainer
June 2025 | CWA # 1719

J Yamini  

China’s EV Surge
What contributes to the rise of BYD
Global Politics Explainer
June 2025 | CWA # 1717

J Yamini

Gender Violence in Pakistan:
What are the larger issues in the Noor Mukadam case?
TWTW Note
June 2025 | CWA # 1715

Femy Francis

The US-China:
On Tariffs, Rare Earths and Visas
The World This Week
June 2025 | CWA # 1713

GP Team

The World This Week #315
The UN Ocean Conference in France and the US-China Meeting in London
Conflict Weekly
June 2025 | CWA # 1709

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #284-285
Cambodia-Thailand Border Tensions, Protests in the US, and the Indigenous Māori question in New Zealand
The World This Week
June 2025 | CWA # 1705

GP Team

The World This Week #314
Elections in South Korea and Poland I China and the Pacific Island Countries I Bangladesh Election Announcement 2026
Global Politics Explainer
June 2025 | CWA # 1703

M Kejia 

Sagarmatha Sambaad in Nepal
Kathmandu’s Global Agenda for the Himalayas
Global Politics Explainer
June 2025 | CWA # 1700

R Preetha

Ethiopia bans the TPLF
What does the TPLF ban mean for the Pretoria agreement? What next for Ethiopia?
TWTW Note
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
Harvard vs Trump Administration
The World This Week
June 2025 | CWA # 1691

GP Team

The World This Week #313
China-ASEAN-GCC Summit I President Macron's visit to South East Asia I Trump Vs Harvard
The World This Week
May 2025 | CWA # 1690

GP Team

The World This Week #312
Elections in Romania, Portugal & Poland I UK-EU Summit
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
Continuing Russia’s Aerial Attacks, despite exchange of prisoners
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
The Humanitarian Crisis and Israel’s Renewed Offensive
TWTW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1685

Aparna A Nair

UK-EU Summit:
First step towards a reset
TWTW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1683

Aashish Ganeshan

Elections in Portugal:
The Rise of Chega Party and the Search for Political Stability
TWTW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1679

Aashish Ganeshan

US in the Middle Easr
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE
TWTW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1678

Gauri Gupta

China in Latin America
China-CELAC forum: Strengthening ties with Latin America and Caribbean
The World This Week
May 2025 | CWA # 1677

GP Team

The World This Week #310-311
China in Latin America and the Carribbean I Trump's Middle East Visit I Denmark as the new Arctic Chair
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1672

D Suba Chandran

India and Pakistan:
De-escalation and the “New Normal”
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1671

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

US, Ukraine and Russia:
Air attacks amidst a Minerals deal and Ceasefire Proposals
Global Politics Early Bird
May 2025 | CWA # 1670

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Singapore Elections in 2025:
People’s Action Party (PAP) Wins, Again
TWTW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Tough Tariff Negotiations with the US
TWTW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1666

Padmashree Anandhan

The US-Ukraine
The mineral deal with the US
Conflict Weekly
May 2025 | CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
Global Politics Early Bird
May 2025 | CWA # 1663

R Preetha

Canada Elections 2025:
What do the results convey? What next for Mark Carney?
NIAS Global Politics Database
March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
NIAS Global Politics Database
February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
The War in Ukraine
October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
IPRI Quarterly Forecasts I Triggers, Trends, and Trajectories
July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
2022: The World This Year
December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
Europe: Heatwaves, Wildfires, Droughts, and Ice Melt in Alps
November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
NIAS Africa Weekly
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
The World This Week: 150th Issue
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
Pakistan Reader
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
NIAS Fortnightly on Science, Technology & International Relations
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
Science, Technology and International Relations
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon

The Maldives
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan

India
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej

Bangladesh
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Afghanistan