The Pentagon’s National Defence Strategy: Four major takeaways

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TWTW Note

The Pentagon’s National Defence Strategy: Four major takeaways

Brighty Ann Sarah
25 January 2026

On 23 January, the Pentagon released the 2026 National Defence Strategy, a first since 2022. The 34-page document aligns closely with the US National Security Strategy and the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine released in 2025. The NDS outlines a pragmatic, “America First” approach to national security, emphasizing “peace through strength” by prioritizing the defence of the US homeland and Western Hemisphere. The document is also severely critical of Washington's European allies and the past administrations for the former's dependence on US defence guarantees.

The following are the key takeaways from the report.

1. Reinforcing a ‘realist,’ America-first strategy and selective interventionism
The NDS reiterates the administration’s emphasis on national interest and is highly critical of the pursuits of previous administrations that engaged with problems across the world through “interventionism, endless wars, regime change, and nation building.” The report rebukes Washington's former priorities of the rule-based international order as “cloud-castle abstractions,” indicating a sharp turn in rejecting the multilateral order. The NDS echoes the National Security Strategy in prioritising the immediate neighbourhood and US interests in the hemisphere, pitching access to critical territories like Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal as vital to its national interest and security priorities.

It further centres the Western Hemisphere as the primary geographic focus of American power projection, invoking the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The document also clarifies that non-interventionism will not be isolationism, but rather selective engagement in enterprises most beneficial to Washington, through “flexible, practical realism.”

2. Allied burden-sharing with Europe and Israel as the model ally
The NDS adopts a stern tone toward allies, particularly Europe and NATO, due to their reliance on US security guarantees and underinvestment that have "weakened our alliances and left us more vulnerable." It also criticises past US policies for enabling allies to act as "dependents rather than partners," and commits to ending one-way security guarantees. The NDS identifies Russia as a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern member, but also highlights that “Moscow is in no position to make a bid for European hegemony.” Highlighting their economic and military edge, it urges Europe to take primary responsibility in countering Russia, including in defence of Ukraine while Washington’s support will remain critical, but limited. South Korea is also expected to bear defence responsibility in proportion to the threat it faces from North Korea.

Simultaneously, Israel is positioned as a “model ally,” that is willing and able to defend itself with critical but limited support from the US, particularly against Iran. The NDS criticises the previous administrations for limiting their support for Tel Aviv and highlights the need to further empower Israel’s defence capabilities as bulwark against Tehran and to advance eUS interest in the Middle East.

3. Deterring rather than confronting China and Washington’s economic interest in the Indo-Pacific
Aligning with the NSS, the NDS also diminishes the idea of China as an existential threat, and also acknowledges Beijing as an ascending power. It advances the possibility of countering China through “strength” not "confrontation," where the Indo-Pacific emerges as the theatre of contention. It places growing emphasis on the Indo-Pacific as the “world’s economic centre of gravity,” highlighting China’s dominance in the region’s trade flows, resource access, and dynamic markets as carrying major implications for American security, freedom, and prosperity. The strategic objective is to maintain a stable “balance of power” in the region, primarily through sustained military denial capabilities along the First Island Chain and close collaboration with regional allies. It also prioritises diplomatic engagement with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) across a wider range of formats aimed at promoting strategic stability, facilitating deconfliction, and enabling broader de-escalation mechanisms.

It suggests that the US has little interest in direct military confrontations with China provided Washington’s core economic interests, open trade routes, and fair commercial access remain unthreatened.

4. Revival of the Defence Industrial Base
The 2026 National Defence Strategy places heavy emphasis on supercharging the US defence industrial base (DIB) as a means of deterrence through strength. It frames it as a foundational element to rebuild and sustain the world's most lethal military while integrating into President Trump's broader “once-in-a-century revival of American industry.” The strategy calls for re-shoring strategic production, incentivizing innovation, slashing regulatory barriers, and dramatically scaling manufacturing capacity, aiming to “produce not only for ourselves but also for our allies and partners at scale, rapidly, and at the highest levels of quality.” It also calls for the reinvigoration of military culture, and restoring the “warrior ethos,” that is claimed to have been lost due to the decentring of the military and efforts at regime change and nation-building across the world.

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