Conflict Weekly

CWA # 1964
Conflict Weekly
US-Iran & Ukraine Negotiations in Geneva I US Military Deployment in Nigeria
CW Columns on Middle East and Africa
Conflict Weekly #319-320, 20 February 2026

IPRI Team
20 February 2026

Photo Source: France 24, Al Jazeera

Conflict Weekly Main Note
The US-Iran Negotiations in Geneva: Ambiguous Conclusions and Escalating Fears of Military Action
Brighty Ann Sarah

In the news
On 13 February, President Trump endorsed regime change in Iran, stating that it was the “best thing that could happen,” in the country. Washington also intensified the military build-up in the region by deploying a second aircraft carrier, the Gerald R. Ford, which joined the carrier Lincoln. Thousands more troops, along with fighter aircraft, guided-missile destroyers and other firepower, also joined the fray. Trump warned: “In case we don't make a deal, we'll need it.”

On 16 February, Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, asserted that “The missile issue concerns Iran’s national security, and we will not negotiate over it.” 

On 17 February, Iran partially shut down the Strait of Hormuz, citing "security precautions" for shipping safety while Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards conducted military drills there.

On 18 February, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi stated that understanding had been reached with the US on the main "guiding principles" that will frame efforts to resolve the dispute around Tehran's nuclear programme. On the same day, he asserted that the civilian nuclear programme was Tehran’s “inherent right is non-negotiable,” at the international conference on disarmament in Geneva.

On 19 February, the White House stated that Iran is expected to submit a written proposal on how to resolve its standoff with the US. President Trump has ordered a major military buildup in the region, and full forces are expected to be in place by mid-March. The White House said there are many "reasons and arguments that one could make for a strike against Iran," but that diplomacy is always the first option.

Issues at large
First, a brief note on the Geneva talks and the inconclusive progress. The talks on 17 February in Geneva, Switzerland, marked the second round of Oman-mediated indirect negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, following an initial round in Oman earlier. Iran’s delegation was led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and a set of technical experts, while special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner led the US delegation. The talks focused on the terms of Iran’s nuclear programme. The crisis echoes a previous round of talks in April 2025, which culminated in the joint US-Israel strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. 

Second, Washington’s broad-ranging demands and Tehran’s resistance. The US remains steadfast on several critical demands on Iran’s nuclear and defence programmes, claiming them as essential red lines to eliminate nuclear breakout risks and regional threats. Reports state that the US urged Iran to permanently forgo uranium enrichment, a "zero enrichment" principle, alongside restrictions on its ballistic missile program and limits on support for regional proxies. Iran has staunchly resisted these expansive conditions, rejecting any permanent halt to domestic enrichment, which it views as a sovereign right and core to its civilian nuclear programme, and refusing to discuss missiles or proxies, insisting talks remain strictly nuclear-focused in exchange for sanctions relief. Iran offered compromises like temporary enrichment suspension, diluting high-enriched uranium stockpiles, and enhanced IAEA access to damaged sites, but these fall short of US maximalist positions. This core mismatch led to agreement only on "guiding principles" for future talks, but no breakthrough on the fundamental gaps.

Third, Washington’s coercive diplomacy and heightened fears of military action. The US has bolstered the indirect talks with explicit threats of military action. Washington’s extensive military buildup, notably the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford, the world’s largest aircraft carrier, aims to coerce Iran to negotiate on US terms. Tehran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei has also issued threats about striking the US vessels. 

In perspective
For the US, Washington’s diplomacy is overshadowed by coercion to secure a favourable outcome, aiming to limit Tehran’s influence as a regional power. It seems to view Iran’s current political and economic challenges as an opportunity to strengthen its bargaining position in the negotiations.

For Iran, the terms of the negotiations remain widely asymmetrical, as Washington is demanding far beyond the neutralization of its nuclear weapons programme. The US military posture in the region also adds to Iran’s pressure. However, despite recent economic difficulties and internal political strain, Tehran maintains a firm, defensive stance, presenting itself as a sovereign power and a deterrent.

For the region, any escalation could have far-reaching regional consequences. The visible military buildup on both sides has already raised fears of a broader conflict. If Iran retaliates, US military bases across the Gulf could be targeted, potentially drawing in countries including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Unlike the short 12-day war involving Israel, a larger US-Iran confrontation would likely extend beyond a single front. 


Conflict Weekly Main Note
The War in Ukraine: The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
Lekshmi MK

In the news
On 16 February, a third round of trilateral talks began in Geneva with Ukraine, Russia and the US. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the talks are more about Ukrainian concessions than about Russian concessions. The Geneva talks follow two rounds of US-mediated talks in the United Arab Emirates, which were considered constructive but did not produce any significant breakthroughs.

On 17 February, Moscow said key issues, including territorial disputes, were discussed in the talks. Meanwhile, Russia carried out massive attacks on the energy infrastructures of Ukraine, and Ukraine conducted drone attacks on Russia's energy infrastructure.

On 18 February, President Zelensky described the peace talks in Geneva as “difficult,” accusing Russia of deliberately delaying progress toward a deal to end the war. He also criticised President Trump of exerting undue pressure on Kyiv to secure a resolution to the war. And he stated that it was “not fair” that Trump kept publicly calling on Ukraine, not Russia, to make concessions in negotiating terms for a peace plan. Russia's chief negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, said that a new round of talks would be held soon. 

Issues at large
First, a brief note on peace talks so far. The Geneva meeting represents the third round of trilateral talks between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States. It follows two earlier US-mediated rounds in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, which were described as constructive but failed to yield breakthroughs. Despite repeated diplomatic engagement, core disagreements remain unresolved, including territorial control, security guarantees, and ceasefire terms. The continuation of hostilities alongside negotiations highlights limited trust and hardened positions. The repeated rounds indicate sustained diplomatic efforts. However, the absence of tangible outcomes underscores the difficulty of reaching a mutually acceptable settlement.

Second, the tussle over territorial sovereignty and annexation claims. Ukraine insists that its internationally recognised borders must remain intact and refuses to give up land seized during the war. However, Russia wants the occupied areas to be formally recognised as its own, citing security concerns, historical links, and the protection of Russian-speaking populations. For Ukraine, accepting annexation would mean losing sovereignty. For Russia, retaining control strengthens its political leverage. Because both sides see the territory as vital to national security, neither is willing to compromise.

Third, the differences over security guarantees to Ukraine. Ukraine wants strong security guarantees from its partners to deter future attacks and ensure its safety. These include military support, defence commitments, or long-term security arrangements. Russia opposes such guarantees. For Kyiv, guarantees are essential to avoid another invasion. However, for Moscow, limiting Ukraine’s security partnerships is a strategic priority. Thus, the disagreement is not only about ending the war but about shaping future security and deterrence in the region.

Fourth, an uneven negotiating environment for Ukraine and Trump’s asymmetric pressure on Kyiv. Ukraine feels greater pressure to compromise than Russia. Kyiv depends heavily on military and financial support from Western partners, which limits its bargaining flexibility. President Zelensky has indicated that proposals discussed in Geneva appear to demand more concessions from Ukraine than from Russia. By contrast, Russia faces fewer immediate external constraints. 

Fifth, continuing military strikes. Russia continues attacks to pressure Ukraine and weaken its infrastructure, especially energy systems. Ukraine conducts strikes to disrupt Russian logistics and demonstrate its resilience. Neither side fully trusts the other to honour a ceasefire, so neither reduces military pressure. By negotiating while continuing military operations, both attempt to secure better terms. 

In perspective
First, tough negotiations over territory. Reaching a settlement remains difficult because the territorial question lies at the heart of the conflict. Russia seeks recognition of territories under its control, while Ukraine refuses to concede sovereignty over internationally recognised borders. With both sides treating territory as central to national security and legitimacy, negotiations remain difficult and progress is limited.

Second, questions over Trump’s neutrality complicate mediation. Proposals linking security guarantees to territorial compromise create perceptions of bias in Kyiv. Pressure from President Trump to accelerate a settlement has further raised concerns about fairness and balance. 

Third, the war’s fourth year marks a prolongation without resolution. As the war enters its fourth year, the absence of a political settlement highlights not stability but deepening complexity. Continued fighting has hardened positions, expanded humanitarian and economic costs, and intensified energy and security vulnerabilities across the region. Prolongation has also widened geopolitical divisions and increased reliance on external actors. Instead of moving toward resolution, the war risks generating new security challenges and long-term instability. 

Conflict Weekly Main Note
Nigeria: US military deployment amidst worsening insurgency
Anu Maria Joseph

In the news
On 13 February, the New York Times reported that about 100 US military personnel had arrived in the northeastern Nigerian city of Maiduguri. It is the first team of US troops to arrive in the country to train and advise local forces in their fight against Boko Haram and IS-linked groups. According to the US Africa Command, approximately 200 US troops, including intelligence analysts, advisors and trainers, will be deployed to the country during the coming week.

On the same day, Nigeria's Defence Headquarters spokesperson, Samaila Uba, confirmed the troops' arrival and added that they will provide "technical support" and "intelligence training" to defeat "terrorist organisations." He added: “These personnel do not serve in a combat capacity and will not assume a direct operational role. Nigerian forces retain full command authority, make all operational decisions and will lead all missions on Nigerian sovereign territory."

Issues at large
First, the motivations behind US-Nigeria military cooperation. The primary objective of the US counterinsurgency cooperation with Nigeria is to maintain stability in the country’s oil sector. Nigeria produces approximately 1.7 million barrels of oil per day, making it one of Africa's largest producers and a major global supplier. Additionally, according to the US Mission in Nigeria, between January and August 2025, the country exported over 33.23 million barrels of crude oil to the US, which is almost half of the annual production. Besides, geopolitically, Nigeria serves as a gateway for the US in West Africa, where China and Russia have recently expanded their economic and military footprints.

Second, Nigeria’s security issues. Nigeria faces multiple security issues. In the northeast and northwest, Islamist militants, predominantly Boko Haram and its splinter groups, ISWAP, JNIM and Lakurawa, have been active for decades. Armed men, locally known as bandits, carryout ransom kidnappings and killings in the northwest. In the Middle Belt, farmer-herder clashes are common over land, cattle and grazing rights. Fulani Muslim herders attack farmers belonging to both Christian and Muslim Communities. Another actor is the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a secessionist armed group fighting for a Christian breakaway state in the southeast.

Third, the recent developments. Since November 2025, there has been an increase in attacks and kidnappings. In November, Boko Haram kidnapped 13 girls from Borno state; bandits killed 12 people in Niger, and kidnapped 300 students from a school in Kaduna. In December, bandits killed eight people and kidnapped over 150 people from a church in Kaduna state. Attacks by Boko Haram, ISWAP and bandits were also recorded in Zamfara, Borno, Katsina and Niger states. This year alone recorded more than 12 major attacks, including the 4 February attack, when at least 120 people were killed by armed men in Kwara state. The increase is not only in the number of attacks but also in the geographical spread and the number of fatalities. While in 2025 the majority of the attacks were concentrated in the states of Borno, Zamfara and Kaduna, in 2026 it spread to Kwara, Niger and Katsina states. Meanwhile, the US-Nigeria military cooperation began with the US military strikes against IS-linked groups in Nigeria's Sokoto state in December, in collaboration with the Nigerian government. In January, the US AFRICOM delivered critical military supplies. The latest deployment of 100 US troops is expected to assist Nigerian forces with intelligence, military equipment and technical and operational coordination. The US has also approved USD 413 million for counterinsurgency operations in West Africa, including Nigeria.

Fourth, the US pressure on Nigeria and domestic concerns. Nigeria came under US pressure when Trump accused the Nigerian government of failing to protect Christians from the IS-linked group's attacks in the northwest. The US’s December strikes in Sokoto targeted the IS-linked groups. Nigerian authorities denied the allegation and clarified that the targets are not exclusively Christians. While the Nigerian government welcomes US support, there is growing domestic concern about external influence on internal security decisions, the Nigerian force's operational autonomy, the state's dependence on the US for counterinsurgency, and US economic and geopolitical interests in the region.

In perspective
For Nigeria, the US military intervention, although it raises several concerns, is a major counterterrorism step to regain the state's control over the peripheries, which have been lost to multiple security challenges. However, the US focus on selected states raises the concern of insurgency spreading to neighbouring states, which struggle with limited security support. It implies that long-term, sustainable security will depend on comprehensive support to address the potential geographic spread. Besides, Nigeria's US dependence, Trump's narratives of a Christian genocide and increasing US pressure imply that it will be challenging for the Nigerian state to balance security cooperation and external control over domestic policies.

For the US, this cooperation allows it to protect its geopolitical and economic interests, including regional stability, energy security, and counter China and Russia's footprints in the region. Regardless, durable security improvement is a long road, given the large number of actors, multiple motivations, and cross-border security issues in the region.
 

Conflict Weekly Column on the Middle East
The War in Gaza: Trump’s Board of Peace Inaugural, Israel’s Escalating Occupation of the West Bank and Hamas Entrenchment in Governance
Brighty Ann Sarah

What happened this week?
On 15 February, Israel's cabinet approved further measures to tighten Israel's control over the occupied West Bank and make it easier for settlers to buy land, a move Palestinians called a "de-facto annexation.”

On 16 February, Israel issued a 60-day ultimatum for Hamas to disarm, threatening to resume war if the Palestinian group fails to comply

On 18 February, an Israeli military assessment highlighted that Hamas is cementing its hold over Gaza by placing loyalists in key government roles, collecting taxes and paying salaries. Hamas stated it is prepared to transfer Gaza’s administration to the US-backed committee of Palestinian technocrats led by former Palestinian Authority official Ali Shaath. s, which oversee taxation and security, reported Reuters.

On 20 February, President Trump chaired the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace, with representatives from over 45 countries in attendance, and announced that USD 7 billion has been raised towards the reconstruction of Gaza. 

What are the issues?
1.Gaza: Board of Peace and the ‘New Gaza,’ repealing of the Israeli occupation laws and Hamas entrenchment in Gaza’s governance
During the inaugural session of President Trump’s Board of Peace, Washington announced a contribution of USD 10 billion towards the reconstruction efforts in Gaza, and an additional USD 7 billion raised by member states. The attendees were largely from Middle Eastern countries. The discussions of “New Gaza,” the reconstructed enclave, and the deployment of the International Stabilisation Forces also took centre stage. However, major US allies who were part of the Board's inception, including the UK, were notably absent. It was also noted that reconstruction efforts would begin in Rafah after Hamas's disarmament.

The recent measures approved by Israel's security cabinet repeal longstanding laws that prohibited non-residents of the West Bank, specifically Israelis and foreigners, from directly purchasing land there. By lifting this ban, along with eliminating the requirement for special transaction permits for real-estate deals, the changes open the West Bank land market more directly to Israeli settlers and others, allowing private purchases from Palestinian owners with reduced bureaucratic oversight and government intervention. This, combined with related steps including declassifying land registry records make the region open to larger Israeli occupation.

Hamas, despite agreeing to hand over governance to the technocratic authority, continues to strengthen its presence in governance, while simultaneously rejecting the prospects of disarmament. This is in stark resistance to Israel’s assertion that Hamas will be allowed no part in Gaza’s administration, further complicating the reconciliation process. Reports also suggest mixed responses from the population to Hamas’ continued influence in Gaza.

What does it mean?
In Gaza, the inauguration of the Board of Peace and the focus on reconstruction efforts exclude major questions on critical aspects, including Hamas’ disarmament, the scope of Palestinian statehood and the persisting humanitarian concerns in the enclave. These questions had formed the backbone of the second phase and have been consistently sidelined despite the advancements towards the agenda of “New Gaza.”

The repealing of the settler laws has deepened the already unchecked settler expansion in the West Bank. The lack of accountability on Israel’s settler projects, including the E1 settlement project diminish the already waning scope of a contiguous Palestinian state and is an infringement on the lives of the displaced Palestinian population.

Hamas’ efforts to retain influence in Gaza’s administration amid increasing pressure to disarm is likely to instigate further Israeli aggression, justified by the group's defiance. In case of renewed violence, it could also worsen the Gazans’ approach towards the group and further erode their hold in the region, and affect the scope of future negotiations over autonomous Palestinian governance. 

Conflict Weekly Column on Africa
US troop deployment in Nigeria and the UN's genocide mention in Sudan
Anu Maria Joseph

What happened this week?
1. Nigeria
On 19 February, the BBC reported that a suspected Islamist militant group attacked several villages in Kebbi state in northwestern Nigeria, killing at least 34 people. Nigerian officials blamed the Lakurawa terrorist group. 

On 16 February, Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters confirmed the arrival of 100 US military personnel in the northeastern city of Maiduguri. According to the headquarters, the troops will be providing technical support, associated equipment, and intelligence sharing to assist Nigerian forces in their counterinsurgency operations.

On 15 February, gunmen on motorcycles attacked villages in Niger state, killing dozens of people, according to the BBC. 

2. Sudan
On 19 February, a UN fact-finding mission in Sudan concluded that evidence of the atrocities carried out by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) during their takeover of el-Fahser in October points to a genocide. One of the mission experts, Mona Rishmawi, stated: "The body of evidence we collected — including the prolonged siege, starvation and denial of humanitarian assistance, followed by mass killings, rape, torture and enforced disappearance, systematic humiliation and perpetrators' own declarations - leaves only one reasonable inference."

She added: "The RSF acted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Zaghawa and Fur communities in El-Fasher. These are the hallmarks of genocide."

The report also quoted a victim that more than 6,000 people were killed in three days during the el-Fasher siege. 

What are the issues?
1. Nigeria: Increasing multi-actor attacks, the US troop deployment and domestic concerns
Since January 2025, there have been more than 12 major attacks, including the 4 February attack in Kwara state, which killed more than 120 people. While in 2025 attacks were limited in number and concentrated in the states of Borno, Zamfara, and Kaduna, early 2026 points to an increase in numbers and a geographic spread. 

Meanwhile, Lakurawa, an Islamist militant group that expanded across Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso, has been carrying out frequent attacks and organised crimes in the region. In January, Nigeria designated the group as a terrorist organisation. The group is active in the northwestern region and started gaining attention in 2024. The group killed over 100 people during November 2024 and September 2025. Lakurawa was the target of the US airstrikes in Sokoto state in December, killing more than 100 of its members. The latest attack by the group suggests a potential expansion of its territory in Nigeria's northwestern region.

The US troop deployment was an outcome of Trump's pressure on Nigeria following his remarks about a Christian genocide and the December military strikes. While the Nigerian government welcomes counterinsurgency cooperation with the US, there is growing concern about dependence on the US and the potential for external influence over Nigeria's internal security. 

2. Sudan: Four months after the fall of el-Fasher and the first international genocide call
The RSF carried out a siege and took control of el-Fasher in October 2025. It was the only city in the Darfur region that was under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). El-Fasher is located at an international crossroads between Chad, Egypt and Libya. The capture of the city gave RSF an advantage in easier military and logistical supplies and access to trade routes for smuggling minerals. The capture also signalled RSF's consolidation of a parallel government centred on Darfur. Besides, the genocide is also linked to the RSF's targeted attacks on the non-Arabs in the region. 

The latest report is the closest the UN has come to declaring a genocide in Darfur since the start of the civil war. Previously, in January 2025, the then US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, had accused the RSF of carrying out a genocide in the country. The latest UN report and the UN genocide acknowledgement in Sudan comes at the backdrop of multiple failed global peace efforts, led by the US, Saudi Arabia, the AU and Egypt. The major reason behind the failure is the non-compliance of the conflict actors. The warring parties are adamant about gaining a territorial upper hand and claiming the country's legitimate leadership. Besides, the UAE and Iran are allegedly supporting the RSF and the SAF with weapon supply. The abundant flow of weapons, despite the UN arms embargo, has given the warring parties an incentive to disregard the peace talks efforts and continue the violence. 

What does it mean?
In Nigeria, the US troop deployment points to a positive development in counterinsurgency efforts. However, because of Trump's Christian genocide narratives and hegemonic approach, the Nigerian state will likely struggle to balance between external support and internal security policies. 

In Sudan, although aware of the dire humanitarian situation, the UN and other international actors and institutions have been unable to prevent or stop it. It also points to challenges of the UN's Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide when it comes to many conflicts in African countries.

 

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