In the news
On 31 January, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched a series of violent attacks targeting military bases and police stations in at least nine districts in Balochistan province, including Quetta, Gwadar, Mastung, Nushki, Pasni, and Kharan, killing 31 civilians and 17 security officials. At least a dozen towns and cities in the province reported attacks.
On 01 February, Pakistan announced a counterinsurgency campaign against the group that killed 145 militants on the first day alone. The police also suspended Internet and train services in the province.
On 04 February, security forces retook the desert town of Nuskhi after a three-day battle with militants.
On 05 February, Pakistan announced the end to “Operation Radd-ul-Fitna-1”, which ultimately ended up killing 216 militants. Train services were partially restored.
Issues at large
First, the continuing and expanding violence in Balochistan. After Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan was the second-worst hit by violence in 2025. This has been a rising trend. According to the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), since 2020, fatalities from violent attacks in Balochistan have been on a steady increase, from 138 in 2020 to 398 in 2023 to 956 in 2025. Violence has also been expanding in geographical scope, with only a handful of districts being affected in 2020 to all 36 districts experiencing violence in 2025. Militant groups in Balochistan have been growing more aggressive and offensive, departing from their traditional hit-and-run tactics to more sophisticated and coordinated attacks targeting critical infrastructure. This is seen once again with coordinated attacks by the BLA in nine districts across the province. The militant attacks prompted a major military intervention, including the use of helicopters and drones to retake Nushki in a three-day battle with the BLA. The latest round of attacks indicates that Balochistan continues to see a disproportionate amount of violence from militant groups.
Second, a military-first response from the government. Often, violence in the province has been treated with violence by the state. In response to the latest attacks, Pakistan decided to launch a counterinsurgency campaign called Operation Radd-ul-Fitna-1. The military killed 216 militants across four days in the province, making it one of the deadliest weeks in Balochistan’s recent history. Even before the attack, security officials had conducted intelligence-based operations (IBOs) in Harnai and Panjgur districts, killing over 40 militants. This is in line with Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti saying that the solution to the province’s issues lies with the military rather than political dialogue. This heavy-handed approach has continued to create resentment within the population against the state, which they view as not addressing their grievances.
Third, the missing political dialogue. Following the attacks, the government made it clear that it was not going to pursue diplomatic talks to resolve the Balochistan issue. The government and the Baloch people have been at loggerheads for over 70 years, with the people viewing the state as the main reason for their political grievances and economic disenfranchisement. The expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into the province and the increased migration of non-Baloch people, from Sindh and Punjab, into the province has added to the bitterness between the Baloch population and the state. This, combined with the passing of the Anti-Terrorism (Balochistan Amendment) Act 2025, which has increased incidents of unenforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, has further put the state at odds with the people.
In perspective
Balochistan is once again at the centre of internal violence in Pakistan, picking up where it left off in 2025. Going with the current trends and the extent of violence witnessed during the recent attacks, the province is likely to continue seeing an increasing amount of violent attacks going ahead. This is primarily because the state still isn’t interested in engaging in political dialogue with the people and is instead continuing to pursue a military response. Additionally, with the recent expansion of ties between Pakistan and China and the transition to what is being called “CPEC 2.0”, the resentment being felt by the Baloch people towards the state is unlikely to decrease. Being the poorest province in the country, unless the root issues relating to the people’s political grievances and economic disenfranchisement fears are addressed, the violence is bound to continue increasing and expanding in scope.
