Conflict Weekly Note

Conflict Weekly Note
The US-Iran War, Week One
Rapid Escalation, Regional Spillover, Global Uncertainty
Conflict Weekly #322, 06 March 2026

Rohini Reenum
6 March 2026

Photo Source: Axios

In the news
The US-Israel attacks
On 28 February, the US and Israel launched an extensive air and missile campaign against Iran. Code-named Operation Epic Fury (by the US) and Operation Roaring Lion (by Israel), the attacks killed the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his family members. Several high-ranking officials including the Minister of Defense, Aziz Nasirzadeh and the IRGC Ground Forces Commander, Mohammad Pakpour were also killed.  A missile attack on a girls' school in Minab killed more than girls, mostly children. On 1 March, the Pentagon confirmed the killing of three US service members in retaliatory strikes on regional bases by Iran. On 3 March, Admiral Brad Cooper of US Central Command said that the US had struck nearly 2,000 targets in Iran.

On 4 March, US Defense Secretary, Peter Hegseth confirmed that a US submarine had sunk an Iranian warship in international waters off Sri Lanka’s coast, killing more than 80 sailors.

Iran’s response
On 28 February, Iran retaliated by launching approximately 170 ballistic missiles targeting Israel and US bases in the region, in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. On 1 March, Iran officially confirmed the death of the Supreme Leader and announced 40 days of mourning. On 2 March, Iran's IRGC announced the blockade/closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The conflict expansion in Lebanon
On 1 March, Hezbollah launched a barrage of missiles and drones against Israel;  in response, Israel targeted Hezbollah strongholds in Dahieh, Beirut and southern Lebanon. Subsequently, mass displacement notices to more than 50 towns and villages in southern and eastern Lebanon were given by Israel. On 3 March, Israel launched a ground offensive in Southern Lebanon. On 4 March, Israel carried out renewed strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, while Hezbollah said it engaged Israeli soldiers in south Lebanon in combat.

Regional responses
On 3 March, Saudi Arabia condemned the Iranian attack on the US embassy in Riyadh. On the same day, Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry condemned an attack on the US embassy in the country, calling it “treacherous” and “a flagrant violation of all international norms and laws.” The UAE Defence Ministry confirmed that 186 missiles and 812 drones had been launched from Iran, killing three and injuring 68. Bahrain announced that it had destroyed 73 missiles and 91 drones. On 4 March, Turkiye announced that a ballistic ?missile fired by Iran was destroyed by NATO air and missile defence systems in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The target of the missile was not immediately clear.

Statements from the US and Iran
On 1 March, President Trump announced that the Iran war was initially “projected for four to five weeks”, adding that the US military has the “capability to go far longer than that.” On the same day, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian asserted that the killing of the Supreme Leader was a “declaration of war against Muslims.”

Issues at large
First, the end of the US-Iran nuclear talks.
The attacks on Iran began during negotiations between the US and Iran for a new nuclear deal. Despite three rounds of talks in early 2026 in Geneva and Muscat, no diplomatic resolution could be reached due to fundamentally irreconcilable demands on both sides. While Iran wanted the talks to be restricted to its nuclear program, the Trump administration insisted on a “comprehensive” deal that would include limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme and the dismantling of Iranian proxy networks in the region, including Hezbollah and the Houthis. The breakdown of the talks provided the final push for the Israeli-US February attack.

Second, expanding American objectives.
The initial US demands were limited to curtailing Iran’s nuclear weapon pursuit and limiting its ballistic missile capabilities. However, the US  war objectives have expanded;  in his recent address, Trump outlined four military objectives: “preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, destroying its missile arsenal and production sites, degrading its proxy networks, and annihilating its navy—alongside a desired political outcome of regime change from within.”

Third, state of the war and regional conflagration.
While the US-Israeli attack on Iran was characterized by coordinated, high-precision strikes, Iran’s retaliation has been strategically diffuse and scattered. Rather than a symmetrical counter-attack, Iran has chosen to target regional bases. Tehran also perhaps aims to pressure the US allies in the region a strategy that would draw the entire region into the war and plunge it into an unpredictable instability.

Fourth, the importance of the Strait of Hormuz.
The strait is a major transit point for global maritime trade; nearly 34 per cent of seaborne oil trade and 30 per cent of liquefied natural gas transits goes through it. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), approximately 20 million barrels of oil, worth about USD 500 billion in annual global energy trade, passed through the Strait of Hormuz each day in 2024. Major exporters that depend on this route include- Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Asian economic giants like India, China, Japan, and South Korea, receive nearly 70 per cent of their crude oil via this route.

Fifth, domestic responses in Iran and the US.
The killing of the supreme leader has stoked a civic polarisation within Iran, with reports from Reuters, Al Jazeera and The Guardian portraying a nation divided. While loyalists have held massive pro-government demonstrations, anti-regime citizens in other districts have been celebrating the strikes and chanting “Death to the Dictator.” Further, while the killing of the supreme leader and primary leadership has not led to a collapse of the government per se, the Interim Leadership Council is struggling to present a united front and immediately choose Khamenei's successor, as the IRGC has reportedly demanded. Similarly, in the US, the domestic response has been divided, primarily on the legality and the necessity of the War. On 4 March 4, the US Senate narrowly defeated a War Powers resolution that would have mandated a formal congressional authorization. While most Republicans supported President Trump, Democrats and a small group of Libertarian-leaning Republicans (led by Senator Rand Paul) argued that the administration lacks a clear “exit strategy” and has bypassed the Constitution. Recent polls from Reuters/Ipsos and CNN indicate that roughly 50-60 per cent of Americans disapprove of the operation, with many citing fears of another “endless war.” However, among Republican voters, approval remains high with nearly 80 per cent in favour of the war.

Sixth, a divided international response.
While traditional US allies like the UK, France, and Germany have refrained from participating in the strikes, they have expressed support for the removal of the nuclear threat. On the other hand, Spain has taken a hardline “No to War” stance, refusing to allow the US. aircraft to use its bases. Canada and several EU leaders have voiced concerns regarding the unilateral nature of the attack, deeming them “inconsistent with international law,” simultaneously condemning Iran’s retaliatory attacks on Gulf neighbors. Iran’s traditional allies, like Russia and China have condemned the US-Israeli attack in strongest terms. Countries like India, with significant energy stakes in the Middle East and a strategic partnership with the US and Israel, have tried to walk a diplomatic tightrope.

In perspective
The first week of the US-Iran War marked the definitive end of a decades-long “shadow war” between Israel and Iran and brought the US into a direct military conflict with Iran. Iran’s calibrated response has the US’s regional partners in the Middle East caught in the crossfire and ushered in a period of high-intensity, multi-domain and multi-party conflict in the Middle East.

As the US and Israel pursue the systematic degradation of Iranian military and governance assets, including warnings of a ground invasion, the orientation and timeline of this war are becoming increasingly difficult to predict.

Barring an unforeseen diplomatic breakthrough or a sudden collapse of the Iranian security apparatus, the region appears to be headed towards a period of unpredictable, high-intensity instability that will likely redefine Middle Eastern geopolitics for the remainder of the decade and beyond.

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