Conflict Weekly Note

CWA # 2018
Conflict Weekly Note
The US-Iran War, Week Two
Expanding Fronts, Shifting Goalposts, and Global Fallout
Conflict Weekly #323, 13 March 2026

Rohini Reenum
14 March 2026

Photo Source: France24

In the news
The US-Israeli offensive
Between 5 and 12 March, the US and Israel continued the heavy bombardment of Iran, especially its capital, Tehran, with targets expanding from military and strategic sites to energy infrastructure.

On 10 March, the U.S. Central Command claimed to have “eliminated” 16 Iranian mine-laying vessels near the Strait of Hormuz. On 12 March, US Central Command (CENTCOM) said approximately 6,000 targets had been struck in Iran since the War began. On the same day, CENTCOM claimed that 90 Iranian vessels were damaged or destroyed, including more than 60 ships and over 30 mine-laying vessels.

Iranian Response
Between 7 and 11 March, Iran launched waves of drones and missiles at critical facilities, including Saudi Arabia’s Shaybah oil field and the Abadan refinery. On 10 March, Saudi Arabia announced that it had intercepted six ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan Air Base and several drones over the eastern city of Hafar al-Batin. On the same day, a swarm of Iranian drones struck the Ruwais industrial city in Abu Dhabi, forcing the state oil giant ADNOC to shut down the refinery as a precautionary measure. On 11 March, multiple drones struck fuel storage tanks at the Port of Salalah and Duqm, in Oman, causing massive fires. On the same day, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Tehran remained committed to regional peace and outlined three conditions to end the war: “recognition of Tehran’s legitimate rights, payment of reparations, and firm international guarantees against future aggression.”

On 12 March, Iran's UN Ambassador said that Tehran was not going to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, but added that it was Iran's right to preserve the security of the key shipping route. On the same day, in his first televised address, Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, vowed to “avenge the blood” of Iranians killed in the current War, advised the Gulf countries not to host US bases, and threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.

Developments at the United Nations
On 12 March, the UN Security Council voted in favour of a resolution sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and co-sponsored by a record 135 member states, demanding “immediate cessation” of attacks by Iran against Gulf countries and Jordan. The resolution also termed these attacks “a breach of international law and a serious threat to international peace and security.” The resolution also acknowledged the right of these countries to respond, either individually or collectively, under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Further, it condemned Iran’s attempts to obstruct the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab Al Mandab. The resolution, however, made no reference to the US-Israeli aggression, leading Russia to abstain and terming the text “extremely unbalanced." China also abstained, reasoning that the text did not adequately reflect “the broader dynamics of the conflict.”

On the same day, Russia introduced a draft resolution urging “all parties,” without naming them, to immediately stop military activities and refrain from further escalation. The resolution received four votes in favour, two against, and nine abstentions.

Issues at large
1. A brief note on the role of the Supreme Leader and the process of his election
The post was created following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and instituted as the office of “rahbar,” meaning “leader.” The Constitution recognizes the Leader as the highest authority in the country. He is the head of state and commander in chief of the army and wields wide-ranging powers; he oversees the appointment and dismissal of important government and military officials, like the highest commanders of the armed forces and security bodies, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the head of the state broadcaster, the head of the judiciary, and the chief of general staff. He also determines the general political direction of the government, and is solely responsible for declaring war, peace, and mobilization of the armed forces, and approves the appointment of the President after the election. The Leader is elected by the 88-member Assembly of Experts, which is a deliberative body mandated with overseeing the Supreme Leader’s worthiness to lead the country. The members of the Assembly are elected every eight years by the Guardian Council, half of whose members are appointed by the Supreme Leader and the other half recommended by the Head of the Judiciary (who is himself a Leader-appointee).

2. Tehran’s expanding targets and threats
During the second week of the 2026 conflict, Tehran dramatically expanded its target list, shifting from a narrow focus on military assets. Like the first week, Tehran has continued its diffused attacks across the Middle East, targeting primarily the Gulf countries alongside Israel, Iraq, and Jordan. However, from restricting its attacks on US and allied military installations in the earlier week, Iran has now also started targeting energy infrastructure. Reports have also confirmed an attack on the Dubai International Airport. Iran has also started attacking vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz and has threatened to lay mines. This has driven the price of crude oil past the USD 100 mark. Additionally, it has issued warnings to tech giants like Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Nvidia as “future targets,” highlighting their role in supporting the US-Israeli campaign.

3. America’s shifting goalposts
While earlier announcing that the War would last four to five weeks, followed by an assertion that the US was prepared for a longer conflict, Trump has become increasingly evasive about any timeline for the war's conclusion. Interestingly, in his latest remarks, Trump has claimed that the War was pretty much over, citing the destruction of the Iranian Navy and Air Force. This is even though his other war objectives announced earlier are far from being achieved. Earlier claims of an active pursuit of regime change have taken a back seat, with Trump expressing only his displeasure with the non-consultation in selecting the new Supreme Leader. Trump has also, without providing any concrete evidence, claimed that the Iranian Navy and Air Force have been decimated and that the new supreme leader has been removed.

4. The significance of drone warfare
The use of drone warfare gained particular momentum since the start of the Ukraine War and has continued as a dominant strategy since. The low-cost, low-casualty weapon has become an important tool in asymmetric wars. Along with ballistic missiles, Iran has relied heavily on its drone capabilities to sustain pressure across the Middle East and raise the cost of war. Tehran’s drone strategy has relied on the principle of mass usage, wherein it uses high volumes of low-cost drones in attack waves to overwhelm sophisticated and expensive air defense systems. For instance, to shoot down a USD 30,000 drone, a USD 4 million Patriot interceptor is used, which is indicative of Iran using exhaustion tactics. The drone waves also serve as bait for radar systems, forcing defenders to engage and reveal their positions. Given this dynamic, reportedly, Ukrainian military experts (who have massive experience in tackling Iranian drones being used by Russia) have arrived in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia to help them defend against drones. A BBC report also suggested that other Ukrainian experts are helping the US do the same in Jordan.

5.  Faultlines at the UN
During the second week of the conflict, the United Nations became a battleground for competing diplomatic narratives and brought to light international geopolitical faultlines. The overwhelming acceptance of the resolution tabled by the Gulf countries, supported by 135 UN General Assembly members, is indicative of the wider support for the GCC countries and Tehran’s diplomatic isolation. On the other hand, Russian and Chinese abstentions versus vetoes also indicate the limited extent of their diplomatic support for Iran at multilateral forums.

In perspective
First, in the second week, the Iran War has metastasized from a terrestrial military campaign, engulfing the region, into an evolving maritime-economic conflict. With Iran’s Supreme Leader and other officials at the helm, communicating defiance and demonstrating the capability to stick out a war of attrition, any hope of immediate negotiation with the US seems unlikely. This unlikelihood is compounded by President Trump’s trumpeting of war victory, threats of intensified attacks, and zero hints at a diplomatic turnabout.

Second, the international community has also failed to respond to the War in a balanced manner, generating global economic ramifications. By singling out Iranian attacks as “egregious,” without recognizing the role played by the US-Israel duo in sparking them, the international community has not only failed to address the nuances and contours of this decades-long rivalry but brought into question which countries can act in self-defense and which cannot, creating a hierarchy of legitimacy. This asymmetry of international legal application does not bode well for the role the United Nations was instituted to play for the cause of international peace and security.

 

Rohini Reenum is a PhD scholar at NIAS.

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