CWA # 2057

The World This Quarter�

Myanmar (Jan-Mar 2026)

An Illegitimate Regime's Consolidation Game

In Myanmar, the elections, the silencing of the political opposition, and the relentless military campaign against resistance forces signal a regime focused on perpetuating its grip on power rather than governing inclusively

Bibhu Prasad Routray 5 April 2026

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On 3 April, the newly elected parliament in Myanmar chose General Min Aung Hlaing, the former chief of the Tatmadaw, as the country's president. The General had already stepped down as armed forces commander, as required by the constitution, before he could take the post of president. The event was yet another example of the quasi-military government’s attempt to gain legitimacy by brute force. While most of the paraphernalia for transforming the repressive regime that grabbed power more than five years back into a governing entity is now complete, it hardly offers hope for stability, peace, and development.  

On the other hand, the installation of a new regime and the election of a new president illustrate a narrative of authoritarian resilience. This challenges the conventional understanding that repressive regimes are inherently fragile and will eventually yield to popular movements. Five developments in Myanmar between January and March 2025, elaborated in the succeeding paragraphs, highlight how illegitimate regimes manage to consolidate power by overcoming predictions of defeat.

1. The Sham elections and their winner
The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)’s win in the parliamentary elections, held in multiple phases in late December 2025 and January 2026, was a preordained outcome. Results announced in February merely confirmed this, with more than 80 per cent of the electable seats won by the USDP. This is a throwback to 2010, when the party secured a landslide victory, with the National League for Democracy (NLD) boycotting the process. The following years, however, witnessed a gradual march of democracy and resulted in an NLD victory in the 2015 elections.  This time, the military-formed State Administration Council (SAC) is using the elections not as a means of transitioning to democracy, but rather to normalise its rule following the coup and to provide institutional legitimacy to a military-aligned government.

The SAC claimed a voter turnout of 54 to 55 per cent, but other estimates dispute this, suggesting it might not have exceeded 41 to 44 per cent due to the exclusion of millions of voters. However, low voter turnout is not the only issue with these staged elections. The most popular party, the NLD, has been barred from participating, and several restrictions have been imposed on the genuine political aspirations of the citizens. The military's refusal to consider suggestions to make the elections more inclusive and to give democracy another chance is stubbornly audacious.

2. A repressive regime’s makeover? Not really
Following the election, Myanmar's parliament began its first session on 16 March. After establishing its official control over the government, it is highly unlikely that the regime will transform from a repressive entity into one that actively seeks to govern the country. The government is expected to consist predominantly of military personnel, prioritising security measures above all else. By merely changing the colours of their robes, it is not expected to give up pursuing a policy that has only one objective—silencing the opposition that still remains sizeable and in control of significant stretches of the country’s territory.

Between January and March 2026, the military government accelerated its reliance on airstrikes. An airstrike on 21 January in Kachin State killed 21 people, and another attack on 25 February in Rakhine State killed 17 people. The opposition National Unity Government (NUG), its allied Peoples’ Defence Forces (PDFs), and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) remain militarily potent. Confronting them would remain a priority for the quasi-military government.

3. Coordinating the Resistance
In the last week of March, the NUG and four major EAOs launched a new leadership body to coordinate political and military strategy in the struggle against military dictatorship. This follows a similar move in December 2025. In response to the SAC’s electoral moves and a resurgent military's battlefield victory, 19 armed factions, including the EAOs and PDFs, had formed the Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA). The objective was to improve strategic coordination and overcome previous mistrust between larger EAOs and the NUG. That, however, has produced mixed results. The military has regained control of lost territories in the north. In early March, it regained control of the key township of Tagaung, the last town in the Mandalay Region held by the opposition forces.

On the other hand, the Arakan Army (AA) continued to assert control over most of Rakhine State, challenging the military's hold in the west and launching attacks in areas like Bago. The present conflict can be seen as a long-term, multi-front war with no quick end in sight, where the military is unable to reassert control in some areas despite re-taking others.

4. A Chinese and Russian boost to the Myanmar army
The Myanmar military owes much of its battlefield gains to Chinese pressure on EAOs such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and to Russian military hardware. Between January and March 2026, this dynamic became even more pronounced with Beijing intensifying diplomatic and economic leverage along the Myanmar-China border, urging the EAOs to scale back offensives that threatened regional stability and cross-border trade.

This pressure led to operational pauses in the NUG-coordinated offensives, which the military was able to exploit. At the same time, continued access to Russian military hardware—including upgraded aircraft, precision munitions, and surveillance systems—enhanced the military’s ability to conduct airstrikes and maintain territorial control. These advantages allowed the military to retake key positions in northern Shan State and disrupt the supply lines of opposition forces.

5. ASEAN and the Regional dilemma
In sharp contrast to Chinese determinism, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has struggled to present a unified stance on the Myanmar military's ongoing violations of democratic principles. In late January 2026, the ASEAN foreign ministers met in Cebu but ended their discussions without reaching an agreement on whether to recognise Myanmar's recent election. Some member states sought a pragmatic solution to the political deadlock over the election outcome, but their prioritisation of national interests over the organisation's collective unity has led to an impasse. Countries like the Philippines, ASEAN's current chair, and Thailand have openly advocated for improving relations with the Myanmar military. In contrast, Malaysia remains the only nation that has strongly opposed the elections in Myanmar. The Myanmar military has reasons to interpret this division within ASEAN as a favourable opportunity that it can exploit in the coming months.

To Conclude: Myanmar the first quarter (Jan-Mar 2026)
Myanmar's trajectory under the new quasi-military government, therefore, offers very little optimism. The elections, the silencing of the political opposition, and the relentless military campaign against resistance forces signal a regime focused on perpetuating its grip on power rather than governing inclusively. The future of democracy in Myanmar, therefore, hinges on sustained resistance coordination and international pressure—both of which, under the geopolitical turmoil elsewhere in the world, remain woefully inadequate.

About the author
Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray is the Director of the Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS), Goa. Earlier he served as a Deputy Director in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), Government of India.