CWA # 2066
Special Commentary
Three Years of War in Sudan
Prolonged Stalemate, Humanitarian Cost, External Interventions and Regional Fallouts
Three years into this deadly power struggle, the endgame is clear. The SAF is adamant to fight until the RSF is eliminated or surrenders. The RSF has not taken a strong stance to eliminate SAF, primarily because of its suspected pursuit of internatio
|
Anu Maria Joseph
24 April 2026
|
On 14 April, international leaders held a conference in Berlin on the third anniversary of the Sudanese civil war. They pledged USD 1.5 billion for humanitarian aid. The meeting, represented by more than 60 delegations from different countries, discussed aid and negotiations to end the conflict. The warring parties were excluded from the conference.
At the meeting, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called three years of war a "tragic milestone in a conflict that has shattered a country of immense promise." He said: "The nightmare must end. The consequences are not confined to Sudan. They are destabilising the wider region." The African Union (AU) chairman, Mahmoud Ali Youssou, stated: "We know the magnitude of the crimes committed. We know the level of destruction in this country. The African Union would like to see all efforts to converge towards the cessation of hostilities. A ceasefire is essential."
On the same day, Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) criticised the meeting as a “colonial tutelage approach." The ministry added that they “will not accept that countries and regional and international organisations convene to decide on its affairs and bypass the Sudanese government under the pretext of neutrality."
I
Three Years of Civil War in Sudan:
A Brief Background
The war started as a power struggle between the leaders of two military factions: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In 2019, the two factions together ended the three-decade dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir, promising a democratic transition. However, differences between the factions over control of the country and leadership of the integrated armed forces have led to a full-scale civil war since 15 April 2023.
The SAF, the formal army of Sudan and the RSF, the former Janjaweed militia which carried out the Darfur genocide in 2004, equally claim to be the legitimate authority of the country. Initially, the war was concentrated in Khartoum, the capital. Until the end of December 2024, the RSF controlled Khartoum, and the SAF had reestablished its headquarters in Port Sudan. However, by March 2025, SAF recaptured Khartoum and pushed the RSF to other states. Beyond Khartoum, the war has expanded across the country, especially in Darfur and Kordofan states. The war also took an ethnic turn when Arab and non-Arab militias took sides with the RSF and the SAF, respectively. The three years of war have divided the country between east and west, with the SAF controlling the capital and eastern states and the RSF controlling Darfur and large parts of the three Kordofan states. The RSF has also established a rival government in the West with Darfur as the centre.
II
Four Major Issues
1. Prolonged Stalemate
The violence is currently concentrated in Darfur and Kordofan regions. Both sides have been increasingly relying on drones to strike targets. The SAF uses Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones and the RSF Chinese-made FH095 Kamikaze drones. Three years into this deadly power struggle, the endgame is clear. The SAF is adamant to fight until the RSF is eliminated or surrenders. The RSF has not taken a strong stance to eliminate SAF, primarily because of its suspected pursuit of international legitimacy, suggesting that both sides have no intention of ending the war until an absolute victory. However, an absolute victory is unlikely in the near future. Weapons continue to flow to both sides. The shift towards drone-based aerial campaigns has increased the threat towards soldiers, key figures and military infrastructure of both sides; however, not necessarily the ability to alter ground conditions. It implies that until one side is militarily, strategically, or politically weakened, the war in Sudan is likely to remain in a state of stagnation.
2. High Humanitarian cost
According to the UN, the war has killed over 1,50,000 people (200 in March 2026 alone) and displaced 15 million. The UN states that the war has created the world's “worst humanitarian crisis.” The World Food Programme (WFP) confirmed ten famine locations in the country. It says more than half of Sudan's 50 million population is facing high levels of food insecurity. The cuts in USAID under the Trump administration further restricted the aid delivery. Meanwhile, both warring sides are accused of carrying out widespread human rights atrocities, including sexual abuses and mass killings. In February, a UN fact-finding mission accused the RSF of carrying out mass killings in el-Fasher in October 2025, pointing to a genocide. The international genocide call in Sudan came after three years in January 2026.
3. Failed peace mediations
There were over ten failed ceasefires led by the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the African Union. Besides, there were multiple peace initiatives by the international community, including the Jeddah Declaration (May 2023), the Manama Dialogue (January 2024), the Quad proposal (September 2025) by the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE, the GCC declaration (December 2025) and the Nairobi Declaration (December 2025). All failed due to a lack of commitment and compliance from the warring sides. While much international attention is being shifted to the conflicts in the Middle East, the SAF and the RSF have at times intentionally disrupted dialogue and concluded agreements out of fear of losing the title as the legitimate authority of Sudan.
4. The complicated role of external actors
The abundant flow of weapons has given the warring sides little incentive to end the war. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia, Turkey and Iran have been supporting SAF with weapons. Meanwhile, the UAE has been allegedly supporting the RSF with weapons. These countries have different interests in Sudan. Iran is suspected of eyeing the Red Sea port in Port Sudan. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two Middle Eastern monarchies, have long supported different factions before the war. This divided support has been associated with the monarchies’ divergent views on political Islam, Sudan’s strategic location on the Red Sea, and the objective of influencing Sudan’s regional standing in the post-Arab Spring era. However, this divided support has too little to do with influencing the outcome of the war. Neither country has explicitly announced support for any factions in the war, and does not seem to seek the victory of either side. The UAE’s support for the RSF in the war is linked to its interest in vast RSF-controlled mineral resources. Besides, initial peace mediation and ceasefire efforts were led by Saudi Arabia, despite its weapons supply.
Meanwhile, Russia has been negotiating a deal with the Sudanese government to build a naval base in Port Sudan to access the Red Sea. Initial deployment of the Russian Wagner group to guard Sudanese gold mines indicated its economic interests in the country’s resources. Neighbouring countries, including Chad and the Central African Republic, which share porous borders with Sudan, are sources of supply routes for weapons.
4. Regional implications
The war has displaced over three million people to neighbouring countries, including Chad, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, prompting a regional refugee influx. Besides, the war has spilt over the borders. Since February, there has been a series of violent clashes between the RSF and the SAF-linked militias in the Tine town along the Sudan-Chad border. It killed over 30 people. Chad closed the borders and ordered the military to retaliate against any further strikes.
To conclude: Persistent stalemate and the likelihood of a protracted conflict
The war is moving toward a protracted, geographically divided and externally sustained conflict. The abundant regional weapon supply, despite a UN arms embargo, points to a selective commitment by international actors, prioritising strategic interests over an end to the war. This has undermined the mediation efforts. Unless there is a major shift in international pressure to end weapon supply, the war is likely to continue at the same pace, characterised by periodic territorial advances, recurring waves of violence, regional spillover and a high humanitarian cost. In such a scenario, peace initiatives are likely to remain fruitless while humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, further prolonging the conflict.
III
Three years of Civil War in Sudan:
A Chronology of Major Events
April-May 2023
On 15 April, the fighting between the RSF and the SAF started in Khartoum. The US and Saudi Arabia announced a 72-hour ceasefire, but it was immediately violated. In May, the US and Saudi Arabia held several rounds of discussions between the RSF and the SAF. Many agreements on civilian protection and humanitarian access were announced. However, later the SAF suspended its participation.
June-August 2023
By June, Khartoum was severely damaged and came largely under the RSF’s control. The RSF also consolidated control in large parts of West Darfur. Arab-non Arab violence started in El Geneina. A second ceasefire mediated by the US and Saudi Arabia failed on 10 June.
September-October 2023
In September, SAF reestablished its strategic leadership in Port Sudan. With the mass killing in El Geneina, the humanitarian crisis worsened, and refugees left for Chad and South Sudan.
May-June 2024
The RSF imposed a siege on el-Fasher and blocked the supply of food and humanitarian aid. The siege continued for 18 months. The RSF also attacked the state of Gezira, killing 100 people.
August 2024
The US-led talks were held in Geneva, aiming for a lasting ceasefire and easing of the humanitarian crisis. An RSF delegation attended, while the SAF declined to participate.
December 2024
The SAF launched coordinated offensives across Khartoum and its neighbouring cities. It retook major parts of Khartoum from the RSF’s control for the first time since the beginning of the war.
January-February 2025
Fighting escalated in Khartoum. The SAF recaptured Omdurman and a major oil refinery in the north of Khartoum. The US imposed sanctions on the RSF and recognised the RSF’s genocide in the Darfur region. By February, the SAF regained control of Bahri and ended the RSF’s siege in el-Obeid. In the same month, the RSF and its allies met in Kenya and discussed on establishing a parallel government.
March-May 2025
In March, the SAF filed a case with the ICJ against the UAE for supporting the RSF in its genocide in the war. The SAF also recaptured the presidential palace, airport, army headquarters and other key institutions in Khartoum and achieved a symbolic and strategic victory. The Battle of Khartoum ended with the SAF’s victory. In May, with Port Sudan as centre, the SAF established a civilian-led “Government of Hope” and appointed UN official Kamal Idris as Prime Minister, seeking international legitimacy.
June-August 2025
In July, the RSF announced the formation of the Government of Peace and Unity with Darfur as the centre. By August, the war saw a major battlefield shift. The majority of Western Darfur states and parts of Kordofan states came under the RSF’s control, and Eastern states, including Khartoum, came under the SAF.
September-October 2025
The Quad, involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the US, announced a joint roadmap to end the war in Sudan. It called for a three-month humanitarian ceasefire, followed by a permanent ceasefire and a nine-month transition to a civilian-led government. The SAF rejected the proposal, stating that peace could not be achieved without a military resolution. In October, the RSF captured el-Fasher after an 18-month siege. Several reports claimed that the RSF carried out mass killings, sexual violence and other war crimes in el-Fasher during the siege. With el-Fasher under its control, almost the whole of the Darfur region came under the control of the RSF.
January-April 2026
In February, a UN fact-finding mission in its report accused the RSF of carrying out mass killing in el-Fasher in October 2025. The report described it as a genocide. According to the report, more than 6,000 people were killed during the siege.
The latest quarter has also been marked by a wave of violence along the border town of Tine between Chad and Sudan. Following a series of clashes between the RSF and the SAF-linked militias, more than 30 people were killed in the border town.
About the author
Ms Anu Maria Joseph was a NIAS Project Associate and served as Assistant Editor, Conflict Weekly.
