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NIAS Global Politics Team
24 April 2026 |
Conflict Weekly Special Essay
Three Years of War in Sudan
Prolonged Stalemate, Humanitarian Cost, External Interventions and Regional Fallouts
Anu Maria Joseph
On 14 April, international leaders held a conference in Berlin on the third anniversary of the Sudanese civil war. They pledged USD 1.5 billion for humanitarian aid. The meeting, represented by more than 60 delegations from different countries, discussed aid and negotiations to end the conflict. The warring parties were excluded from the conference.
At the meeting, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called three years of war a "tragic milestone in a conflict that has shattered a country of immense promise." He said: "The nightmare must end. The consequences are not confined to Sudan. They are destabilising the wider region." The African Union (AU) chairman, Mahmoud Ali Youssou, stated: "We know the magnitude of the crimes committed. We know the level of destruction in this country. The African Union would like to see all efforts to converge towards the cessation of hostilities. A ceasefire is essential."
On the same day, Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) criticised the meeting as a “colonial tutelage approach." The ministry added that they “will not accept that countries and regional and international organisations convene to decide on its affairs and bypass the Sudanese government under the pretext of neutrality."
Three Years of Civil War in Sudan: A Brief Background
The war started as a power struggle between the leaders of two military factions: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In 2019, the two factions together ended the three-decade dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir, promising a democratic transition. However, differences between the factions over control of the country and leadership of the integrated armed forces have led to a full-scale civil war since 15 April 2023.
The SAF, the formal army of Sudan and the RSF, the former Janjaweed militia which carried out the Darfur genocide in 2004, equally claim to be the legitimate authority of the country. Initially, the war was concentrated in Khartoum, the capital. Until the end of December 2024, the RSF controlled Khartoum, and the SAF had reestablished its headquarters in Port Sudan. However, by March 2025, SAF recaptured Khartoum and pushed the RSF to other states. Beyond Khartoum, the war has expanded across the country, especially in Darfur and Kordofan states. The war also took an ethnic turn when Arab and non-Arab militias took sides with the RSF and the SAF, respectively. The three years of war have divided the country between east and west, with the SAF controlling the capital and eastern states and the RSF controlling Darfur and large parts of the three Kordofan states. The RSF has also established a rival government in the West with Darfur as the centre.
Four Major Issues
1. Prolonged Stalemate
The violence is currently concentrated in Darfur and Kordofan regions. Both sides have been increasingly relying on drones to strike targets. The SAF uses Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones and the RSF Chinese-made FH095 Kamikaze drones. Three years into this deadly power struggle, the endgame is clear. The SAF is adamant to fight until the RSF is eliminated or surrenders. The RSF has not taken a strong stance to eliminate SAF, primarily because of its suspected pursuit of international legitimacy, suggesting that both sides have no intention of ending the war until an absolute victory. However, an absolute victory is unlikely in the near future. Weapons continue to flow to both sides. The shift towards drone-based aerial campaigns has increased the threat towards soldiers, key figures and military infrastructure of both sides; however, not necessarily the ability to alter ground conditions. It implies that until one side is militarily, strategically, or politically weakened, the war in Sudan is likely to remain in a state of stagnation.
2. High Humanitarian cost
According to the UN, the war has killed over 1,50,000 people (200 in March 2026 alone) and displaced 15 million. The UN states that the war has created the world's “worst humanitarian crisis.” The World Food Programme (WFP) confirmed ten famine locations in the country. It says more than half of Sudan's 50 million population is facing high levels of food insecurity. The cuts in USAID under the Trump administration further restricted the aid delivery. Meanwhile, both warring sides are accused of carrying out widespread human rights atrocities, including sexual abuses and mass killings. In February, a UN fact-finding mission accused the RSF of carrying out mass killings in el-Fasher in October 2025, pointing to a genocide. The international genocide call in Sudan came after three years in January 2026.
3. Failed peace mediations
There were over ten failed ceasefires led by the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the African Union. Besides, there were multiple peace initiatives by the international community, including the Jeddah Declaration (May 2023), the Manama Dialogue (January 2024), the Quad proposal (September 2025) by the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE, the GCC declaration (December 2025) and the Nairobi Declaration (December 2025). All failed due to a lack of commitment and compliance from the warring sides. While much international attention is being shifted to the conflicts in the Middle East, the SAF and the RSF have at times intentionally disrupted dialogue and concluded agreements out of fear of losing the title as the legitimate authority of Sudan.
4. The complicated role of external actors
The abundant flow of weapons has given the warring sides little incentive to end the war. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia, Turkey and Iran have been supporting SAF with weapons. Meanwhile, the UAE has been allegedly supporting the RSF with weapons. These countries have different interests in Sudan. Iran is suspected of eyeing the Red Sea port in Port Sudan. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two Middle Eastern monarchies, have long supported different factions before the war. This divided support has been associated with the monarchies’ divergent views on political Islam, Sudan’s strategic location on the Red Sea, and the objective of influencing Sudan’s regional standing in the post-Arab Spring era. However, this divided support has too little to do with influencing the outcome of the war. Neither country has explicitly announced support for any factions in the war, and does not seem to seek the victory of either side. The UAE’s support for the RSF in the war is linked to its interest in vast RSF-controlled mineral resources. Besides, initial peace mediation and ceasefire efforts were led by Saudi Arabia, despite its weapons supply.
Meanwhile, Russia has been negotiating a deal with the Sudanese government to build a naval base in Port Sudan to access the Red Sea. Initial deployment of the Russian Wagner group to guard Sudanese gold mines indicated its economic interests in the country’s resources. Neighbouring countries, including Chad and the Central African Republic, which share porous borders with Sudan, are sources of supply routes for weapons.
4. Regional implications
The war has displaced over three million people to neighbouring countries, including Chad, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, prompting a regional refugee influx. Besides, the war has spilt over the borders. Since February, there has been a series of violent clashes between the RSF and the SAF-linked militias in the Tine town along the Sudan-Chad border. It killed over 30 people. Chad closed the borders and ordered the military to retaliate against any further strikes.
To conclude: Persistent stalemate and the likelihood of a protracted conflict
The war is moving toward a protracted, geographically divided and externally sustained conflict. The abundant regional weapon supply, despite a UN arms embargo, points to a selective commitment by international actors, prioritising strategic interests over an end to the war. This has undermined the mediation efforts. Unless there is a major shift in international pressure to end weapon supply, the war is likely to continue at the same pace, characterised by periodic territorial advances, recurring waves of violence, regional spillover and a high humanitarian cost. In such a scenario, peace initiatives are likely to remain fruitless while humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, further prolonging the conflict.
Three years of Civil War in Sudan: A Chronology of Major Events
April-May 2023
On 15 April, the fighting between the RSF and the SAF started in Khartoum. The US and Saudi Arabia announced a 72-hour ceasefire, but it was immediately violated. In May, the US and Saudi Arabia held several rounds of discussions between the RSF and the SAF. Many agreements on civilian protection and humanitarian access were announced. However, later the SAF suspended its participation.
June-August 2023
By June, Khartoum was severely damaged and came largely under the RSF’s control. The RSF also consolidated control in large parts of West Darfur. Arab-non Arab violence started in El Geneina. A second ceasefire mediated by the US and Saudi Arabia failed on 10 June.
September-October 2023
In September, SAF reestablished its strategic leadership in Port Sudan. With the mass killing in El Geneina, the humanitarian crisis worsened, and refugees left for Chad and South Sudan.
May-June 2024
The RSF imposed a siege on el-Fasher and blocked the supply of food and humanitarian aid. The siege continued for 18 months. The RSF also attacked the state of Gezira, killing 100 people.
August 2024
The US-led talks were held in Geneva, aiming for a lasting ceasefire and easing of the humanitarian crisis. An RSF delegation attended, while the SAF declined to participate.
December 2024
The SAF launched coordinated offensives across Khartoum and its neighbouring cities. It retook major parts of Khartoum from the RSF’s control for the first time since the beginning of the war.
January-February 2025
Fighting escalated in Khartoum. The SAF recaptured Omdurman and a major oil refinery in the north of Khartoum. The US imposed sanctions on the RSF and recognised the RSF’s genocide in the Darfur region. By February, the SAF regained control of Bahri and ended the RSF’s siege in el-Obeid. In the same month, the RSF and its allies met in Kenya and discussed on establishing a parallel government.
March-May 2025
In March, the SAF filed a case with the ICJ against the UAE for supporting the RSF in its genocide in the war. The SAF also recaptured the presidential palace, airport, army headquarters and other key institutions in Khartoum and achieved a symbolic and strategic victory. The Battle of Khartoum ended with the SAF’s victory. In May, with Port Sudan as centre, the SAF established a civilian-led “Government of Hope” and appointed UN official Kamal Idris as Prime Minister, seeking international legitimacy.
June-August 2025
In July, the RSF announced the formation of the Government of Peace and Unity with Darfur as the centre. By August, the war saw a major battlefield shift. The majority of Western Darfur states and parts of Kordofan states came under the RSF’s control, and Eastern states, including Khartoum, came under the SAF.
September-October 2025
The Quad, involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the US, announced a joint roadmap to end the war in Sudan. It called for a three-month humanitarian ceasefire, followed by a permanent ceasefire and a nine-month transition to a civilian-led government. The SAF rejected the proposal, stating that peace could not be achieved without a military resolution. In October, the RSF captured el-Fasher after an 18-month siege. Several reports claimed that the RSF carried out mass killings, sexual violence and other war crimes in el-Fasher during the siege. With el-Fasher under its control, almost the whole of the Darfur region came under the control of the RSF.
January-April 2026
In February, a UN fact-finding mission in its report accused the RSF of carrying out mass killing in el-Fasher in October 2025. The report described it as a genocide. According to the report, more than 6,000 people were killed during the siege.
The latest quarter has also been marked by a wave of violence along the border town of Tine between Chad and Sudan. Following a series of clashes between the RSF and the SAF-linked militias, more than 30 people were killed in the border town.
The US-Iran War, Week Eight:
A Fragile Ceasefire, Attempts to Control Hormuz and the Stalled Talks in Islamabad
Akshath Kaimal
In the news
Islamabad Talks
On 17 April, US President Donald Trump said that the ceasefire would expire on 22 April and then said on 18 April that there was "some pretty good news" about Iran, but it remains vague. On 20 April, reports suggested that US Vice President JD Vance would travel to Islamabad for talks with Iran, but the Iranian leadership rejected the talks. On 21 April, Trump extended the ceasefire and on 22 April said talks were possible within “36 to 72 hours”, but Iran continued to deny their participation as long as the US naval blockade remained. On 22 April, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said negotiations were “impossible” under a “flagrant breach” of the ceasefire by the US.
The Strait of Hormuz
On 17 April, Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was “completely open” to all ships, only to reverse that decision on 18 April due to the US naval blockade. On 19 and 21 April, the US Navy seized two Iranian-linked vessels transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. Between 18 and 22 April, Iran seized two cargo vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and fired at another.
International and regional responses
On 17 April, France and the United Kingdom hosted over 30 countries to form the Strait of Hormuz Maritime Freedom of Navigation Initiative, a defensive initiative aimed at restoring free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. On 18 April, India summoned the Iranian envoy to protest the firing on Indian vessels. On 21 April, Xi Jinping, on a call with Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman, called for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and reiterated China’s support for restoring peace in the region.
Issues at large
1. A fragile ceasefire
The US and Iran agreed to a ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, on 08 April. The two parties agreed to halt hostilities for 14 days, “safely open” the Strait of Hormuz, and use the 14 days to discuss the remaining points of friction, such as the nuclear issue and economic sanctions. Iran insisted that the Strait’s opening would be managed by its forces, which was a major sticking point between the two parties. Iran was also unhappy about Israel continuing its attacks on Lebanon despite the ceasefire, which it felt covered both theatres of the war. The agreement was further undermined by a US-imposed naval blockade of Iran imposed on 13 April and the seizure of two Iranian-linked vessels on 19 and 21 April. Iran has accused the US of violating the ceasefire agreement and said it reserves the right to respond appropriately. Trump extended the ceasefire before the deadline, but its fragility is clear.
2. Stalemate in Islamabad Talks
Pakistan helped broker a temporary ceasefire on 08 April, which opened the door to the first round of peace talks in Islamabad on 11 April. But the negotiations lasted barely 24 hours before both parties left the capital without reaching an agreement. Iran’s nuclear enrichment and the issue over the Strait of Hormuz remained the major reasons for the deadlock. There was some hope for a second round of talks, but Trump’s decision to impose a naval blockade of Iran on 13 April made it unlikely. Trump has been pushing for talks to resume on US terms, while Iran has pushed back by accusing the US of violating the ceasefire and firing at vessels transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. As of 23 April, the resumption of talks remains uncertain, with Trump claiming a second round could be possible within “36 to 72 hours” while Iran deems negotiations “impossible” at this stage.
3. Trump’s mixed-messaging strategy
US President Donald Trump’s comments and announcements about the war over the last week moved from cautious optimism to all-out threats. He first claimed that Iran was “very close” to making a deal and had agreed to “never close” the Strait of Hormuz again. But his tone quickly changed as peace talks stalled. He claimed that the US was “raring to go” after restocking its weapons during the ceasefire and that it could bomb Iran by Wednesday (22 April) evening if a deal wasn’t reached. On 21 April, he claimed without evidence that Iran had sent “hundreds of ships” towards Texas and Alaska to obtain oil due to the blockade severely impacting its economy. He then extended the ceasefire on 22 April - hours before its expiry - but maintained the blockade. Trump’s strategy is meant to pressure Iran to come to the table, but he is also quick to change when things aren’t going his way. He seems determined to pressure Iran militarily to make an acceptable deal, which is only angering Iran and putting more strain on the ceasefire.
4. Disputed control over the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz has been a major flashpoint in this war. Between 17 and 23 April, both the US and Iran have claimed control over the Strait. On 17 April, Iran said the Strait was “completely open”, but then went back to closing the Strait less than 24 hours later, citing the US naval blockade as a “breach of trust”. The US blockade, imposed on 13 April, has been part of President Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, leading the Navy to seize two Iranian-linked vessels that were passing through the Strait. Iran has reacted violently by also seizing two cargo vessels and firing at another. The latest conflicting claims and provocative actions over the Strait of Hormuz mean the issue remains the primary reason for the stalled negotiations.
In perspective
1. The future of peace talks remains uncertain
Despite extensive diplomatic outreach by Pakistan and its allies, along with increased pressure from Trump to come to the negotiating table, Iran continues to reject peace talks, while the US naval blockade continues to remain in place. This makes the second round of talks uncertain, even though leaders in Pakistan and the Middle East remain optimistic that the two parties will meet. Even if the talks take place, there is little probability that Iran would accept all of the US’s demands, primarily regarding the nuclear issue, meaning peace is still a long way away.
2. The Strait of Hormuz will continue to be one of the main points of contention
Both Iran and the US have employed different tactics to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz. The naval blockade imposed by the US has caused Iran to react violently, making control over the Strait one of the main barriers to successful peace talks. These contested claims are also continuing to have a major impact on the global economy, with oil prices sharply fluctuating and driving price increases worldwide. The International Energy Agency (IEA) labelled this the “biggest energy crisis in history”. With the UN warning that continued weaponisation of the Strait could lead to a global recession, reaching a common ground regarding the waterway seems to be the only way to help peace talks progress.
Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:
Asymmetric Terms, Fragile Truce and Israeli Occupation
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 14 April, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio mediated the first formal Israel-Lebanon talks in Washington, which concluded with a six-point ceasefire that halted hostilities for 10 days to facilitate further negotiations. The second round of negotiations is scheduled to resume on 23 April.
On 16 April, the ceasefire deal came into effect in what President Trump described as a “historic day.” Hezbollah condemned the ceasefire agreement as “an insult” to Lebanon, adding that Israeli occupation justified continued resistance, insisting that Israeli forces must withdraw from occupied Lebanese territory up to the border. On the same day, senior Israeli military officials told reporters that "the Yellow Line model implemented in Gaza will be replicated in Lebanon," along a 10-kilometre-long military zone, in southern Lebanon captured by Israel. Israeli officials stated that they intend to keep the zone under military control, while reserving the right to strike the area.
On 17 April, PM Netanyahu asserted that the Israeli forces “are remaining in Lebanon in a reinforced security buffer zone” along the Yellow Line, while Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that the Israeli military “will continue to hold and control all the positions it has cleared and secured.”
On 21 April, Israeli forces said that Hezbollah violated the ceasefire by launching rockets and a drone into northern Israel. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attack and stated that it was in retaliation for Israeli violations of the truce.
On 22 April, four people, including a journalist, were killed in an Israeli strike in southern Lebanon, on the eve of the second round of ceasefire negotiations in Washington.
Issues at large
1. Asymmetric terms and a fragile truce
The six-point ceasefire, framed as a “gesture of goodwill by Israel,” features several asymmetric and unrealistic demands. It prohibits Israeli offensive operations against Lebanese targets but allows for indiscriminate measures “in self-defence, at any time, against planned, imminent, or ongoing attacks.” No equivalent protection is extended to Lebanon. The deal also hinges on further negotiations and lasting frameworks on Beirut's capacity to rein in Hezbollah and “demonstrating effective sovereignty,” which the state has been incapable of achieving. Additionally, the truce has been violated multiple times by both sides, with Israeli strikes continuing in the south and Hezbollah firing rockets and drones in response. The text also does not address Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon, while Hezbollah has justified its resistance as a result of Israel's continuing occupation.
2. The US-Iran War and Washington’s role in mediation
The tentative ceasefire in Lebanon is not the result of isolated efforts, but rather the broader ceasefire negotiations in the US-Iran war. The outbreak of the Israel-Hezbollah war itself traces back to Hezbollah’s 02 March strikes against Israel in response to the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s former Supreme Leader. Further, Tehran's key demands for extending its own ceasefire with the US explicitly included guarantees that the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon would not resume, placing Lebanon on equal footing with the naval blockade as a red line. The Pakistan-brokered ceasefire also covered "all fronts, including Lebanon,” The US role in brokering the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire is inseparable from its larger strategic position in Iran. Despite Israel’s rejection of implementing the ceasefire in Lebanon, Washington’s efforts in Lebanon are aimed at ensuring Iran stays at the mediation table.
3. The “Yellow Line” entrenchment and Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon
Israel’s entrenchment along the so-called “Yellow Line” reflects a renewed phase of territorial control in southern Lebanon. Modelled on a Gaza-style security buffer, the line is intended to consolidate Israeli presence along the border areas where much of Hezbollah’s weapons infrastructure, tunnel networks and operational bases are concentrated. By restricting access to these underground systems and difficult terrain, Israel seeks to restrict the group’s capacity to rebuild. The current demarcation reportedly encompasses more than 55 villages, with displaced residents barred from returning, also echoes Tel Aviv’s 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000. The earlier “Security Zone,” had spanned around 10 per cent of Lebanon’s territory, extending 5 to 20 kilometres north of the Israel-Lebanon border. Notably, Hezbollah itself emerged as a direct product of resistance to this prolonged occupation.
In perspective
First, although the Israel-Hezbollah war emerged as an extension of the broader US-Israel confrontation with Iran, Tel Aviv appears increasingly intent on pursuing its own strategic objectives within Lebanon. Israel is unlikely to bring hostilities to a close despite Washington’s mediation efforts or the potential strain on US-Iran negotiations without achieving its enduring objective of dismantling Hezbollah.
Second, Hezbollah’s outright rejection of the ceasefire proposal and its justification for maintaining armed resistance on the grounds of Israel’s continued occupation of southern territories significantly narrows the prospects for a resolution. The group conditions any dismantling of its military capacity on Israeli withdrawal, while Israel, in turn, entrenches its presence to prevent Hezbollah’s revival. This leaves the conflict's central deadlock intact and risks a potentially perpetual conflict.
Report Review
The US-Iran War Fallouts on the Asia Pacific, Energy Security and Supply Chains
Five Takeaways of the UNDP Report, April 2026
R Preetha
In April 2026, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released a report titled “Military Escalation in the Middle East: Human Development Impacts Across Asia and the Pacific.” The report draws on 22 UNDP country office impact and needs assessments spanning 36 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, supplemented by UNDP Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulations and external analytical sources. The report offers a preliminary assessment of shock transmission channels (such as energy, trade, fertilisers), examining how these pressures are unfolding in Asia-Pacific, their implications for development trajectories, and where policy attention is most urgently required.
The following are five key takeaways from the report.
1. South Asia is at the centre of losses, both in absolute and relative terms
The report identifies South Asia as the most severely affected subregion, with output losses exceeding USD 183 billion and reaching up to 3.6 per cent of GDP in severe scenarios. This is attributed to its structural vulnerabilities, including high dependence on imported energy, exposure to remittance flows, and limited fiscal buffers.
East Asia also incurs substantial absolute losses exceeding USD 108 billion but experiences relatively modest proportional declines of up to around 0.4 per cent. The report notes that, while East Asia absorbs large shocks in absolute terms, the diversity and resilience of its economies help contain their relative impact. In contrast, South Asia’s concentrated exposure accentuates both macroeconomic and human development setbacks, positioning it as the principal casualty of the crisis.
2. Energy is the dominant shock transmission pathway, affecting economies
The report identifies energy as the primary channel through which the shock is transmitted, affecting economies through multiple, reinforcing pathways. Across the region, 33 of 36 assessed countries report high vulnerability to oil-price shocks, reflecting the fact that over 80 per cent of crude oil and LNG passing through the Strait of Hormuz is destined for Asian markets. However, vulnerability varies depending on import dependence, reserve capacity, and supply flexibility. Risks are reportedly more acute in the Pacific Island Countries, where commercial petroleum needs are met entirely through imports and strategic reserves are limited. UNDP analysis shows that where buffers are weak, energy shocks rapidly extend beyond import costs, impacting inflation, logistics, and household welfare.
3. Fallouts on trade, supply chain, food, fertiliser costs, remittances and tourism
Beyond energy, the report highlights a hierarchy of reinforcing transmission channels that together amplify and prolong the shock across the region. Trade and logistics disruptions emerge as the second major pathway, through higher freight charges, war-risk insurance premia, route diversions, and delays in essential goods. With respect to fertilisers, the Middle East is a major exporter of nitrogen-based inputs with much of it transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, disruptions quickly feed into food systems. In India, over 45 per cent of fertiliser imports come from West Asia, while around 85 per cent of domestic urea production depends on imported LNG. As input and food prices rise together, low-income households, especially women, face disproportionate impacts.
Remittances and tourism further extend the shock. South Asia faces the risk of destabilising household incomes, given that nearly USD 100 billion in remittances come from the Gulf. Whereas tourism arrivals in the Maldives (–23.4 per cent) and Sri Lanka (–40 per cent) highlight pressures on livelihoods and external earnings. Together, these channels reinforce the shock by simultaneously raising costs, reducing incomes, and weakening foreign exchange earnings.
4. Human development setbacks with implications for labour markets
The report finds that the shock is likely to have regressive labour market effects, disproportionately affecting low-skilled workers. A one per cent decline in GDP growth is associated with an estimated 2-per cent increase in unemployment among low-skilled workers, compared to about 1.5 per cent for higher-skilled workers. The crisis is also translating into broader welfare losses, with around 8.8 million people across 14 countries at risk of falling into poverty. The impact is heavily concentrated in Iran, where over 5 million people could be pushed into poverty. Human development losses are also most severe in Iran, with declines in the HDI equivalent to one to one-and-a-half years of progress. While effects elsewhere remain modest under short-duration scenarios, they could increase sharply if the conflict continues, particularly in countries such as Nepal and Pakistan, wherein exposure to external demand, remittances, and imported inputs is high.
5. Emphasis on a four-point priority action framework with social protection, livelihoods, regional cooperation, and resilience at the centre
The report emphasises four key policy priorities to contain and respond to the shock. First, making social protection more agile and able to reach vulnerable groups rapidly and at scale during shocks. This involves particular focus on women, informal workers, migrants, and households close to the poverty line. Second, protecting livelihoods by building the resilience of MSMEs and local economies that are exposed to external volatility. Third, reducing structural vulnerabilities. This means building more resilient energy, food, and employment systems that are less susceptible to external disruptions. Fourth, increasing regional cooperation. Given the interconnected nature of energy flows, trade, and labour mobility, coordinated responses can significantly enhance collective resilience. Put together, these policy suggestions reflect an approach that moves from reacting to isolated crises to preparing the Asia-Pacific to face volatile and uncertain environments in the long run.
Conflict Weekly Column
Africa This Week
Three years of War in Sudan, DRC-M23 talks in Switzerland and the collapse of the peace agreement in Tigray
Anu Maria Joseph
What happened this week?
1. Sudan
15 April marked three years of the civil war in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). On 14 April, international leaders held a conference in Berlin on the third anniversary of the civil war and pledged USD 1.5 billion for humanitarian aid. At the meeting, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called three years of war a "tragic milestone in a conflict that has shattered a country of immense promise." He said: "The nightmare must end." The African Union (AU) chairman, Mahmoud Ali Youssou, stated: "We know the magnitude of the crimes committed. We know the level of destruction in this country."
2. DR Congo
On 19 April, Al Jazeera reported that the Congolese government and the M23 rebels have agreed to ease aid deliveries and the release of prisoners. The move was announced in a joint statement by the US Department of State, following the talks in Switzerland the previous week. The statement read: “The parties agreed to refrain from any action that would undermine the principled delivery of humanitarian assistance within the territories impacted by the conflict."
The statement also added that both sides signed a MoU for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism to “begin conducting surveillance, monitoring, verification, and reporting on the implementation of the permanent ceasefire between the parties."
3. Ethiopia
On 19 April, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia announced that it is taking back control of the Tigray administration, ending the 2022 peace deal signed with the Ethiopian federal government. TPLF stated via Facebook: It “has decided to reinstate the Tigray Government Assembly (parliament), which had been suspended in the name of peace.”
What are the issues?
1. Sudan: A prolonged war, battlefield shifts, failed mediations and regional spill over
The war, which started as a power struggle between the SAF and the RSF, has lasted for three years. Although initially concentrated in Khartoum, the war has now shifted to Kordofan and Darfur states. It has now divided the country into the West and East, with Western states under the control of the RSF and eastern states, along with Khartoum under the SAF. Besides, the RSF has started a parallel government in the West with Darfur as the centre.
Multiple ceasefire efforts and international peace initiatives have failed; most recently, the Nairobi Declaration in December 2025 and the Quad proposal in September 2025. The failure is attributed to two major reasons. First, the abundant supply of weapons from external actors. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia, Turkey and Iran have been supporting SAF with weapons. Meanwhile, the UAE and Iran have been allegedly supporting the RSF with weapons. Secondly, due to a lack of commitment and compliance from the warring sides, amidst fear of losing the title of legitimate authority of Sudan.
Most recently, the war has spilt along the Sudan-Chad border town of Tine. Since February, there has been a series of violent clashes between the RSF and the SAF-linked militias in the Tine town along the Sudan-Chad border. It killed over 30 people.
2. DR Congo: The talks in Switzerland, continuing violence and a questioned peace deal
The latest round of talks in Switzerland included representatives from Qatar, the US, the AU and Togo. The peace monitoring mechanism, agreed by warring sides, aims to track humanitarian and security developments and monitor potential ceasefire violations.
However, the situation on the ground is very fragile. Both sides accuse each other of violating the ceasefire agreement and carrying out attacks despite the US-led peace agreement in December 2025. Most recently, three people were killed in a drone strike in Goma, a region under the control of M23. The US-mediated peace deal was expected to lay the ground for an end to violence. However, the deal was criticised for many reasons. First, the deal lacked inclusivity; M23, the major actor in the conflict, was not a signatory to the agreement. Second, the deal displayed a transactional character when Trump involved the US's mineral interests in the bargaining and deviated from a genuine interest in resolving the conflict. Third, the deal discusses an end to hostilities, disarmament and disengagement of the rebel groups, and a regional economic integration. However, the deal does not discuss resolving the decades-long root causes behind the complex conflict in eastern DRC. Ultimately, the deal reflected a US geopolitical manoeuvre that served Trump's global peace pursuits.
3. Ethiopia: The Tigray problem and the fragile peace deal
Ethiopia's Tigray problem between the federal government and Tigrayans has been ongoing since 2021. The one-year conflict between the TPLF and the federal forces during 2021-2022 killed more than 600,000 people. The violence ended with the November 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement. However, the conflict continued. Despite the agreement, Tigray remained fragile due to several disagreements, the lack of full implementation of the peace agreement and post-agreement instances of violence. Only half of the 2.1 million IDPs have returned.
Meanwhile, the post-agreement initiatives of the Abiy administration triggered ethnic violence across other regions, including Amhara and Oromia. The skirmishes began after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed demanded all ethnic militias, including Amhara’s Fano militia, Tigray’s TPLF and Oromo’s Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), to be integrated into the Ethiopian federal force following the Tigray peace agreement. During early 2025, internal divisions within the TPLF were reported regarding the interim administration of Tigray, which led to a brief instance of violence in Mekelle in March 2025.
Since January, after a long lull in violence, Tensions started simmering in Tigray following the clashes between the TPLF and the federal forces in Tsemlet. The renewed clashes and tensions also arise ahead of the June general elections and threaten the peace deal
What does it mean?
In Sudan, the war has been prolonged for three years primarily because of the abundant weapon supply from the external actors. Both sides appear to have no intention of putting an end to the violence. The war is likely to continue at the same pace, characterised by territorial advances, waves of violence and a humanitarian cost.
In DR Congo, while the outcomes of the conference in Switzerland point to a positive development, the on-ground situation, characterised by ceasefire violations and instances of violence, implies that the peace initiatives are fragile. DRC is likely to witness another wave of intense violence with another trigger.
In Ethiopia, the latest developments point to a high risk of the collapse of the 2022 peace agreement and resumption of full-scale violence in Tigray.
Regional Round-ups
Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week: (16-23 April)
Abhimanyu Solanki, Aishal Yousaf, Akshath K, Brighty Ann Sarah, Glynnis Winona Beschi, Kirsten Wilfred Coelho, Lekshmi MK, Manik Dhawan, Nithin V, R. Preetha, Siddhi Haylur, Sreemaya Nair, Vani Vaishnavi Jupudi, Vishal Manish M, Yesasvi Koganti
China, East and Southeast Asia
Taiwan: Washington signals approval of pending weapon sales
On 16 April, Reuters reported that a bipartisan group of senators indicated that the US is expected to approve the pending weapon sales to Taiwan, as stated in a letter to Taiwanese lawmakers. Further, urging Taipei to accelerate delayed defence spending amidst rising pressure from China. The suggested packages consist of counter-drone systems, integrated command capabilities, and medium-range munitions to reinforce Taiwan's air defences. The letter arrives ahead of US President Trump's visit to China, scheduled for 14-15 May; however, concerns persist that trade negotiations could influence US military support for the island. Furthermore, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has proposed increased defence spending, but opposition parties have stalled the plan. While Washington remains Taiwan’s key security partner, Beijing continues to oppose arms sales and has intensified military pressure on the island.
China: Beijing’s military activity around Taiwan is justified and reasonable, says China's defence minister
On 17 April, China's defence minister stated that the military activity around Taiwan is entirely justified and reasonable. He reiterated that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of ?Chinese territory." He said, "The People's Liberation Army organises training and exercise activities in the waters and airspace around the Taiwan island to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is entirely justified, reasonable, and a matter of course." He added that Taiwan's ruling party peddles war anxiety and distorts China's activities. Taiwan had reported increased China's warplane and warship presence around the island
Myanmar: Military escalates air and drone operations amid continued conflict
On 16 April, Mizzima reported that Myanmar’s military continues to intensify its aerial operations, including the use of drones alongside airstrikes in conflict-affected regions. Reports indicate that these attacks have contributed to rising civilian casualties and displacement, while enhancing the military’s surveillance and targeting capabilities. The increasing reliance on drone warfare reflects an evolving strategy to maintain operational advantage despite ongoing resistance. The situation highlights the continued escalation of violence and its impact on civilian populations.
Myanmar: Political repression and instability persist under military rule
On 16 April, Mizzima reported that political tensions in Myanmar remain high as the military continues to consolidate its authority. Reports indicate ongoing restrictions on political freedoms, suppression of dissent, and lack of inclusive governance. Observers note that the absence of meaningful political dialogue continues to deepen instability and prolong the conflict. The development reflects the persistence of authoritarian rule despite increasing domestic and international criticism.
Myanmar: Military leadership remains a central obstacle to peace
On 16 April, Mizzima reported in an editorial that Myanmar’s ongoing crisis continues to be shaped by entrenched military leadership and lack of political reform. The analysis emphasised that despite attempts to present a civilian political structure, real power remains concentrated within the military. It further highlighted that the leadership’s resistance to democratic transition and reliance on coercive force have hindered prospects for peace and reconciliation. The editorial underscores the broader structural challenges preventing resolution of the conflict.
Myanmar: Conflict and ethnic tensions shape an uncertain regional future
On 21 April, The Irrawaddy reported that Myanmar’s Rakhine State remains deeply affected by ongoing conflict, with tensions between armed groups and communities shaping the region’s future. Reports indicate that while conflict continues to drive instability, there are also concerns regarding ethnic relations and the prospects for coexistence. Observers note that balancing armed conflict with efforts toward ethnic harmony remains a major challenge, as violence and mistrust persist. The development highlights the complex interplay between conflict dynamics and social cohesion in one of Myanmar’s most volatile regions.
Myanmar: Humanitarian concerns persist amid continued conflict and displacement
On 21 April, Mizzima reported that Myanmar continues to face worsening humanitarian conditions as conflict-driven displacement remains high across multiple regions. Reports indicate that affected populations struggle with limited access to food, healthcare, and shelter, while ongoing violence disrupts livelihoods and restricts aid delivery. Humanitarian organisations have highlighted the growing challenges in reaching vulnerable communities due to insecurity and logistical constraints. The situation underscores the deepening humanitarian crisis and the prolonged impact of the conflict on civilian populations.
Myanmar: Thailand to engage diplomatically amid ongoing crisis
On 20 April, The Irrawaddy reported that Thailand’s Foreign Minister is scheduled to visit Myanmar, signalling continued regional diplomatic engagement despite the ongoing conflict. Reports indicate that the visit aims to address issues related to border stability, humanitarian concerns, and bilateral cooperation. Observers note that such engagement reflects the broader regional approach of maintaining dialogue with Myanmar’s military leadership while balancing concerns over the country’s political and humanitarian crisis. The development highlights the role of neighbouring countries in managing the conflict's spillover effects.
Myanmar: Military expands naval drone operations in southern Rakhine
On 20 April, The Irrawaddy reported that Myanmar’s military has stepped up the use of naval drones in southern Rakhine as part of its broader strategy to counter resistance forces. Reports indicate that these operations are aimed at strengthening surveillance and targeting capabilities in coastal regions, reflecting an expansion of drone warfare beyond aerial use. Observers note that the increasing deployment of advanced military technologies signals an intensification of the conflict, raising concerns over civilian safety and further escalation of violence. The development underscores the evolving nature of the military’s tactics amid ongoing instability.
Myanmar and Thailand: Karen organisations urge reconsideration of diplomatic engagement with junta
On 22 April, according to Mizzima, the Karen community organisations, represented by the US Campaign for Burma, sent an open letter to Thailand’s Foreign Minister ahead of his planned visit to Naypyidaw. The letter warned that the visit could legitimise Myanmar’s military-led leadership. The organisations highlighted ongoing violence since the 2021 coup, including airstrikes on civilians, displacement, and human rights abuses. They also criticised the military’s failure to implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, particularly the lack of progress in ending violence. The letter urged Thailand to reconsider the visit or use it to pressure the regime, stressing the wider regional impact of instability along the Myanmar–Thailand border.
Myanmar: Military appoints a new Air Force chief, as aerial campaigns intensify
On 22 April, according to the Irrawaddy, Myanmar’s military appointed Tun Win as the new Commander-in-Chief (Air), promoting him to the rank of general amid leadership reshuffles. His appointment reflects the increasing importance of air power in the regime’s strategy. The military has intensified its air campaign since the 2021 coup, deploying multiple aircraft in coordinated strikes across conflict areas. These operations have caused rising civilian casualties, targeting IDP camps, schools, and religious sites. Despite fuel shortages, the regime continues aerial operations, highlighting its reliance on airstrikes to counter resistance forces.
Myanmar: Repeated airstrikes hit Kan Htoo Ma village as Myanmar military intensifies operations in Sagaing Region
On 23 April, according to Mizzima, Myanmar’s military carried out repeated airstrikes on Kan Htoo Ma village in Sagaing Region, deploying multiple fighter jets in a sustained aerial operation. Reports indicate that the bombardment lasted several hours, destroying homes and injuring civilians. The attacks triggered panic among residents, forcing many to flee. The village, located in a conflict-prone area, has been targeted multiple times, with cumulative civilian casualties reported. Observers note that the incident reflects the military’s continued reliance on air power in areas linked to resistance forces. The development raises concerns over civilian protection and highlights the worsening humanitarian situation amid ongoing conflict.
Myanmar: KIA shuts key Hpakant route amid rising military tensions in Kachin State
On 23 April, according to Mizzima, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) announced the indefinite closure of the Hpakant–Namya–Kamine road, citing concerns over escalating military tensions. Reports indicate that the move is intended to block the movement of junta reinforcements and allied militia forces in the area. The closure has raised concerns among local residents, as the route serves as a key supply line for goods and fuel into Hpakant. Observers warn that prolonged disruption could increase prices and affect livelihoods. Meanwhile, tensions remain high, with reports of drone attacks, artillery use, and the risk of intensified clashes between the KIA and military forces.
Myanmar and China: Beijing increases diplomatic engagement with the military regime
On 23 April, according to Irrawaddy, China intensified diplomatic engagement with Myanmar’s military-led administration. Reports indicate that Beijing aims to safeguard its strategic and economic interests while maintaining influence amid ongoing conflict. Observers note that China’s approach reflects a pragmatic strategy focused on regional stability, infrastructure development, and connectivity. Continued engagement highlights the role of major powers in shaping Myanmar’s political trajectory despite persistent instability. The development also underscores how external actors prioritise strategic interests, even as the internal conflict remains unresolved and humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate.
The Philippines and the US: Annual joint maritime exercise launched to test Manila’s readiness in “real-world conditions across all domains”
On 20 April, Philippine armed forces chief Romeo Brawner launched the annual 18-day maritime exercise, “Balikatan,” along with the US and other allies. The exercise is the largest to date in terms of participating countries, featuring Australia’s return along with the first-time active participation of Canada, France, New Zealand, and Japan. Philippine and US forces will carry out maritime strike exercises on a remote Philippine island close to Taiwan during annual joint drills, designed to assess Manila’s readiness in “real-world conditions across all domains.” The drills will feature precision strike and interdiction operations in Philippine coastal waters, as well as integrated air and missile defence exercises, multinational maritime operations and counter-landing live-fire drills. The exercise would also involve over 17,000 troops, including 10,000 US troops, and a display of Manila’s newly acquired Philippine hardware, such as the BrahMos missiles and allied capabilities, including Japan's Type 88 anti-ship missile, Reuters reported.
South Asia
Afghanistan: Cross-border shelling kills three civilians
On 15 April, Dawn reported that two children and a woman were killed when mortar shells fired from across the Afghan border struck a house in Bajaur district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistani security sources blamed the Taliban for the attack, describing it as unprovoked aggression, and alleged the shelling followed failed attempts to infiltrate militants linked to Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The army reportedly carried out retaliatory strikes, targeting Taliban positions across the border. The incident comes amid heightened tensions following Pakistan’s ongoing military operation, which started in February, and a broader resurgence of militancy since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Despite recent China-mediated talks aimed at preventing escalation, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remain strained, with both sides trading accusations over cross-border attacks and the presence of armed groups.
Afghanistan: Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad have delayed projects involving Moscow, says a media report
On 16 April, Afghanistan International reported that Russia’s presidential envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has warned that tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban are delaying key regional projects and weakening security in the region. He noted that work on a railway and an oil refinery project involving Russia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and the Taliban has not yet begun, with the railway still in the design stage. Kabulov cautioned that any military escalation could further disrupt progress. The 573 km Trans-Afghan railway, agreed upon in February 2021, aims to connect Central Asia to South Asia via Afghanistan and was earlier expected to be completed by 2026. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov confirmed the ongoing involvement of Russian and Uzbek transport organisations. However, Russian newspaper Izvestia reported delays in feasibility studies and route changes, citing persistent security concerns and the absence of a joint security mechanism.
Afghanistan: Mohaqiq backs Durand Line as official border, diverging from Taliban stance
On 20 April, Afghanistan International reported that Afghan politician Mohammad Mohaqiq affirmed recognition of the Durand Line as the official border with Pakistan, aligning with the United Nations defined territorial boundaries. He emphasised that continued territorial claims are strategically unviable, citing Pakistan’s military strength and nuclear capability, and urged acceptance of existing geopolitical realities. Mohaqiq noted that the border dispute remains a central source of tension between the Taliban and Pakistan, as the Taliban continue to reject formal recognition of the line and reportedly maintain broader territorial claims. He also referenced the historical 1893 agreement and reiterated that international recognition now determines legitimacy, drawing on past discussions with Afghan leadership to support his stance.
Afghanistan: Pakistani artillery strikes in Kunar trigger displacement and humanitarian concerns, says a report
On 22 April, according to Afghanistan International, local sources in Asadabad, Kunar, said Pakistani forces carried out late-night mortar strikes, with no immediate reports of casualties. The shelling, which reportedly began around 23:30 hours, follows earlier artillery attacks targeting villages including Kochi, Shahbaz and Koremar in the province. Residents stated that repeated cross-border strikes have forced civilians to flee their homes and seek safer areas, with similar incidents also reported in Paktika. Taliban authorities have not yet commented on the attacks.
Afghanistan: Mass deportations from Pakistan raise rights concerns amid tightening refugee policies
On 22 April, according to Afghanistan International, the Human Rights Watch warned of a sharp escalation in deportations of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, with more than 146,000 returned in 2026 alone. The report detailed patterns of arbitrary arrests, detention during routine activities and alleged police abuses, including extortion and confiscation of belongings, even among individuals holding valid visas. It noted that the crackdown has intensified following border tensions with the Taliban and the suspension of residency document extensions, increasing insecurity among Afghan migrants. The organisation also highlighted risks faced by deportees, including journalists and activists, who may be exposed to persecution upon return. .
Afghanistan-Pakistan: Taliban offer conditional assurance on drone activity amid heightened regional tensions
On 22 April, according to Afghanistan International, Taliban sources indicated that the group has assured Pakistan it will not permit drone operations from Afghan territory that could threaten Islamabad’s security, with the message reportedly conveyed through China. The assurance comes amid heightened sensitivity in Pakistan’s internal security environment and preparations for diplomatic engagements, including possible US-Iran-related talks. Sources said Pakistan warned that its situation remains “highly sensitive” and that even minor miscalculations could trigger a strong response. The Taliban’s commitment was described as conditional, dependent on Pakistan halting airstrikes, shelling and cross-border attacks.
Afghanistan: US lawmakers oppose plan to relocate Afghan refugees to Congo, citing humanitarian concerns
On 23 April, according to Afghanistan International, US lawmakers criticised a proposal by Donald Trump’s administration to relocate Afghan refugees to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Legislators, including Juan Vargas and Ami Bera, described the plan as inhumane and a betrayal of Afghan allies who supported US operations. The proposal involves relocating around 1,100 refugees, including 400 children, currently in Qatar after being promised resettlement in the United States. Critics warned that the move forces refugees to choose between returning to Taliban ruled Afghanistan or relocating to a country facing its own humanitarian challenges.
Bangladesh: Foreign minister urges Iran to ensure the safety of the Bangladeshi vessel
On 20 April, The Dhaka Tribune reported that Bangladesh’s foreign minister has urged Iran to ensure the safety of a Bangladeshi vessel amid ongoing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. The request was made during a diplomatic engagement addressing concerns over maritime security. Officials emphasised the importance of safe passage for Bangladeshi ships and the protection of crew members operating in the region. The government is closely monitoring the situation and maintaining communication with relevant authorities. The development highlights continued concerns over shipping routes affected by regional instability.
Bhutan: Cordyceps harvest season threatens community harmony
On 22 April, according to Kuensel, a conflict emerged in Bhutan’s highland regions over the lucrative harvest of cordyceps, a high-value fungus that serves as a major source of income for local communities. The short harvesting season and rising market value have intensified competition, leading to disputes over access to collection areas. Tensions have been reported between gewogs (village blocks) and among collectors, largely due to unclear boundaries and weak enforcement of regulations. Although the government issues permits and sets restrictions, monitoring remains difficult in remote regions. The growing economic dependence on cordyceps for household expenses and education has further raised the stakes. These conflicts threaten community harmony and raise concerns about overharvesting and sustainability. In response, local authorities are attempting negotiations and calling for clearer demarcation of harvesting zones, improved regulation, and stronger conflict management to ensure both livelihoods and long-term resource conservation are protected.
Pakistan: Islamabad begins preparations for round two of US-Iran talks
On 16 April, Dawn and The Express Tribune reported that preparations are underway for a possible second round of United States-Iran talks in Islamabad, following inconclusive negotiations earlier this month. Officials indicated cautious optimism, with Donald Trump suggesting talks could resume soon, though timelines remain uncertain. Pakistan, which helped broker a temporary ceasefire, continues to serve as the primary mediator, with diplomatic and security preparations already underway. The truce remains intact, even as indirect contacts persist between Washington and Tehran to sustain dialogue and prevent renewed escalation.
Pakistan: Polio team escort killed in attack
On 16 April, Dawn reported that a police constable was killed when gunmen attacked a polio team in Dera Murad Jamali, in Balochistan. The assailants opened fire on security personnel escorting the team, killing Constable Farhan Bashir, while other members remained unharmed. Authorities said the attackers fled the scene, and a search operation is underway, with no group claiming responsibility. The incident occurred amid a nationwide vaccination campaign targeting over 45 million children and highlights ongoing security threats to health workers in Pakistan. Officials reaffirmed that the anti-polio drive would continue despite the attack, as authorities and health agencies condemned the violence and emphasised the need to protect frontline workers involved in eradication efforts.
Pakistan: Balochistan government links recent attacks to networks operating from Afghanistan
On 19 April, Dawn reported that Balochistan officials attributed recent militant attacks to networks operating from Afghanistan, alleging that fighters infiltrate across the border to carry out assaults before retreating. Authorities, including Additional Chief Secretary, Home, Hamza Shafqaat, CTD DIG Aitzaz Goraya and Special Assistant to the Home Department Babar Khan Yousafzai, said groups such as Baloch Liberation Army and Balochistan Liberation Front are increasingly using complex recruitment systems involving psychological manipulation, including the exploitation of women and vulnerable individuals. Officials cited a confessional statement linked to a past suicide attack as evidence of cross-border training and logistical support. They warned of coordinated propaganda efforts to mislead the public and obscure militant links, urging vigilance and community awareness. Security agencies reiterated that operations against such networks are ongoing, describing them as organised, transnational structures central to sustaining militancy in Balochistan and neighbouring regions.
Pakistan: Islamabad suspends USD 1.5 billion weapons agreement with Khartoum following Saudi objection
On 20 April, a Reuters exclusive report stated that Pakistan placed on hold a USD 1.5 billion agreement to supply weapons and aircraft to Sudan after Saudi Arabia withdrew its financial backing and requested that the deal be halted. The agreement, which had progressed significantly, supported by Saudi financing, was suspended after Riyadh decided not to proceed with funding the purchase. Saudi Arabia’s decision followed engagements with Sudanese military officials and came amid external pressure discouraging further involvement in the conflict. Saudi Arabia, a key ally and financial supporter of Pakistan, has reportedly been supporting Sudan’s army, while the United Arab Emirates has been accused of supporting opposing forces, a claim it denies. Additionally, another proposed defence agreement valued at USD 4 billion between Pakistan and Libya’s National Army is reportedly under review as Saudi Arabia reassesses its position. Neither Pakistani nor Saudi authorities have issued official statements regarding the suspension.
Pakistan: Joint operation targets TTP militants in city outskirts of Peshawar
On 20 April, Dawn reported that Pakistani security forces conducted a coordinated intelligence-based operation against Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in the Hassan Khel area near Peshawar and Kohat, following a surge in attacks on law enforcement. The joint offensive involved police, army, Frontier Corps, and Counter-Terrorism Department units, supported by drone surveillance, anti-drone systems, and sniper teams. Officials said several militants were killed or injured and hideouts destroyed during the operation, which also included repairing infrastructure damaged by previous attacks. The action follows recent incidents, including the abduction and killing of police personnel in the area. Authorities reiterated their commitment to eliminating militancy through sustained joint efforts, as Hassan Khel remains a key hotspot for insurgent activity along the Peshawar-Kohat border.
Pakistan: Attacks kill three police personnel in Balochistan
On 20 April, Dawn reported that three police personnel, including a female constable, were killed and several others injured in separate militant attacks in Balochistan’s Khuzdar and Mastung districts. In Khuzdar, armed assailants ambushed a police team during a raid, killing Lady Constable Malik Naz and Constable Sami Ullah and injuring others, including a senior officer. In a separate clash in Mastung, an Anti-Terrorism Force official was killed, and four personnel were injured in an exchange of fire with suspected militants. Authorities said the attackers also suffered casualties, though details remain unclear. The incidents highlight persistent insecurity in the province, where security forces continue to face targeted attacks despite ongoing counterterrorism operations aimed at curbing militant activity.
Pakistan: Four militants killed in two separate operations; one police officer killed in KP
On 20 April, The Express Tribune reported that four militants were killed and one police officer martyred in two separate intelligence-based operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the first operation in Bannu, the ISPR confirmed the killing of two Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants, including the ring leader Waheedullah alias Muktiar, described as one of the most wanted terrorists and identified as the main handler of the suicide bomber responsible for the martyrdom of Lieutenant Colonel Gul Faraz in February 2026. A suicide jacket, weapons, and ammunition were recovered. In a separate CTD operation in the Akhundan forest area near the Bannu border in Lakki Marwat, two militants were killed, including highly wanted commander Amir Sohail alias Aqabi, wanted in multiple cases of targeted killings and attacks on security forces. Frontier Reserve Police Constable Atiqur Rehman was martyred during the operation. President Asif Ali Zardari and PM Shehbaz Sharif commended the security forces, with Zardari noting that Pakistan's enemies sought to undermine its peace efforts through terrorism.
Pakistan: Six militants killed in Khyber and Bannu
On 22 April, Dawn reported that security forces killed six militants in separate counter-terrorism operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Khyber and Bannu districts. Five militants were killed in a major operation in Akkakhel, Bara, after intelligence indicated fighters from the Tirah Valley had regrouped near Peshawar. Officials said the operation prioritised civilian safety, noting drones and quadcopters were deliberately avoided to minimise collateral damage. In a separate raid in Bannu, forces killed a wanted militant, Naeemat Wazir alias “Grenade,” described as a key figure in regional violence. Authorities said an “intense exchange of fire” preceded his death. (“Six terrorists killed in Khyber, Bannu operations,” Dawn, 22 April 2026)
Pakistan: Airspace ban on India extended until 24 May
On 21 April, Dawn reported that the Pakistan Airport Authority (PAA) extended its ban on Indian aircraft using Pakistan’s airspace until 24 May 2026, marking a full year of restrictions. A Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) confirmed that all Indian-registered, operated, and military flights remain barred from both the Karachi and Lahore flight information regions. The move follows escalating tensions between Pakistan and India after a deadly 2025 attack in Pahalgam, which New Delhi blamed on Islamabad - an allegation Pakistan denied while offering a neutral investigation. Since then, both countries have closed their airspace to each other.
Pakistan: Authorities detain Afghan family as deportations cross 5600
On 22 April, Dawn reported that law enforcement agencies in Rawalpindi detained a 15-member Afghan family, including children, as part of an ongoing crackdown on undocumented migrants, transferring them to a repatriation centre for deportation to Afghanistan. Authorities said more than 5673 Afghan nationals had been deported since the expiry of the voluntary return deadline. Officials have also directed agencies to maintain “accurate, comprehensive and consolidated records” of all repatriations, whether voluntary or enforced. Data collection is being coordinated and verified by the Counter-Terrorism Department to strengthen migration management and law enforcement planning.
Pakistan: India has failed to provide evidence linking Pakistan to Pahalgam attack, says Info Minister Tarar
On 22 April, Dawn reported that Information Minister Attaullah Tarar said India had failed to provide evidence linking Pakistan to the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, which killed 26 people in Pahalgam. Marking the attack’s anniversary, Tarar questioned the rapid filing of the FIR and India’s rejection of a neutral probe, alleging the incident “may have been a false flag operation”. He added that Pakistan had expressed sympathy for the victims while remaining a victim of terrorism itself. The attack triggered a sharp escalation, including India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and cross-border strikes before a US-brokered ceasefire. Tarar warned that any future “misadventure” would receive a “firm, decisive and swift response,” amid continuing tensions and competing narratives between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
Middle East and Africa
THE MIDDLE EAST
Lebanon: A UN peacekeeper gets killed in a shooting in Beirut
On 18 April, The Straits Times reported that a French UN peacekeeper was killed and three others wounded in southern Lebanon during a road-clearing mission, in what officials say was a likely attack by Hezbollah. The troops were part of the UNIFIL force. Following which, President Emmanuel Macron condemned the incident, calling it “unacceptable,” while initial UN findings pointed to a deliberate ambush by non-state actors. France has urged Lebanese authorities to take action as investigations continue into the attack.
Lebanon: Israel warns Lebanese citizens not to return to areas marked by new maps
On 20 April, Reuters reported that Israel told residents of Southern Lebanon not to enter the belt of territory running the length of the Israel-Lebanon border and to stay away from the Litani River. This announcement comes after a ten-day ceasefire took effect between Israel and Hezbollah. However, the ceasefire remains fragile due to the presence of Israeli troops in Southern Lebanon, which aims to create a buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Israeli military published a map on social media which displayed a red line through twenty-one villages and said that no one should move into the area between the line and the border. This map also marked fifty other villages which civilians should avoid. The Israeli military published another map which marked its new deployment line in Lebanon. This line lies ten kilometres deep in Lebanese territory. Mahmoud Qmati, a senior Hezbollah official, told the residents of the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut not to return to their homes because of risks of Israeli strikes.
Lebanon: Beirut seeks ceasefire extension and UN presence
On 23 April, Reuters reported that Lebanon will seek an extension of the ongoing ceasefire with Israel during US-hosted talks in Washington, as the current truce is set to expire. Lebanese officials stated that extending the ceasefire is necessary to reduce violence and create conditions for broader negotiations. The talks involving envoys from both sides are part of a rare direct engagement aimed at managing tensions between Israel and Hezbollah. Lebanon is expected to raise concerns over Israeli military actions in southern areas and push for issues such as Israeli withdrawal, detainee returns and border arrangements in future discussions. Hezbollah supports extending the ceasefire but opposes direct negotiations, while Israel aims to weaken Hezbollah and improve security. At the same time, the United Nations is considering maintaining a continued though smaller presence in Lebanon after the UNIFIL mission ends in December 2026. Ongoing consultations are expected to lead to recommendations to the UN Security Council by June. Renewed violence since March 2026 and rising instability have increased concerns about the fragile ceasefire. Lebanon has said it prefers the UN to remain, even in a smaller role, to avoid a possible security vacuum, despite financial challenges affecting UN peacekeeping operations.
The War in Gaza: Board of Peace advances Gaza reconstruction discussions; Gaza municipal elections to test Hamas’ public support
On 22 April, Reuters reported that representatives of US President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace” (BOP) have held discussions with Dubai-based logistics company DP World regarding potential involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction. The talks explored a possible partnership in which DP World would manage logistics and supply chains for goods entering Gaza, including humanitarian aid and commercial cargo through warehousing, cargo tracking and security systems. Discussions also examined proposals to build a new port either in Gaza or along Egypt’s Mediterranean coast and to establish a free-trade zone to support economic recovery. Meanwhile, BOP envoy Nickolay Mladenov stated that negotiations on the Gaza peace plan must move quickly despite challenges in talks with Hamas. The proposal, supported by the UN Security Council, includes the disarmament of militant groups, the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the launch of large-scale reconstruction efforts. Gaza’s rebuilding is estimated to cost more than USD 70 billion after two years of conflict severely damaged infrastructure.
Separately, Reuters reported that residents of Deir al-Balah are preparing to vote in municipal elections, marking one of the first local electoral exercises in Gaza in many years. The vote is seen as an indicator of public sentiment toward Hamas, which has governed the territory since 2007. Although Hamas has officially boycotted the election due to disagreements with the Palestinian Authority (PA) over the voting framework, several candidates perceived as pro-Hamas are contesting. Around 70,000 eligible voters are expected to participate. Analysts say the results may offer a rare indication of Hamas’s grassroots support after the devastating conflict that began with the group’s 2023 attack on Israel. The elections are also viewed as part of broader efforts by the PA to maintain political continuity and include Gaza in the wider Palestinian political process.
Turkey and the US: Ankara warns Washington's potential withdrawal from European security architecture to be 'destructive'
On 18 April, Reuters reported that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said discussions are underway on managing a potential withdrawal of the US from Europe’s security architecture. Further cautioning, it could be “destructive” if uncoordinated. Speaking at a forum in Antalya, he urged allies to prepare for reduced US involvement while using upcoming NATO talks to reset ties with Washington. Furthermore, Fidan also criticised divisions within NATO, accusing EU members of acting independently. Meanwhile, NATO chief Mark Rutte acknowledged US frustrations, as reports suggest Donald Trump has considered reducing US troop presence in Europe.
THE US-IRAN WAR
DAY 47
Top American officials say that the US is ready to resume combat operations against Iran, reports Reuters
On 16 April, Reuters reported that the US armed forces are prepared to resume combat operations against Iran if a peace deal is not reached. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, in a briefing to the Pentagon, warned Iran against making poor choices which could lead the US to bomb its power and energy infrastructure. He added that the US also has intelligence about the movement of Iran's military assets. Furthermore, General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that US armed forces were ready to launch major operations at "a moment's notice." He added that the US Navy would intercept any ship which refuses to comply with the American blockade of Iran, in both Iran's territorial waters and international Iranian-flagged waters. He said that so far, thirteen ships had chosen to turn around instead of breaking the blockade. The Trump administration on Wednesday had expressed optimism about reaching a deal with Iran while applying economic pressure through a naval blockade against Iranian-flagged vessels or any other vessel attempting to provide material support to Iran.
DAY 48
Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz following Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire
On 17 April, Reuters reported that Iran's Foreign Minister, Seyed Abbas Araqchi, has declared the Strait of Hormuz open. This declaration follows a US-brokered ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah. Earlier Tehran had cited Israeli strikes on Lebanon as the reason for not reopening the Strait. In a post on X, Mr Araqchi said that the Strait was open for all commercial vessels after the US brokered a ten day truce in Lebanon. He added that all vessels must follow the sea route which was announced by Iran's Ports and Maritime Organisation. US President Donald Trump acknowledged the reopening of the Strait in a post on Truth Social. He added that USA's naval blockade will remain in effect until negotiations with Iran are completed.
President Trump expects the US-Iran war to end soon as negotiations progress
On 17 April, Reuters reported that US President Donald Trump said that he believes that the US-Iran war could end soon. However he didn't clarify the exact timing. In a post on Truth Social, where President Trump declared that the US will not lift its blockade of Iran until their transaction is complete, he said that should happen quickly since most points were already negotiated. However, Iranian sources said that some gaps between Iran and US still need to be resolved before a preliminary deal could be struck. A Pakistani source informed Reuters that there was some progress through backdoor diplomacy. He added that the next meeting could lead to a memorandum of understanding followed by a deal within sixty days. Iran has demanded upliftment of sanctions while the US is concerned with Iran's nuclear program. Furthermore, an Iranian source said that the US had agreed to unfreeze Iranian assets worth billions of dollars.
France and Britain are to chair a meeting to discuss the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz
On 17 April, Reuters reported that France and Britain will chair a meeting on Friday of around forty countries aimed at signaling to the United States that some of its closest allies are ready to play a role in restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz once conditions allow. President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni will attend the meeting in Paris, while officials from across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East will join by video conference. Since the start of the war on 28 February, Iran has kept the Strait closed to all vessels except its own. On Monday, Washington announced a blockade on ships leaving the Iranian ports after peace talks in Islamabad failed. Trump has encouraged other countries to also participate in the blockade and has criticized the NATO countries for abstaining from it. However, Britain, France, and others have stated that joining the blockade would amount to entering the war. The meeting aims to reaffirm full diplomatic support for unfettered freedom of navigation through the strait and the need to respect international law. It will also address the economic challenges facing the shipping industry, discuss safety measures for the twenty thousand stranded seafarers and commercial vessels, and outline preparations for deploying a strictly defensive multinational military mission to ensure freedom of navigation. However, a statement from the Chair of the meeting is required to spell out what such a mission could entail.
DAY 49
US forces turn back 23 vessels to Iran amid naval blockade
On 18 April, the US military announced that 23 ships had complied with orders from American forces and turned back toward Iran since imposing the naval blockade on Iranian ports and coastal areas. On 13 April, the United States imposed a blockade after the collapse of peace talks in Islamabad, which aimed at ending the ongoing Iran war. It specifically targets vessels entering or departing Iranian ports along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman (including areas near the Strait of Hormuz), while allowing ships transiting the strait to or from non-Iranian ports to pass freely.
Iran strengthens control over the Strait of Hormuz as ships report gunfire
On 18 April, Reuters reported that Iran stated it was tightening control over the Strait of Hormuz on Saturday, and at least two vessels reported coming under fire while trying to transit the waterway. Tehran has responded to the US blockade by calling it a violation of the ceasefire. Iran had initially announced its temporary reopening of the Strait following a US-brokered ten-day ceasefire agreement on Thursday between Israel and Lebanon after Israel invaded parts of Southern Lebanon. However, on Saturday, Iran's armed forces command declared that transit through the strait had reverted to a state of strict Iranian military control due to what it described as repeated US violations and acts of “piracy” under the guise of a blockade. According to maritime security and shipping sources, some merchant vessels received radio messages from Iran’s navy stating no ships were allowed through the waterway, and at least two vessels reported being hit by gunfire as they attempted to cross the strait. Iran's deputy foreign minister, Saeed Khatibzadeh, stated that no date had been set for the next round of negotiations. At the same time, Trump has told Reuters there would probably be ?more direct talks between Iran and the US this weekend, which some diplomats have declared unlikely. Trump also added that the US blockade of Iranian ports would continue.
DAY 51
US-Iran Peace Talks: Tehran rejects talks following Washington’s blockade of Hormuz and seizure of an Iranian vessel
On 20 April, Reuters reported that Tehran will abstain from the peace negotiations in Islamabad as the two-week ceasefire is set to expire. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei stated that the US has “violated the ceasefire from the beginning of its implementation,” citing Washington's naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the US’ capture of an Iranian vessel that attempted to breach the blockade. Security sources stated that chief negotiator Field Marshal Asim Munir had informed President Trump that the blockade would be a major obstacle to the talks. Baghaei also underscored that Tehran’s 10-point proposal, submitted prior to the first round of talks, will remain the basis for all negotiations and that Iran will “respond accordingly,” in the event of further aggression from the US or Israel. He accused Washington of showing a lack of seriousness toward diplomacy, stressing that Tehran would not change its stated demands and does not accept deadlines or ultimatums in matters concerning its national interests.
DAY 53
The US: Washington seizes Iran-linked tanker in international waters as truce deadline nears
On 21 April, the US military stated that it had seized a tanker linked to Iran in international waters, reflecting continued enforcement of its blockade as the two-week truce was coming close to expiring. According to Reuters, Washington expressed confidence that peace talks with Iran may proceed in Pakistan, with Tehran reportedly considering participation. However, time was running out as the deadline neared. The US military confirmed that it boarded the tanker Tifani “without incident.” The vessel, capable of carrying two million barrels of crude, was located near Sri Lanka and had indicated Singapore as its destination. The US Central Command stated: “As we have made clear, we will pursue global maritime enforcement efforts to disrupt illicit networks and interdict sanctioned vessels providing material support to Iran — anywhere they operate.” Iran did not comment on the boarding; however, media reports suggest this could challenge peace talks arrangements. Tehran said that the blockade of its ports constitutes a US violation of the truce and that it will not negotiate while the blockade is in place.
The US-Iran Peace talks: President Trump says Tehran has "no choice but to send" delegates to Pakistan
On 21 April, the BBC reported that President Trump stated Iran has “no choice but to send” delegates to Pakistan for talks with the US. In an interview with CNBC, he reportedly expressed confidence that Washington would “end up with a great deal.” He described the naval blockade as a “tremendous success” and, when asked about extending the ceasefire, he stated: “I don't want to do that.” Trump later stated that: “I expect to be bombing 'cause that would be a better attitude.” According to Reuters, Tehran had not yet decided on its participation in the second round of peace talks in Islamabad. Pakistan officials noted that, if delegations attend, they are unlikely to arrive before 22 April, leaving only limited time to secure an agreement before the two-week truce expires. President Trump has warned of resuming hostilities, including potential attacks on Iran’s civilian infrastructure, if his terms are not accepted. An initial round of talks held ten days earlier failed to result in an agreement. Subsequently, Tehran showed reluctance to engage in a second round this week, referring to the US’ refusal to lift its blockade and its seizure of an Iranian cargo vessel.
The War in Iran is generating the worst energy crisis in history, says IEA head
On 21 April, the head of the International Energy Agency (IEA) stated that the conflict between Iran, Israel, and the US is generating the worst energy crisis ever faced by the world. He noted that “the crisis is already huge, if you combine the effects of the petrol crisis and the gas crisis with Russia,” pointing to the overlapping pressures on global energy markets. The war has disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a key route for roughly one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows. These disruptions compound earlier shocks from the War in Ukraine, which limited Russian gas supplies to Europe. The IEA chief had earlier assessed the situation as more severe than the crises of 1973, 1979, and 2022 combined. In March, the IEA authorised the release of 400 million barrels of oil from strategic stockpiles to stabilise rising oil prices.
DAY 54
The US-Iran Ceasefire: Trump extends ceasefire indefinitely ahead of new round of negotiations; Tehran undecided on further talks
On 22 April, CNN reported that President Trump indefinitely extended the ceasefire with Iran on the eve of its expiry, and that a new round of talks were on hold. Trump asserted that Iran wanted the Strait of Hormuz open “so they can make $500 Million Dollars a day.” He further claimed that “Iran is collapsing financially!,” and is “starving for cash.” Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Esmaeil Baghaei, stated that Tehran is yet to decide whether to participate in the new round of talks, as Washington “has shown disregard and lack of good faith.”
Iran: Tehran seizes and redirects two vessels in the Strait of Hormuz after attacks are halted
On April 22, Reuters reported that Iran seized two ships in the Strait of Hormuz after President Trump extended the ceasefire indefinitely. The Hindu also reported that one of the vessels was headed to Gujarat’s Mudra port while the second ship was Liberia-flagged Epaminoda. Iran's semi-official news agency Tasnim, said that the Revolutionary Guards had seized two vessels for maritime violations and escorted them to the Iranian shores. This marks the first time Iran has seized ships since the war began in the last week of February. The Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy also cautioned that any act that may be considered a disruption to the order and safety in the strait would be considered a "red line”. Despite this, shipping executives at the FT commodities global summit said that Asian ship owners may begin to sail through the Strait of Hormuz soon amidst a fragile U.S.-Iran ceasefire as they have a higher tolerance to risk. They likely can also manage to pay the tolls. This is unlike the western firms that are more inclined to comply with the sanctions that are imposed.
The US: Washington adopts Ukrainian counter-drone technology after Iranian strikes
On 22 April, Reuters reported that the United States military has begun using Ukrainian counter-drone technology at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia following the repeated Iranian drone and missile attacks on regional targets. The system, known as Sky Map, is a Ukrainian command and control platform designed to detect the incoming drones and coordinate counter-attacks using the interceptor drones. Ukrainian military personnel have recently arrived at the base to train US troops in operating this system. This move reflects Ukraine’s rapid advances in drone and counter-drone technologies developed during its war with Russia, where such systems have been widely used against Iranian-designed Shahed drones. Analysts had noted that the adoption of Ukrainian technology also highlights the existing gaps in US air and missile defence coverage. The base, which is located at about 640 kilometres from Iran, has faced several drone and missile attacks that damaged aircraft and infrastructure and resulted in casualties among US personnel.
DAY 55
The US and Iran: Iran tightens control over the strait following the collapse of peace talks; US forces interdict a sanctioned vessel in the Indian Ocean; Trump orders the US Navy to “shoot and kill any boat”
On 23 April, Reuters reported that Iran showed tightened control over the Strait of Hormuz after the collapse of peace talks. It released footage of commandos boarding commercial vessels, including the MSC Francesca, after claiming their seizure on 22 April. Iranian officials stated that ships crossing without permits had "faced the law.” The vice speaker of parliament also stated that the first revenue from the newly imposed transit tolls had been transferred to the central bank. Reuters reported that Iran has effectively restricted passage through the strait, linking any reopening to the lifting of the US blockade on its shipping.Meanwhile, the BBC reported that US forces have interdicted a sanctioned vessel that is transporting oil from Iran, reflecting the continued enforcement efforts. According to the defence department: "US forces carried out a maritime interdiction and right-of-visit boarding of the sanctioned stateless vessel M/T Majestic X transporting oil from Iran in the Indian Ocean.” Further, President Trump stated on Truth Social that "I have ordered the United States Navy to shoot and kill any boat, small boats though they may be... that is putting mines in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz.” "There is to be no hesitation,” he added. In this backdrop, negotiations remain stalled, with Iranian officials refraining from sending a delegation over the US blockade, alongside other reasons, as highlighted by media reports.
Africa This Week
Burkina Faso dissolves over 100 civil society groups
On 17 April, Al Jazeera reported that Burkina Faso’s military government ordered the dissolution of more than 100 civil society organisations, intensifying a broader crackdown on dissent. Authorities, under military leader Ibrahim Traoré, said the move complied with existing laws, but rights groups condemned it as a violation of fundamental freedoms. The decision follows earlier measures including the dissolution of political parties and tighter restrictions on NGOs, unions, and public assembly. Amnesty International described the action as a “flagrant attack” onfreedom of association and part of a wider pattern of repression involving intimidation, arrests, and legal constraints on activists. The government has justified such measures on security grounds amid its fight against armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL, though critics argue
they are aimed at silencing opposition and consolidating military rule.
DRC: Government and M23 agree on humanitarian measures
On 19 April, Al Jazeera reported that talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo government and M23 rebels resulted in agreements to ease aid access, release prisoners within 10 days, and avoid targeting civilians, according to a joint statement shared by the United States Department of State. The measures, reached after five days of negotiations in Switzerland, also include the creation of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism to verify compliance and build confidence. Despite a US-brokered peace deal in December, fighting has continued in eastern DRC, particularly in South Kivu, where humanitarian conditions remain dire. Rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, have accused both sides of blocking aid and restricting civilian movement. Mediators, including Qatar, Switzerland, and the African Union, are pushing for sustained progress amid a conflict that has persisted for decades.
DRC: US considering sending 1000 Afghan allies to DR Congo, according to NYT
On 22 April, Africa News reported that the administration of Donald Trump is considering relocating more than 1,000 Afghan allies to the Democratic Republic of the Congo instead of the United States, according to the New York Times and to the AfghanEvac non-profit. The proposal involves up to 1,100 Afghans currently stranded in Qatar, many of whom worked with US forces during the Afghanistan war, including interpreters and their families. Over 400 are children, and many have already spent more than a year awaiting resettlement. The move follows the suspension of a programme that previously allowed their entry into the US. Advocacy groups argue that around 900 are already eligible for resettlement and urge Washington to admit them, warning that sending them to a conflict-affected country risks further instability and raises humanitarian concerns.
Burundi: Hundreds of Congolese refugees repatriated from Burundi
On 24 April, Africa News reported that hundreds of refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo were voluntarily repatriated from Burundi’s Busuma camp in Buhumuza Province, amid ongoing conflict in eastern Congo. Many cited harsh living conditions, with one returnee saying, “there are diseases…it’s hard to get water and food; it’s a real mess.” The repatriation, organised by the UNHCR, remains strictly voluntary, with officials stressing that only those able to return to relatively secure areas are eligible. The camp hosts tens of thousands displaced by fighting involving the M23, which has driven mass displacement across the region, with over 100,000 refugees in Burundi alone.
UAE-linked Colombian mercenaries backed RSF in Sudan, says report
On 22 April, BBC reported that a new investigation by the Conflict Insights Group (CIG) alleged that Colombian mercenaries backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) played a critical role in supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) during its capture of el-Fasher in Sudan. The report, based on mobile phone tracking, flight data, and satellite imagery, claimed mercenaries travelled via a UAE military facility in Abu Dhabi and later operated drones from RSF-held areas. CIG director Justin Lynch said the findings “prove UAE involvement with certainty,” though Abu Dhabi has denied backing the RSF. The offensive on el-Fasher - described by investigators as bearing “hallmarks of genocide” - highlighted the role of foreign support in sustaining Sudan’s civil war, with analysts noting such external involvement has significantly prolonged and intensified the conflict.
518 killed in Tanzania post-election unrest, inquiry finds
On 23 April, BBC News reported that a commission of inquiry in Tanzania found that 518 people died from “unnatural causes” following widespread protests after the October 2025 elections. Commission chairman Mohamed Chande Othman said the deaths stemmed from “long-standing issues” such as unemployment, political grievances, and social tensions, but did not assign responsibility, recommending further investigations. Opposition groups and rights organisations have accused security forces of a violent crackdown, while President Samia Suluhu Hassan - who won 98 per cent of the vote - maintained the election was fair and blamed “foreigners” for the unrest. Critics have questioned the commission’s independence, arguing it lacks impartiality, as the findings highlight deep-rooted tensions in Tanzania’s political landscape.
Sahel rift deepens as Mali & Niger accuse neighbours of backing militants
On 23 April, Africa News reported that tensions in West Africa escalated as Mali and Niger accused neighbouring states and foreign actors of supporting armed groups in the Sahel. Speaking at a forum in Senegal, Mali’s foreign minister alleged some states were “harbouring” militants, while Niger’s counterpart said certain partners were “fuelling and sustaining” violence, later pointing to France. The accusations come as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso deepen their break from ECOWAS after recent coups, forming a separate alliance. Despite rising rhetoric, Mali signalled that limited cooperation with ECOWAS remains possible, even as jihadist violence continues to destabilise the region.
Europe and the Americas
The War in Ukraine: Russia launches deadly wave of attacks
On April 16, Reuters reported that Russia launched its most intense and deadly wave of attacks on Ukraine in 2026, carrying out overnight drone and missile strikes that killed at least 17 people, including a 12-year-old child, and injured around 100 others, with the toll expected to rise. The heaviest damage occurred in major cities such as Kyiv, Odesa, and Dnipro, where residential buildings, apartment blocks, and a hotel were hit, triggering large fires and leaving debris scattered across urban areas. Emergency crews worked through smoke-filled streets as residents reacted with fear and grief over the rising civilian casualties. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy condemned the attacks and urged stronger international support, emphasising that Russia should face continued sanctions and pressure rather than normalisation. Russia, however, stated that its strikes were aimed at Ukraine’s energy systems and military-related production facilities. At the same time, Ukraine carried out a counterattack using drones on the Russian Black Sea port city of Tuapse, where two people, including a teenage girl, were killed, several others were injured, and a major fire broke out at an oil-related facility. The events highlight a sharp escalation in the conflict, with both sides increasing strikes and civilian impacts growing more severe.
The War in Ukraine: Export disruptions and drone strikes hit Russia’s oil production
On 21 April, Reuters reported that Russia reduced oil production by about 300,000 to 400,000 barrels per day, marking the sharpest monthly drop since the COVID-19 pandemic. The decline was mainly due to Ukrainian drone attacks on key Russian oil infrastructure, including major export ports such as Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk and Vysotsk, which disrupted the country’s ability to ship crude oil. The shutdown of the Druzhba pipeline, one of the last remaining routes supplying Russian oil to parts of Europe, also contributed to the decline. In addition, seasonal refinery maintenance further limited the processing capacity. Despite the fall in output, rising global oil prices linked to geopolitical tensions, including the conflict involving Iran, could partly offset Russia’s revenue losses and help ease pressure on its budget. However, analysts noted that continued infrastructure damage and export disruptions could affect Russia’s ability to maintain production levels. The International Energy Agency has also lowered its forecast for Russia’s oil supply for the rest of the year. (“Russia cuts oil output in April, sources say,” Reuters, 21 April 2026).
The War in Ukraine: EU approves EUR 90 billion loan to support Ukraine, however, funding gap remains high
On 23 April, Reuters reported that the European Union has approved a EUR 90 billion loan to support Ukraine’s economy and war efforts, offering critical financial relief as the conflict with Russia continues. The loan is expected to help Ukraine avoid major cuts to public services and sustain military spending, with funds disbursed in 2026 and the remainder in 2027. However, analysts note that Ukraine’s financial needs remain significantly higher than current estimates, with additional funding required for defence and infrastructure repairs. Despite support from the EU, the International Monetary Fund and other partners, Ukraine continues to face a funding shortfall, with the existing aid covering only part of its military and domestic needs. The loan approval followed the resolution of political disagreements within the EU, particularly after Hungary lifted its veto. Officials emphasised that while the loan provides short-term stability, sustained international assistance will be necessary to support Ukraine’s long-term recovery and war effort.
Russia: Moscow claims new territorial gains in Ukraine
On 21 April, Reuters reported that Russia’s top military commander said Russian forces had captured about 1,700 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and around 80 settlements since the start of 2026. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, stated that Russian troops are advancing towards key Ukrainian defensive positions in the Donbas region, often described as Ukraine’s “fortress belt.” These include the cities of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostiantynivka. He said Russian forces are already fighting in parts of Kostiantynivka and are positioned about 7 to 12 kilometres from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Gerasimov also claimed that Russian troops are advancing in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv region and the northern Sumy region to establish what Moscow calls a “security zone.” Moreover, Reuters noted that the claims could not be independently verified, and pro-Ukrainian maps suggest Russia’s territorial gains this year are closer to about 600 square kilometres. However, pro-Ukrainian maps show that Russia currently controls roughly 19.35 per cent of Ukraine’s territory.
The US and Afghan Refugees: Washington to resettle 1,100 Afghan refugees in Congo
On 22 April, Reuters reported that the Trump administration and the Democratic Republic of Congo is considering the resettlement of 1,100 Afghans stranded in Qatar who fled the Taliban and are awaiting US visas. Shawn VanDiver, founder and president of the advocacy organisation #AfghanEvac, described the resettlement plan as unacceptable given the persistent security crisis in Congo, and that he had been briefed about the plan by US officials. "I worry that this is just a way for State to wash their hands of these folks, many of whom are women, children, and family of U.S. military, that will ultimately result in them becoming stateless or having to go back to ?certain death in Afghanistan," VanDiver said. “Why would you go from the world’s No. 1 refugee crisis to the world’s No. 2 refugee crisis?” he added. The Afghan nationals stranded at Camp As Sayliyah in Qatar are largely people who worked alongside US forces during Washington’s war in Afghanistan and fled Kabul after the Taliban takeover in 2021. The resettlement was halted following the Trump administration's 2025 executive order that placed a blanket ban in all refugee admissions.
The US and the Afrikaners: The Trump administration aims to expand the intake of Afrikaners under the refugee programme
On 23 April, Reuters reported that Donald Trump’s administration aims to double the annual refugee limit to bring in White South African refugees into the country. Trump’s policies have usually featured pausing refugee administration from around the world, as reflected since he took office in January 2025. However, in a few weeks of assuming office, the President issued an executive order to prioritise the resettlement of the Afrikaners of European descent. Trump has often claimed that they face prejudice and persecution on the basis of their race. The South African government has strongly refuted the President’s claims. The US Refugee Admissions Program was formally established in 1980 due to refugees fleeing the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia. Trump has, however, used it almost exclusively to bring white South Africans into the US. Officials in the US have also planned to increase the refugee cap from 7500 to 10000 to accommodate more whites.
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C Shraddha, Vaishak Sreekumar, Kumari Krishna, Nova Karun K
IPRI Team
GP Team
PR Team
IPRI Team
Nupur Priya
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Prajwal TV
Kavithasri M
IPRI Team
Ashna Pathak & Surangana Rajya Laxmi Rana
Anu Maria Joseph
Ayan Datta
Samruddhi Pathak
Femy Francis
IPRI Team
Abhiruchi Chowdhury
GP Team
Nuha Aamina
Rohini Reenum
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Ayan Datta
S Shaji
Vetriselvi Baskaran
Anu Maria Joseph
Ayan Datta
Advik S Mohan
GP Team
Advik S Mohan
Advik S Mohan
IPRI Team
Rohit Paswan
Padmashree Anandhan
Ayan Datta
Shreya Jagadeesan
Bishwarupa Kar
Saritha VK & Mahesh Mohan
Sruthy
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
Advik S Mohan
GP Team
Advik S Mohan
Neha Tresa George
IPRI Team
Samruddhi Pathak
Neha Tresa George
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
Ayan Datta
Vetriselvi Baskaran
Sayeka Ghosh
GP Team
Neha Tresa George
Advik S Mohan
Samruddhi Pathak
Padmashree Anandhan
Ramya B
Sim V
Pummy Lathigara
Ronakk Tijoriwala
Arya Madhavan S
Ankita Chakra
Rianne Rajath P
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Anu Maria Joseph
Ayan Datta
Anu Maria Joseph
Vetriselvi Baskaran
GP Team
Swagathi Annabel
Bishwarupa Kar
Prajwal T V
Ayush Bhattacharjee
Shifa Moideen
IPRI Team
Vetriselvi Baskaran
L S Hareesh
Mugdha Chaturvedi
Ken B Varghese
Ayan Datta
Vaneeta
Pummy Lathigara
Ms Ramya
Nivetha B
Leivon Victor Lamkang
Siddhima M
Pranesh Selvaraj
Dhriti Mukherjee
GP Team
Nandini Khandelwal
Prajwal T V
Ramya B
Ronakk Tijoriwala
Govind Anoop
Shreya Jagadeesan
Rohit Paswan
Nupur Priya
Neha Tresa George
Shilpa Joseph
Vetriselvi Baskaran
Vetriselvi Baskaran
IPRI Team
Dhriti Mukherjee
Dhriti Mukherjee
Rohini Reenum
GP Team
Shilpa Jospeh
Samruddhi Pathak
Sayeka Ghosh
Govind Anoop
Ayan Datta
Vetriselvi Baskaran
Neha Tresa George
Padmashree Anandhan
Diya Madhavan
GP Team
Vetriselvi Baskaran
Vaneeta
Dhriti Mukherjee
Ashwini Barla
Ayan Datta
Karthik Manoharan
Ramya B
Prajwal T V
IPRI Team
GP Team
Vaneeta
Sayeka Ghosh
Ayan Datta
Karthik Manoharan
Prajwal TV
Mayank Bharti
Ronakk Tijoriwala
Deepika Seervi
Ayan Datta & Sayeka Ghosh
Vetriselvi Baskaran
Anu Maria Joseph
Anu Maria Joseph
Vetriselvi Baskaran
Anu Maria Joseph
Jerry Franklin A
Anu Maria Joseph
Anu Maria Joseph
IPRI Team
Dhriti Mukherjee
Prajwal T V
Rohini Reenum
GP Team
IPRI Team
Vetriselvi Baskaran
Dhriti Mukherjee
IPRI Team
Anu Maria Joseph
Padmashree Anandhan
Ronakk Tijoriwala
Neha Tresa George
Shilpa Joseph and Ken Varghese
IPRI Team
Femy Francis
IPRI Team
Dhriti Mukherjee
Torunika Roy
GP Team
LS Hareesh
IPRI Team
Femy Francis
Dhriti Mukherjee
IPRI Team
Mugdha Chaturvedi
Dhriti Mukherjee
By young scholars of NIAS Course on Global Politics: Contemporary World Order and Theories. Compiled by Sayeka Ghosh.
Akhil Ajith
By the NIAS-IPRI Course scholars on Contemporary Conflicts, Peace Processes, Theories and Thinkers. Compiled by Ayan Datta.
Vaneeta
Kavithasri M
Mallika Joseph
Rohini Reenum
Padmashree Anandhan
Tiara Marie Warjri
GP Team
Akhil Ajith
Femy Francis
Femy Francis
Akhil Ajith
Akhil Ajith
Dhriti Mukherjee
IPRI Team
D Suba Chandran
Padmashree Anandhan
Femy Francis
Akhil Ajith
Dhriti Mukherjee
Rohini Reenum
GP Team
Dhriti Mukherjee
D Suba Chandran
Rohini Reenum
Dhriti Mukherjee
NIAS South Asia Team
NIAS South Asia Team
Devi Chandana M
Alka Bala
D Suba Chandran
Rohini Reenum
Dhriti Mukherjee
Rohini Reenum
Dhriti Mukherjee
GP Team
IPRI Team
Lakshmi Karlekar
GP Team
Sayeka Ghosh
IPRI Team
Karthik Manoharan
Nupur Priya
GP Team
Dhriti Mukherjee
Femy Francis
IPRI Team
Vaneeta
Arya Prasad
Sayeka Ghosh
Ramya B
Alka Bala
GP Team
Diya Madhavan
IPRI Team
GP Team
Femy Francis
IPRI Team
Ramya B
NIAS South Asia Team
Devi Chandana M
Padmashree Anandhan
Rosemary Kurian
Alka Bala
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
T C A Raghavan
IPRI Team
Karthik Manoharan
Rosemary Kurian
NIAS Africa Team
Manasa G
GP Team
IPRI Team
D Rohan Kumar
Sivasubramanian K
LS Hareesh
Ramya B
GP Team
NIAS South Asia Team
NIAS South Asia Team
NIAS Africa Team
NIAS Africa Team
Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
NIAS South Asia Team
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
NIAS Latin America Team
NIAS South Asia Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
Jerry Franklin A
GP Team
IPRI Team
Padmashree Anandhan, Femy Francis, Rohini Reenum, Akriti Sharma, Akhil Ajith, Shamini Velayutham and Anu Maria Joseph
Alka Bala
IPRI Team
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Narmatha S and Anu Maria Jospeh
Alka Bala
Rosemary Kurian
IPRI Team
CEAP Team
GP Team
Femy Francis
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
CEAP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Anu Maria Joseph
GP team
Hoimi Mukherjee
Richa Chandola
Aprajita Kashyap
Shreya Pandey
Binod Khanal
Rishika Yadav
Padmashree Anandhan
Anu Maria Joseph
Nuha Aamina
Alka Bala
Sayani Rana
​​​​​​​Ashok Alex Luke
Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri
Femy Francis
Amit Gupta
Kuri Sravan Kumar
Yogeshwari S
Abhishek Ranjan
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Nithyashree RB
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Anu Maria Joseph
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
Jerry Franklin A
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
PR Team
Amit Gupta
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Sneha Surendran
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Akhil Ajith
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Femy Francis
Femy Francis
Femy Francis
Femy Francis
Prerana P
CR Team
NIAS Africa Team
Nithyashree RB
Jerry Franklin
GP Team
IPRI Team
PR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Nithyashree RB
PR Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Padmashree Anandhan
Rishika Yadav
Sreeja JS
Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri
Yogeswari S
GP Team
IPRI Team
PR Team
PR Team
Prof Joyati Bhattacharya
IPRI Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
Anu Maria Joseph
Jerry Franklin A
IPRI Team
Dhriti Mukherjee
PR Team
Femy Francis
Shamini Velayutham
Dhriti Mukherjee
Ankit Singh
Sneha Surendran
PR Team
PR Team
PR Team
PR Team
NIAS Africa Team
Anu Maria Joseph
Feben Itty
Genesy B
Sreeja JS
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Sneha Surendran
Heribert Dieter
IPRI Team
Nithyashree RB
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Sneha Surendran
Rishika Yadav
Padmashree Anandhan
NIAS Africa Team
Jerry Franklin A
Sneha Surendran
Nithyashree RB
Rishika Yadav
GP Team
IPRI Team
Anu Maria Joseph
Jerry Franklin A
NIAS Africa Team
Lakshmi Parimala H
GP Team
Rishika Yadav
IPRI Team
D Suba Chandran
GP Team
Indrani Talukdar
IPRI Team
S Shaji
Jerry Franklin A
Sneha Surendran
NIAS Africa Team
Himani Pant
Ankita Dutta
D. Suba Chandran
Ankit Singh
Sneha Surendran
IPRI Team
Rubina Pradhan
Medini Hegde
Ramya Balasubramanian
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Nithyashree RB
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Devjyoti Saha
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
Jerry Franklin A
Anu Maria Joseph
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
Lakshmi Parimala
GP Team
IPRI Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Sneha Surendran
GP Team
Padmashree Anandhan
IPRI Team
Rishika Yadav, Sneha Surendran, Sandra D Costa, Ryan Marcus, Prerana P and Nithyashree RB
GP Team
Harini Madhusudan, Rishika Yada, Sneha Surendran, Prerana P, Sreeja JS and Padmashree Anandhan
GP Team
IPRI Team
Bibhu Prasad Routray
NIAS Africa Team
Anu Maria Joseph
Jerry Franklin
GP Team
IPRI Team
Bibhu Prasad Routray
NIAS Africa Team
Jerry Franklin
Anu Maria Joseph
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Jerry Franklin
Anu Maria Joseph
Akshaya S
GP Team
Rishika Yadav, Sreeja JS, Nithyashree RB, and Melvin George
Nithyashree RB
Sreeja JS
Rishika Yadav
Rishika Yadav and Nityashree RB
Padmashree Anandhan
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Devjyoti Saha
Indrani Talukdar
Debangana Chatterjee
Kasturi Chatterjee
Ankita Dutta
Amrita Purkayastha
GP Team
Lakshmi Parimala H
Amit Gupta
GP Team
GP Team
Rishika Yadav
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
Padmashree Anandhan
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Himani Pant
Sourina Bej
IPRI Team
GP Team
Indrani Talukdar
Padmashree Anandhan
Padmashree Anandhan
D Suba Chandran
D Suba Chandran
Bhoomika Sesharaj
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
D Suba Chandran
NIAS Africa Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
Avishka Ashok
Madhura Mahesh
Padmashree Anandhan
Ankit Singh
Riya Itisha Ekka
Apoorva Sudhakar
Sayani Rana
Anu Maria Joseph
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Sethuraman Nadarajan
Avishka Ashok
IPRI Team
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
Allen Joe Mathew, Sayani Rana, Joel Jacob
Sethuraman Nadarajan
Ankit Singh
Bhoomika Sesharaj
Madhura Mahesh
Harini Madhusudan
Avishka Ashok
Akriti Sharma
Padmashree Anandhan
Poulomi Mondal
Mohaimeen Khan
Padmashree Anandhan
Madhura Mahesh
Padmashree Anandhan
Janardhan G
Sapna Elsa Abraham
Avishka Ashok
Anu Maria Joseph
Apoorva Sudhakar
Rashmi BR
Kaviyadharshini A
Avishka Ashok
Chrishari de Alwis Gunasekare
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
NIAS Africa Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Vignesh Ram
Vignesh Ram
Sai Pranav
Harini Madhusudan, Rishma Banerjee, Padmashree Anandhan, Ashwin Immanuel Dhanabalan, and Avishka Ashok
Sourina Bej
Padmashree Anandhan and Rishma Banerjee
Mathew Sonu Simon
Sourina Bej
Rashmi BR and Akriti Sharma
Rashmi Ramesh
Rishma Banerjee
Sai Pranav
Padmashree Anandhan
Emmanuel Selva Royan
Padmashree Anandhan
Rishma Banerjee
Ashwin Immanuel Dhanabalan
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
Avishka Ashok
Angelin Archana
Shreya Upadhyay
Uma Purushothaman
Debangana Chatterjee
Himani Pant
Sethuraman Nadarajan
Avishka Ashok
GP Team
GP Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Sourina Bej
Padmashree Anandhan
Padmashree Anandhan
Devjyoti Saha
Dr Beena
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
NIAS Africa Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Sourina Bej
GP Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Padmashree Anandhan
NIAS Africa Team
NIAS Africa Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
STIR Team
GP Team
Padmashree Anandhan
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
Padmashree Anandhan
NIAS Africa Team
Avishka Ashok
NIAS Africa Team
STIR Team
STIR Team
STIR Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Emmanuel Selva Royan
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Rishma Banerjee
Rashmi Ramesh
Sourina Bej
S Shaji
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
STIR Team
NIAS Africa Team
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Naina Singh
GP Team
Amit Gupta
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
STIR Team
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
Anu Maria Joseph
Ashwin Immanuel Dhanabalan
Joeana Cera Matthews
Avishka Ashok
Nireekshan BollimpalliÂ
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
PR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
NIAS Africa Team
GP Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Joeana Cera MatthewsÂ
Ashwin Immanuel Dhanabalan
IPRI Team
STIR Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Porkkodi Ganeshpandian and Angkuran Dey
Ashwin Immanuel DhanabalanÂ
Mohamad Aseel Ummer
IPRI Team
STIR Team
Shalini Balaiah
Angelin Archana
Prakash Panneerselvam
N Jayaram
S Shaji
GP Team
Amit Gupta
IPRI Team
GP Team
Apoorva Sudhakar
Joeana Cera Matthews
Padmashree Anandhan
Harini Madhusudan
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Sneha M
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
STIR Team
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
D. Suba Chandran
Ankit Singh
Ankit Singh
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Sneha M
D. Suba Chandran
Ankit Singh
D. Suba Chandran
Sneha M
Ankit Singh
Apoorva Sudhakar
Ankit Singh
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Sneha M
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Harshita Rathore
GP Team
Apoorva Sudhakar
Ankit Singh
Ankit Singh
Sneha M
Vishnu Prasad
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Ankit Singh
Apoorva Sudhakar
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Ankit Singh
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Vaishnavi Iyer
Joeana Cera Matthews
Sneha M
D. Suba Chandran
Ankit Singh
Apoorva Sudhakar
Ankit Singh
STIR Team
GP Team
Padmashree Anandhan
Joeana Cera MatthewsÂ
Joeana Cera MatthewsÂ
Harini Madhusudhan
Sourina Bej
IPRI Team
Sneha M
D. Suba Chandran
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Apoorva Sudhakar
D. Suba Chandran
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Apoorva Sudhakar
Sneha M
D. Suba Chandran
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
D. Suba Chandran
Ankit Singh
Apoorva Sudhakar
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
D. Suba Chandran
D. Suba Chandran
Chetna Vinay Bhora
GP Team
IPRI Team
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Aswathy Koonampilly
GP Team
IPRI Team
STIR Team
GP Team
Sourina Bej
Harini Madhusudan
Apoorva Sudhakar
Vineeth Daniel Vinoy
GP Team
IPRI Team
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Juan Mary Joseph
Joeana Cera MatthewsÂ
Joeana Cera MatthewsÂ
Sukanya Bali
Joeana Cera MatthewsÂ
Lokendra Sharma
IPRI Team
Bhuvan Ningania
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
STIR Team
Lokendra Sharma
GP Team
IPRI Team
Apoorva Sudhakar
Anu Maria Joseph
Dincy Adlakha
Sarthak Jain
GP Team
Jeshil J Samuel
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Keerthana Rajesh Nambiar
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Anu Maria Joseph
Sankalp Gurjar
Apoorva Sudhakar
Lokendra Sharma
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Mohamad Aseel Ummer
Dincy Adlakha
Dincy Adlakha
Joeana Cera MatthewsÂ
GP Team
IPRI Team
STIR Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
SDP Scholar
GP Team
IPRI Team
Gurpreet Singh
Chetna Vinay Bhora
Anju Joseph
GP Team
IPRI Team
SDP Scholars
GP Team
Sarthak Jain
Sourina Bej
Vibha Venugopal
Dincy Adlakha
Udbhav Krishna P
Joeana Cera Matthews
Keerthana Rajesh Nambiar
Julia Mathew
Dhanushaa P
GP Team
IPRI Team
SDP Scholars
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Apoorva Sudhakar
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
​​​​​​​Rashmi BR
Lokendra Sharma
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
V S Ramamurthy and Dinesh K Srivastava
Lokendra Sharma
GP Team
Harini Madhusudan
Apoorva Sudhakar
IPRI Team
GP Team
GP Team
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Akriti Sharma
Avishka Ashok
Apoorva Sudhakar
Sukanya Bali
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Apoorva Sudhakar
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Avishka Ashok
Harini Madhusudan
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Sukanya Bali
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Apoorva Sudhakar
GP Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
N Manoharan and Drorima Chatterjee
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
D Suba Chandran
GP Team
D Suba Chandran
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
Mallika Devi
Harini Madhusudan
Kamna Tiwary
Apoorva Sudhakar
Teshu Singh
Sourina Bej
Rashmi Ramesh
Aparaajita Pandey
Teiborlang T Kharsyntiew
Sandip Kumar Mishra
Sourina Bej
Harini Madhusudan
Gunjan Singh
Sukanya Bali
Sumedha ChatterjeeÂ
GP Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Rashmi Ramesh
IPRI Team
GP Team
Harini Madhusudan
IPRI Team
Harini Madhusudan
GP Team
IPRI Team
Sukanya Bali
GP Team
Savithri Sellapperumage
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Harini Madhusudan
Rashmi Ramesh
Mallika Devi
IPRI Team
Srikumar Pullat
GP Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Harini Madhusudan
Lokendra Sharma
GP Team
Nancy Pathak
Shreya Sinha
Kamna Tiwary
Tamanna Khosla
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Vaishali Handique
Sneha Tadkal
Unnikrishnan M J
Rashmi Ramesh
A Padmashree
Oviya A J
Harini Sha P
Chavindi Weerawansha
Arjun C
Anju Annie Mammen
Harini Madhusudan
Sourina Bej
Lakshmi V Menon
GP Team
Samreen Wani
Sankalp Gurjar
IPRI Team
Harini Madhusudan
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Sourina Bej
GP Team
IPRI Team
Harini Madhusudan
Samreen Wani
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
Padmashree A
IPRI Team
GP Team
GP Team
IPRI Team
GP Team
Boa Wang
IPRI Team
Adnan Aziz Chowdhury
Mahesh Bhatta
Boa Wang
N. Manoharan
Prof PM Soundar Rajan
GP Team
Harini Sha P
Rashmi Ramesh
Sourina Bej
D. Suba Chandran
Harini Madhusudan
La Toya Waha
Jenice Jean Goveas
GP Team
Sanduni Atapattu
Chavindi Weerawansha
Chrishari de Alwis Gunasekare
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
Natasha Fernando
Ruwanthi Jayasekara
N Manoharan
Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
Kabi AdhikariÂ
Jenice Jean Goveas
Fatemah Ghafori
GP Team
Sukanya Bali
Lakshmi V Menon
Rashmi Ramesh
Rashmi Ramesh
Harini Madhusudan
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
GP Team
IPRI Team
La Toya Waha
D. Suba Chandran
Rohej Khatiwada
Lakshmi V Menon
Rashmi Ramesh
Kabi AdhikariÂ
Malini SethuramanÂ
Aarathi Srinivasan
Roshni Sharma
Rashmi Ramesh
Dhruv Ashok
Prathiksha Ravi
Aswathy K
Padmini Anilkumar
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Lakshmi V Menon
Sourina Bej
Sukanya Bali
Harini Madhusudan
Parikshith Pradeep
GP Team
GP Team
Boa Wang
Vivek Mishra
Sukanya Bali
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
Aashiyana Adhikari
GP Team
Shailesh Nayak
Lakshmi V Menon
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Sukanya Bali
Harini Madhusudan
Parikshith Pradeep
Sourina Bej
Rashmi Ramesh
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
Rashmi Ramesh
Harini Madhusudan
Parikshith Pradeep
GP Team
GP Team
Harini Madhusudan
Rashmi Ramesh
Sourina Bej
D. Suba Chandran
Parikshith Pradeep
Nidhi Dalal
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
Sourina Bej
Lakshman Chakravarthy N & Rashmi Ramesh
Sukanya Bali
GP Team
GP Team
Lakshman Chakravarthy N
Rashmi Ramesh
Sukanya Bali
Parikshith Pradeep
Harini Madhusudan
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
Mahesh Bhatta
Titsala Sangtam
Vivek Mishra
Lakshmi V Menon
Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer
Harini Madhusudan
GP Team
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Sourina Bej
Mahath Mangal
Titsala Sangtam
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
Sourina Bej
Harini Madhusudan
Raakhavee Ramesh
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Mahath Mangal
Mahath Mangal
Jerin George
Titsala Sangtam
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Mahath Mangal
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Abigail Miriam Fernandez
Harini Madhusudan
Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer
Sourina Bej
Abigail Miriam Fernandez
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
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GP Team
GP Team
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Sourina Bej
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GP Team
Harini Madhusudan
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
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Sourina Bej
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Aparupa Bhattacherjee
GP Team
GP Team
GP Team
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GP Team
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GP Team
Sourina Bej
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Abhishrut Singh
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Kriti
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GP Team
Mahesh Bhatta
Nasima Khatoon
Harini Madhusudan
Sourina Bej
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Harini Madhusudan
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Divyabharathi E
Lakshmi V Menon
Nasima Khatoon
Harini Madhusudhan
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
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Oishee Majumdar
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Druta Bhatt
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Apoorva Sudhakar
Divyabharathi E
Oishee Majumdar
D. Suba Chandran
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Gayan Gowramma KC
Druta Bhatt
Siddhatti Mehta
Miti Shah
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Hely Desai
Manushi Kapadia
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Divyabharathi E
Miti Shah
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Siddhatti Mehta
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Manushi Kapadia
Miti Shah
Divyabharathi E
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Hely Desai
Apoorva Sudhakar
Lakshmi V Menon
Samreen Wani
Divyabharathi E
Ann Maria Shibu
Dhruv Ashok
Lakshmi V Menon
Harini Madhusudan
Jamyang Dolma
Divyabharathi E
Lakshmi V Menon
Samreen Wani
Jamyang Dolma
Shalini E
Dhruv Ashok
Apoorva Sudhakar
Ann Maria Shibu
Divyabharathi E
Samreen Wani