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Brighty Ann Sarah
8 May 2026 |
What happened this week?
Lebanon
On 04 May, Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun declined to meet with Israel’s PM Netanyahu until Israel's attacks on South Lebanon ceased. Lebanon’s Parliament Speaker and close Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri also stated that there could be no negotiations with Israel without a halt to the war.
On 06 May, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that peace between Israel and Lebanon was “immediately achievable,” but the problem rested with Hezbollah.
On 07 May, Israel carried out strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, killing the commander of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force in the group’s stronghold of Dahiyeh.
The attack marked the first strike on Beirut’s suburbs since the 16 April ceasefire, even as clashes in southern Lebanon continue.
On the same day, White House sources revealed that the US will host the third round of ambassador-level talks between representatives from Israel and Lebanon on 14 and 15 May.
The United Arab Emirates
On 04 May, a major Iranian attack in response to Washington’s Project Freedom struck an empty ADNOC oil tanker belonging to Abu Dhabi and sparked a fire at the Fujairah Petroleum Industries Zone, a key oil facility in eastern UAE.
On 05 May, the UAE reported a second consecutive day of attacks, with air defences engaging additional missiles and drones from Iran, which Tehran denied responsibility for.
On 06 May, a second liquefied natural gas tanker managed by Abu Dhabi's National Oil Company (ADNOC) covertly crossed the Strait of Hormuz, followed by another shipment on 07 May.
On 08 May, the UAE Ministry of Defence announced that air defences were "actively engaging" with a new missile and drone attack originating from Iran.
What are the issues?
1. Lebanon: Israel’s pivot towards Beirut, nominal ceasefire and imbalance negotiations
Despite the April ceasefire, Israel’s strikes and invasions had been largely limited to Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon and Israel’s border areas. By hitting Beirut, Israel has broken the post-ceasefire “red line” that had previously insulated the state capital from attacks. Beirut, particularly its southern suburbs of Dahiyeh, is Hezbollah’s primary stronghold and de facto command centre in Lebanon's capital. The densely populated Shia-majority area has long served as the group’s political, military and logistical hub.
Further, Lebanon’s leadership remains reluctant to engage in ministerial-level talks with Israel, demanding a more stable environment, starting with a consolidated ceasefire, a complete halt to Israeli strikes and a clear timetable for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Beirut explicitly rejects normalization with Israel, seeking a limited security or non-aggression arrangement. Lebanon prefers a step-by-step approach, insisting on “no negotiations under fire” until concrete Israeli concessions are secured.
Additionally, the notable absence of Hezbollah in the negotiations and the group's repeated demands for Israeli withdrawal complicate the process. This is compounded by the negotiation’s hinging on Beirut’s ability to dismantle Hezbollah while the group remains a prominent political and military force, while the state is persistently weakened by sustained Israeli aggression and internal friction.
2. The UAE: Abu Dhabi under Iranian attacks and post-OPEC revitalisation
The UAE has emerged as a target of Iranian aggression since its recent exit from the Saudi-led OPEC and OPEC+ due to differences over production flexibility, contentions with Saudi Arabia, and to distance itself from the cartel amid the escalating crisis in global oil supply chains. Following its departure, Abu Dhabi had staunchly condemned the GCC’s “historically weak” and muted collective response to Iran’s missile and drone strikes on Gulf states.
Further, the UAE has cultivated a deep strategic partnership with the US and Israel through the 2020 Abraham Accords. Through the Accords, Abu Dhabi forged normalization with Israel, driven by shared concerns over Iran and with strong US backing, solidifying its role as Washington’s key Gulf partner with major US military basing and advanced arms deals. While other GCC oil producers such as Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar have suspended sales, reduced prices to attract reluctant buyers or limited shipments to routes through the Red Sea, the UAE risks transits through the Strait of Hormuz. These efforts, combined with Abu Dhabi’s close alliance with the US and Israel, have significantly increased the likelihood of Iranian attacks on the UAE.
What does it mean?
For Lebanon, Lebanon’s leadership has emerged assertive in its stance against Israel’s ceasefire violations and entrenching occupation. With their rejection of direct talks with Israel and the exclusion of Hezbollah from the negotiation table, the negotiations are likely to conclude without resolution. Further, the US-mediated talks also coincide with the diplomatic developments in the broader Israel-US war against Iran, where cessation of Israeli attacks in Lebanon had been among Tehran’s core demands. The timing of the talk will provide further momentum to Washington’s negotiations with Tehran.
For the UAE, Abu Dhabi’s continued covert operations through the Strait of Hormuz despite escalating security risks reflect the strategic autonomy enabled by its exit from OPEC, as well as its broader effort to assert dominance within a weakened global oil supply chain. For Abu Dhabi, seeking to position itself beyond the constraints of the OPEC framework, maintaining energy flows and market influence carries great value. Its close partnership with the US is also likely to secure access to shipping routes should tensions ease. However, this strategy increasingly places the UAE among the foremost targets for potential Iranian retaliation.
