CWA # 2103
CW Note
Rising violence in the Lake Chad region:
Complex Geography, Multiple Insurgencies, and an Escalating Humanitarian Crisis
At the intersection of four countries (Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon), the Lake Chad region has a complex geography, making it easier for insurgents to evade authorities from any single country.
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Akshath Kaimal
15 May 2026
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In the news
On 04 May, Boko Haram militants launched an attack on the Barka Toloram island garrison in Chad, killing 23 soldiers and wounding 26.
On 06 May, two Chadian generals were killed in another Boko Haram attack in the same region.
On 08 May, Chad declared a 20-day state of emergency in the Lake Chad province.
On 10 May, the Chadian military launched airstrikes on Boko Haram strongholds in the region as part of Operation Haskanite, reportedly killing over 40 civilians.
Issues at large
1. The complex geography and economy of the Lake Chad region
The Lake Chad region has a complex geography. The lake has hundreds of small islands and dense marshland, making it nearly impossible for conventional heavy military vehicles to patrol effectively. Additionally, the lake sits at the intersection of four countries (Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon), making it easier for insurgents to evade authorities from any single country. The region's ethnic distribution is closely tied to its geography: the Buduma inhabit the islands and marshlands near Chad, the Kanuri occupy the mainland shores near Nigeria, and the Kotoko settle along the lower stretches of the Logone and Chari rivers near Cameroon. Numerous other ethnic groups are also dispersed across the wider basin. Boko Haram is primarily based in the southern islands of Lake Chad, while the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) dominates the northern islands. Resource control is also another factor that contributes to the violence. Both groups levy heavy taxes on local communities, particularly on fishermen and cattle herders, gaining significant control over the “island economy” in the region. They also control certain market towns, allowing goods to flow, while also taking a cut of the profits. The funds raised through taxation and trade disruptions, combined with the complex geography of Lake Chad, help contribute to the violence in the region.
2. The rise of Islamist militant violence in the Lake Chad region
The Boko Haram insurgency began in Nigeria but spread to the Lake Chad region in 2014 after the Nigerian military began pushing militants out of urban areas in the northeastern part of the country. The region eventually became a stronghold for the group, particularly due to its complex geography. The internal conflict within Boko Haram resulted in the group breaking into two - the original faction and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). While both are rivals and experienced significant infighting last year, the groups have targeted armed forces and military infrastructure around the Lake Chad region. Additionally, they created a stranglehold over the communities around the region, resulting in widespread human rights abuses and a worsening humanitarian situation. This has been exacerbated by indiscriminate attacks on civilian communities by both non-state armed groups and national armies. By July 2025, deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure had increased by 32 percent, resulting in 880 direct deaths, according to ACLED.
3. Multiplicity of actors and a largely inefficient state response
The main actors are Boko Haram, ISWAP, and the countries bordering Lake Chad. While violence in 2023 remained largely localized, 2024 marked a significant escalation, with recorded incidents rising 32 per cent to 2423. In addition to targeting military infrastructure, armed groups have tightened their grip on the population through systematic taxation, abduction, and even the killing of suspected military collaborators. Attacks became more widespread in 2025, resulting in nearly 4000 casualties by July. Violence around the border areas, especially, saw an 86 percent rise in violence, according to ACLED. The militaries of the four countries bordering Lake Chad have responded to the violence in varying ways. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established in 2025, was a regional military coalition intended to coordinate operations across the four countries. This initiative has failed to stop the violence in the region. Adding to its woes is the withdrawal of Niger in 2025, following a coup. The armies have also heavily relied on international support, particularly from the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the UK, and the US.
4. The escalating humanitarian crisis
The Lake Chad region is among the world's poorest and most conflict-affected regions. According to the UN humanitarian office, over 6.4 million people have been displaced since the conflict began. 2.3 million in Nigeria alone, while over 230,000 people have been displaced in the Lac Province of Chad. In 2025, 41.8 million people in West and Central Africa are at “crisis” levels of food insecurity, with a large part around the Lake Chad region. Health and education have been adversely impacted, leaving millions of children prone to acute malnutrition, violence, and child labour. Women are also disproportionately impacted, facing increased risk of exploitation, trafficking, and severe maternal health issues. Funding cuts have worsened the situation, with Chad only receiving 24 percent of the funding needed for refugee safety in 2025.
In perspective
First, violence will continue amid a disorganised state response. In the Lake Chad region, violence and instability are likely to continue as attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP escalated in 2025, with the groups largely consolidating their strongholds around the region. Niger’s withdrawal leaves the MNJTF weakened, with each country now undertaking its own operations in several circumstances. As long as the military response from the four countries remains disorganised, the armed groups will continue to take advantage of the complex geography to mount attacks.
Second, the humanitarian situation will worsen, with women and children disproportionately affected. The escalation of violence in 2025 has stranded communities in the region with only sporadic help coming their way. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, with women facing widespread exploitation and trafficking, while children are subjected to forced recruitment and child marriage, especially with schools shut down. This significantly raises the risk of severe disease and health complications for both groups, exacerbated by the lack of functioning health facilities and a decline in aid funding.
About the author
Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, and is part of the NIAS Pakistan Reader and Africa Studies teams.
