CWA # 2128
The World This Week
The Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 2026, and China's Shenzhou-23 Mission
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31 May 2026
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The Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting 2026:
Prioritizing Critical minerals, Supply chain resilience, and Maritime surveillance
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella
What happened?
On 26 May, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar hosted the 11th Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and Japan’s Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi were in attendance. On the same day, the meeting produced a joint statement, a factsheet, and a statement on Indo-Pacific energy security.
New initiatives launched at the Quad summit include the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC), the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative Framework, a joint port infrastructure project in Fiji under the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership initiative, and the Quad Indo-Pacific Energy Security Initiative.
They also confirmed the growth of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness and an open radio access network, clarified their position on "economic coercion" and actions that unilaterally define the status quo, and expressed concern about the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China said, “We also do not support the formation of exclusive cliques or bloc confrontation. No cooperation should undermine mutual trust and cooperation among regional countries."
What is the background?
1. A brief note on Quad and the member countries
The Quad grouping emerged after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when an informal disaster relief and humanitarian assistance coalition was formed between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, which was later formalized in 2007 by Japan's then-Prime Minister. Today, it brings together some of the world’s largest economies, accounting for approximately a third of global GDP and a fourth of the world's population.
2. Increasing focus on critical minerals and supply chain resilience
The new Critical Minerals Initiative Framework launched by the Quad commits member countries to mobilizing up to USD 20 billion in combined government and private-sector support across mining, processing, and recycling. Critical minerals are essential inputs of the modern economy; they are indispensable for manufacturing semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, defence equipment, and renewable energy systems. The key issue lies not in the supply of these minerals but in their processing concentration; roughly 70-75 percent of global processing capacity is held by China. Furthermore, export restrictions enforced by China since 2023 on germanium, gallium, and graphite have demonstrated the challenge of this supply chain control for other manufacturing and growing economies.
3. Enhancing maritime surveillance for digital security
The new Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC) is an integrated surveillance initiative to enhance monitoring capabilities across the Indo-Pacific; this ties into the fragility and need for security of digital infrastructure. Approximately 95 percent of all intercontinental internet traffic travels through a network of undersea cables that can be disrupted by natural events, ship anchors, or deliberate interference. The Indo-Pacific harbours a high concentration of these cables, as well as submarine activity, making maritime domain awareness and surveillance a security necessity.
4. Increasing attention to the Pacific Islands
Pacific Island countries have become a focal point in geopolitical strategy. China has significantly expanded its investments, diplomatic presence, and security partnerships in the region, most notably in 2022, establishing the China-Solomon Islands security agreement. This development has alarmed the Quad countries. In 2023, the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership initiative was built specifically to provide infrastructure, port development, undersea cable connectivity, and development finance alternatives to Pacific Island countries. Now, the joint port infrastructure project in Fiji aims to advance port infrastructure and related activities in the country.
5. Securing critical maritime trade and energy corridors
The new Indo-Pacific Energy Security Initiative is a plan covering technology, emergency response, and a dedicated Quad Fuel Security Forum. Approximately 60 per cent of global maritime trade passes through the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the region links energy exports from the Gulf to manufacturing hubs in East and Southeast Asia, and these hubs to Europe and the Americas. Recent instability in critical container shipping and oil and gas corridors, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, has direct energy security and trade implications for the Quad economies.
6. China’s continued opposition to the Quad
China's opposition to the Quad has been consistent since the grouping's revival in 2017, often characterizing it as an exclusive group aimed at sowing discord between regional countries and China. The core objection is framed not as opposition to any specific Quad initiative but as a rejection of "group politics," arguing that it is inherently destabilizing and incompatible with the Asia-Pacific's role as a "pacesetter of cooperation.” The Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, reiterated this position of discontent after this year’s Quad meeting as well.
What does this mean?
First, the meeting signals continued investment in the Quad by its member countries. This is the third ministerial in eighteen months, demonstrating that the grouping has become a feature of how these four governments manage shared interests, despite foreign policy turbulence.
Second, the meeting is not exceptional in itself. Here, the agenda is important and shows a growing focus on making supply chains stronger, improving digital infrastructure, and managing technology as key security issues.
Third, the initiatives launched go beyond strengthening partnerships. These initiatives aim to challenge China's dominance in mineral processing, maritime surveillance, Pacific Island infrastructure, and technology standards. However, none of these pose a material challenge until they are fully operationalized.
The Shenzhou-23 Mission:
China’s Space Missions, Technology, and Infrastructure
Aparna A Nair
What happened?
On 24 May, China’s Long March-2F Y23 launch vehicle carried the Shenzhou-23 crewed spacecraft to the Tiangong space station from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre. The mission carried three astronauts—a flight engineer, a spacecraft pilot, and a payload specialist. The spacecraft performed a 3.5-hour rendezvous and docking with the Tiangong space station.
The mission marks an increased return payload capacity with over 100 metric tons, three times the previous capacity. According to media reports, it carried more than 100 new science and application projects, focusing on frontier fields such as space life science, materials science, microgravity fluid physics, aerospace medicine, and new space technologies. In this mission, an astronaut will conduct a one-year in-orbit experiment on human adaptability and performance limits.
What is the background?
1. China’s space plans
Shenzhou is a series of manned spacecraft that launches taikonauts to China’s first modular space station, the Tiangong space station. The mission was launched in 2003; in the initial phases, the test was uncrewed. It gradually transitioned to launch taikonauts into Earth orbit and to experiment with innovations that support human life for prolonged periods. The uncrewed flights between 1999 and 2002 were to validate spacecraft systems, life support, re-entry, and orbital operation. In 2003, China’s first crewed mission—Shenzhou 5—was launched and made China the third country to independently send humans to space. In 2008, Shenzhou 7, China, performed its first spacewalk. Shenzhou 8 performed the first uncrewed automatic docking with Tiangong-1, and Shenzhou 9 conducted the first crewed docking. Tiangong 2 was launched in 2016, and Shenzhou 11 was the first crewed mission to dock with it. In 2021, China expanded the Tiangong space station, which included the Tianhe core module. Then, crew rotations became regular in Shenzhou. Shenzhou-12 was the first crewed mission to Tiangong and stayed for three months. Shenshou-21, which recently returned to Earth, spent almost seven months in space. This mission is central to China’s ambition of landing taikonauts on the moon by 2030 and establishing a permanent human presence in low Earth orbit.
2. The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre (JSLC)
It is the largest comprehensive rocket and satellite launch centre in China and the only manned space launch site. Established in 1958 as China’s first spaceport, it features state-of-the-art facilities, including the Technical Centre, Launch Complex, and Control Centres. It is optimized to launch into low and medium Earth orbits with large inclination angles. It’s 40-50 per cent, or higher, and aligns with the inclination of the Tiangong space station, which is 41-42 per cent. This fact rules out the need for large plane-change manoeuvres. Since it is located in the Gobi Desert of Inner Mongolia, the site has dry, clear weather suitable for launches 300 days per year.
3. Increased return payload capacity
This mission marks a drastic increase in China’s return payload capacity from 50 kg to over 100 kg. It is achieved through the miniaturization of cabin instruments and the reconfiguration of the interior layout. Earlier, the lower payload capacity had made the selection of experiments stricter. This capacity supports extensive research and experiments.
4. Space and the 15th Five-Year Plan
Space is regarded as an emerging pillar of the industry. The 15th five-year plan (2026 to 2030) aims to transform the space industry into a centralized, self-sustaining ecosystem by 2030. It includes suborbital tourism, digital infrastructure for space, space resource development, etc. China also aspires to accomplish lunar exploration by 2030 and achieve self-reliance in critical space technology.
What does it mean?
First, the larger objectives of the Shenzhou mission. The Shenzhou program is aimed at being the backbone of China’s human spaceflight. It has evolved through spacewalks, docking tests, and long-duration station stays. Rather than a crew rotation, it is an operational node. The focus shifts from permanently inhabiting the platform to testing the limits of human endurance and increasing scientific value. It includes the scientific ambition of human lunar landing by 2030 and the International Lunar Research Station by 2035.
Second, China’s other ambitions. The exclusion from the International Space Station has motivated China to build an independent space infrastructure. Shenzhou, along with Tiangong and the Long March series, symbolizes China’s commitment to self-reliance and control over critical space technology. With the establishment of its own space station, China positions itself as an alternative global space power.