In the news
On 31 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his official instruction to the IDF to “deepen and expand” ground operations and control over previously Hezbollah-held areas.
On 1 June, US President Trump announced a verbal agreement between PM Netanyahu and backchannel representatives for Hezbollah, wherein the latter had agreed to halt its attacks against Israel if the latter ceased its offensive against Lebanon. On the same day, the UNSC convened an emergency session on Lebanon; top UN officials termed the situation “deeply alarming,” and cautioned over continuing attacks and Israel’s push further north. On the same day, Hezbollah announced that it had engaged and attacked Israeli ground troops and launched a retaliatory strike.
Between 1 June and 31 May, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio held urgent diplomatic calls with PM Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, proposing a phased framework where Hezbollah would halt attacks in exchange for Israel ending escalating strikes in Beirut.
On 3 June, the US, the Lebanese government and Israel issued a joint statement on Israel and Lebanon agreeing to a conditional ceasefire depending on “a complete cessation of Hezbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hezbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” The statement also emphasized that “the future of the relationship” between the two countries “must be decided by the two sovereign governments.” Additionally, the parties “rejected any attempt, by any state or non-state actor, to hold Lebanon’s future hostage.”
On 4 June, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem dismissed this deal, labeling it as “surrender and defeat.”
Issues at large
First, the expanding conflict geography. Previously, Israel had restricted itself to launching aerial attacks on Hezbollah strongholds in Southern Lebanon and South Beirut. Subsequently, Israel announced plans to occupy southern Lebanon up to the Litani River as a “defensive security zone.” This was followed by a ground offensive, which saw targeted attacks against civilian infrastructure, effectively cutting off Southern Lebanon from the mainland. The expansion further north continued with the capture of the castle and the crossing of the Litani River.
Second, diplomatic success followed by implementation failure. Since Israel’s offensive began, the US has mediated four direct talks and has managed to successfully conclude one 10-day pause and its subsequent extension. Despite this, Israeli attacks on Lebanon have continued, with Hezbollah intensifying its retaliation and increasingly taking an offensive posture. Even assurances from President Trump have failed to alter Netanyahu’s plans for Lebanon. The truce has thus been rendered ineffective. This diplomatic success should also be viewed against the backdrop of ongoing Iran-US negotiations wherein Tehran has insisted on the inclusion of Hezbollah as a prerequisite to any deal. A major roadblock to the implementation of the ceasefire has been the inability of the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah/deter its rearmament, which is a key Israeli demand.
Third, the New Deal and its attempt to address implementation challenges. The latest deal has sought to mitigate some implementation challenges by mandating the expedited creation of “pilot zones.” The US has also reiterated its commitment to train the LAF, which can be viewed as sidelining Hezbollah diplomatically, scuttling its rearmament goals, and rendering it a non-factor in Israel-Lebanon relations permanently. This move is also aimed at reaffirming the Lebanese government’s territorial sovereignty and improving its state capacity.
Fourth, the failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) and the entry of the US. The UN peacekeeping mission (UNFIL) was deployed in Lebanon in 1978 to “confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.” Subsequently, its mandate was expanded to include providing humanitarian aid, bringing the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River under the control of the LAF and UNFIL, among others. Despite its mandate being renewed annually for the past four decades, the mission has failed to achieve anything concrete. Unsurprisingly, in 2025, the UNSC decided to withdraw the UNFIL, setting a deadline of December 2026, effectively ending the UN’s presence in Lebanon.
In perspective
First, the last week was characterized by rapid escalation, breakthrough talks followed by ceasefire violations- a cycle that has repeated this past year. This has continued to fuel suspicion on both sides, creating a classic case of security dilemma. Second, the ongoing conflict has also created a conundrum for the Lebanese government, which lacks both the state capacity to disarm Hezbollah and respond to Israel effectively. Beirut has chosen the diplomatic route to reaffirm its sovereignty, deal with the Israeli aggression, and solve the Hezbollah problem. The success depends largely on continued US support and Israel’s commitment to its obligations, which is highly unlikely given its past actions. Third, Hezbollah is likely to remain a factor in Israel- Lebanon relations, at least for the immediate future, given Iran’s unwillingness to abandon it and Hezbollah’s long-standing domestic support.
