In the news
On 15 June, President Trump, at the G7 summit in France, announced that the US and Iran had signed a preliminary 14-point agreement to end the war, hailing it as a "major win" and declared the deal "complete."
The agreement, titled the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America,” calls for the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon. Under the memorandum, Iran will lift its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, demine the region, and restore commercial transit to pre-war levels within 30 days. In parallel, Washington will lift its naval blockade and withdraw military forces from areas surrounding Iran.
The memorandum further states that Tehran will neither acquire nor develop nuclear weapons. Both sides have agreed to negotiate, under IAEA supervision, a mechanism to manage Iran's stockpile of enriched nuclear material, with on-site downblending as the minimum measure. Washington has also agreed to lift UN Security Council sanctions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and US primary and secondary sanctions according to a mutually agreed schedule. The US will release Iran's frozen assets and has proposed a USD 300 billion economic reconstruction plan, coordinated through regional allies and private investment. The agreement also establishes a 60-day, extendable window to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement.
On 19 June, fighting resumed between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, forcing the official signing ceremony in Switzerland to be called off. Later the same day, US officials announced that Washington and Doha had mediated a new ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.
Issues at large
1. Iran's nuclear assurances and the Lebanon ceasefire
Washington's principal objective throughout the war had been the dismantling of Iran's nuclear infrastructure and the prevention of any future nuclear programme. Tehran, meanwhile, consistently maintained that its nuclear programme was solely for civilian purposes and a sovereign right. Despite the interim agreement, Iranian officials have remained largely silent on the commitment to forgo a weapons programme, while Trump has repeatedly warned of renewed military strikes should Iran fail to comply. Given Iran's longstanding defence of its nuclear programme and previous disputes despite IAEA oversight, the durability of this commitment remains uncertain.
The ceasefire in Lebanon faces similar challenges. Iran has consistently demanded an end to Israeli military operations and occupation, while Israel and Hezbollah have repeatedly violated previous US-mediated ceasefires. With Israel openly opposing the interim agreement and violations occurring almost immediately, the ceasefire in Lebanon is likely to remain fragile unless backed by comprehensive implementation mechanisms.
2. Sanctions relief and reconstruction plans
The release of frozen assets, sanctions relief, and war reparations have been central Iranian demands. Washington's sanctions regime has been its most effective instrument of pressure for decades, making the promise of comprehensive sanctions relief difficult to anticipate in practice. The scope and duration of sanctions removal also remain unclear and will likely require further negotiations.
Although framed differently than war reparations, with Washington stressing that the fund would not come from US coffers, the USD 300 billion package serves as a major economic incentive for Tehran as both sides prepare for negotiations on a final peace agreement. However, the likelihood of Gulf countries, particularly those who came under attack by Iran for hosting US bases, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, financing Iran's reconstruction remains doubtful. The proposal resembles previous US attempts to mobilize external reconstruction funding, such as the Board of Peace in Gaza, which has largely been at a standstill.
3. Deepening US-Israel divergence
The unilateral US-Iran interim agreement has significantly weakened the Netanyahu administration's political standing. While Israel has been largely absent from major US-Iran negotiations, Israel's broader objectives, particularly the dismantling of Hezbollah, remain unfulfilled. The agreement has widely been perceived as a capitulation to Tehran, triggering domestic political backlash against Netanyahu. Simultaneously, Washington's frustration with Israel's unilateral military operations in Lebanon and Israeli criticism against Trump’s deal strains the US-Israel relations.
In perspective
First, the US has conceded more than it conquered. While the long-term success of the agreement and its implementation remain uncertain, the interim deal marks a notable diplomatic success for Tehran, with many of its principal demands either accepted or partially accommodated. Despite agreeing to abandon a weapons-grade nuclear programme, Iran has secured commitments toward sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, substantial reconstruction assistance, and stronger US assurances regarding hostilities in Lebanon, while retaining its ballistic missile programme.
Second, the US has achieved important gains by securing commitments on Iran's nuclear programme and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, particularly as rising energy prices and declining domestic support had increased pressure on the Trump administration. Beyond these achievements, however, Washington has fallen short of several of its initial objectives, including dismantling Iran's ballistic missile programme and pursuing regime change. The agreement reflects greater concessions by Washington than military gains. Nonetheless, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is a clear strategic gain for all parties.
