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Global Politics Team
19 June 2026 |
The US-Iran MoU:
Asymmetric Gains and Implementation Challenges
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 15 June, President Trump, at the G7 summit in France, announced that the US and Iran had signed a preliminary 14-point agreement to end the war, hailing it as a "major win" and declared the deal "complete."
The agreement, titled the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America,” calls for the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon. Under the memorandum, Iran will lift its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, demine the region, and restore commercial transit to pre-war levels within 30 days. In parallel, Washington will lift its naval blockade and withdraw military forces from areas surrounding Iran.
The memorandum further states that Tehran will neither acquire nor develop nuclear weapons. Both sides have agreed to negotiate, under IAEA supervision, a mechanism to manage Iran's stockpile of enriched nuclear material, with on-site downblending as the minimum measure. Washington has also agreed to lift UN Security Council sanctions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and US primary and secondary sanctions according to a mutually agreed schedule. The US will release Iran's frozen assets and has proposed a USD 300 billion economic reconstruction plan, coordinated through regional allies and private investment. The agreement also establishes a 60-day, extendable window to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement.
On 19 June, fighting resumed between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, forcing the official signing ceremony in Switzerland to be called off. Later the same day, US officials announced that Washington and Doha had mediated a new ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.
Issues at large
1. Iran's nuclear assurances and the Lebanon ceasefire
Washington's principal objective throughout the war had been the dismantling of Iran's nuclear infrastructure and the prevention of any future nuclear programme. Tehran, meanwhile, consistently maintained that its nuclear programme was solely for civilian purposes and a sovereign right. Despite the interim agreement, Iranian officials have remained largely silent on the commitment to forgo a weapons programme, while Trump has repeatedly warned of renewed military strikes should Iran fail to comply. Given Iran's longstanding defence of its nuclear programme and previous disputes despite IAEA oversight, the durability of this commitment remains uncertain.
The ceasefire in Lebanon faces similar challenges. Iran has consistently demanded an end to Israeli military operations and occupation, while Israel and Hezbollah have repeatedly violated previous US-mediated ceasefires. With Israel openly opposing the interim agreement and violations occurring almost immediately, the ceasefire in Lebanon is likely to remain fragile unless backed by comprehensive implementation mechanisms.
2. Sanctions relief and reconstruction plans
The release of frozen assets, sanctions relief, and war reparations have been central Iranian demands. Washington's sanctions regime has been its most effective instrument of pressure for decades, making the promise of comprehensive sanctions relief difficult to anticipate in practice. The scope and duration of sanctions removal also remain unclear and will likely require further negotiations.
Although framed differently than war reparations, with Washington stressing that the fund would not come from US coffers, the USD 300 billion package serves as a major economic incentive for Tehran as both sides prepare for negotiations on a final peace agreement. However, the likelihood of Gulf countries, particularly those who came under attack by Iran for hosting US bases, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, financing Iran's reconstruction remains doubtful. The proposal resembles previous US attempts to mobilize external reconstruction funding, such as the Board of Peace in Gaza, which has largely been at a standstill.
3. Deepening US-Israel divergence
The unilateral US-Iran interim agreement has significantly weakened the Netanyahu administration's political standing. While Israel has been largely absent from major US-Iran negotiations, Israel's broader objectives, particularly the dismantling of Hezbollah, remain unfulfilled. The agreement has widely been perceived as a capitulation to Tehran, triggering domestic political backlash against Netanyahu. Simultaneously, Washington's frustration with Israel's unilateral military operations in Lebanon and Israeli criticism against Trump’s deal strains the US-Israel relations.
In perspective
First, the US has conceded more than it conquered. While the long-term success of the agreement and its implementation remain uncertain, the interim deal marks a notable diplomatic success for Tehran, with many of its principal demands either accepted or partially accommodated. Despite agreeing to abandon a weapons-grade nuclear programme, Iran has secured commitments toward sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, substantial reconstruction assistance, and stronger US assurances regarding hostilities in Lebanon, while retaining its ballistic missile programme.
Second, the US has achieved important gains by securing commitments on Iran's nuclear programme and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, particularly as rising energy prices and declining domestic support had increased pressure on the Trump administration. Beyond these achievements, however, Washington has fallen short of several of its initial objectives, including dismantling Iran's ballistic missile programme and pursuing regime change. The agreement reflects greater concessions by Washington than military gains. Nonetheless, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is a clear strategic gain for all parties.
The War in Ukraine:
Massive drone attacks, Europe's support for Ukraine, and a Distant ceasefire
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella
In the news
On 10 June, Ukraine struck a defence museum in Sevastopol, a military plant in Volga City, the port of Mariupol, and a tanker called West Horizon, reportedly tied to Russia's shadow fleet, in the Black Sea.
On 11 June, Russia's Defence Ministry said its forces had captured villages in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions.
On 12 June, both sides exchanged heavy drone strikes.
On 14 June, Trump held separate calls with Zelenskyy and Putin, urging an end to the war. On the same day, Ukraine formally opened the first phase of EU membership negotiations. Subsequently, at night and the following morning, 15 June, Russia reportedly launched missile and drone attacks at Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv; the strikes also damaged the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, a UNESCO-listed, thousand-year-old cathedral, which Russia denied targeting.
On 16 June, on the sidelines of the G7 summit, President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had a meeting, after which President Trump called on Russia to make a deal, said that there was “dislike” between the two leaders, and that he would do whatever he could to end the war. The French President noted that “Europeans are currently providing almost 100% of the aid to Ukraine.” On the same day, Ukraine struck crude distillation units in Moscow and Russia hit cities in eastern Ukraine.
On 17 June, G7 leaders issued a joint statement pledging "unwavering support" for Ukraine, citing "new momentum" in the war and promising to bolster Kyiv's air defences and tighten sanctions on Russian oil and gas. The Netherlands separately pledged USD 580 million for drones.
On 18 June, Ukraine's defence minister said NATO's Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) mechanism would channel USD 4 billion in support, Ukraine and Germany signed an anti-ballistic missile cooperation agreement, and the UK announced GBP 750 million drawn against interest on frozen Russian central bank assets for Ukrainian-made drones and air defence missiles. On the same day, Ukraine reportedly carried out its largest single-night long-range attack of the war with ballistic missiles and drones striking the Kapotnya refinery in Moscow, which supplies roughly 40 percent of the capital's petrol, and reportedly injuring 17 people.
Issues at large
1. Drone and missile warfare continues to intensify
This week’s exchanges, including major strikes launched by Ukraine targeting a refinery in Moscow, reinforce the pattern in which both sides are increasingly targeting energy, economic, civilian-support and military-support infrastructure. Ukraine continues strikes on shadow fleets and refineries; Russia continues strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Additionally, the reported capture of the villages Rozkishne and Okhrimivka in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions reflects the pattern of slow, incremental ground advances, supported by sustained aerial attacks.
2. European financial and military commitments continue to expand
The recent Dutch, British, German, and NATO pledges to Ukraine's military infrastructure, such as drones, air defence systems, and defence-industrial cooperation, demonstrate continued support for Ukraine’s war effort and defence capabilities. The announcements also reflect the ongoing role of European states and institutions in providing financial support to Ukraine, as illustrated by the recent statement at the G7 by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the EUR 90 billion loan approved by the European Council in April 2026, and French President Emmanuel Macron, who said that Europeans provide almost 100 per cent of the aid to Ukraine.
3. Diplomatic and political initiatives continue to proceed, but vary
President Trump’s calls to President Zelenskyy and Putin, Ukraine’s advancement in the EU accession process, the G7’s joint statement of renewed commitment to increase support to Ukraine while tightening sanctions on Russia, and President Trump's attempts at a peace deal stand in the backdrop of escalating conflict, massive missile and drone attacks, and increased financial support for Ukraine. Support remains firm, as seen in the G7 rhetoric, diplomatic and political engagement calls for peace alongside increasing military aid, and escalating battlefield developments continue to unfold in parallel.
In perspective
The pattern from early to mid-June suggests that the war has intensified on the aerial front, with the conflict’s centre of gravity being drone warfare. Russia continues to combine incremental territorial gains with sustained missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, while Ukraine continues to target Russian energy and military infrastructure. At the same time, new European military and financial commitments continue to strengthen Ukraine's defence capabilities. In addition, varying initiatives, Trump's outreach to both Kyiv and Moscow, in the context of Ukraine's progress in the EU accession process, and the G7's renewed commitments on sanctions and support run on separate tracks, making any near-term ceasefire appear unlikely.
Anti-immigrant violence in South Africa:
Xenophobic attacks, Economic distress, and an Aggressive crackdown
Akshath Kaimal
In the news
On 04 June, vigilante groups targeted Mozambican and Malawian migrants in Kleinmond, forcing them to flee their homes and seek safety in nearby mountains and coastal dunes.
On 07 June, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in a national address outlined an expanded crackdown on undocumented immigrants while explicitly warning vigilante organisations against violence.
On 08 June, the March and March Movement rejected the President’s speech and demanded that companies terminate all foreign employees by 30 June while marching through business parks in Johannesburg.
On 09 June, local religious and human rights groups in George, Western Cape, set up neighbourhood watch systems to prevent further xenophobic clashes. Community leaders in Cape Town also took similar initiatives.
Between 04 and 09 June, over 1,100 Mozambicans were processed for repatriation by the South African government, along with 150 Malawians, 654 Nigerians, 663 Ghanaians, and 74 Zimbabweans.
Also on 09 June, the African Union convened a high-level meeting where the leadership issued a warning that targeted harassment and displacement of African migrants directly violated the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
On 15 June, the South African government said it had repatriated 2,745 immigrants in a single week.
Issues at large
1. Recurring xenophobic violence in South Africa
Anti-immigrant violence in South Africa has evolved from sporadic post-apartheid riots into an entrenched structural crisis. Early violence relied on chaotic mob tactics, escalating from township expulsions in 1995 to catastrophic nationwide waves of attacks in 2008, 2015, and 2019. Today, primary actors have shifted from unorganized crowds to structured, media-savvy vigilante groups like Operation Dudula and March and March, who weaponize digital networks to enforce physical blockades around government services. An “outsider” in South Africa is both racialized and classist. Hostility is concentrated almost exclusively against low-income, Black Africans from neighbouring nations like Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique and generally not wealthier foreign nationals. Trapped in economically strained townships, these migrants serve as scapegoats for deeper systemic governance failures.
2. Economic distress as a primary trigger
According to Statistics South Africa, the official unemployment rate stands at 32.7 percent, rising to 43.7 percent when including discouraged job seekers, while youth unemployment sits at 45.8 percent, creating a large pool of economically marginalized young people vulnerable to populist rhetoric. Subsequent electricity price hikes further squeezed lower-income households, and in this climate of desperation, migrants, perceived as willing to work for lower wages or operate informal businesses outside the tax net, became a convenient scapegoat, with roughly three million immigrants comprising around 4.5 percent of the population.
3. From government inaction to aggressive crackdown
Initially reactive, the South African government deployed forces only after the 2008 riots devastated migrant communities. As vigilante movements gained traction, the state tightened controls, establishing the Border Management Authority in 2023 and introducing strict foreign hiring quotas. In March 2026, the Cabinet approved the Final Revised White Paper on Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Protection (CIRP). Politically, the government now faces pressure from multiple directions, with a frustrated electorate demanding tougher enforcement and simultaneous international condemnation. Following large-scale protests in April and May 2026, President Ramaphosa adopted its current approach - an aggressive state-led crackdown on illegal migration while explicitly warning vigilante networks against civilian violence.
4. Migrant communities face systematic exclusion
Anti-immigrant violence in South Africa is deeply racialized and classist, targeting low-income Black African migrants who originally fled socioeconomic and political instability at home. This hostility has triggered a major internal displacement crisis. Vigilante groups like March and March have systematically denied migrants basic healthcare by blockading public hospitals. In Mossel Bay, vigilantes killed five Mozambicans in early June, underscoring the extreme lengths these groups will go to enforce exclusion. This aggression reflects a sharp shift in public sentiment. According to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), public hostility is at its highest level since 2003, with 42 percent of South Africans demanding a complete ban on immigrants. Weaponized by a strict 30 June eviction deadline set by these anti-immigrant networks, several African nations are now actively accelerating the repatriation of their citizens to ensure their survival.
In perspective
While Ramaphosa’s government is trying to be cautious in its approach, decades of inaction by previous governments have already laid the groundwork for anti-immigrant violence to expand across the country. This is worsened by the current government’s aggressive crackdown on undocumented immigrants and the worsening economic outlook.
With the 30 June deadline approaching, African governments are likely to extend repatriation procedures. South Africa’s aggressive approach towards illegal immigration, combined with xenophobic violence perpetrated by anti-immigrant groups, is also likely to drive increased displacement of immigrant communities across South Africa.
Israel's Ultra-Orthodox Jews:
Why are they protesting?
Rohini Reenum
In the news
On 11 June, the “extremist” Jerusalem Faction called for demonstrations in Central Israel following the transfer of custody of 19 “draft dodgers” from the police to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). These dodgers were arrested after a demonstration by the ultra-Orthodox Jews (Haredim) outside the home of Supreme Court Deputy Chief Noam Sohlberg turned into a riot with protestors causing extensive property damage while attempting to break in.
On 15 June, dozens of “extremist” Haredim demonstrators gathered outside the residence of Supreme Court President Isaac Amit to protest the arrest of a Haredi draft dodger.
On 17 June, clashes between the police and Haredim protesters turned violent in central Israel. On 19 June, the Israeli media reported that “Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) rioters” had blocked traffic and set fire near Shabbat Square in Jerusalem, leading to the arrest of two people.
Issues at large
1. Differing rules on mandatory military service
In Israel, each citizen who is either “Jewish, Druze, or Circassian” is supposed to compulsorily serve in the military from the age of 18; however, Druze and Circassian women are exempt. Men are mandated to serve for about three years and women for at least two years, with additional reserve duty until the age of 40. Palestinian citizens of Israel, Muslim or Christian, are not obligated to join the military. Young ultra-Orthodox Jewish men who study the Torah full-time in seminaries have been historically exempt under a special arrangement under the principle of torato umanuto (which means “Torah study is his job”) while young ultra-Orthodox Jewish women are completely exempt. These different rules and exemptions have long irked the secular Jews.
2. Blanket exemption for Ultra-Orthodox Jews
Following the formation of Israel in 1948, the then PM had exempted around 400 senior students of the community so they could “study and preserve sacred Jewish knowledge and traditions.” Over the years, this exemption has been extended under various laws, while their population has grown exponentially due to a higher birthrate (currently accounts for about 13 percent of the population); however, their enlistment remains very low. Due to these demographic changes and the compounding economic cost, there have been increasing calls for the removal of this exemption.
3. Removal of exemption by the Supreme Court.
In June 2025, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled unanimously directing the military to begin drafting ultra-Orthodox men. This was an interim ruling, as the parliament had failed to pass a resolution on the exemption that lapsed on 31 March 2025. The court reasoned that in the absence of a law that distinguishes between Jewish seminary students and other draftees, Israel’s compulsory military service system applies to ultra-Orthodox men like any other citizen. The court also argued that the state was carrying out “invalid selective enforcement," and this was a violation of the rule of law.
4. Increasing crackdown against draft dodgers and opposition
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling, there have been attempts by the police to identify the draft dodgers leading to arrests and detentions. The crackdown is also due to a shortage of military personnel since the 2023 offensive in Gaza began and has now expanded to Lebanon and Iran. The move towards strict enforcement has evoked a sharp reaction from not only the Ultra-Orthodox Jews but also their political leaders and the Jerusalem Faction, which is an Israeli Haredi political organization. There have been multiple protests, some violent and leading to mass riots. There have been increasing acts of violence against the court officials and law enforcement. Many ultra-Orthodox Jews also oppose Zionism, believing that establishing the state of Israel was anti-Jewish as it reflects preempting the arrival of the messiah.
In perspective
The history of protests by the ultra-Orthodox Jews is indicative of long-standing fissures within Israeli society on the question of compulsory military drafting. However, the recent protests are the culmination of increasing pressure that Israel’s multi-front and multi-year wars have put on the IDF, the economy, and the government, leading them to deal with the problem of draft-dodging and blanket exemptions.
These protests are also a probable precursor to the impending political fallout wherein the ultra-Orthodox parties in PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition are threatening to withdraw their support if the pending bill on exemption is not passed. This would not only lead to a collapse of the coalition and preponing of elections but also a massive political setback for Netanyahu, whose domestic support and standing have taken a recent hit with the signing of the US-Iran MoU and the US’s public lashing out over Lebanon and Israel’s unattained end games in their regional wars.
