CWA # 2157
The World This Week
The G7 Summit 2026
President Xi Jinping’s North Korea visit I Myanmar President’s China visit
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Global Politics Team
21 June 2026
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The G7 Summit 2026
Four Takeaways on Economic security, Critical minerals, and Consensus on Ukraine and Iran
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella
During 15-17 June, the 52nd G7 Leaders’ Summit took place in Évian-les-Bains, France. French President Emmanuel Macron served as the leader of the summit with France holding the G7 Presidency for 2026. Leaders of member states such as Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the President of the European Union, and the President of the European Council, attended the summit. Additionally, non-G7 countries Brazil, Egypt, India, Kenya, South Korea, Qatar, Ukraine, and the UAE were invited and participated as partners to the summit.
Over the course of the three days, nine joint declarations/statements on geopolitical issues, migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, cancer, mutually beneficial partnerships, the Ebola outbreak, critical minerals, digital space for minors, and durable resilient growth were issued.
Following are four major takeaways from the G7 summit.
1. Emphasis on tackling macroeconomic imbalances
The G7’s “Leaders' statement for a more balanced durable resilient growth,” noted the global economic uncertainty citing the Strait of Hormuz. It called for strengthening international financial institutions and establishing “well-functioning, stable and transparent markets for energy and other commodities.” A few of these imbalances in question include underlying savings-investment dynamics, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which disrupted the energy market, recent tariff measures by the United States, and China's 2023 restrictions on critical minerals.
2. Continued focus on critical minerals and supply chain resilience
The G7 issued a declaration on securing critical mineral supply chains, backed by Australia. It highlighted the importance of critical minerals to economic prosperity, called for strategic reserves, and set a target of reducing dependence on any single supplier to below 60 per cent by 2030. To institutionalise this commitment, leaders established a non-binding G7 Critical Minerals Resilience and Production Alliance. Critical minerals underpin semiconductors, EV batteries, defence technology, and renewable infrastructure. The primary challenge is the concentration of their processing and refining; China currently accounts for approximately 70–75 per cent of global processing capacity, a dependence that was highlighted by China's export controls in 2023. The G7's response sits alongside two other efforts: the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative Framework, launched in July 2026 to diversify processing and prioritise recycling, and the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue held in Kazakhstan.
3. New momentum on Ukraine
The G7 leaders in the “statement on geopolitical issues” declared "unwavering support for Ukraine," agreeing to increase air defence deliveries and economic pressure on Russia, including sanctions on the oil and gas sectors. Moreover, President Zelenskyy said he had secured commitments on air defence missiles, along with licenses to produce them. The joint consensus marks a shift from the summit in 2025, where a joint statement on Ukraine was not produced, seemingly because of fundamental differences with the United States' position. This consensus comes in the backdrop of President Trump calling for a peace deal and intensifying drone and missile warfare in the last week, with notable strikes on the UNESCO-listed Kyiv Pechersk Lavra Cathedral and Ukraine's largest single-night long-range attack, damaging a refinery in Moscow.
4. Delicate emphasis on the Iran-US deal
The G7 leaders in the “statement on geopolitical issues” recognised and acknowledged the breakthrough in the Middle East. The statement noted that the US-Iran MoU has the potential to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It reaffirmed that the right of transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz - free from restrictions or tolls - is the bedrock of international trade. Leaders also expressed readiness to support and contribute to the MoU's implementation. The statement arrives against a backdrop of the conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran, wherein the strait through which roughly a fifth of the world's seaborne oil trade passes had become a point of conflict. The war's broader toll on regional energy markets and global shipping insurance costs gives the reopening significance. However, on 20 June, reports indicate that Iran's Revolutionary Guards said that the Strait of Hormuz is closed again as a result of ceasefire violations in southern Lebanon.
To Conclude:
First, the G7 is functioning through specificity rather than unity. This year's nine declarations, replacing the single communiqué, show member states reaching consensus on narrower fronts, even when broader alignment may remain elusive. Second, economic security defined the bloc's key focus. The shared emphasis on macroeconomic imbalances and critical mineral dependence reflects an agenda increasingly defined by supply chain resilience and tackling global economic challenges. Third, the joint statement on Ukraine and the support for the US-Iran MoU reflect commitments with unresolved contradictions underneath. On Ukraine, the pledges on air defence, production licences, and sanctions deepen the West's commitment to Kyiv, but President Trump’s push for a peace deal remains unresolved. On Iran, G7 backing for the US-Iran MoU rests on the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the prevention of Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At present, developments in Lebanon and the closure of the strait puts the support by the G7 under strain.
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate student from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at NIAS.
President Xi Jinping’s North Korea visit:
Resetting bilateral ties, Sidelining denuclearisation, and Restoring China’s centrality
Avaneesh S
What happened?
On 08 June, China’s President Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang for a two-day state visit to improve bilateral relations between the two countries. Invited by North Korea’s President Kim Jong-un, President Xi’s visit to North Korea marks his first trip to the country since 2019 and his first foreign trip in 2026. He was joined by senior Polit Bureau officials, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, Minister of National Defence Dong Jun, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau Cai Qi and Head of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee Liu Haixing. The trip also marks the 65th anniversary of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.
On the same day, President Xi stated that the two countries are at a “new historical starting point.” During the talks, Minister Liu Haixing stated that the two sides reached “important consensus” on several issues and agreed to “maintain close strategic communication.” Kim stated that he would fully support the “One China principle,” and “agreed to seize the general trend of the times, respond to the shared aspirations of the two peoples, strengthen high-level exchanges.”
On 09 June, President Xi and Kim visited the Sino-Korean Friendship Tower and laid tribute, honouring Chinese soldiers who fought alongside North Korean forces during the 1950-53 Korean War. Later in the day, they visited a “Central Cadres Training School”, which is the leadership academy of the Workers’ Party of Korea, observing a class and planted a tree on campus as a gesture of friendship. In his concluding remarks, President Xi also stated that they reached “important consensus” with President Kim and had thanked for the hospitality.
What is the background?
1. A brief context on recent China-North Korea ties
Pyongyang-Beijing ties have seen periods of strained tensions and “coldness”, especially so for the past six years. North Korea is disapproving of China’s “abandonment” of socialism in the 1980s, and China is angered by its refusal to adopt Chinese-style economic reforms. However, since 2018, President Xi has worked towards mending ties with North Korea despite it being China’s only formal treaty ally, bound by the mutual defence pact signed in 1961.
2. Deepening Russia-North Korea partnership
Moscow-Pyongyang ties on the other hand have grown significantly in the past two years. It reached its peak by the ratification of the treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which is also a mutual defence pact signed in 2024. Even before the treaty, North Korea had been supplying munitions and missiles to Russia for its war effort in Ukraine, and since the treaty, it has sent over 15,000 troops to fight alongside Russians.
3. The reunification question
North Korea has amended its constitution, which dropped references to the re-unification of the Korean peninsula, and redefined its territory as bordering China, Russia and South Korea. It has acknowledged that re-unification is impossible, and the division is permanent. China also used North Korea’s official name, indicating the transition from re-unification to “coexistence.”
What does it mean?
First, China’s shift away from denuclearization. China-North Korea relations were primarily strained due to Beijing’s “Three No’s” policy, namely “No wars, no instability and No nukes,” and it has disapproved of Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons. However, in recent years, China has softened on the denuclearization rhetoric, slowly dropping its use in official statements and communications. It was also absent in this year’s summit, marking a sharp contrast since 2019, where Beijing had called for its denuclearization. Therefore, it indicates that Beijing has quietly accepted North Korea’s status as a nuclear state.
Second, China still views the US with distrust, considering recent US sanctions on curbing Chinese companies in the development on Advanced AI computing chips, and the blacklist of EV manufacturers. Beijing and Pyongyang also released a statement opposing “military hegemonism," thereby indicating that China needs North Korea in its sphere of influence in countering the US’ growing military cooperation with Japan and South Korea.
Third, if China continued to keep its distance from North Korea, it may have pushed it further into Russia’s orbit, where the latter has already provided technological support to improving Pyongyang’s military capabilities. The visit may now open a window towards a potential trilateral cooperation between China-Russia-North Korea, especially in military intelligence and sharing valuable drone warfare experience.
Avaneesh S is a postgraduate student from the department of History, School of Social Sciences, Pondicherry University. He is currently an intern at NIAS.
Myanmar President’s China visit:
Diplomatic legitimacy, Economic cooperation and Beijing’s interests
Aparna A Nair
What happened?
During15-19 June, Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing visited China. In this state visit, he met with China’s President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang and the National People’s Congress standing committee chairman Zhao Leji. Both Presidents signed 18 agreements and MoUs in areas such as security, development, trade, health, science and infrastructure cooperation. Apart from the cooperation document, both agreed to jointly advance China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), and Global Development Initiative (GDI).
The Myanmar delegation included officials from Kachin and Shan states. The discussions covered cross-border transportation and regional connectivity within the Greater Mekong Subregion. China also pledged assistance for earthquake response efforts and reconstruction projects in Myanmar.
President Xi said, “I am willing to continue strengthening our leadership (over our countries' bilateral ties), carry forward the brotherly friendship between our two peoples, deepen comprehensive strategic cooperation.”
What is the background?
1. A brief note on China-Myanmar bilateral ties
China and Myanmar relations are rooted in traditional "Paukphaw" (brotherly) friendship and rest on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In 2020, the relationship got upgraded to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership,’ the highest bilateral partnership tier of China. In 2024, both sides agreed to build a community with a shared future. Historically, China has backed Myanmar rulers regardless of regime type. Myanmar occupies a critical position in China’s regional ambitions as it is a gateway to the Indian Ocean region. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor encompasses China’s BRI initiatives in Myanmar. It includes oil and gas pipelines and infrastructure. China seeks a stable Myanmar because the coup, border instability and rise of telefraud and scam centres had affected Chinese citizens and joint projects.
For Myanmar, China remains the largest trading partner and the largest source of imports and investments. In 2025, bilateral trade stood at USD 19.4 billion, a 19.1per cent year-on-year increase. The cooperation from China will help stabilise the regime, cope with economic challenges and earn diplomatic legitimacy.
2. Myanmar President seeking legitimacy after the election
Min Aung Hlaing, military junta chief, became President in April 2026 after an election held between December 2025 and January 2026. The election process was widely criticised because of the exclusion of major opposition groups. It also led the military-backed candidates to secure victory. In this context, he has been seeking international recognition and diplomatic legitimacy. The UN,EU,US,UK and ASEAN states like Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are yet to recognise his government.
What does it mean?
First, the visit marked a diplomatic success for President Min Aung Hlaing. He was welcomed to China with full state honours, and President Xi’s assurance of close engagement provided Myanmar with external recognition and strengthened claims to political legitimacy. This legitimacy will help break the international isolation Myanmar faces and enable economic aid and investment to flow to the country.
Second, Myanmar emerges as China's most comprehensive BRI partner in Southeast Asia. The signed documents and other agreements broaden bilateral cooperation in infrastructure, trade, security and innovation. This makes Myanmar China’s most comprehensive BRI partner in Southeast Asia. The agreements linked to the GSI, GDI and GCI also indicate China's effort to expand the acceptance of its global governance initiatives among developing countries. The visit also reflected the convergence of political, economic and security interests.
Aparna A Nair is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. She is currently a research intern at NIAS.