In the news
On 25 June, the “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” police chief Liaqat Ali Malik dismissed critical coverage of the ongoing unrest in PoK, including a BBC Urdu report, as "disinformation" within a "hybrid warfare" framework, even as internet suspensions and the Joint Awami Action Committee's (JAAC) strike continued.
On 29 June, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Hafiz Naeemur Rehman announced that JAAC had paused its planned long march as JI stepped in to mediate, warning that the 27 July elections could face credibility questions if normalcy wasn't restored.
On 30 June, the “AJK Assembly” passed a PKR 286 billion budget featuring a PKR 32.6 billion wheat subsidy, and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) (JUI-F) announced an electoral alliance ahead of the 27 July polls, urging protesters toward parliamentary channels.
On 01 July, despite ongoing mediation, JAAC chief Shaukat Nawaz Mir was arrested in Dhirkot on sedition charges; JAAC vowed the movement would emerge stronger. As on 01 July, according to the PoK government's tally, four security personnel killed, over 570 arrests, and 155 individuals placed on a terrorism watchlist since JAAC's proscription under the Anti-Terrorism Act on 5 June.
Issues at large
1. From economic grievance to political representation
The protests are led by JAAC, a coalition of traders, transporters, lawyers, and students united by shared economic grievances rather than political ideology. It began in 2023 as a complaint over inflated flour and electricity prices, but has escalated subsequently. The demands expanded to include hydropower royalties and abolishing reserved seats; the movement's focus shifted from cost-of-living relief to political representation. An early June Court ruling upholding the reserved seats acted as an accelerant, closing the legal door without addressing the underlying grievances.
2. The reserved-seats controversy and upcoming elections
The push to abolish refugee-reserved seats comes just weeks before these seats are contested in the 27 July elections. Mainstream parties are rallying around the electoral process rather than the protests; the PPP-JUI-F alliance is explicitly urging protesters to seek solutions through the PoK parliament. However, this pitch assumes the reserved-seats question is genuinely back on the table, which government conduct does not support.
3. Local stakeholders and Islamabad’s shadow
The primary actors are JAAC and its detained leader, Shaukat Nawaz Mir, facing an “AJK administration” that is simultaneously cracking down and negotiating. JI is positioned as an independent mediator, while the PPP and JUI-F offer an electoral alternative. Holding ultimate authority over “AJK's” constitutional and security affairs is Pakistan's federal government, understood to be shaping the harder elements of the state's response. The state also invokes a "hybrid warfare" framing to gesture at India, casting domestic dissent as an external threat.
4. The dual strategy of concession and coercion
The government is running a contradictory, two-track response. The conciliatory track involves a subsidy-heavy budget, withdrawn cases, and claimed fulfillment of demands. The coercive track involves proscribing JAAC, arresting Mir, rolling internet suspensions, and maintaining a watchlist exceeding 150 names. Advancing both tracks in the same week suggests an administration focused on managing appearances rather than resolving the core dispute.
In perspective
The current unrest is not an isolated flashpoint but the most severe iteration of a recurring cycle. Over three years, frustration over flour and electricity prices has hardened into a fundamental dispute over political representation and PoK’s constitutional relationship with Islamabad.
This situation is highly likely to prolong. Past partial concessions have only bought temporary calm, and the legal avenue for the reserved-seats question has now been firmly closed by the courts rather than resolved politically. Arresting JAAC's leadership during active mediation leaves little room for a durable settlement before the 27 July elections.
Ultimately, the government's pattern of concession and coercion highlights a structural limitation in governance. While the PoK’s institutions are self-governing in paper, true power over security, finance, and constitutional status remains routed through Islamabad, a limitation that the “AJK” shares with Gilgit-Baltistan. While the immediate unrest may subside after the election, the underlying conditions that reproduce this cycle roughly once a year remain unaddressed.
