CWA # 2172
Conflict Weekly
Anti-immigrant Protests in South Africa
The Israel-Lebanon Framework I The US-Iran Negotiations I The Unrest in PoK
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NIAS Global Politics Team
3 July 2026
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Anti-immigrant Protests in South Africa:
Economic Grievances, National Mobilisation, and Fractured Government Response
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella
In the news
On 27 June, said South Africa’s President, Cyril Ramaphosa stated that “There is no place for racism, sexism, tribalism, xenophobia, Afrophobia or any other form of intolerance.”
On 29 June, the leader of March and March declared that “We are not calling for violence … No one will be killed on 30 June, and no looting will take place in our name.”
On 30 June, ahead of the protests, the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) stated that 25,000 people had been repatriated in recent weeks. Police were deployed across major cities, with protesters gathering in large numbers and foreign nationals camping near consulates and shelters for protection. 2000 protestors were reported to have marched through Durban.
On 01 July, the police stated there were 120 marches; 108 were peaceful, while 12 required police intervention, and 900 people were reportedly arrested for immigration violations, public violence, harbouring undocumented migrants, and robbery.
On 02 July, reports emerged that protests were largely peaceful, with isolated incidents of looting, vandalism, and violence.
Issues at large
1. South Africa’s recurring anti-immigrant violence
From 1998 to 2006, minor attacks against immigrants from Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique were documented. In 2008, protests and riots that started in Alexandra spread to other provinces and cities, and reportedly led to the death of 62 people. Isolated incidents of violence were recorded from 2009 to 2014. In 2015 and 2019 protests turned into riots and involved attacks on migrants, looting, displacement, and deaths. 2021 saw the rise “Operation Dudula,” which operated a social media campaign demanding action on undocumented immigrants and organised a protest calling for their removal. The latest wave of protests seen around and after the deadline of 30 June, set by “March and March” group follow historic xenophobic sentiment and anti-immigrant violence and protests.
2. Internal troubles in South Africa’s neighbourhood
The 2022 census recorded more than 2.4 million international migrants (both documented and undocumented) in South Africa, roughly 3.9 per cent of the population. A 2025 report by the Department of Statistics on migration reveals that most immigrants, roughly 84 per cent, come from the Southern African Development Community (SADC); 80 percent of these migrants are estimated to come from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Malawi. Zimbabwe's inflation and underemployment since the early 2000s, Mozambique’s internal conflicts and insurgencies, Malawi’s recurrent droughts and fuel shortages, and Lesotho's economy dependent on remittances from South Africa demonstrate the economic, political, and environmental circumstances and motives that continue to drive immigration.
3. Immigrant inflow, South Africa’s economic stress and mobilisation by vigilante groups
According to the World Bank, South Africa’s GDP growth in 2025 stands at 1.11 percent, and according to Statistics South Africa, the official unemployment rate stands at 32.7 per cent, and youth unemployment at 46 per cent. A large part of South Africa is economically marginalised, while migrants who are willing to work for lower wages and in informal businesses.
“March and March” cites these economic challenges, the hiring of cheap foreign labour, and alleged strain on public healthcare and housing and alleged increased crime rates as the reasons for the unrest in South Africa and the deadline for migrants to leave the country. Unlike earlier protests that spread from local incidents, as seen in 2008, 2015, 2019, and 2021, the demands in 2021 organised by ‘Operation Dudula’ on social media and the current protests, specifically mobilised by a single deadline set for 30 June, mark a change in the way vigilante groups are defining the nature of the anti-immigrant sentiment.
4. Fractured government response
Historically, the South African government has treated flare-ups in xenophobic protests and violence delicately. In the last few years, South Africa has also attempted to tighten control by creating the Border Management Authority in 2023 and then releasing a white paper on citizenship, immigration, and refugee protection on 07 June this year, calling for workplace inspections, border technology, anti-corruption measures, asylum system reform, and regional diplomacy. While the government has responded against violence and anti-immigrant sentiment by arresting rioters, it continues to maintain its stance on removing undocumented immigrants.
In perspective
First, despite the protests, migration from neighbouring countries is unlikely to decrease. Historically, migration to South Africa has increased, despite the anti-immigrant and undocumented immigrant sentiments and significant violence and flare-ups.
Second, government action reflects domestic political pressure as much as migration concerns. The five-pillar approach launched by the government after intensified rhetoric surrounding undocumented immigrants and the 30 June deadline, as well as the 900 arrests made during the protests on 30 June, shows that government action has been reactionary.
Third, long-term stability will likely depend on solving economic grievances, clarifying the policy surrounding undocumented immigrants, and combating the decades-long xenophobic sentiment. Enforcement operations and repatriation drives may relieve pressure in the short term but leave unaddressed the structural challenges.
The Israel-Lebanon Framework:
Conditional peace and Implementation deadlocks
Yesasvi Koganti
In the news
On 21 June, Israel's Defence Minister Israel Katz, confirmed that its forces would remain in the 10 kilometres security zone with full operational freedom, while Hezbollah's chief Niam Qassem vowed to respond to any further Israeli violations. This development follows the ceasefire violations by both sides.
On 24 June, both countries discussed a US-backed "pilot project" for Israel's phased withdrawal. Lebanon and Israel rejected US claims that Israel had begun withdrawing
On 27 June, Israel and Lebanon signed a US-brokered 14-point trilateral framework agreement establishing a conditional roadmap for Israel's redeployment. The agreement linked Israel's withdrawal to verified Hezbollah disarmament, introducing two pilot zones where the Lebanese Army would gradually assume security responsibilities. It also establishes a trilateral Military Coordination Group to oversee implementation. Hezbollah firmly opposed the deal.
On 29 June, Israel continued military operations against Hezbollah targets, arguing they complied with the new framework. Hezbollah condemned the strikes as violations, rejecting the agreement.
On 30 June, PM Netanyahu visited occupied southern Lebanon and declared that Israel's forces would remain in the buffer zone until Hezbollah no longer posed a military threat.
Issues at large
1. A complicated ceasefire roadmap
Constant violations of ceasefires between Israel and Hezbollah with little accountability reinforce a cycle of continued military action despite diplomatic commitments. While diplomatic efforts, mainly led by the US, Qatar, France, and the UN, prevented the outbreak of larger regional wars, they hardly ever clarified the underlying disagreements about Hezbollah’s military role, Israel's security concerns, and Lebanon's territorial control. Instead, each ceasefire has largely served as a temporary mechanism to contain violence, leaving the principal drivers of the conflict unresolved.
2. Competing endgames by Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah
The Israel-Lebanon conflict is shaped by three actors pursuing fundamentally different strategic objectives. Israel seeks Hezbollah's disarmament to withdraw from southern Lebanon. Israel views the region as a critical buffer that protects its northern communities from cross-border attacks, rocket fire, and militant infiltration. Lebanon prioritises reclaiming territorial control through Israel’s complete withdrawal. Meanwhile, Hezbollah maintains armed resistance as central to Lebanon's defence, arguing its military capabilities remain necessary while Israeli forces occupy territory and continue cross-border operations. These competing endgames leave little room for compromise and make implementing any agreement inherently contentious
3. The inherent challenge in the peace framework
The US-brokered framework aims to address several long-standing disputes through a phased implementation process. However, central provisions are mutually dependent, creating a political and security deadlock from the outset. Israel conditioned its withdrawal from southern Lebanon on the disarmament of Hezbollah and the elimination of security threats. While Lebanon insists that the restoration of territorial control requires Israel’s withdrawal. Hezbollah rejects any process demanding its disarmament, leading to the persisting presence of Israel’s forces in Lebanon. Instead of settling these competing demands ahead of implementation, the framework is integrated into the agreement itself, requiring a need to provide concessions that none of the principal actors are willing to make first.
4. Lebanon's limited state authority continues to constrain the peace process
Lebanon and Hezbollah operate as parallel military centres shaping the Israel-Lebanon conflict. While Beirut represents Lebanon diplomatically, Hezbollah possesses independent command structures, military capabilities, and close ties with Iran. Such decentralised security system has long limited the government's capacity to enforce security commitments and exercise full control over southern Lebanon. As a result, agreements negotiated by Beirut remain subject to actors beyond its authority, making compliance and implementation difficult.
In perspective
First, the framework is unlikely to break the cycle of previous Israel-Lebanon agreements. Like earlier ceasefires and security arrangements, it attempts to reduce violence without resolving the conflict's central political and security disputes. Although negotiated after four rounds of unprecedented direct talks, the deal ultimately depends on Hezbollah's willingness to alter its military footprint, something it has never been willing to do. Centering the agreement on Hezbollah's disarmament, it highlights the limitations of state-to-state diplomacy in conflicts involving powerful non-state actors with independent military capabilities.
Second, the Israel-Lebanon framework is also a product of US-Iran diplomacy. Renewed US mediation focused less on Israel-Lebanon reconciliation and more on Washington's objective of preserving broader engagement with Iran. The US-Iran MoU explicitly linked ending hostilities in Lebanon to a wider regional settlement, with Iran demanding Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territory as a condition for peace. This reflects the growing influence of regional negotiations over developments in Israel-Lebanon relations.
Third, lasting peace ultimately depends on the reconciliation of Israel's security concerns and Lebanon's goal of restoring territorial control. While military action and externally brokered agreements temporarily ease tensions, they will only aggravate the fundamental differences between Israel's security demands and Lebanon's territorial claims. As long as both remain dependent on the other's concessions, successive agreements will likely face similar implementation challenges.
The US-Iran negotiations:
Tenuous Ceasefire, Renewed Threats and the Contest over the Strait of Hormuz
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 26 and 27 June, the US and Iran engaged in tit-for-tat military strikes as Washington attacked Iran following Tehran’s drone strike on a vessel passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Both countries traded accusations of ceasefire violations.
On 28 June, President Trump threatened that "the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist" if Washington is forced to "militarily complete the job" it started. In response, Iran struck US bases in Kuwait and Bahrain
On the same day, US officials announced that the hostilities between the two have halted and that technical talks have resumed.
On 30 June, Iran rejected direct negotiations with the US, and Tehran’s top negotiator, Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, stated that "The sovereignty of the Strait of Hormuz lies with Iran and Oman, and traffic in the Strait is subject to arrangements determined by Iran.” Reuters also cited Iran’s senior officials, stating that Tehran is deliberating the imposition of tolls for the transit of vessels through the strait by mid-August.
On 02 July, the talks in Doha concluded without a breakthrough and mediators stated that the focus was largely on the Strait of Hormuz and unfreezing Iran's funds.
Separately, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that the only authorized routes through the Strait of Hormuz are those designated by the Islamic Republic.
Issues at large
1. Early threats to the ceasefire deal and persisting hostilities
The ceasefire established on 17 June, aimed at securing a 60-day halt to all hostilities to facilitate further negotiations, has been threatened from the very outset by violations from both sides. Repeated attacks and counterattacks have rendered the truce largely nominal, while an air of distrust continues to persist between Tehran and Washington, marked by Iran's rejection of direct talks and President Trump's repeated threats to annihilate Tehran. The continued violations of the ceasefire, Iran’s escalating demands over the Hormuz and the unrelenting Israel-Lebanon conflict in the background threatens the possibility of a comprehensive deal.
2. Iran’s bid for control over the Strait of Hormuz
The US-Iran interim agreement calls for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial transit at pre-war levels, without the imposition of tolls or the threat of disruption. However, Iran has escalated its demands by seeking sovereign control over the strategic chokepoint, with the aim of consolidating both economic and military influence over the waterway. Tehran’s demands starkly contradict the provisions of the 14-point interim agreement. Further, the reopening of the Strait had been one of Washington's principal objectives and one of the few provisions implemented alongside the ceasefire. Tehran's renewed demands for control over the Strait, however, have emerged as a major point of contention and continue to fuel tensions in the ongoing negotiations.
3. The contradictory coexistence of ceasefire and violations
The US and Israel's war against Iran has revealed an unprecedented coexistence of nominal ceasefires and persistent violations. Despite the ceasefire agreement calling for a halt to hostilities to facilitate negotiations towards a comprehensive framework, repeated attacks continue to undermine the truce. Yet, these violations have not derailed the negotiations; instead, the diplomatic process continues under the shadow of ongoing hostilities. A similar pattern is evident in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon. This renders the ceasefire more nominal, simultaneously increasing the risk of a return to full-scale conflict. It also undermines the predictability as agreements are immediately followed by attacks and counterattacks, while discord at the negotiating table is mirrored by military escalations on the ground. Further, it threatens to establish a new diplomatic normal where agreements are routinely violated without significant political consequences, eroding respect for negotiated commitments.
In perspective
First, the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as the new axis of the conflict. At the outset of the war, the US and Israel justified military action against Iran primarily on the grounds of eliminating Tehran's nuclear threat, accompanied by rhetoric of regime change. However, Iran's decision to leverage its control over the Strait of Hormuz fundamentally shifted the conflict's focus. The blockade's severe economic repercussions, including disruptions to global energy markets and rising fuel prices even in Washington, became a key factor driving negotiations. While the ceasefire was expected to restore unhindered transit through the Strait, Tehran has since tightened its control, making the reopening of Hormuz without Iranian dominance Washington's principal objective. In the process, the initial emphasis on Iran's nuclear programme has been relegated to the background.
Second, Trump's unprecedented brand of diplomacy. The US-Iran war serves as a theatre not only for military confrontation but also unconventional means of diplomatic engagement. President Trump has repeatedly made claims of having “defeated” or “deposed” the Iranian regime and threats to annihilate the country's “entire civilization.” These threats are often followed by renewed negotiations and subsequent declarations that the talks had been successful, only to conclude in another round of coercive rhetoric. This oscillation between intimidation and unilateral declarations of victory marks an unusual departure from conventional diplomacy. Beyond complicating the negotiating process, it has dealt a significant blow to the norms of mutual respect and restraint that form the bedrock of diplomacy.
The Unrest in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK):
A Contested Narrative, Election Apprehensions, and Islamabad’s Control
Radhika M Agarwal
In the news
On 25 June, the “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” police chief Liaqat Ali Malik dismissed critical coverage of the ongoing unrest in PoK, including a BBC Urdu report, as "disinformation" within a "hybrid warfare" framework, even as internet suspensions and the Joint Awami Action Committee's (JAAC) strike continued.
On 29 June, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Hafiz Naeemur Rehman announced that JAAC had paused its planned long march as JI stepped in to mediate, warning that the 27 July elections could face credibility questions if normalcy wasn't restored.
On 30 June, the “AJK Assembly” passed a PKR 286 billion budget featuring a PKR 32.6 billion wheat subsidy, and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) (JUI-F) announced an electoral alliance ahead of the 27 July polls, urging protesters toward parliamentary channels.
On 01 July, despite ongoing mediation, JAAC chief Shaukat Nawaz Mir was arrested in Dhirkot on sedition charges; JAAC vowed the movement would emerge stronger. As on 01 July, according to the PoK government's tally, four security personnel killed, over 570 arrests, and 155 individuals placed on a terrorism watchlist since JAAC's proscription under the Anti-Terrorism Act on 5 June.
Issues at large
1. From economic grievance to political representation
The protests are led by JAAC, a coalition of traders, transporters, lawyers, and students united by shared economic grievances rather than political ideology. It began in 2023 as a complaint over inflated flour and electricity prices, but has escalated subsequently. The demands expanded to include hydropower royalties and abolishing reserved seats; the movement's focus shifted from cost-of-living relief to political representation. An early June Court ruling upholding the reserved seats acted as an accelerant, closing the legal door without addressing the underlying grievances.
2. The reserved-seats controversy and upcoming elections
The push to abolish refugee-reserved seats comes just weeks before these seats are contested in the 27 July elections. Mainstream parties are rallying around the electoral process rather than the protests; the PPP-JUI-F alliance is explicitly urging protesters to seek solutions through the PoK parliament. However, this pitch assumes the reserved-seats question is genuinely back on the table, which government conduct does not support.
3. Local stakeholders and Islamabad’s shadow
The primary actors are JAAC and its detained leader, Shaukat Nawaz Mir, facing an “AJK administration” that is simultaneously cracking down and negotiating. JI is positioned as an independent mediator, while the PPP and JUI-F offer an electoral alternative. Holding ultimate authority over “AJK's” constitutional and security affairs is Pakistan's federal government, understood to be shaping the harder elements of the state's response. The state also invokes a "hybrid warfare" framing to gesture at India, casting domestic dissent as an external threat.
4. The dual strategy of concession and coercion
The government is running a contradictory, two-track response. The conciliatory track involves a subsidy-heavy budget, withdrawn cases, and claimed fulfillment of demands. The coercive track involves proscribing JAAC, arresting Mir, rolling internet suspensions, and maintaining a watchlist exceeding 150 names. Advancing both tracks in the same week suggests an administration focused on managing appearances rather than resolving the core dispute.
In perspective
The current unrest is not an isolated flashpoint but the most severe iteration of a recurring cycle. Over three years, frustration over flour and electricity prices has hardened into a fundamental dispute over political representation and PoK’s constitutional relationship with Islamabad.
This situation is highly likely to prolong. Past partial concessions have only bought temporary calm, and the legal avenue for the reserved-seats question has now been firmly closed by the courts rather than resolved politically. Arresting JAAC's leadership during active mediation leaves little room for a durable settlement before the 27 July elections.
Ultimately, the government's pattern of concession and coercion highlights a structural limitation in governance. While the PoK’s institutions are self-governing in paper, true power over security, finance, and constitutional status remains routed through Islamabad, a limitation that the “AJK” shares with Gilgit-Baltistan. While the immediate unrest may subside after the election, the underlying conditions that reproduce this cycle roughly once a year remain unaddressed.
About the author
NIAS Conflict Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 339, 03 July 2026