Conflict Weekly

Conflict Weekly
US-Iran War, Week 21 I Houthi's Saudi Arabia target in the Red Sea
Return of South China Sea tensions I Resurgence of Somali piracy

Conflict Weekly #341, Vol 7, No. 28, 23 July 2026

Global Politics Team
24 July 2026
Photo Source:

CW Note
US-Iran War, Week 21:
Resumption of attacks and the Strait of Hormuz impasse

Brighty Ann Sarah

In the news
On 17 July, President Trump signalled the possibility of expanding the scope of US strikes to include civilian and energy infrastructure, while the CENTCOM stated that the strikes were "designed to continue degrading Iran's ability to threaten commercial shipping.”

On 18 July, Iran intensified its attacks on US allies and bases in the region, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Saudi Arabia after Washington’s attacks on Tehran’s civilian infrastructure and power facilities.

On the same day, the US CENTCOM stated that two US military personnel were killed in Jordan and another was missing in action after an Iranian attack, while Iran's supreme leader said Washington would pay for "seeking to escalate the conflict" after a seventh straight night of US attacks. 

On 20 July, Qatar, Egypt Pakistan and other regional mediators presented the US and Iran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire as a window to further negotiations.

President Trump issued severe threats against Iran, stating that "Every time Iran kills an American Soldier, they will pay for that killing ⁠many times over.”

On 22 July, the US launched a fresh wave of attacks in Iran’s Bushner Province, home to Iran’s only nuclear plant. 

On the same day, the US Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth, stated that the war in Iran has cost the US USD 37 billion by latest estimates. He requested the Senate Appropriation Committee for an additional USD 70 billion in funds.

Issues at large
1. Escalating military action
The recent escalation marked one of the deadliest pints of the renewed US-Iran war with aggressive rhetoric and hedging, particularly from the US side. Washington seeks to degrade Iran’s key defence and civilian infrastructure to nudge negotiations in its favour. However, President Trump’s increasingly inflammatory statements have escalated tensions. This rhetoric has been matched by a steep expansion in the scope of US strikes, and a stark US military buildup.  Iran has also threatened to pursue “eye-for-an-eye” response to US military action. 

2. Iran’s retaliatory posture and regional spillover
Tehran has demonstrated notable resilience against the growing intensity of US strikes. Beyond the defensive posture, Iran has significantly widened the scope of its attacks; it has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and drones against US military installations and assets in neighbouring countries, drawing Washington's regional allies into the fray. Kuwait faced sustained Iranian attacks, with its forces intercepting ballistic missiles and drones. The attacks also damaged Kuwait’s desalination plants and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation reported one of its oil facilities were hit, causing significant damage and injuries. In Bahrain, the IRGC targeted Sheikh Isa Air Base, a hub for US combat aircraft, and an intelligence data centre.  In Jordan, Iranian missiles and drones struck the US base at Al Azraq, destroying at least two US fighter jets and three other aircraft. Simultaneously, Iran has leveraged its network of regional proxies to amplify pressure, the Houthis in Yemen to threaten and potentially blockade Red Sea shipping routes. Houthi missile and drone attacks on vessels and announcements of blockades targeting Saudi-linked shipping, have compounded the disruptions already caused by the Hormuz crisis.

3. The waning window of negotiations
Despite multiple attempts by Pakistan and other mediators to broker de-escalation, most recently the 10-day truce aimed at halting strikes and resuming talks, these initiatives have consistently failed amid escalating military exchanges and inflammatory rhetoric from both sides. As the conflict entered one of its most intense and hostile phases, with daily US airstrikes met by Iranian retaliatory attacks on regional targets and shipping, both parties have openly flouted ceasefire understandings, further eroding trust. The cycle of tit-for-tat strikes, coupled with high-level threats including US vows of infrastructure retaliation and Iranian pledges of “eye-for-an-eye” responses, has significantly diminished prospects for a near-term diplomatic breakthrough. Moreover, the growing emphasis on revenge for casualties and perceived aggressions has made negotiations politically costly.

In perspective
Washington seeks to militarily coerce Iran to its terms, but Tehran continues to hold its ground and refuses to concede its new-found leverage over the strait, which has now become the central flashpoint of the conflict. Washington’s strategy appears cantered on militarily degrading Iran’s key defence infrastructure and prolonging the conflict in hopes that Tehran will eventually return to the negotiating table on US terms. However, Iran has secured more relative gains so far, and has effectively turned the waterway into its central bargaining chip. Washington cannot simply walk away without losing face if shipping through the strait is not restored on its terms.  Prolonged disruption risks an economic fallout and political embarrassment at home. Simultaneously, Iran is determined to institutionalise its control, which it views as a legitimate post-war gain. However, the spillover of the conflict and the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz could eventually turn the winds against Tehran. A drawn-out “forever war” would likely exhaust Iran’s defences over time, especially if countries successfully develop alternative shipping routes or adopt a more unified retaliatory stance. The high stakes of the strait had locked Washington and Tehran in a dangerous standoff, with neither willing to back down easily, and the escalation churning into broader war.

Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.


CW Note
The Houthis target Saudi Arabia:
A new front in the US-Iran War

Brighty Ann Sarah

In the news
On 16 July, Yemen’s Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi warned that if Saudi Arabia escalates its involvement in the conflict, the group will target all Saudi oil facilities and other vital infrastructure with missiles and drones. The threat followed Houthi missile strikes on Saudi Arabia, after the group accused Riyadh of bombing the Saana airport under their control on 13 June, effectively ending a four-year truce between the two sides.

On 21 July, the Houthis declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabian vessels transiting through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait in the Red Sea. The group also sent e-mail threats to shipping companies, warning them against using Saudi ports, or they may be targeted.

The Saudi-backed coalition government in Yemen stated that they would respond to the threat through military force and has adopted measures to secure the strait. 

On 23 July, the group declared that it attacked two Saudi oil tankers, Encelia and Layla,  in the Red Sea that had "violated" its blockade of Saudi ports. 

President Trump warned that a repeated attack would be met with "major military punishment" upon both the Houthis and Iran.

Issues at large
1. The long-standing Saudi Arabia-Houthi conflict
The latest flare-up between Riyadh and the Iran-backed Houthis have broken the fragile truce that had taken hold four-years back in 2022. The Houthi’s began as a Zaidi Shia group from northern Yemen in the early 2000s. The group repeatedly clashed with the Saudi-backed government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of interfering in Yemeni affairs and supporting crackdowns against them. Tensions escalated dramatically in 2014-2015, when the Houthis seized the capital Sanaa amid Yemen’s civil unrest, ousted the internationally recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, and advanced toward key areas, prompting Saudi Arabia to form a nine-nation military coalition in March 2015. The intervention, initially called Operation Decisive Storm, aimed to restore Hadi’s government, secure Saudi Arabia’s borders, and counter Iranian influence through the Houthis. The intervention led to one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with widespread civilian casualties, famine risks, cholera outbreaks, and infrastructure destruction. A fragile truce was set in place in 2022 and had largely held in terms of Saudi-Houthi clashes, which has been broken by the latest outbreak.

2. The Iran-Houthi axis
The Houthi’s hold a central position in Iran’s network of regional proxies, or the ‘Axis of Resistance.’ The Houthis initially rose with grievances against the central government, but Iran saw strategic value in supporting them as a low-cost lever against Saudi Arabia and broader Sunni Gulf powers, particularly leveraging their control of the Red Sea chokepoints.  Tehran provides advanced weaponry, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, explosives, drones and other military support to the group’s operations, often smuggled through the Red Sea. IRGC-Quds Force have also trained the group in combat. Financially, Iran supplies funding, gold and sanctions-evasion networks to sustain Houthi operations. While the Houthis retain considerable autonomy in decision-making, Iran provides overarching guidance, especially during escalations, encouraging actions like Red Sea disruptions.

3. The Red Sea blockade and the compounding crisis
The Houthi blockade on Saudi vessels and the Red Sea has dramatically compounded the ongoing Strait of Hormuz crisis by simultaneously threatening both the primary and alternative export routes for Gulf oil. Following the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea corridor had acted as a key transit point for oil and shipping vessels from the Middle East. Saudi Arabia had responded by rerouting a significant portion of its crude through the East-West Pipeline to Red Sea ports like Yanbu, with recent volumes reaching several million bpd, much of it heading south through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Bab el-Mandeb typically handles 4-9 million bpd of oil and products, forming a critical southern gateway for shipments to Asia and Europe. 

By imposing a naval embargo and claiming attacks on Saudi-linked tankers, the Houthis have forced rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of miles, 10-14 days of transit time, and sharply higher costs, while spiking insurance rates and oil prices to USD 100 per barrel. This dual-chokepoint pressure severely risks broader energy market instability.

In perspective
The latest Saudi-Houthi flare-up has effectively opened a dangerous new front in the broader regional war by shattering the fragile four-year truce and dragging Riyadh back into direct confrontation with the Houthi’s. What began with accusations over the Sanaa airport bombing quickly escalated into Houthi missile and drone strikes on Saudi targets and their declaration of a naval blockade on Saudi vessels in the Red Sea, directly threatening the kingdom’s alternative oil export routes through Bab el-Mandeb at a time when the Strait of Hormuz is already under severe pressure. This mirrors how escalation in the US-Iran conflict rips open old and unhealed conflicts across the region, long-simmering rivalries and unresolved grievances that were never truly settled, only temporarily suppressed during brief spells of uneasy calm. The pattern had been earlier visible in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict as well, where conflicts lie dormant, waiting for minor hairpin triggers to set off conflicts. 

Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.


CW Note
China, the Philippines, and the return of South China Sea tensions:
Accusations, Arbitrations and Ambiguities

Aparna A Nair

In the news
On 21 July, Reuters reported that China and the Philippine Coast Guards traded accusations at Second Thomas Shoal. 

The China Coast Guard (CCG) stated that a Philippine vessel rammed into a Chinese patrol boat in the South China Sea and the Philippine personnel initiated "malicious attacks" against Chinese law enforcement officers by using oars and long sticks.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stated that the Chinese Coast Guard approached within close range of ⁠its grounded warship on the Second Thomas Shoal and took photos and videos. Additionally, Philippine Navy personnel were harmed with a wooden baton.

On the same day, the Philippine president summoned the Chinese Ambassador to Manila and China's foreign ministry summoned Manila's envoy to China. China’s Foreign Ministry stated that it will never accept any attempt by the Philippines to build permanent facilities or establish a permanent outpost at Ren'ai Jiao. The statement added that the grounded vessel violates the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) of 2002.

On the same day, on the sidelines of the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended a consultative meeting on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). 

Issues at large
1. Relevance of Second Thomas Shoal
Second Thomas Shoal is 200 nautical miles from Palawan, which makes the area under the Philippines' exclusive economic zone based on UNCLOS. China calls this region Ren’ai Jiao, and claims this area as a feature of the South China Sea. This atoll is in the Spratly Islands and is a gateway to Chinese-occupied reefs and waters. The presence of the Philippines' BRP Sierra Madre, a World War II–era vessel, makes the area a semi-permanent military outpost. The Second Thomas Shoal grounds the World War II–era Philippine vessel BRP Sierra Madre. It was beached in 1999 to serve as a physical outpost and a symbol of effective control. China had demanded the removal, claiming it was an “illegally grounded warship.” China’s main argument was that the presence of this vessel violates the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Beijing also views the resupply mission as a routine operation to sustain personnel stationed there.

2. The long-standing South China Sea dispute and its multiple actors
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and other countries in the South China Sea contest overlapping territorial and maritime claims. China, being the largest claimant, has laid out the Nine-Dash Line and claims several territories, islands, reefs, and territorial waters in this area. China and other claimants, such as the Philippines, have constructed facilities and deployed coast guard to highlight their presence and enforce control. In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration against China to clarify its maritime rights and the legal status of disputed features in the South China Sea. The tribunal decision rejected China’s historical sovereignty in the region. It also laid out that the nine-dash line is incompatible with UNCLOS. China rejected the arbitration and reiterated its historical sovereignty. Beijing has been consistently rejecting third-party interference and maintains that the issue must be addressed by the concerned parties.

3. The UNCLOSS award and its tenth anniversary
On the tenth anniversary of the arbitral award, fourteen countries, including the US, Philippines, Australia, and Canada, released a joint statement reaffirming the award. The statement rejected China’s maritime claims and urged that the parties resolve the dispute peacefully. They also reiterated their historic rights and that land territorial issues are not subject to UNCLOS.

The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was signed between ASEAN and China. It is not a legally binding document but calls for peaceful dispute resolution, self-restraint, and cooperation in the South China Sea. Contrarily, Manila, along with many ASEAN countries, views China’s claims and coast guard behaviour as the real breach of the norms. Ironically, the coast guard accusations happened as the consultative meeting was progressing.

In perspective
The incident brings out the ambiguity over sovereignty claims, UNCLOS-based arguments, and DOC-based claims. The bottom line reflects that there is ample legal and operational ambiguity. The UNCLOS arbitration and DOC, which were supposed to bring peace to the table, are now tools for mutual blame. For Beijing, withdrawing from features like Second Thomas Shoal undermines its claim to its indisputable sovereignty. On the other hand, if Manila concedes, it would be read as abandoning its legal and moral grounds

Aparna A Nair is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai.


CW Note
The resurgence of Somali piracy:
Sophisticated tactics, Regional instability and an Ineffective international response

Akshath Kaimal

In the news
On 17 July, seven armed Somali pirates hijacked a Tanzanian-flagged chemical and oil products tanker, MT ASANA, roughly 75 miles off the coast of Mukalla, Yemen. This marks the second such hijacking of a tanker since May.

On the same day, maritime security group Ambrey revealed that the ship lacked an on-board private armed security team and identified the perpetrators as an active "pirate action group".

Also on the same day, risk management group Vanguard said that while the hijacking was in progress, specific details regarding the total number of attackers and crew status remained unconfirmed. 

There were no statements from the owner of the tanker or the Somali government.

Issues at large
1. Political instability and Somali coast’s persisting problem  
Piracy along the Somali coast came out of the collapse of the Somali government in the early 1990s, when small, disorganised militias formed by local fishermen began combating illegal foreign fishing and toxic dumping. From here, it grew into a lucrative hijacking enterprise, creating a major global threat, primarily between 2005 and 2012. During this period, pirate groups carried out over 1,000 attacks, which cost the global economy USD 18 billion annually. This era was marked by localised and rudimentary tactics, with groups relying on small arms and basic skiffs to launch their attacks. 

Political instability has historically fueled piracy off Somalia’s coast. Since the fall of the Somali government in the 1990s, federal authorities have faced increasing calls for autonomy from states. The lack of sovereign control, coupled with rising insurgencies from Islamist militant groups, created a vacuum for piracy to flourish. Today, in 2026, the country is going through a constitutional crisis, with the government unilaterally postponing the general elections and ousting regional leaders in South West and Jubaland states. Besides, the spread of Al-Shabaab and Islamic State-affiliated militant groups, has left the government incapable of addressing the piracy issue effectively. Local leaders and communities are pushed to increasingly rely on piracy as a source of unregulated funding for their regional campaigns, a similar trend seen during the 2005-2012 era. 

2. From rudimentary to sophisticated tactics 
Since 2023, piracy has evolved into a far more sophisticated threat, with groups using GPS and satellite technologies to track commercial ships up to 1,000 kilometres into the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, pirate groups have forged new alliances - with the Al-Qaeda-aligned Al-Shabaab for logistical protection on land, and Yemen’s Houthis for advanced weapons, training and strategic intelligence - turning a once-rudimentary force into a highly sophisticated one.

3. Economic stagnation and aid cuts
Widespread poverty, high cost of living and climate change have pushed Somalia into a multidimensional humanitarian crisis. This is worsened by international aid cuts, with USAID funding falling from USD 467 million in 2024 to just USD 3 million in early 2026. In addition to this, illegal, unregulated fishing drains USD 300 million from the Somali economy annually, leaving civilians in desperation. This situation is also increasingly pushing young people to view piracy as an economic lifeline, with pirate groups locally celebrated as generous employers whose multi-million dollar ransoms fund whole communities. Hence, economic stagnation and aid cuts create a complex environment for piracy to flourish.

4. Regional conflicts as drivers this resurgence in piracy
The ongoing US-Iran war and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have created a vacuum for Somali pirates. With the Strait of Hormuz closed and the high security risk around the Red Sea, nearly 70 per cent of maritime traffic in the region has been rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, pushing a large volume of ships and tankers directly past the Somali basin. Simultaneously, the international naval fleets have reduced their anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa to reinforce security in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The regional instability and lack of reinforcements have allowed pirate groups to mount attacks further into the Indian Ocean.

5. Ineffective regional and international responses 
The international community today lacks the political and fiscal willpower to resurrect the major naval security initiatives it undertook in the previous era. For its part, Somalia has signed defence pacts with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to protect its mainland as well as the wider Red Sea corridor, but these commitments remain insufficient to address threats 1,000 kilometres offshore. Shipowners are also compromising on expensive private security teams, leaving vessels exposed. The Somali Basin is inching towards being designated a “high-risk area," which could drive up costs and worsen the humanitarian situation. 

In perspective
With two major incidents in the space of three months, the threat of Somali piracy is no longer theoretical. Somalia is currently in a no-win situation, with domestic political turmoil, violent insurgencies and an accelerating humanitarian crisis leaving the government incapable of addressing piracy on its own. Unless the international community can collaborate again to fight this growing threat, piracy incidents around the Horn of Africa are only expected to rise.

Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, and is part of the NIAS Pakistan Reader team.


 


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Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria
Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment
March 2026 | CWA # 2012

Padmashree Anandhan

The War in Ukraine
Long-range strikes, Defence adaptation and the EU’s energy dependence
March 2026 | CWA # 2010

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Elections 2026
The Rise of the “New” and the Fall of the “Old”
March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026
Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape
March 2026 | CWA # 2001

Preetha Renganarayanan

Six major takeaways on the economy, border and internal security and Iran
February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan
Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover
February 2026 | CWA # 1986

Preetha Renganarayanan

Focus on Trade, Defense, Energy and Regional Connectivity
February 2026 | CWA # 1985

Abhimanyu Solanki

Basant in Pakistan
The return of Basant, and what it signifies
February 2026 | CWA # 1977

Anu Maria Joseph

Violence in Nigeria
US military deployment amidst worsening insurgency
February 2026 | CWA # 1976

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine
The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
December 2025 | CWA # 1971

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan Budget 2025-26
Legislating stabilisation under IMF discipline and coalition constraints
December 2025 | CWA # 1970

Aparna A Nair

Pakistan & China
Ten Years of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
November 2025 | CWA # 1968

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan and the US
A New opening, or another cycle?
February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti

UK and China
PM Keir Starmer’s visit and the Recalibration of Economic, Strategic, and Domestic ties
January 2026 | CWA # 1946

Preetha Renganarayanan

The Davos Summit 2026
Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum
December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1914

Preetha Renganarayanan

August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech and the Civil Rights Movement in the US
August 2025 | CWA # 1790

GP Team

The World This Week#323-324
The Trump-Putin meeting & the US-China tariff extension
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
Weaponization of access to the US economy
August 2025 | CWA # 1779

GP Team

The World This Week#322
US tariffs on India, Brazil and Canada & the EU-US trade deal
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, starting the First World War
July 2025 | CWA # 1770

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:
Why the focus on terrorism, refugees, and Uzbekistan as the third partner?
July 2025 | CWA # 1769

GP Team

The World This Week#321
Indian PM Modi's visit to the Maldives I Elections to the Upper House in Japan
July 2025 | CWA # 1762

Lekshmi MK

Ocean Darkening: 
What is the phenomenon? What are its effects? And who are more vulnerable?
July 2025 | CWA # 1749

R Preetha

Africa as the Hunger Epicenter
Of the 13 Global Hunger Hotspots, 8 are in Africa: Five reasons why
July 2025 | CWA # 1748

GP Team

The World This Week #318
PM Modi’s Visit to Trinidad and Tobago & Ghana, One big beautiful bill, and Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting
July 2025 | CWA # 1744

Chittrothu Vaihali

EU-Canada Summit 2025
What is security and defence partnership all about?
July 2025 | CWA # 1742

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly # 287-88
The 12 Day War and the Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal
July 2025 | CWA # 1738

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Thailand and Cambodia
What was the phone call between PM Shinawatra and President of Senate Hun Sen? What is the border dispute between the two? Why has this become an issue?
June 2025 | CWA # 1735

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025:
Trump making Europe great again
June 2025 | CWA # 1734

GP Team

The World This Week #317
NATO Summit 2025 and Russia-Mali bilateral agreements
June 2025 | CWA # 1733

Ananya Dinesh

China and the Pacific Islands 
What was the recent China-PIC joint statement about? What it says, and what it means?
June 2025 | CWA # 1728

M Kejia

G7 Summit 2025:
The Focus on the Middle East and Trade negotiations
June 2025 | CWA # 1727

Aparna A Nair

Second China-Central Asia Summit:
China’s continuing search for regional partners, and the emphasis on the BRI
June 2025 | CWA # 1726

GP Team

The World This Week #316
China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, and the G7 Summit in Canada
June 2025 | CWA # 1725

Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Santhiya M, Aparna A Nair & M Kejia

Operation Midnight Hammer: US bombs three nuclear sites in Iran
What were the three Iranian nuclear sites that were targeted? What are the B2 Bombers and Bunker Buster Bombs? What do these attacks mean? What Next?
June 2025 | CWA # 1724

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #286
The Spiralling Israel-Iran Crisis, and the Dangerous Hunger Hotspots
June 2025 | CWA # 1721

Rizwana Banu S and Santhiya M

Who are the Afrikaners?
Why is Trump interested in the Afrikaner question in South Africa?
June 2025 | CWA # 1720

Lekshmi MK

New WMO Report on Arctic Warming
What are the social, economic and environmental implications of Arctic warming
June 2025 | CWA # 1719

J Yamini  

China’s EV Surge
What contributes to the rise of BYD
June 2025 | CWA # 1717

J Yamini

Gender Violence in Pakistan:
What are the larger issues in the Noor Mukadam case?
June 2025 | CWA # 1715

Femy Francis

The US-China:
On Tariffs, Rare Earths and Visas
June 2025 | CWA # 1713

GP Team

The World This Week #315
The UN Ocean Conference in France and the US-China Meeting in London
June 2025 | CWA # 1709

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #284-285
Cambodia-Thailand Border Tensions, Protests in the US, and the Indigenous Māori question in New Zealand
June 2025 | CWA # 1705

GP Team

The World This Week #314
Elections in South Korea and Poland I China and the Pacific Island Countries I Bangladesh Election Announcement 2026
June 2025 | CWA # 1703

M Kejia 

Sagarmatha Sambaad in Nepal
Kathmandu’s Global Agenda for the Himalayas
June 2025 | CWA # 1700

R Preetha

Ethiopia bans the TPLF
What does the TPLF ban mean for the Pretoria agreement? What next for Ethiopia?
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
Harvard vs Trump Administration
June 2025 | CWA # 1691

GP Team

The World This Week #313
China-ASEAN-GCC Summit I President Macron's visit to South East Asia I Trump Vs Harvard
May 2025 | CWA # 1690

GP Team

The World This Week #312
Elections in Romania, Portugal & Poland I UK-EU Summit
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
Continuing Russia’s Aerial Attacks, despite exchange of prisoners
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
The Humanitarian Crisis and Israel’s Renewed Offensive
May 2025 | CWA # 1685

Aparna A Nair

UK-EU Summit:
First step towards a reset
May 2025 | CWA # 1683

Aashish Ganeshan

Elections in Portugal:
The Rise of Chega Party and the Search for Political Stability
May 2025 | CWA # 1679

Aashish Ganeshan

US in the Middle Easr
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE
May 2025 | CWA # 1678

Gauri Gupta

China in Latin America
China-CELAC forum: Strengthening ties with Latin America and Caribbean
May 2025 | CWA # 1677

GP Team

The World This Week #310-311
China in Latin America and the Carribbean I Trump's Middle East Visit I Denmark as the new Arctic Chair
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
May 2025 | CWA # 1672

D Suba Chandran

India and Pakistan:
De-escalation and the “New Normal”
May 2025 | CWA # 1671

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

US, Ukraine and Russia:
Air attacks amidst a Minerals deal and Ceasefire Proposals
May 2025 | CWA # 1670

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Singapore Elections in 2025:
People’s Action Party (PAP) Wins, Again
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Tough Tariff Negotiations with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1666

Padmashree Anandhan

The US-Ukraine
The mineral deal with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
May 2025 | CWA # 1663

R Preetha

Canada Elections 2025:
What do the results convey? What next for Mark Carney?
March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon

The Maldives
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan

India
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej

Bangladesh
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Afghanistan