What happened?
On 22 July, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Energy His Royal Highness Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed a “peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement” known as the “123 Agreement,” alongside an accompanying bilateral safeguards agreement.
On 23 July, US President Trump stated that the deal with Saudi Arabia is a civil nuclear deal, does not include enrichment, and hinges on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. Subsequently, Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office released a statement, saying that Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords would be an “historic leap” without mentioning the nuclear deal.
Democratic Party members in the US have expressed concern over the deal, stating, “This agreement will set off a nuclear race in the region, further disincentivizing Iran from limiting its own program,” and that the US Congress would only approve the deal if it had “the same gold-standard safeguards as our deal with the UAE.”
What is the background?
1. A note on the “123 Agreement”
The "123 Agreement" refers to Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which requires Washington to conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement before any transfer of significant nuclear material, equipment, or technology to another country, ensuring compliance with global non-proliferation standards. The US currently has 26 agreements with different countries and international organizations. In the Middle East, the UAE and now Saudi Arabia are a part of this agreement. The US has used these agreements to strengthen strategic partnerships, promote a degree of nuclear non-proliferation, and establish dominance in the nuclear export trade.
2. The US-Saudi Arabia nuclear dialogue
Ten years ago, Riyadh and Washington began discussing a civil nuclear program and a potential 123 Agreement. Negotiations date back to the first Trump administration and continued through Joe Biden’s presidency, when a nuclear deal was linked to Saudi-Israel normalization. In 2025, talks were revived; during the November visit to the US by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the two sides signed a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Cooperation, laying the groundwork for the formal 123 Agreement.
3. Saudi Arabia’s long-standing nuclear ambitions
In 2019, Prince Abdulaziz said that the Kingdom aims to go "from producing uranium, to enriching uranium, using the uranium, even acquiring the technologies." In 2023, this was reiterated by him conveying the country’s intent to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) domestically. The nuclear power is expected to free up oil for export and diversify the Kingdom's energy mix under Vision 2030. Externally, the rivalry with Iran has been a key factor. In 2018, Prince Mohamed bin Salman said that Saudi Arabia would follow Iran if it were to develop a nuclear bomb, “without a doubt.” Additionally, Saudi Arabia is reported to have helped Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and is speculated to have an understanding with Islamabad under the 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement that extends a "nuclear umbrella."
4. The Abraham Accords as a conditional factor
The Abraham Accords, the set of US-brokered agreements in 2020 between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, later signed by Morocco, Sudan, and Kazakhstan, aimed to normalize diplomatic relations among the Arab countries and Israel. Saudi Arabia has long maintained that any normalization with Israel would require the establishment of a Palestinian state. Additionally, during the Israel-Gaza war in 2024, Mohammed bin Salman stated, “The Kingdom reiterates its condemnation and absolute refusal of the collective genocide committed by Israel against the brotherly Palestinian people,” while continuing to take a stand against Israel’s actions in the region as the US-Iran conflict persists.
5. Apprehensions for non-proliferation
The agreement has been criticized by non-proliferation experts for deviating from the "gold standard" set by the 2009 UAE 123 Agreement, in which the UAE voluntarily consented to forgo plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their main argument is the current 123 agreement, which permits an enrichment option and exempts Riyadh from joining the IAEA Additional Protocol. According to experts in the field from Carnegie and Stimson, the agreement creates new, risky precedents at a time when nuclear weapons are expanding globally, and its provisions are "tantamount to the United States giving up on non-proliferation." These concerns come in the backdrop of increasing tensions in the Middle East.
What does this mean?
First, the Abraham Accords condition adds uncertainty. Saudi Arabia has not responded to Trump's statement, leaving it unclear whether this constitutes a binding part of the agreement, particularly given Riyadh's consistent linkage of Palestinian statehood to any normalization with Israel.
Second, should the reported non-proliferation standards prove to be true, this would reflect a shift in US policy, setting a precedent that could weaken established non-proliferation norms and also allow other countries like South Korea to advance similar interests.
Third, the deal is likely to shape the broader Middle East calculus, given that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the only countries party to a 123 Agreement in the region, further feeding Iran's and Israel's strategic calculations and threat perceptions.
