CWA # 2218
Conflict Weekly
The US-Iran War, Week 22 I Heatwaves and Wildfires in Spain and France
Ebola expansion in Africa I Profile: Houthis
Conflict Weekly #342, Vol 7, No. 29, 30 July 2026
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Global Politics Team
30 July 2026
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CW Note
The US-Iran War, Week 22:
End of pause, Return of hostilities and Expanding conflict geography
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 24 July, President Trump stated that Washington was temporarily pausing its military strikes on Tehran to revive negotiations, after thirteen consecutive days of attack. Iranian officials responded that Tehran will halt its attack for only as long as the US holds off, and that Iran remains in a position of “attack for attack.”
On the same day, President Trump stated that President Xi Jinping had assured China would not enable Tehran “Under any circumstances, give or sell weapons to the Islamic Republic of Iran — And that statement included Chinese Companies.” He warned that such involvement from Beijing and Moscow “would be very bad for them.”
On 26 July, Iran's Houthi allies in Yemen said they had targeted the East-West Pipeline carrying oil to Saudi Arabia's main Red Sea port of Yanbu in retaliation for Saudi drone incursions.
On 29 July, the US CENTCOM stated that it intercepted multiple ballistic missiles launched by Iran in “an attempted surprise attack.” On the same day, the US and Saudi Arabia launched strikes on Iran-backed groups in Iraq citing drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities.
Separately, Reuters, in an exclusive, reported that Iran is set to purchase 400 Chinese-made shoulder-fired air-defence missile launchers, amounting to USD 60-70 billion. The purchase also includes between 300 and 400 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), including Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missiles. Reports also suggested that China held direct talks with the Houthis to allow safe transit of its tankers through the southern Red Sea, amid the Houthi embargo on exports from Saudi Arabia.
Issues at large
1. End of truce and expanding geography of the conflict
The temporary pause has ended with Iran’s strikes against the US and persisting attacks unfolding across various fronts in the war. The conflict-geography has markedly expanded with new fronts opening in Yemen and Iraq. In Yemen, Iran-backed Houthi forces have sharply escalated the confrontation with Saudi Arabia, and established a second maritime front in the Red Sea, drawing Riyadh into active combat. Simultaneously, Iran-backed militias operating from Iraqi territory have turned Iraq into an active launch platform, conducting drone attacks directed by the IRGC against Saudi oil sites.
2. Targeting Saudi Arabia and opening new fronts
Saudi Arabia has emerged as Iran’s key target, notably against the backdrop of the recent US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Iran is leveraging the vast network of proxy groups it has cultivated over the decades as a tool of escalation. Opening new fronts in Yemen and Iraq has widened the scope of what US or and regional allies have to confront alongside direct confrontations with Iran. The Iran-backed militias in Iraq have turned Baghdad into an operational base for Tehran’s attacks. These militias form a key pillar of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” largely organized under the banner of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or Hashd al-Shaabi, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Forming a powerful network of predominantly Shiite paramilitary groups, they emerged during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fight against ISIS after 2014 and were later formally integrated into Iraq’s security apparatus while retaining strong operational, financial and ideological ties to Iran’s IRGC and its Quds Force.
3. The emerging China factor and the end of Beijing's non-interference
For months, Beijing had limited its involvement in the war largely to protecting its own energy and shipping interests, publicly calling for de-escalation, safeguarding the flow of oil and avoiding direct military entanglement. However, that posture has markedly eroded with its supply of ammunition to Iran to help rebuild its short-range defences depleted by US and Israeli strikes, effectively tilting Beijing toward Tehran and shedding the appearance of non-interference. The events are a stark contradiction to the assurances against “enabling” Tehran that Trump claimed to have secured. Simultaneously, the direct talks with the Houthis to secure safe passage for Chinese tankers through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait underscore Beijing’s proximity to Iran and its proxy networks.
In perspective
Iran has remained unyielding to Washington’s war of attrition, weaponizing the repeated cycles of aggression to nudge negotiations in its favour. On the contrary, Tehran has only amplified its offensive, leveraging regional proxies against Washington’s close allies, raising the scope and stakes of the conflict.
On the other hand, the US has been unable to curb Tehran effectively, even failing to prevent the expanding war that has dragged Saudi Arabia into direct conflict. It has neither been able to prevent the attacks on Riyadh, nor mitigate the threat posed by the Houthi’s on Iran’s behalf.
For China, the military assistance and engagement with Iran’s proxies goes beyond securing its economic interest. Beijing finds it an opportunity to counter US strategic interests that seek to wear down Iran militarily to secure a decisive win. It introduces a new dimension of US-China rivalry into the conflict and risk further complicating an already volatile crisis.
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies. Bengaluru.
CW Note
Heatwaves and Wildfires in Spain and France:
Capacity gaps and Resource constraints amidst Recurring extreme weather
Lekshmi MK
In the news
On 27 July, Reuters reported that Spain and France are battling record wildfires driven by an intense heatwave, forcing the evacuation of 300,000 people as authorities warned that another spell of extreme heat could worsen the crisis. Euronews further reported on a European Commission official acknowledging that the intensity and spread of the wildfires were "ten times over the capacity" of the personnel and equipment available to contain them.
On 30 July, The Guardian reported that “Spain faces ‘complex’ three days with risks of heatwave and strong winds reigniting some fires – as it happened.” Reuters further reported on the EU stating “Wildfire threat moving east, threatening Italy and Greece.”
Issues at large
1. Spain and France remain the hotspots
The current wildfires are concentrated in regions that have repeatedly experienced large fires in recent years. In Spain, the worst-affected areas include Castile and Leon, Extremadura, Andalusia, Catalonia and Galicia. These areas were of extensive forests, shrublands and grasslands combined with prolonged summer droughts and recurring heatwaves to create highly combustible landscapes. In France, major fires have occurred in Aude, Bouches-du-Rhone, Herault, Var and the Gironde region, particularly in Mediterranean forests and pine plantations. According to the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), by late July more than 60,000 hectares had burned in France and over 150,000 hectares in Spain during 2026, with France already surpassing its total burnt area for 2025. Mediterranean vegetation, increasing human activity near forests, accidental ignitions and occasional arson combine with highly flammable landscapes to make these regions recurring wildfire hotspots.
2. Recurring extreme weather events and the wildfire risks
The current wildfires are the result of compound extreme weather events rather than a single heatwave. Scientists stated that natural climate variability, including phenomena such as El Nino, can influence global weather patterns. However, the recurring heatwaves and prolonged drought affecting southern Europe are primarily linked to various conditions, which has increased the likelihood and intensity of extreme heat events. These conditions have left forests, shrublands and grasslands exceptionally dry. This allowed fires to ignite more easily and spread rapidly under strong winds. According to the World Weather Attribution (WWA) initiative, human activities have also become one of the factors to increase the likelihood and intensity of extreme heat in Europe, creating longer and more severe wildfire seasons.
3. Dwindling state capacity
The expanding wildfires across Spain and France have exposed growing constraints in governments’ ability to respond effectively to climate-driven disasters. Human capacity has come under pressure as thousands of firefighters, military personnel and emergency responders have been deployed simultaneously across multiple fire zones, stretching available manpower. Technical capacity remains constrained by the limited availability of aerial water bombers, helicopters, specialised firefighting equipment and water resources. European Commission officials acknowledged that the scale of the fires was “ten times over the capacity” of the personnel and equipment available to contain them. Financial capacity is also under increasing strain as governments bear rising costs associated with emergency operations, evacuations, disaster relief, infrastructure recovery and long-term forest restoration. Together, these pressures highlight the growing mismatch between the scale of climate-driven wildfire emergencies and existing state response capacities.
4. Europe’s collective response under strain
The simultaneous wildfires have exposed the growing strain on the European Union’s collective disaster response mechanisms. Through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and rescEU, member states share firefighting aircraft, specialised personnel and emergency assistance during major disasters. However, as multiple countries experienced large-scale wildfires concurrently, the demand for resources increased significantly, limiting the effectiveness of cross-border assistance. The crisis demonstrates that Europe’s existing emergency response arrangements are being tested by increasingly frequent and overlapping climate-related disasters.
In perspective
First, forecasted heatwaves could further intensify the wildfire crisis across Europe. Meteorological agencies have forecast another spell of extreme heat across southern Europe in the coming week. This is likely to sustain conditions favourable for wildfire ignition and spread, intensifying existing fires in Spain and France while increasing the risk of new outbreaks in other vulnerable European countries.
Second, recurring wildfires could increase pressure on governments. The recurrence of large-scale wildfires is likely to increase public scrutiny of governments' preparedness and response capabilities. The growing health impacts of heatwaves and wildfires are also likely to push governments and the EU to increase investment in healthcare systems as part of broader climate adaptation strategies.
Third, recurring wildfires could reshape Europe’s disaster governance. Recurring wildfires are likely to push the EU to strengthen its collective disaster governance. This could include expanding shared firefighting resources, increasing investments in prevention and climate adaptation, and improving cross-border emergency coordination. As simultaneous disasters become more frequent, collective preparedness may become a strategic priority for the EU.
Lekshmi MK is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
CW Note
Ebola expansion in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
Healthcare worker strikes amidst Misinformation, Climate disaster and Humanitarian crisis
Akshath Kaimal
In the news
On 22 July, Charité University Hospital in Berlin reported that a US citizen, who was medically evacuated from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), tested positive for Ebola and was receiving treatment in a high-security isolation unit.
On 23 July, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) emphasized that its USD 55.8 million regional preparedness plan still faced a critical funding gap, with only USD 20 million secured.
On 28 July, UNICEF announced that nearly three million children and adolescents are at risk in the outbreak zone.
On 29 July, Uganda was declared Ebola-free after detecting zero cases over the last 42 days, meeting the WHO criterion for ending the outbreak.
As of 29 July, according to the CDC, cases in the DRC stood at 3,360 and deaths at 1,487, representing a case fatality rate (CFR) of over 44 per cent.
Issues at large
1. A recurring and rapidly expanding outbreak, with DRC as the epicentre
The DRC has been the epicentre of Ebola since 1976; this is its 17th outbreak. The 2018-2020 Kivu outbreak was the second largest in history, with a 65 per cent fatality rate. The current outbreak is caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain, for which no approved vaccine or treatment exists. By late July 2026, with more than 3,300 cases and 1,400 deaths, it became the fastest-growing Ebola epidemic on record. While the 2013-2016 epidemic took eight months to reach 1,000 deaths, this outbreak did so in less than ten weeks. The DRC’s location within the Congo Basin places communities close to wildlife reservoirs, particularly fruit bats, increasing the likelihood of repeated spillover events. Yet geography alone does not explain the crisis; a chronically underfunded healthcare system, compounded by a 30 per cent cut in US health assistance in 2025, has severely weakened the country’s outbreak response.
2. Cultural practices and misinformation as accelerating factors
Beyond health infrastructure challenges, cultural practices and widespread misinformation have significantly accelerated Ebola transmission. Traditional burial rituals, which often involve washing and touching the deceased over several days, expose mourners to the virus, which is highly concentrated in bodily fluids after death. According to the WHO, these practices have triggered major chains of transmission. However, measures such as sealing bodies in bags have also brought health workers into conflict with grieving families seeking to observe cultural traditions. At the same time, false claims that Ebola as a hoax have led some communities to reject treatment, evade checkpoints, and attack response teams. The breakdown in community trust ensures that a large portion of the viral transmission remains completely untraceable.
3. Healthcare worker strikes amid declining public trust
The rapid spread of Ebola in the DRC has been further intensified by a growing labour crisis among healthcare workers. Throughout July 2026, frontline staff in the hardest-hit regions, including Ituri, staged protests and strikes outside treatment centres. In Butembo, Beni, and Kisangani, doctors, nurses, and laboratory technicians launched an indefinite strike in mid-July, citing months of unpaid wages, poor living conditions, and inadequate compensation despite facing a virus with a 30-50 per cent fatality rate. The failure to adequately support frontline responders has disrupted clinical operations, delayed experimental treatment trials, and weakened the overall outbreak response. The crisis has also deepened public mistrust.
4. An outbreak worsened by a humanitarian and climate crisis
The Ebola response in the DRC is occurring against the backdrop of an expanding, multidimensional humanitarian crisis. In June 2026 alone, over 46,000 newly displaced households were recorded across eastern DRC, driven largely by armed conflict and shifting frontlines. Armed groups, such as the M23, continue to restrict humanitarian access, forcing millions into overcrowded camps where disease control is difficult. Compounding this violent instability is the accelerating impact of climate change and an expanding cholera outbreak. Torrential rains and severe flooding have devastated agricultural centers, leaving nearly a quarter of the population facing acute food insecurity. As extreme climate stress destroys livelihoods and militias capture territory, massive population movements overwhelm host communities and dismantle containment corridors, turning an isolated viral spillover into an unmanageable regional crisis.
In perspective
First, the outbreak continues to expand unpredictably. Despite Uganda being declared Ebola-free, the situation in the DRC remains dire. With international organisations struggling to meet their funding quotas and contact tracing near non-existent, according to the WHO, the trajectory of this epidemic remains unpredictable and dangerous.
Second, healthcare workers need protection to regain public trust. The DRC has so far failed to protect its healthcare workers, who continue to protest unpaid wages. This has severely undermined the country’s response, which has remained fragmented due to misinformation and the public’s waning trust in the healthcare system. Adequately paying its frontline staff is essential for the government to rein in misinformation and break the chain of transmission, which can only happen with the public’s trust and if information is disseminated in a culturally appropriate manner.
Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
CW Profile
The Houthis:
Origins, Ethnic makeup, Political structure, Geographical footprint and External support
Manikranth Chakravarthula
The origins
Officially named Ansar Allah (Supporters of God), the Houthis are a Zaydi Shia political and military movement operating as northern Yemen’s de facto governing regime. The group emerged in the early 1990s in northwestern Sa'dah Governorate as Al-Shabab al-Mu'min (The Believing Youth), founded by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi.
Originally established to revitalize Zaydi identity against Saudi-funded Salafi and Wahhabi proselytization, the movement expanded following opposition to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the external alignment of Yemen’s former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis led six consecutive insurgencies against government forces, known as the Sa'dah Wars.
Capitalizing on the political disruption of the 2011 Arab Spring and anger over fuel subsidy cuts, the Houthis seized Sana'a in September 2014, drove President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi into exile by early 2015, and established state-like control over northern Yemen. Ideologically and politically, patriarch Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his sons received religious training at the Iranian seminary in Qom during the 1990s, forging foundational ties with Iran.
The ethnic, elite and ideological makeup
Ethnically composed of indigenous Arab Yemenis, the movement’s internal hierarchy is strictly stratified. Executive, spiritual, and ideological leadership is concentrated within the Hashemite (Sada/Sayyid) elite class including the founding al-Houthi family which claims direct lineage from the Prophet Muhammad via his grandsons Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn. Historically, the Sada elite held immense religious and political power, serving as Qadis (Islamic judges) and ruling the Zaydi Imamate until its overthrow in the 1962 civil war.
Beneath this elite leadership, the core fighting force and grassroots backing are drawn from northern highland tribal confederations, primarily the Bakil and Hashid. Doctrinally rooted in Zaydism, a Shia branch unique to northern Yemen comprising 35–40 per cent of the Yemen’s population, the Houthis have increasingly integrated Twelver Shia political iconography while co-opting Sunni tribal groups through populist anti-corruption and anti-imperialist messaging.
The geographical footprint
From their heartland in Sa'dah Governorate, the Houthis control 20 to 30 per cent of Yemen, encompassing 70 to 80 per cent of the population (roughly 24 to 25 million people). Their domain includes major administrative centers: Sana'a, Sa'dah, Amran, Hajjah, Dhamar, Ibb, and parts of Taiz. Crucially, control over Al-Hudaydah Governorate grants direct positioning along the Red Sea coast and Bab al-Mandab Strait, providing significant leverage over global maritime trade routes.
Political and Military structure
Ansar Allah’s platform combines Zaydi revivalism, anti-imperialism, pan-Islamism, and anti-Zionism, summarized in their official slogan (Sarkha): "God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, A Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam.” The movement operates across four primary operational pillars: Military Wing headed by Abdullah al-Hakim, overseeing tactical and armed operations; Tribal Wing managing integration, alliances, and recruitment across northern tribal networks; Ideological Wing directed by Abdulkarim al-Houthi, supervising religious, cultural, and political education and the Political Wing led by Mahdi al-Mashat via the Supreme Political Council (SPC), managing formal public administration. Operational authority relies on a dual structure: formal civil ministries function under the SPC in Sana'a, while a shadow supervisor network (mushrifin) enforces ideological compliance, controls civil servants, and extracts state revenue through tribal patronage, financial incentives, and coercive political repression.
Evolving from a grassroots religious organization into a strong paramilitary force capable of state capture, Houthi troop estimates vary: in 2018, Houthi officials claimed 60,000 fighters, while external estimates placed the number between 15,000 and 50,000. Historically, recruitment relied on northern social networks, religious sermons, and youth summer camps. Reports also document heavy reliance on child soldiers deployed at frontlines as guards, fighters, and mine clearers.
External Support
The Houthis are a central component of Iran's regional "Axis of Resistance." Tehran serves as the group’s primary state sponsor and sole government providing formal diplomatic recognition. Through the IRGC-Quds Force, Iran supplies ballistic and cruise missiles, kamikaze UAVs, anti-ship systems, and technical advisers. Non-state support is provided by Lebanese Hezbollah’s specialized Unit 3800 through tactical training and battlefield assistance. Financially, the movement sustains its war economy through international smuggling networks trafficking fuel, raw materials, and arms across the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and Horn of Africa.
Though doctrinally Zaydi Shia, the Houthis enter opportunistic alliances with Sunni extremist groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), maintaining a ceasefire since 2022 and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. To expand their global footprint and counter US influence, the Houthis have also leveraged ties with major powers, including Russia and China.
Manikranth Chakravarthula is a doctoral student at the Conflict Resolution and Peace Research Programme, School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
CW Newsmakers
The Berlin Pride attack I Gaza’s International Stabilisation Force
Netanyahu’s US Visit I Zelensky’s US Visit I US Senate bill on Russia sanctions I Japan’s earthquake
Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, Urja R Kudalkar
The Berlin Pride attack:
A Lone Wolf Attack and Responses in Germany
On 25 July, The Guardian reported that an attacker rammed a van into a crowd leaving Berlin's Pride celebrations in Tiergarten Park, killing one person and injuring 29 others, in what authorities classified as an Islamist terrorist attack. The suspect, identified as Abdul B, a German citizen with links to Islamist circles, was tracked down after a nationwide manhunt and shot dead by police in Spandau on 26 July after charging at officers with a bladed weapon. Investigators said he had made repeated failed attempts to join the Islamic State, including travelling to Lebanon, where he was jailed for three months before returning to Germany and being arrested again for preparing a serious act of violence. Despite this, a judge had handed him a 22-month suspended sentence rather than the three years sought by prosecutors, a decision Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt called incomprehensible given the danger he posed. The government has since ordered a review of terrorism laws, considering changes to bar suspended sentences for those convicted of terror-related offences, including juveniles.
The attack triggered sharply divided political reactions. Chancellor Friedrich Merz and President Frank-Walter Steinmeier condemned the violence and urged Pride-goers not to be intimidated, while CDU lawmakers pushed for tougher penalties and expanded digital investigative powers. However, columnist Fatma Aydemir criticised this show of solidarity as hypocritical, noting that Merz's own coalition had cut funding and protections for queer communities in recent years, including rejecting a rainbow flag over the Bundestag last year. She argued the debate risked being hijacked by both the far-right, which used the attack to attacks migration policy, and by conservatives whose own record on queer rights she called comparably hostile.
Gaza’s International Stabilisation Force:
Israel’s security cabinet approves the US-backed ceasefire plan
On 26 July, Reuters reported that Israel’s security cabinet has approved the legal framework allowing the entry of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) into Gaza as part of President Trump’s ceasefire plan for the territory. The decision was taken ahead of Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, where discussions with US officials included Gaza’s future security arrangements and regional stability. The International Stabilisation Force is expected to operate in areas of Gaza that are not under Israeli control and will work in coordination with the Israeli military. The force is planned to include around 200 personnel from countries including Uganda and Morocco, although the participation of individual countries will require separate approval. A timeline for deployment has not yet been announced. The deployment is part of a broader US-backed framework aimed at stabilising Gaza after prolonged conflict. The plan includes humanitarian assistance, establishing a civilian Palestinian administration, reducing Hamas’ military capabilities and supporting the transition towards post-war governance. However, challenges remain, including disagreements over Hamas’ disarmament, the extent of international involvement and Israel’s continued security concerns. Israel’s approval of the force represents a significant step towards implementing the proposed Gaza arrangements, but the limited scope of the deployment has raised questions about its effectiveness. Some analysts have described the move as a strategic decision by Israel to manage international pressure while maintaining control over security arrangements in Gaza. The establishment of the International Stabilisation Force is expected to play a key role in shaping Gaza’s post-war environment, balancing Israel’s security priorities with international efforts to restore governance, humanitarian access and regional stability.
Mass migrant crossings Spain's Ceuta
Regional government requests Madrid to deploy army and close the border with Morocco
On 30 July, Reuters reported that migrants crossed into Spain's North African enclave of Ceuta, with over 1,500 people crossing over, some swimming and others breaking through fences on foot. A Guardia Civil spokesperson said migrants were "massively entering from the sea," calling it an "explosion" following a slow trickle since a Supreme Court ruling that migrants intercepted at sea cannot be summarily returned to Morocco. Ceuta and Melilla represent the EU's only land border with Africa and have long been flashpoints for migration into Europe. State television TVE reported 2,000 to 3,000 people had crossed. Ceuta's regional government requested Madrid deploy the army and close the border. Spain's Interior Ministry said the armed forces would reinforce the Guardia Civil, while Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez pledged an “immediate response.” Spanish authorities blamed human trafficking networks for exploiting the court ruling to encourage crossings, vowing to deport those entering illegally. Spain and Morocco agreed to strengthen cooperation and return irregular migrants "as soon as possible
Hamas announces “complete disarmament”
President Trump claims of a "historic agreement"
US President Trump announced that his Board of Peace had reached what he described as a "historic agreement" to secure the phased disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza, alongside the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces. The announcement marks the first major diplomatic initiative by the Board of Peace, a US-led body established in 2026 to oversee peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in Gaza. According to Trump, the agreement is based on a 20-point framework that includes the dismantling of Hamas' weapons and tunnel network, the deployment of an international stabilisation force, and the establishment of a new Palestinian technocratic administration to govern Gaza during a transitional period. Trump said the agreement would represent a "monumental step" towards lasting peace in the region.
Reuters reported that the Board of Peace was first proposed in 2025 and formally launched in January 2026. Chaired by Trump, it includes senior figures such as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Jared Kushner. Reuters and the BBC reported that key issues, including the sequencing of Hamas' disarmament and Israel's military withdrawal, remain unresolved.
Netanyahu’s US Visit:
Focus on Iran, Gaza and Middle East security
On 27 July, Reuters reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington for talks with President Trump focused on the future direction of US-Israel policy in the Middle East, with Iran emerging as the main issue of discussion. Netanyahu is expected to urge Trump to maintain a firm approach towards Tehran, arguing that Iran continues to pose a major security threat and that any future negotiations over its nuclear programme should include strict conditions. Trump, while continuing pressure on Iran, has shown interest in exploring diplomatic options. The discussions focused on preventing Iran from rebuilding its nuclear and military capabilities, possible frameworks for future negotiations, and responses if Tehran resumes uranium enrichment or expands its regional activities. The leaders also discussed Gaza, including efforts to stabilise the territory, humanitarian concerns, future governance arrangements and possible international involvement. Developments in Lebanon and measures to reduce tensions along Israel’s northern border were also part of the broader regional security discussions. The visit came amid reported differences between Trump and Netanyahu over handling Iran and the future approach towards regional conflicts. Netanyahu sought continued US support for Israel’s security priorities, while Trump aimed to balance military pressure with diplomatic engagement. The talks also covered broader regional diplomacy, including efforts to expand the Abraham Accords and strengthen US-Israel cooperation in the Middle East.
Zelensky’s US Visit:
Trump agrees on Ukraine’s production of US-designed Patriot air defence missiles
On 28 July, The New York Times reported that President Volodymyr Zelensky met President Donald Trump at the White House. Zelensky, still confronting fallout at home over his decision to dismiss Ukraine's defence minister and army chief, sought to reboot stalled peace talks with Russia and press Trump to follow through on a pledge, first made at this month's NATO summit, to grant Ukraine a licence to produce US-designed Patriot air defence missiles domestically. Ukraine has said it needs the interceptors, which can strike targets up to 1,000 kilometres away and track multiple threats simultaneously, to counter escalating Russian drone and ballistic missile attacks, Kyiv and its army have said 25 Patriot systems are needed, with each missile costing an estimated USD 3 million to USD 5 million.
Trump called the closed-door meeting "very good," and Zelenskyy told reporters afterwards that Trump had agreed to grant the production licences, adding he had since met representatives of US defence manufacturers to discuss possible co-production. The two leaders also discussed a potential ceasefire on long-range airstrikes and the broader peace process. Zelenskyy separately met a bipartisan group of senators shortly before the Senate voted 86-12 to advance sweeping new sanctions on Russia and Iran, legislation championed by the late Senator Lindsey Graham, whose memorial service both leaders were in Washington to attend. Domestic production of the Patriot systems would also help shore up Zelensky's approval ratings, with the key remaining question being where Ukraine could produce the systems securely and quickly enough to shift the balance of the war.
US Senate bill on Russia sanctions:
The US Senate advances Graham's Russia sanctions bill
On 28 July, The New York Times reported that the US Senate voted 86-12 on 28 July to invoke cloture and advance the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, clearing a key hurdle for legislation aimed at penalising Moscow over its war in Ukraine. The vote came hours after senators memorialised Graham, who died on 11 July, at ceremonies in the Capitol and Washington National Cathedral, and shortly after they met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who watched the vote from the Senate gallery and thanked senators for their continued support as the war neared its four-and-a-half-year mark. Senator Roger Wicker said the bill would go after Vladimir Putin, his inner circle and the shadow fleet used to evade sanctions, while holding accountable those who purchase the most Russian oil and gas. The bill targets Russian officials, oligarchs, banks and financial institutions, and empowers the president to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on the largest purchasers of Russian oil and gas, with the top five buyers reassessed every 180 days.
The bill, which has 62 co-sponsors, also extends the Iran Sanctions Act by five years and includes a five-year sunset clause on the new tariff powers. It still requires House approval, where Democrats have expressed reservations about expanding Trump's tariff authority, 11 Democrats and one Republican voted against the measure in the Senate. Senator Peter Welch, who opposed the bill, said its language on "facilitators" of Russian oil sales was too broadly defined and could let Trump target countries arbitrarily. Negotiators had revised the bill to require, rather than merely permit, the president to impose sanctions, while allowing him to waive them on national security grounds, and added reporting requirements to Congress.
Japan’s earthquake:
Death toll crosses 30
On 28 July, Asahi Shimbun reported that a magnitude 7.1 earthquake, registering a maximum intensity of 7, struck Kumamoto Prefecture at 1627 hrs, with the epicentre at a shallow depth of about ten kilometres. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi ordered a government-wide emergency response. About 90 minutes later, an explosion suspected to be a gas leak tore through the AEON Mall Kumamoto in Kashima town, collapsing its second floor and trapping shoppers and staff. Reuters reported nearly 260,000 people were evacuated, with over 34,000 homes still without power amid temperatures near 34 degrees Celsius, raising heatstroke concerns at evacuation centres. Kyushu Shinkansen services and Kumamoto airport were suspended, roads and bridges buckled, and Kumamoto Castle's stone walls, still under repair since 2016, were damaged again. The quake disrupted the region's manufacturing hub. Sony Semiconductor, Renesas Electronics, Ebara Corp, Honda, and Mitsubishi Electric's Melco unit suspended plants, while Toyota halted three Fukuoka factories through Friday. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) evacuated workers but resumed operations gradually.
Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, Urja R Kudalkar are postgraduate students at the Department of Public Policy, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences. They are currently Research interns at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)