In the news
On 15 October, Reuters reported that the Houthi launched missile strikes at Aden’s Al-Maashiq presidential palace, the headquarters of Yemen’s Saudi-backed internationally recognised government.
Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said the attacks were part of targeting "Saudi reinforcements wherever they were located” and that the headquarters stored weapons.
The attacks followed days of severe damage to Riyadh’s oil infrastructure, particularly the headquarters of Saudi Arabian oil giant Aramco, Saudi airports and ports. Coalition spokesperson Turki al-Maliki stated that the King Khalid International Airport, one of Saudi Arabia's main international aviation hubs, was attacked at least 20 times in the span of a month. The Saudi government was met with criticisms over failing to issue an effective warning before the attacks, and in intercepting the assault.
On 19 October, Al Jazeera and other major sources reported that Riyadh has postponed the 10th edition of its flagship investment conference, the Future Investment Initiative, to 2027 in the light of the Houthi attacks.
On 22 October, a Reuters exclusive stated that the US State Department had asked diplomats and families to depart from missions in Saudi Arabia following a Houthi drone attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, killing one resident and injuring eight others.
Issues at large
1. The relentless and escalating Houthi attacks
The Houthis have expanded the scope of their attacks despite the reclamation of strategic territory from the group by Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces the previous week. The feat was expected to weaken Houthi control over Yemen’s southern coast, restore maritime traffic through the strait, and constrain the group’s regional reach. However, these gains have done little to degrade the Houthis’ offensive capabilities. The group continues to launch sustained attacks against Riyadh, targeting infrastructure vital to its oil artery and expanding to civilian sites. The Houthis, bolstered by years of Iranian technical and training assistance, demonstrate a formidable capacity to sustain the pressure independently, despite the reduced support from Tehran.
2. Imbalanced capabilities, and the limits and challenges of Saudi defence infrastructure
Despite being one of the largest purchasers of US defence equipment, Saudi Arabia continues to struggle to counter the Houthis’ low-cost drones and cruise missiles. Its sophisticated arsenal, including F-15 fighter aircraft, Patriot air defence systems and THAAD interceptors, has not fully addressed the threat posed by low-flying, manoeuvrable targets deployed by the Houthis in swarms. Systems such as Patriot and THAAD are designed primarily to counter ballistic and other high-velocity missile threats, making the interception of certain low-altitude targets more challenging. Further, using a multi-million-dollar asset like the Patriot to shoot down thousands of low-cost drones creates an economic asymmetry that is too costly to sustain, particularly amid a shortage of interceptors.
Saudi Arabia’s vulnerabilities are compounded by the geographical distribution of its defence infrastructure. With much of its military preparedness historically concentrated in the north, oriented towards threats from Iran and Iraq, its southern flank remains comparatively exposed to Houthi attacks. The structural limitations, coupled with the kingdom’s continued reliance on external assistance, constrain its ability to respond effectively.
3. The muted response from regional allies and defence partners
Despite Riyadh’s central role in major regional groupings including the OPEC and the GCC,the response from its regional allies to the Houthi attacks has remained largely muted, with limited tangible assistance. The same is largely true for the kingdom's defense partners, particularly the United States, which has historically served as its principal security ally. The much-publicised Mecca defence pact has likewise yielded little beyond broad condemnations and warnings to the Houthis, falling short of a coordinated response to address the peril. The region has largely remained outside the conflict, leaving Saudi Arabia to counter the Houthi threat despite the escalation being part of the broader US-Iran war that has drawn the region into its orbit.
In perspective
First, Riyadh is suffering more damage than it is inflicting. Saudi Arabia’s multi-billion-dollar defence budget and sophisticated arsenal struggle to counter the Houthis without the cushion of US support. While the Kingdom continues to face attacks across multiple fronts, its military response has done little to significantly curb the group’s capabilities. The attacks on key oil infrastructure and civilian hubs bear down further on the blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the incapacitation of the east-west oil pipeline.
The attacks have also caused cracks in Riyadh’s global positioning as a secure destination for global investment. Although no major corporations have exited the Kingdom and the Houthi threat has long remained a security consideration, the postponement of major investment events such as the Future Investment Initiative, widely dubbed the ‘Davos of the Desert,’ risks undermining confidence in Saudi Arabia’s image as a stable investment hub.
Second, Saudi Arabia is a swelling pressure point. Although the broader US-Iran war has witnessed a lull in the recent weeks, the pressure that had shifted to the Saudi-Houthi front continues to deepen. While the US and Iran remain at the periphery, a resolution between Washington and Tehran, or their willingness to engage appears increasingly necessary to ease the tensions in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia remains caught between Washington’s reluctance to provide sustained assistance against Houthi attacks and Tehran’s influence over the group as a tool to extract favourable positions from the US, while Riyadh is left with little room to manoeuvre.
