CWA # 2312
The World This Quarter
Russia (Jul-Sep 2026):
Elections, Drone warfare, Macroeconomic stagnations and Global summits
The World This Week #376, Vol 8, No. 38, 25 October 2026
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Ramya B
25 October 2026
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In the third quarter, Russia navigated a complex landscape beginning with the successful conduct of elections, consolidating political control,and intensifying strategic air campaigns, while straining under with war impacts and a stagnant economy.
1. State Duma elections
The Russian State Duma elections were held in September 2026 with a voter turnout of 59.8 per cent and the ruling United Russia Party secured a constitutional majority with a landslide win capturing 349 out of the 450 seats in the lower house. Yabloko, Russia’s oldest liberal party was struck from the party list ballot by the Russian Supreme court in August, while numerous independent candidates faced interference, detentions and disqualifications. The Kremlin had also deliberately included 46 Ukraine War veterans into the legislature that accounts to 10 per cent of the total strength effectively institutionalising war as a permanent fixture of Russian governance.
2. Escalated Drone Warfare and vulnerabilities
In this quarter, Russia had increased its use of smaller tactical units to hold or assault positions. Strategic air campaigns targeting various power grids, and major Ukrainian urban centres have utilised thousands of long-range ballistic missiles, and a new generation of jet-powered drones in an attempt to break Ukraine’s economy and exhaust its air defence stockpiles. Infantry attrition was high in the Donetsk Oblast region and the Pokrovsk Sector was the most volatile region in this quarter.
Ukraine retaliated with long-range drone campaigns targeting Russian oil refineries and terminal hubs across Rostov, Perm, Yaroslavl, and the Black Sea regions. The Kremlin struggled to shield all its domestic energy infrastructure, as most high-end mobile air defence systems were heavily deployed along the borders of Ukraine. Russia employed many makeshift solutions to combat the threat such as resurrecting World War Era barrage balloons, using electronic jamming systems to disrupt the GPS of autonomous drones, creating heavy smoke screens to obstruct visibility, and installing steel netting etc. Precision strikes continue to breach these defences knocking out millions of barrels at the refineries.
3. Macroeconomic stagnations
In the third quarter, Russia continues to face a high inflation of 7 per cent and stagnant economic growth. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated Russian crude oil production declined by roughly 7 per cent in August and 6.35 per cent in September 2026. The mining and production of petroleum products contracted; manufacturing output is moderate. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) downgraded Russia’s annual GDP growth forecast by 0.2 percentage points to a mere 0.9%. The Bank of Russia maintains high interest rates of 14 per cent stifling civilian commercial lending. The newly elected State Duma fast-tracked federal budget proposals that allocated over 30 per cent of total state spending to defence and national security. The Kremlin also increased tariffs for electricity, gas and housing utilities.
4. Russian structural resilience
Despite the gloomy picture of the third quarter of 2026, Russia has sustained selective growth packets. Russia’s federal budget revenue from oil and gas taxes is expected to spike 10% by the end of October more than doubling in comparison to September due to West Asis supply disruptions. The IT and digital sector’s contribution to Russia’s GDO has doubled in six years, reaching 5.9 trillion roubles in revenue. The Russia led regional economic integration bloc comprising Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (Eurasian Economic Union / EAEU) has significantly accelerated its external free trade agenda towards Asia, the Middle East, and the Global South. Intra-EAEU mutual trade has jumped 10 per cent in 2025
5. High-level Global Summits
Russia participated in multilateral high level global summits to counter isolation efforts pursued by the West. President Putin alongside hosts India and China participated in the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi and supported the adoption of the New Delhi Declaration that notably omitted direct references to the Ukrainian situation. This marked a diplomatic win for Moscow's attempt to keep multilateral forums focused strictly on trade, BRICS multi-currency payment interoperability and anti-unilateral sanction frameworks.
President Putin attended the 26th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit on September 1st, 2026 in Bishkek, where he emphasised the transition toward a multipolar order and noted trade contribution beyond 400 billion dollars.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation conducted talks with the chairperson of the African Union Commission in preparation for the Third Russia-Africa Public Summit to be held in October 2026.
To conclude
This quarter has seen Russia’s aggressive push toward the Global South and further integration within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to offset Western isolation. These indicators reveal a state stretching its domestic capacities to sustain a high-intensity war of attrition. The civilian economy is being starved to feed expanding defence expenditures. Russia's ability to maintain this stance heading into the final months of the year will depend on whether its newly forged trade networks can outpace the mounting structural strains of a prolonged war.
About the author
Ramya B is an Associate Professor at the Department of History, Kristu Jayanti Deemed to be University, Bengaluru