The World this Week

The World this Week
US ban on Myanmar Generals, Kulbhushan Yadav Verdict, Trump's Saudi Arms Deal, Sudan Power Sharing, US-Turkey tensions and Pakistan's reopening of its Airspace

GP Team
20 July 2019
Photo Source: TImes of India

This week focuses on six issues: The US sanctions Myanmar leaders in Myanmar over human rights abuses; the ICJ judgement on the Kulbhushan Jadav;  the US House of Representatives resolution in response to Trump's plan to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia; power-sharing agreement between Sudan's pro-democracy movement and the ruling military council; US decision to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program; and Pakistan reopening its airspace for Civilian aircraft after five months. 

Aparupa Bhattacherjee, Sourina Bej, Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh, Abigail Fernandez, Mahath Mangal and Harini Madhusudan


Myanmar: US-led  sanctions will not go far

What happened?

This week, the United States of America has imposed sanctions on four senior leaders of Myanmar's military, including their Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing over the atrocities and human rights abuses against Rohingya Muslims. Apart from the Commander in Chief his deputy Soe Win and Brigadier Generals Than Oo and Aung Aung's names are also in the list. The sanction bans these Myanmarese military leaders and their families from entering the US territory. This is the first strict measure taken against them on behalf of the US. The sanction may be extended soon to include the names of two more military leaders identified in UN investigators report in 2018. This report has been compiled by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, and have blamed six Myanmarese military leaders including of those mentioned above, for genocide against the Rohingyas.

What is the background?

The riots and attacks against the Rohingya in Arakan province, an ethnic community, has been a significant cause of conflict since 2012. The Rohingya, who are Muslims do not figure in the list of 135 ethnic communities in Myanmar and hence are stateless since 2008. In 2012 the rise of radical monks and organisations like 969 and Ma Ba Tha acted as a catalyst for this conflict. This has forced many Rohingya to migrate to Bangladesh over the years. But in 2017 a military crackdown drove more than 730,000 Rohingya to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh, according to UN figures. UN investigators have stated that the atrocities included mass killings, gang rapes, and arson and was executed with "genocidal intent." This issue has also led to Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Councilor, loss of the Noble Peace Prize awarded to her, due to her inaction against the military. Both the army and the State have denied the charges of attack and genocide. Since 2018, Myanmar has agreed for repatriation of the refugees from Bangladesh; however, not even one Rohingyas are repatriated yet.  

What does it mean?

The US measure has been appreciated by many especially by Bangladesh, as a right move against Myanmar. Both the US and Bangladesh have called upon other countries to follow the same. But as rightly pointed out by the UN special rapporteur Yanghee Lee that this sanction will "do not go far enough." Most of these leaders may not even need to travel to the US. If other countries follow suit, that will not have any significant impact on these leaders neither will it assist to reduce any misery for the Rohingya refugees. As insisted by Yanghee Lee the properties of these leaders in the US or in different countries must be frozen. However, until China who is the biggest investor in Myanmar, supports the military not much could be done through sanctions on the military. Even ASEAN is yet to take steps against its member although this issue has been discussed in several committees and annual meetings. It seems although appreciated the US-led sanction will not be of much help. 

 

ICJ verdict: Kulbhushan Jadhav gets consular rights 
 

What happened? 

On 17 July, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stayed the death sentence by Pakistan's military court on Kulbhushan Jadhav. Jadhav was convicted of espionage and placed on death row, but India has described him as a retired naval officer-turned-businessman. As a result of the verdict in Hague, not only the death warrant was stalled, the court recognising the right to counsel has asked Pakistan to grant Jadhav his right to defend himself in front of the law. Following this verdict, Pakistan on 18 July has granted consular rights to Jadhav.  

What is the background? 

Pakistan announced Jadhav's arrest on 29 March 2016, following a video confession he reportedly made was broadcast that day in which he was heard saying that he was an Indian spy and had carried out terrorist acts on Pakistani soil. Following the arrest, India and Pakistan relation worsened. Pakistan for the first blamed India for instigating proxies and indulging in cross border terrorism the same that Islamabad is accused off. Upon his arrest and death sentence, India decided to move to the ICJ on the ground of Jadhav's right to consular access under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) of 1963. 

At the ICJ, both the countries vigorously argued their case, and at the end, Pakistan's contention that Article 36 of the VCCR did not apply on the grounds of espionage was rejected. It also overruled the argument that a 2008 India-Pakistan bilateral agreement on consular access allowed it to deny consular access on 'security' grounds. Instead, the court concluded that Pakistan had indeed violated international law when it deprived India of the right to communicate with and have access to Jadhav. 

What does it mean? 

The ICJ judgement is balanced that offered both the countries space to drive the outcome. Thus it wasn't a surprise that ICJ didn't ask for the release of Jadhav and asked Pakistan to grant consular access to Jadhav.  

But it is also important to note that this is how far international law can go. How long the stay lasts and what sort of outcome emerges from the review process will likely be determined by political considerations – both within Pakistan and at the bilateral level with India. Thus what next after the verdict?

First, the ICJ left the choice of the review process to Pakistan. The latter will decide to go with the military courts or civilian courts. If the civilian courts get into the act and display an independent judgement, then it is possible for relief.  Second, what Pakistan does next will determine how it wants to maintain its relation with India as well as its global image. Thus while Pakistan is obliged to review and reconsider the conviction and sentence, it will also be wary of the adverse impact it causes.  Lastly, the possible outcome could happen that Jadhav is put on trial before the military court once again, and he is found guilty one more time. But this time India will also be witnessing the process. 

But all said and done, the Jadhav case is the product of the central position that terrorism and allegations of state sponsorship of terrorism have come to occupy in the discourse of India-Pakistan relations. The case should remind one that while New Delhi's case against Islamabad may have strong support worldwide, but the Pakistani military has also made rhetoric through Jadhav's confession video that it too is a victim of "cross-border terrorism".

 

US House blocks Trump's Saudi arms deal

What happened?

On 17 July 2019, the US House of Representatives has reportedly passed a resolution to block Trump's plan to sell weapons and guided missiles to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Jordan. Given the mounting rift between the White House and the Congress, the latest blockade could be read as an expression of political displeasure of Trump's involvement with Saudi in the human rights abuses and the increasing causalities in the Yemen war. 

What is the background?

Initially, in May 2019, the Trump administration had pushed for an $ 8.1 billion worth of arms deal with Saudi Arabia, UAE and Jordan by issuing an emergency declaration available within the Presidential powers. The "emergency powers" from the US Arms Export Control Act under the arms control law was tweaked to complete the deal by circumventing the Congress. As per US law, Congress holds the right to review significant weapons sales. 

According to the White House, the fast-track decision came as a measure to tackle new military tensions with Iran that has been threatening the stability of the region while putting a strain on major international trade routes. Most significantly, it has been putting US security and national interests at risk.


What does it mean?

The primary reason for this move is the increasing divide within the system. 

Firstly, the latest blow on the President's decision could be viewed as an extension of ongoing efforts to put restraints over the American President's war-time powers and restructure current defence policies. It could also be read as an effort by Congress to exert its importance as a constitutional authority. According to US Arms sales law, the Congress review "stands to be the only instance that allows the open scrutiny of major arms sales to foreign countries."

Second, concerns over the message that USA's deepening relations with Saudi would send at a time when the former has to be seen holding the kingdom accountable for the murder of US journalist Jamal Khashoggi. It is imperative to note that Trump had earlier dismissed UN requests over investigations into the Khashoggi murder claiming that it could affect the existing weapon transactions and sales with Saudi. 

Finally, the move shows mounting discomfort over American involvement in the Yemen war. The weapon deal has come at a time when Yemen is trying to push for a peace process. In April this year, Trump had vetoed a Congress decision to end US involvement in the Yemen crisis through Saudi. Widespread reports suggest that the latest weapon-transfer is to be used for the Yemeni war by the Saud as they have used up their weaponry and are looking for supplies. This is on par with Trump's idea that Saudi supported coalition in Yemen would help in differentiating targets better and thereby reduce civilian causalities. 


Sudan: Civilians and Military Leaders Sign Power-Sharing Deal
 

What happened?

On 17 July 2019 Sudan's pro-democracy movement and the ruling military council signed a power-sharing agreement. The ceremony was held in the capital, Khartoum. This marks the end of protests and negotiations that have been going on for more than three months. Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan was a signatory for the military to the power-sharing deal.
The deal lays down that there would be joint civilian-military sovereign council which would govern Sudan during the three- year transition period. The council will be made up of 11 members, five civilians, five from the military, and one person will be chosen by the council. The military will head the council for the first 21 months after which the civilian leader will lead for the remaining 18 months. They have also agreed for a cabinet in which the civilians will choose the prime minister and two other posts of defence, and the military will nominate interior minister. Further, the deal also promises an investigation into all the violence that has taken place. 

What is the background?

Sudan has gone through several struggles to reach this deal. The unrest can be traced back to when President Al Bashir's government imposed emergency austerity measures which cause the beginning of the uprising, leading to him being ousted by the military. However, the demonstrators demanded that power be transferred to the civilians. Since then, the military and civilians have clashed many times, causing many deaths and turbulence in the country. The military and civilian representative met to discuss in June. However, no consensus was reached, which is when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed flew to Sudan to help mediate a new agreement between the two sides. It was only after a few days of talks that his special envoy, Mahmoud Dirir stated that protest leaders had agreed to suspend their strikes and return to the negotiating with the military, after which two sides reached a new power-sharing agreement on 5 July 2019. 

What does it mean? 
This deal is a step towards civilian rule for Sudan. After months of disrupted talks, the coming together of the two sides to sign such an agreement is noteworthy by itself. On paper, this means that in three years, there will be a fully established civilian administration in Sudan. Even though the agreement fails to mention finer details of how the power is to be shared and various other elements, it is a well enough foundation for the two sides to build upon. Sudan is a country that is familiar with transitions; they have witnessed three transitions in the last six decades. Thus this is a process they are familiar with, and the only difference now is that if things go as planned, Sudan will see democracy at the end of this. 

 

US excludes Turkey from the F-35 program

What happened?

The US authorities have begun the process to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program. The move comes after several rounds of negotiations. Turkey had called for reconsideration, but the US chose the harsher response. Donald Trump on Thursday said that imposing sanctions on Turkey for its purchase of the Russian made S-400 Triumf missile defence system is still under consideration in the US administration. This comes after the US ended Turkey's involvement in the development of the F-35 fighter jet. 

By March 2020, the withdrawal of Turkey's industrial participation in the development of the fighter jet will be completed.

What is the background?

The tensions between the two countries have been on for several years. Sharing a long history of alliance from the Cold War era where they found a common enemy in the Soviets. The interests of the two nations diverged in the case of Syria. The US support to Kurd rebels made Ankara dubious of its real interests. 

Though a NATO partner, Ankara has grown sceptical of how important Turkey's security to Washington is. The watershed moment could be the 2016 coup attempt on Erdogan. While the cleric who ordered the coup was located in the American soil and a lukewarm response by the US annoyed Turkey, Vladimir Putin was one of the first international leaders to phone Erdogan. 

The S-400s are the best anti-aircraft defence system in the world, quintessential for Erdogan to defend his palace against the NATO jets flown by rogue pilots that are proving to be a security risk. Hence the alliance seems to be also out of necessity.

What does it mean?

While Turkey is diverging from its earlier position in the world stage as a NATO partner, as a staunch ally of the US against the Russians in this radical pivot move, the one that would benefit the most would be Russia. Russia has been looking to increase its global footprint somewhat slyly by signing agreements and deals with several nations facing sanctions from the US. 
About Turkey, the case is no different. An offer for Su-35 fighter jets as a replacement for the F-35s is already on the table from the Russian Rostec corporation. 
With the Congress calling for enacting sanctions on Turkey through CAATSA, the US is dismayed with the developments. While the US sanctions are undesirable for the nations, it is also becoming a tool for Russia to find common ground to engage more with the affected countries. 

 

Pakistan Airspace Reopens after five months

What happened?

After fully closing their airspace on 26 February 2019, Pakistan partially opened its airspace in March 2019. On 16 July 2019, Normal air traffic operations between India and Pakistan resumed, and Islamabad opened its airspace for all civilian flights. The earlier open sky policy has now been switched over to fair sky policy which offers equal opportunities to domestic air operators to expand their businesses. Previously, domestic airlines did not have space to expand their operations because of open sky policies. 

What is the background?

Five months after closing the airspace due to escalating tensions between Pakistan and India; Pakistan reopened its airspace, with a NOTAMS, "With immediate effect, Pakistan airspace is open for all types of civil traffic on published ATS (Air Traffic Service) routes." Indian Civil Aviation Minister, Hardeep Singh Puri, stated to India's upper house of parliament that the airspace closure had cost the Indian airlines more than $80.1m loss. The bulk of the losses affected Air India, the national flag carrier, which lost more than $71.65m; other carriers affected include Indian airlines SpiceJet ($4.48m), IndiGo ($3.66m) and GoAir ($0.3m). Pakistan is reported to have lost $50 billion by closing its airspace. 

Additionally, this situation led to carriers having to fly around Pakistan rather than over it. This diversion resulted in flight times to India (especially Delhi) and SouthEast Asia to increase significantly. After it was reopened, fares to the US, Europe dropped by 15-20%. Immediately, aviation minister H S Puri tweeted that India would resume its tri-weekly Delhi- Amritsar- Birmingham service.

What does it mean?

It took five strong months for Pakistan airspace to remain closed, despite requests from India. Eventually, the logistics and economics of the issue made the upper hand. This period was necessary to understand the level of economic and geographical interdependence that the two nations have. Pakistan chose to forego their condition to have India remove its fighter jets from the vicinity, this speaks for itself. 


PREVIOUS COMMENTS

May 2026 | CWA # 2111

NIAS Global Politics Team

The Trump-Xi Summit
The Africa Forward Summit 2026 I North Korea's Constitutional Amendment 2026
May 2026 | CWA # 2110

Aishal Hab Yousuf

The Trump-Xi Summit:
Managing Strategic Competition through Trade, Technology, and Diplomacy
May 2026 | CWA # 2092

NIAS Global Politics Team

The US-Iran War, Week Ten
CW Column on Middle East: Escalating Israeli Aggression in Lebanon I UAE's Covert Manoeuvres
May 2026 | CWA # 2091

Brighty Ann Sarah

Conflicts in the Middle East:
Escalating Israeli Aggression in Lebanon I UAEs Covert Manoeuvres
May 2026 | CWA # 2090

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Ten:
Fraying Ceasefire, Renewed Negotiations and the Risk of a Stalemate
May 2026 | CWA # 2088

Nithin V

King Charles's US Visit:
Emphasis on strong bilateral relations, democratic values and security cooperation
May 2026 | CWA # 2086

Aishal Hab Yousuf

UAEs Exit from OPEC:
Implications for the Middle East and the Energy Market
May 2026 | CWA # 2083

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Nine:
Deadlocked Negotiations, Competing Agendas and Domestic Pressure
May 2026 | CWA # 2082

Akshath Kaimal

Escalating Violence in Mali:
Between Ethnic Insurgencies, Jihadist Attacks, and Military Coups
April 2026 | CWA # 2079

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Japans New Defence Posture:
From Post-War Pacifism to Strategic Recalibration and Autonomy
April 2026 | CWA # 2074

Brighty Ann Sarah

Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:
Asymmetric Terms, Fragile Truce and Israeli Occupation
April 2026 | CWA # 2073

Akshath Kaimal

The US-Iran War, Week Eight:
A Fragile Ceasefire, Attempts to Control Hormuz and the Stalled Talks in Islamabad
April 2026 | CWA # 2072

Anu Maria Joseph

Three Years of War in Sudan
Prolonged Stalemate, Humanitarian Cost, External Interventions and Regional Fallouts
April 2026 | CWA # 2069

Padmashree Anandhan

The War in Ukraine
Expanding Drone Warfare, Russia's Strategic Patience and Ukraine's Diplomatic Outreach
April 2026 | CWA # 2068

Femy Francis

China-Japan Tensions
Escalating Defence Posturing and Economic Decoupling
April 2026 | CWA # 2067

Anu Maria Joseph

Conflicts in Africa
Continuing Conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan and DR Congo, Security issues in Nigeria, and Political Instability in Madagascar
April 2026 | CWA # 2066

Akshath Kaimal

The Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict
Recurrent Clashes, Defiant Taliban, Contesting Narratives and Emerging Chinas Role
April 2026 | CWA # 2065

Lakshmi Venugopal Menon

The Middle East (JanMar 2026):
The US-Iran War, Israel-Hamas Conflict and their interconnected fallouts
April 2026 | CWA # 2064

Anwesha Ghosh

Afghanistan (JanMar 2026):
Gender Repression, Leadership Rifts, Regional Realignments and Clashes with Pakistan
April 2026 | CWA # 2063

Ramya B

Russia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Assertive Military Posture, Attempts for an Economic Turnaround and Search for Partners
April 2026 | CWA # 2062

Himani Pant

Europe (Jan-Mar 2026)
Trade diversification & FTAs, Increased defence spending, Tightening irregular migration and Economic slowdown
April 2026 | CWA # 2061

S Shaji

Africa (Jan-Mar 2026)
Elections, Civil Wars, Militancy and Peace Initiatives
April 2026 | CWA # 2059

Adarsh Vijay

India and the World(Jan-Mar 2026)
Maintaining Strategic Autonomy, Balancing the US relations and Resetting the China ties
April 2026 | CWA # 2058

Nishchal N Pandey & Mahesh Raj Bhatta

Nepal (Jan-Mar 2026)
Political Upheaval, Generational Change and Economic Uncertainty
April 2026 | CWA # 2057

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar (Jan-Mar 2026)
An Illegitimate Regimes Consolidation Game
April 2026 | CWA # 2056

Ashik J Bonofer

Southeast Asia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Deteriorating situation in Myanmar, Philippines as the ASEAN Chair, New government in Thailand, and Economic & Environmental challenges
April 2026 | CWA # 2055

Haans J Freddy

East Asia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Chinas military operations near Taiwan, Japan-China tensions and South Koreas security challenges
April 2026 | CWA # 2054

Amrita Jash

Chinas External Landscape (Jan-Mar 2026):
Regional assertion, Pragmatic recalibration with the West and Avoiding military entanglement in the Middle East
April 2026 | CWA # 2052

Shreya Upadhyay

The United States(Jan-Mar2026)
Tariffs, Ukraine, Iran and Operationalization of Trumps World Order
March 2026 | CWA # 2039

Femy Francis

Trump-Xi Meeting
Why did Trump reschedule it? What does that mean?
March 2026 | CWA # 2035

Akshath Kaimal

Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict
Broken ceasefire, Expanding military strikes and Worsening humanitarian situation
March 2026 | CWA # 2033

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal after elections:
Five major challenges for the new government
March 2026 | CWA # 2024

Lekshmi MK

The UN and the Iran-US War
UNSC Resolution 2817 between Clear and Unified Message and Manifest Injustice
March 2026 | CWA # 2023

Femy Francis

Chinas Two Sessions 2026
New Five-Year Plan, Ethnic Unity Law, and an Enhanced Defence Budget
March 2026 | CWA # 2019

Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria
Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment
March 2026 | CWA # 2012

Padmashree Anandhan

The War in Ukraine
Long-range strikes, Defence adaptation and the EUs energy dependence
March 2026 | CWA # 2010

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal Elections 2026
The Rise of the New and the Fall of the Old
March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026
Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape
March 2026 | CWA # 2004

Akshath Kaimal

The Forgotten South Sudan Conflict
Instability returns, with a fragile peace agreement, uptick in violence and limited international engagement
March 2026 | CWA # 2003

Yesasvi Koganti

PM Modis Visit to Israel
From bilateral ties to a special strategic partnership
February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan
Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover
February 2026 | CWA # 1985

Abhimanyu Solanki

Basant in Pakistan
The return of Basant, and what it signifies
February 2026 | CWA # 1977

Anu Maria Joseph

Violence in Nigeria
US military deployment amidst worsening insurgency
February 2026 | CWA # 1976

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine
The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
December 2025 | CWA # 1971

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan Budget 2025-26
Legislating stabilisation under IMF discipline and coalition constraints
December 2025 | CWA # 1970

Aparna A Nair

Pakistan & China
Ten Years of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
November 2025 | CWA # 1968

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan and the US
A New opening, or another cycle?
February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti

UK and China
PM Keir Starmers visit and the Recalibration of Economic, Strategic, and Domestic ties
January 2026 | CWA # 1946

R Preetha

The Davos Summit 2026
Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum
December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech and the Civil Rights Movement in the US
August 2025 | CWA # 1790

GP Team

The World This Week#323-324
The Trump-Putin meeting & the US-China tariff extension
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
Weaponization of access to the US economy
August 2025 | CWA # 1779

GP Team

The World This Week#322
US tariffs on India, Brazil and Canada & the EU-US trade deal
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, starting the First World War
July 2025 | CWA # 1770

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:
Why the focus on terrorism, refugees, and Uzbekistan as the third partner?
July 2025 | CWA # 1769

GP Team

The World This Week#321
Indian PM Modi's visit to the Maldives I Elections to the Upper House in Japan
July 2025 | CWA # 1762

Lekshmi MK

Ocean Darkening: 
What is the phenomenon? What are its effects? And who are more vulnerable?
July 2025 | CWA # 1749

R Preetha

Africa as the Hunger Epicenter
Of the 13 Global Hunger Hotspots, 8 are in Africa: Five reasons why
July 2025 | CWA # 1748

GP Team

The World This Week #318
PM Modi’s Visit to Trinidad and Tobago & Ghana, One big beautiful bill, and Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting
July 2025 | CWA # 1744

Chittrothu Vaihali

EU-Canada Summit 2025
What is security and defence partnership all about?
July 2025 | CWA # 1742

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly # 287-88
The 12 Day War and the Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal
July 2025 | CWA # 1738

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Thailand and Cambodia
What was the phone call between PM Shinawatra and President of Senate Hun Sen? What is the border dispute between the two? Why has this become an issue?
June 2025 | CWA # 1735

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025:
Trump making Europe great again
June 2025 | CWA # 1734

GP Team

The World This Week #317
NATO Summit 2025 and Russia-Mali bilateral agreements
June 2025 | CWA # 1733

Ananya Dinesh

China and the Pacific Islands 
What was the recent China-PIC joint statement about? What it says, and what it means?
June 2025 | CWA # 1728

M Kejia

G7 Summit 2025:
The Focus on the Middle East and Trade negotiations
June 2025 | CWA # 1726

GP Team

The World This Week #316
China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, and the G7 Summit in Canada
June 2025 | CWA # 1725

Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Santhiya M, Aparna A Nair & M Kejia

Operation Midnight Hammer: US bombs three nuclear sites in Iran
What were the three Iranian nuclear sites that were targeted? What are the B2 Bombers and Bunker Buster Bombs? What do these attacks mean? What Next?
June 2025 | CWA # 1724

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #286
The Spiralling Israel-Iran Crisis, and the Dangerous Hunger Hotspots
June 2025 | CWA # 1721

Rizwana Banu S and Santhiya M

Who are the Afrikaners?
Why is Trump interested in the Afrikaner question in South Africa?
June 2025 | CWA # 1720

Lekshmi MK

New WMO Report on Arctic Warming
What are the social, economic and environmental implications of Arctic warming
June 2025 | CWA # 1719

J Yamini  

China’s EV Surge
What contributes to the rise of BYD
June 2025 | CWA # 1717

J Yamini

Gender Violence in Pakistan:
What are the larger issues in the Noor Mukadam case?
June 2025 | CWA # 1715

Femy Francis

The US-China:
On Tariffs, Rare Earths and Visas
June 2025 | CWA # 1713

GP Team

The World This Week #315
The UN Ocean Conference in France and the US-China Meeting in London
June 2025 | CWA # 1709

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #284-285
Cambodia-Thailand Border Tensions, Protests in the US, and the Indigenous Māori question in New Zealand
June 2025 | CWA # 1705

GP Team

The World This Week #314
Elections in South Korea and Poland I China and the Pacific Island Countries I Bangladesh Election Announcement 2026
June 2025 | CWA # 1700

R Preetha

Ethiopia bans the TPLF
What does the TPLF ban mean for the Pretoria agreement? What next for Ethiopia?
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
Harvard vs Trump Administration
June 2025 | CWA # 1691

GP Team

The World This Week #313
China-ASEAN-GCC Summit I President Macron's visit to South East Asia I Trump Vs Harvard
May 2025 | CWA # 1690

GP Team

The World This Week #312
Elections in Romania, Portugal & Poland I UK-EU Summit
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
Continuing Russia’s Aerial Attacks, despite exchange of prisoners
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
The Humanitarian Crisis and Israel’s Renewed Offensive
May 2025 | CWA # 1685

Aparna A Nair

UK-EU Summit:
First step towards a reset
May 2025 | CWA # 1683

Aashish Ganeshan

Elections in Portugal:
The Rise of Chega Party and the Search for Political Stability
May 2025 | CWA # 1679

Aashish Ganeshan

US in the Middle Easr
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE
May 2025 | CWA # 1678

Gauri Gupta

China in Latin America
China-CELAC forum: Strengthening ties with Latin America and Caribbean
May 2025 | CWA # 1677

GP Team

The World This Week #310-311
China in Latin America and the Carribbean I Trump's Middle East Visit I Denmark as the new Arctic Chair
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
May 2025 | CWA # 1672

D Suba Chandran

India and Pakistan:
De-escalation and the “New Normal”
May 2025 | CWA # 1671

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

US, Ukraine and Russia:
Air attacks amidst a Minerals deal and Ceasefire Proposals
May 2025 | CWA # 1670

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Singapore Elections in 2025:
People’s Action Party (PAP) Wins, Again
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Tough Tariff Negotiations with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1666

Padmashree Anandhan

The US-Ukraine
The mineral deal with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
May 2025 | CWA # 1663

R Preetha

Canada Elections 2025:
What do the results convey? What next for Mark Carney?
March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon

The Maldives
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan

India
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej

Bangladesh
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Afghanistan